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Question everything and everyone. Be subversive, 
constantly questioning reality and 
the status quo. 
Be a poet, not a huckster. Don’t cater, don’t 
pander, especially not to possible audiences, 
readers, editors, or publishers. 
Come out of your closet. It’s dark in there. 
Raise the blinds, throw open your shuttered 
windows, raise the roof, unscrew the locks 
from the doors, but don’t throw away the 
screws. 
Be committed to something outside yourself. 
Be militant about it. Or ecstatic.
Challenges to Young Poets by Lawrence Ferlinghetti
Episodes in the history of Latin American social sciences and the various discursive formations communicated by means of a Western-centric1 
language might be especially uncomfortable or intractable to the reader, if the 
narrative that follows aims to reveal a whole set of misapprehensions by the 
Western-centric tradition. Starting with the misrecognition of the existence 
of an autochthonous regional discourse on economics, which requires re-
examination. Hopefully, the narrative will become “uncomfortable”, which 
means that the account has a tale to tell!
The following narrative points towards several historical circumstances, 
which enabled the theories developed within Latin America vis-à-vis the 
then dominant orthodox economics tradition, both regionally and worldwide 
in the 1940s. Chapter 1 A Southern Perspective on Development Studies: 
Contributions from Latin America offers a sketch of the “Southern” theoretical 
problematic and historical context that can be examined with more detail 
in the following chapters of the book. Hence, Chapter 2 The Unfamiliar 
Raúl Prebisch (1943-1949) aims to exhibit a relatively unknown phase of 
the theoretical transition in the vast work of Prebisch (1901-1986), which 
in part got curtailed in 1949 given the responsibilities he was to undertake 
when he was the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLAC).2 Next, in Chapter 3, there is a summary of the work and 
1 Anglo-Saxon and/or Eurocentric discourses.
2 Since its first day, the creation of ECLAC sought after Prebisch as the ideal candidate to be Executive 
Secretary, a post he rejected in July 1948, which was then occupied by the Mexican Gustavo Mar-
tinez Cabañas. After much “pleading”, Prebisch accepted a three month consultancy post in 1949, 
which after the appearance of the famous text (Latin American “Manifesto”), generated a further 
negotiation and discussion culminating in his acceptance of the Executive Secretary in question; it is 
worthwhile to examine the wording of the emissary sent from the UN to talk to Prebisch on the issue. 
Adolfo Dorfman, in a letter to Victor Urquidi (who had equally rejected the post), conveys to him the 
sad news of Prebisch’s negative answer, “various reasons were wielded, but anyway, important is… 
that he offered advice and sporadic collaboration, which is something” (Dorfman 1948, my emphasis). 
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struggles of Celso Furtado (1918-2004) Celso Furtado and Development: A 
Brief Outline (1950-2004). Chapter 4 Theoretical Misrecognitions as the Source 
of Development Theory Déjà Vu assesses the figure and work of Albert O. 
Hirschman (1915-2012), during the 1950s and early 1960s. He was Furtado’s 
contemporary in most theoretical details of the period. 
The book then changes its “geographical” direction. Two chapters 
examine and evaluate How Economics Forgot Power and All That Is Solid Does 
Not Necessarily Melt Into Air in the scope of two brave and recent critiques of 
mainstream economics as portrayed in the Western-centric academic circles. 
However, examined from a “Southern” or Latin American Structuralism 
perspective, our story emphasizes mainly the theoretical aspects of those 
books that stopped short of the “full nine yards”.3 
The resolution to focus on certain Latin American theorists as the main 
contenders of the story about “development” is related, paradoxically, to 
their recent upsurge within Western-centric discourses, in which the names 
of Raúl Prebisch and Celso Furtado appear prominently. I believe it is time to 
recover the central themes and terminology of their ideas, which have been 
“domesticated” as it were, or read through a vocabulary that was precisely 
their objective to question. 
There are two central themes implicit or explicit in the argument of the 
book, namely: (a) the process of a theoretical reconstruction; and (b) the 
status of the notion of power: 
(1) it assumes, on the one hand, that the Latin American critique of the 
ethnocentric characteristics of the discourse implied the construction 
of a set of new objects and categories, but which, on the other, meant 
simultaneously problematizing the adequacy of those categories 
to explain those economies from which they were apparently their 
“image”;
(2) the theoretical reconfiguration pivots on a long well-established 
tradition, from Marx onward, in which the power asymmetry 
among and between agents and the social relations in question 
are paramount, but Latin American Structuralism critique of 
Western-centric discourse embraces the idea that it has surpassed 
(“superseding” in Hegelian terms), in a very important sense, 
certain of Marx’s notions.
3 Originally, the book was composed with the aim to include the work of Enrique Leff on the 
“environment” and the sustainable development in the Periphery, which also represents a 
regional autochthonous perspective, but I was not given permission to incorporate the text: 
“The Sustainable Development Labyrinth” (Mallorquin 2017a), which was originally pub-
lished in the International Journal of Pluralism and Economics Education, 8(1). Its publisher, 
“Inderscience,” seems to own the copyright on behalf of IJPEE, which should be a warning to 
all future authors whose purpose is to publish under this corporation’s name.
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After the Bombing of Hiroshima
After World War II, the diffusion of Western-centric governmentality 
discourse (government and governed), was transmuted into a three-layer 
governmentality: “households and firms,” “self-governing units” (“people-
goods”), and national governments, in charge of the latter’s surveillance, 
which are in turn “gazed” upon by top layer “international organizations” 
(Danby 2017: 78). Governments “gained” “new powers” by means of national 
accounting statistics: surveillance and surveying make “government” 
instantaneously more visible (ibid.) and vulnerable. 
International organizations after WWII and governments amplified 
their field of action and the “nation” became an object of the multilateral 
organizations and international purview: the hitherto race civilization divide 
took on a distinct new form, superseded by a new “scale-making project.” 
(Danby 2017: 79). The “developed/underdeveloped” economy or society 
couple implied:
A rhetoric of discipline and punishment (for disordered people, 
families, and nations) structured: the merging world and international 
institutions (…) [the] difference worked differently: on the one hand 
rigorously standardized categories of nation, government, household, 
business, and citizen promised formal equality. On the other hand, the 
world could be divided into those who lived up to and enacted these 
categories, and those who fell short and therefore required tutelage 
and discipline. (Danby 2017: 78-79) 
In fact, the Keynesian national income accounting was to “conquer the 
world.” The “choice” meant highlighting the household/business split, a 
product of “modernist ideology” (Danby 2017: 63). The productive process 
was divided into “two categories” distinguished by “the state of mind of 
the people doing that activity” (ibid.), monetary spending, households 
and businessmen/government, which alternatively can be differentiated by 
regrouping into one single flow “of disparate ‘real’ goods and services” (ibid.), 
with money as the underlying “unit”, or neglecting the “real” products and 
services, and “treat money as important in itself, as a financial asset with its 
own properties” (ibid.). 
The Keynesian theoretical victory of national income accounting 
displaced questions that Kuznets addressed, regarding “measuring” well-
being and “flow of life-improving benefits to households” (Danby 2017: 64). 
The potentially warring historical characteristics of WWII and the changing 
process of economic representation, with the rise of the new international 
institutions: the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 
and the United Nations; the IMF and the World Bank, all of which display 
the data gathering momentum, dwarfing the conundrum of the “welfarist” 
“national income” debate: 
8
After the war, [M] Gilbert consolidated the victory of Keynesian 
national income accounting in the United States, ensuring that there 
would be no peacetime reversion to Kuznets’s system. This was a 
moment of some drama. In 1947, the National Income Division of the 
Commerce Department, now directed by Gilbert, published National 
Income and Product Statistics of the United States, 1929-1946, which 
pointedly redid all the estimates Kuznets had produced in the 1930’s, 
using Keynesian concepts and signaled that the Keynesian framework 
would be used later. Kuznets attacked the new figures in a 1948 article. 
(…) He charged that the new system may allow the investigator to rest 
too comfortably on the monetary surface of economic circulation, 
without forcing him to examine closely the real flow of commodities 
and services beneath the surface -a danger that, as the discussion below 
suggests, the report does not avoid. (Kuznets in Danby 2017: 70-71)
The “shape of the world,” as coined by Danby, had been reconstituted, 
and with new “nations,” and the force of the decolonization movements, 
signals the inevitable decline of tutelage by “empires” and its organization. 
Nationhood, literally “parachuted” so to speak, in many cases, despite the 
communities’ wishes in question, “imposing watchful disciplines” (Danby 
2017: 68): Keynesian monetary economics and bounded national entities 
revolve around the concepts imported from accounting procedures.
The rise of a specific set of both national and international accounting 
procedures is a story of a specific power struggle, which Keynes’s disciples 
ultimately hegemonized, in which the chief theoretical heroes were M. Gilbert 
and R. Stone: Keynes “persuaded” (Danby 2017: 68) the British government 
in the 1940s for Stone’s incorporation into the process of assembling data, who 
in turn occupied and dominated the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation, and United Nations (UN) alongside Milton Gilbert, U.S.A’s 
conqueror of Kuznets in the “national accounting” standardization dispute:
In a nutshell, a set of international organizations emerged after WWII 
that needed standardized nation-level concepts. Richard Stone and 
Milton Gilbert had forged a common Anglo-American position 
during the war on national income accounting: There was no serious 
competitor. No alternative system of national accounting had such well-
placed advocates or was as well poised to claim global applicability. 
(Danby 2017: 68-69)
The national accounting theoretical “framework”4 Y = C + I + G in 
Keynes’s 1940 text How to Pay for War, had previously undergone a sustained 
theoretical dispute, to say the least, vis-à-vis the then denominated “Treasury 
View”.5 The epoch exhibits a singular “will to power” on the move, all of which 
is incomprehensible without naming the force of the persona in question.
4 Y=National Income, C=Private Consumption, I=Private Investment, G=Government 
Spending.
5 See also Chapters 5 and 7 in Peden (2000, 2004).
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By “the summer of 1940, [Keynes] was an insider at the Treasury” having 
“accepted” an invitation to become a “member of a new Consultative 
Council” to “advise the Chancellor” (Peden 2000: 311), while simultaneously 
Hawtrey’s influence “underwent a complete eclipse” (ibid.). By September 
of 1941, Keynes was a “director of the Bank of England” (Peden 2004: 12) 
and a “peer by June of 1942” (Ibid). Although both [Hubert] Henderson and 
[Dennis] Robertson had left the Treasury by the end of 1945, “Neither (…) 
could match Keynes’s personality. Moreover, as Henderson had grudgingly 
to admit, ‘the currents of abstract economic thought’ had been ‘flowing in 
recent years in the direction of sympathy with the doctrines to which Lord 
Keynes is attached” (Peden 2000: 312).
Keynes, to put it as quaintly as possible, did not hide his loathsome attitude 
toward those he considered “intellectually” inferior,6 but to be fair to him his 
conduct was unmistakably consistent as can be examined from his famous 
depiction of the Bretton Woods participants in 1944 as “the most monstrous 
monkey-house assembled for years” (quoted in Thornton 2017: 150).
Cosio Villegas´s (the Mexican representative) appreciation at the Bretton 
Woods venue, recollects the war in process and the USA-Great Britain power 
struggle as the source of the “authoritarian” spirit of the Conference. It was a 
well-organized “consensus” charade among those countries invited with the 
aim to bring to light the newly created financial institutions of the IMF and the 
World Bank of Reconstruction and Development. Cosio Villegas describes a 
“clash with the great master” (Cosio 1976: 220), in two interventions which 
he made to the Committee discussing the project of the World Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, and in which Keynes, as the Director of the 
Debates, simply “discourteously” put aside: Cosio Villegas wanted to change 
the title’s order of appearance, “development” before “reconstruction,” since 
the latter was to be a task for a limited and temporary period in the Bank’s 
tasks, while development had to be thought of “eternally”, especially for Latin 
American countries. For the sake of unanimity, in this occasion Cosio Villegas 
did not contradict Keynes’s “dismissal” remark that the Bank’s name was 
not under discussion, but when an acute article relating to loan applications 
was being prepared, Cosio Villegas questioned the concentrated nature of 
the decisions in the hands of a small group, e.g. USA/England, and perhaps, 
France, which to top it all, the reception of the loan in a specific denomination 
could elevate the costs substantially if the credit had to be used in a country 
of a different monetary unit (say Franc loan for a dollar acquisition). Without 
fail, Keynes dismissed the submission, but on this occasion, Cosio Villegas 
(Cosio 1976: 221) announced that Mexico would vote against the article, and 
simultaneously demanded that a note be taken unveiling both the negative 
posture and the reasons of the Mexican government. Finally, the matter 
6 For example, in 1945, Keynes hailed a long-standing Treasury representative, in charge of 
the “Home Finance Division,” Hebert Brittain, as being “intellectually contemptible” (Peden 
2000: 356).
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was solved by stipulating that Latin American countries would have two 
permanent representatives in the governing committee of both the World 
Bank and the IMF, regardless of the volume of capital contributions by which 
the voting rights were accorded, although it did not change the dominance 
of USA, Great Britain, and France as major “shareholders” in those financial 
institutions (Helleiner 2014).
The theoretical differences between (Gilbert) “monetary” and (Kuznets) 
“real” were initially the source of the antagonism during the process of 
constructing national accounts: 
flows of spending for their own sake, not as proxies for something 
else, and integrates them into a monetary macroeconomic theory. By 
contrast for Kuznets, the central purpose of national income, moral as 
well as analytical was to measure the flow of real benefits to households: 
good meals, warm houses, decent clothes. (Danby 2017: 71)
In Kuznets’s perspective, government (military expenditure), could not 
be seen as “benefiting” households, nor could the government be perceived 
as some kind of “ultimate consumer” as a “corporeal entity” (ibid.) in the 
same sense by which men and women attain satisfaction, if only because it 
invites a dangerous “fetishism” (ibid.).
Gilbert’s reply was that Kuznets excluded from “total production” certain 
goods and services. These theoretical disputes accentuate Danby’s central 
thesis, whereby a “moralistic flavor” creeps in disfiguring “national income 
measurements”. Thus, romantics such as Ruskin can be reinstated into the 
narrative: “it is noteworthy that Gilbert and associates reached for John 
Ruskin, the 19th Century romantic thinker, in order to name the despised 
opposite of quantitative Economics” (Danby 2017: 72).
On his part, M. Gilbert moved in 1951 to the OEEC, created in 1948, 
as Head of its Department of Economics and Statistics. The OEEC’s most 
important tasks were to coordinate the Marshall Plan’s aid among the 
respective national development plans, requiring “multilateral surveillance,” 
and common concepts: despite Gilbert’s vocation, generally forgotten 
given Richard Stone’s own ubiquity on a number of duties and publishing 
magnitude, hence Danby’s claims of his “essential” role in worldwide national 
account standardization.
Stone and Gilbert pioneered within the OEEC organization the “first 
generation” (Danby 2017: 73) of standardized statistics and national accounts 
frameworks, globalizing them (ibid.). On the other hand, Stone’s Cambridge 
post at the Department of Applied Economics, OEEC, and UN, formed 
the basis by which a technocrat managed to sponsor and shape careers and 
research on British colonial accounts.
Hence, this narrative assumes the existence of flows between different 
borders, although in certain economic formations, the absence of a formal 
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set of assets framework is contradicted by IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics:
Two assumptions are not only built into globally-applied national income 
accounting, but actively advertised and promoted by the published data: 
that every country is in the same way integral and complete with similar 
institutions, and that the relations between national economies are relatively 
thin and inconsequential. (Danby 2017: 74-75)
Therefore, national accounting data misses the “dependent” character 
between and among different economic formations. No “data concept” (Danby 
2017: 75) can symbolize this “relation.” As Danby emphasized, the appearance 
of national units as discrete entities was relinquished through the concept of an 
“abstract global space of goods and financial flows without power or politics, 
without alliances, antagonisms, or spheres of influence. And it appears as 
though it had the same internal institutional structure” (ibid.).
The mathematical example is drawn from the theoretician Jacques Polak, 
who starts from a simple single-country, self-contained “autonomous factors” 
(Danby 2017: 77), through which the national income and imports are 
determined, and then proceeding to a “world” model in “less than a page” 
(Danby 2017: 77). The “illegibility” of power and absence of institutional 
specificities generated by the “world model” posed by Polak and the 
Keynesian categories and national income accounting were profound. See 
further ahead.7 
The worldwide data (standardized) has a particular effect: it can gauge 
individual “policy” successes or “failures” and, therefore, those national 
governments. According to Danby, hitherto the world’s cartography 
was defined by a series of “discontinuous empires” in which “power,” or 
international power was in plain sight:
This fit the panoptic quality of official post-WWII international 
organizations, dividing the world’s population into national cells and 
spotlighting their condition by means of statistics-gathering. The 
brightly lit UN General Assembly is a visual metaphor for this observed 
world, each formally identical nation named and fixed space. (Danby 
2017: 78)
The Tropics of Discontent
Even before initiating his role as ECLAC’s second Executive Secretary 
in 1949, Raúl Prebisch’s report (The Economic Development of Latin 
7 Danby writes: “close relations between any particular export sector and particular foreign 
buyers are illegible. There is no category -no conceptual category, no measurable thing- in 
which the structure of the international financial system might appear. (…) the International 
market is conceptualized as a space of pure flows, a space without people or institutions, who 
are all tucked away inside national economies. This effect is strengthened by the way orthodox 
economists like to model markets, as efficient anonymous smoothly adjusting mechanisms to 
facilitate flows of goods and services and exchanges of assets” (Danby 2017: 77, my emphasis).
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America and its Principal Problems),8 was promoting the importance of 
“systematic research” to understand the region’s economic problematic, 
and simultaneously reminding us of his own theoretical evolution during 
the second half of the 1940s. Dispatching economists from the Periphery to 
“study at the great universities in the United States or Europe, was important, 
but insufficient,” since one of the:
most conspicuous faults which general economic theory suffers from, 
seen from the Periphery, is its false sense of universality. In truth, it 
could hardly be expected that economists of the great countries, 
embroiled by serious problems of their own, would preferentially 
dedicate their attention to other countries rather than the study their 
own. […] However, do not misinterpret that this purpose is encouraged 
by an exclusive particularism. On the contrary, it can only be seen to be 
accomplished through a solid knowledge of those theories elaborated 
in the great countries, with their great wealth of common truths. We 
must not confuse a reflexive knowledge of the other with a mental 
subjection to extraneous ideas, from which we are slowly learning to 
be free. (Prebisch 1949b: 106, my translation)
It is through a similar guise that one should interpret Dudley Seers’s 
condensed prose on the “special case” (Seers 1963) to describe the economics 
developed in the Anglo-Saxon or European universities. Simply put, it was 
the flip side of Prebisch’s rejection of their presumption of “universality.”
A “Southern perspective” on economic matters also suggests the existence 
of a “Northern” or Western-centric perspective, subsumed within an ever-
constant power asymmetry confrontation, a political and academic struggle 
both within and without the “Center-Periphery” complex. Foucault’s notion 
of discursive formations and specific enunciative modalities as product and 
source of the empowered social relations are implicit, if not explicit, in our 
argumentative logic. The premises of the argument insists that the concept of 
the agency, whether when it refers to the entity as an “enunciative modality,” 
and/or “productive agent,” does not suggest necessarily the category of a 
“human subject” as the materialization of its “acts,” which also explains our 
efforts to use as little as possible the term “actor.” In other words: agents are 
not always “human beings.” What falls within the category of agency will 
depend on the context and power asymmetries: corporations, individuals, 
“sectors,” “countries,” production units, “firms,” etc.
Clothed in Prebisch’s words, there is no presumption that a ubiquitous 
“geographical” or “language” characteristic is the obligatory source, nor a 
guarantee of a privileged “epistemic” discursive perspective, or its putative 
“consistency,” but it just so happened that Nietzsche’s so-called “will 
to power” can also be an attribute of certain agents in the Periphery or 
8 Prebisch (1949b), United Nations Department of Economic Affairs (1950), original text in 
Spanish, April 1949.
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regions beyond the Western-centric areas of the world. Taking up Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s idea about the absence of meta-discourse to guide us in 
reaching and understanding a precise juncture corroborates the notion that 
Latin American Structuralism could well have been constructed through the 
allocution of Shakespearean “noises.”
Hence, my theoretical “bridge” building process between contrasting 
discursive formations, proceeds simultaneously by critique and running 
commentary of the work of P. Pilkington and C. Danby, Chapters 5 and 6, 
respectively: the former unwittingly a “Latin American Structuralist,” and 
the latter a conscious performer not withstanding my critique.
These theoretical episodes may well have been written, as already pointed 
out, by means of the “clatter” of the “Shakespearean” noises, an aspect which 
is not eluded in our argument. Therefore, it might be useful reminding readers 
within the Western-centric tradition of a possible line of reasoning.
The previous discursive struggles on notions of national accounting, 
for instance, are perhaps one of the best illustrations of the problematical 
nature of those aspects necessitating replacement which the evolution of 
“developmentalism” in economics hoped to achieve. One possible route was 
to elaborate new categories in situ: the Prebisch-Furtado-Seers’s conundrum. 
In the Center countries, as seen above, even before the dust of the theoretical 
debates on the accounting categories was cleared, Keynes was sponsoring 
their “transference” to colonial territories, with which to generate reliable 
data despite the presence of peculiar social relations where “production” and 
“distribution” are apparently associated by “non-market” mechanisms.
Simultaneously to “technical” accounting conundrums, potential 
theoretical disputes were at hand, since the story required a description and 
generation of alternative vocabularies to explain the specificities of those 
peripheral “nations.” It was precisely the U.S. and Soviet Union, post-WWII 
antagonism, which generated certain of those theoretical opportunities. For 
example, it is currently unimaginable that a United Nations report would dare 
recommend to governments of an “under-developed country” to undertake a 
“land reform” (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 1951: 93). 
It is worthwhile to highlight, for those whose theoretical gaze springs 
from the “Periphery,” the theoretical problems to be discussed represent the 
decisive moments of the reconstruction of the “economics” vocabulary in the 
region (Latin America, for example), prominent among them the perspective 
C. Furtado, and R. Prebisch between the 1950s and the 1960s.
On the other hand, early on in his professional life, Dudley Seers perceived 
the existence or the potentiality of discourses questioning Western-centric 
thought during the 1950s:
Similar doubts were also being expressed elsewhere, notably by 
Gunnar Myrdal then working on his Asian Drama, though it was 
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not published (by Allen Lane) until 1968. What Paul Streeten called 
“mumbles of discontent with established categories of thought” had 
also been audible, in particular from Raul Prebisch and Latin American 
economists associated with him, but these were not taken very seriously 
by the profession, especially in that period. (Seers 1979: 718).
Seers also reflected on the limiting theoretical and practical aspects of 
“general theories like those of Keynes and Harrod-Domar model,” and hoped 
Anglo-Saxon writers, “acquire some relativity” and “comparative attitude” 
(Seers in Martin and Knapp 1967: 158). At the same time, he did not jettison 
the construction of a more “‘general theory’ of development” (Seers in Martin 
and Knapp 1967: 223), and on this occasion the call was the need for a “Hume” 
or “Moore rather than a Hegel” (Seers in Martin and Knapp 1967: 158), to 
understand the process through which an analogous theoretical transition 
is constructed. He also more than flirted with the idea of understanding the 
undergoing evolution of economics, to comprehend its reconstruction: 
We are not even in a position to judge what has to be demolished of the 
old doctrine, or what can be saved and adapted for further uses. This is 
still somewhere late in the ‘Hobson phase’, or early in the ‘Kahn phase’, 
of development economics. (Seers in Martin and Knapp1967: 3)
Seers’s “exploitation” (pun intended) of Keynes’s own reflections in 
the last chapters of his General theory… to underscore Hobson’s standing 
to comprehend the importance of the struggles through which theoretical 
transitions are produced (“rebellious” authors), and/or the use of Kahn’s 
“multiplier model”, are a good example when examining the evolution of the 
discursive formations. The analogy implies that:
The ‘Kahn article’ may not yet have been published. A characteristic of 
this article is, of course, that nobody recognizes it as much, at the time; 
only in the ‘Keynes phase’ can its historical significance be appreciated. 
All one can safely say is that attempts to solve practical problems of 
development are going to teach us a great deal about processes of 
economic change, and the time is almost ripe for the appearance of 
a Keynes (though this task may be beyond the capacity of any single 
person). (Seers in Martin and Knapp 1967: 3) 
Seers declares this having previously pointed the reader to a footnote 
where he says:
the transformation now is bigger and there are a number of candidates 
for being considered the ‘Hobson’ of this generation -e.g. Myrdal, 
Prebisch, Singer and Nurkse. I would be inclined to nominate Prebisch, 
because it is a characteristic of a ‘Hobson’ that he does not quite realize 
what he is doing to the subject. Besides, Prebisch lives closer to the 
seismic fault from which the tremors are emanating. (Seers in Martin 
and Knapp 1967: 3).
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It is in the context of a theoretical reunion in Manchester in 1967, centered 
on discussing Seers’s famous text published in 1963, The Limitations of the 
Special Case, that P. Streeten’s indications must be understood. Prolonging 
the procedure of these rhetorical analogies, he actually adds a name “Hobson-
Gessell phase,” and further on adds a third: “Mayor Douglas” (Seers in Martin 
and Knapp 1967: 66).9 Streeten’s remark about the “mumbles of discontent,” 
commented by Seers, seems to imply their mutual accord and understanding 
that the “concepts and categories” (Seers in Martin and Knapp 1967: 158) 
then dominant required transformation: “We are unable to carry out the sort 
of reconstruction of working categories which are necessary, partly for lack 
of time and partly because we are ourselves held in the vice of conventional 
concepts” (Seers in Martin and Knapp 1967: 157-58). 
Seers aimed to differentiate patterns and institutional settings, to think 
dynamics in distinct economies whose characteristics seem at odds with 
conventional economics. Kurt Martin invoking Seers’s ideas indicates:
He had suffered himself when first working in Africa from being too 
‘Latin American’, e.g. from putting too much weight on the foreign 
trade bottleneck and not enough on education, though this had been a 
less incurable fault than being too ‘Anglo-Saxon’. (Seers in Martin and 
Knapp 1967: 224)
But put in those terms the central theoretical conundrum is inadvertently 
hidden: “why particular countries of particular types of countries are 
exceptions” (ibid.). 
It is my contention that Seers’s Anglo-Saxon contemporaries did not 
fully grasp the “specter” which haunted his work, or as I call it “‘the white 
man’s burden’ curse,”10 the “added” term to the classic Rudyard Kipling’s 
racist expression intends to radicalize the conundrum in question: Seers 
consciously bore the burden as a “curse”: the task of advising governments 
under specific power complex asymmetries. Strictly speaking, Kipling’s 
expression represents a technological-knowledge power regime a la Foucault. 
I believe Streeten and Richard Jolly and other colleagues misapprehended 
the origin of Seers’s wit and conduct:
Dudley’s second phase was expressed most sharply in the negative -as 
a strong critique of the Brandt, Commission’s report. North-South: a 
Programme for Survival stirred Dudley’s ire and irony as few documents 
did. In his review ‘Muddling morality and mutuality’ [Seers 1980], 
Dudley tore into the Commissioners -many were his friends- for what 
he argued was a long list of confusions over ‘mutual interests’, which 
the Brandt report had made a central point underlying its proposals. 
(…) this was one of Dudley’s least credible efforts, itself limited and 
illogical, at times bitter and sour, with little of that sense of humour 
9 In fact, Gessell forms part of Prebisch’s early reads.
10 See Guha (1997), Hindess (2001).
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and ironic touch which enlivens most of Dudley’s writing. Instead we 
have a sledgehammer being used to smash a whole report, rather than 
to drive home some important points of criticism. ( Jolly 1989: 39)
On his part, Streeten says:
His wit could be quite mordant. (…) on a visit to the IDS [Institute of 
Development Studies], discussing with him aid criteria and whether 
human rights should be included. I said, naively, that I was against 
torture. Dudley replied devastatingly: ‘You’ve come along way, Paul’. 
(Streeten 1989: 27)11
On the other hand, this book mentions only in passing the so-called Latin 
American “dependency school,” whether in its Marxist or alternative versions, 
both claiming Raúl Prebisch as its theoretical instigator; whether for better or 
for worse, since I don’t dedicate much space to the perspective, interested 
English readers can easily gather the quality of the theoretical diversity by 
reading one of the best introductions written in English by Cristobal Kay 
(1989), and yet to be translated to Spanish!!! The author in question had 
Seers as his Ph.D. supervisor, during which Dudley Seers, religiously never 
once uttered a word to him in “broken” Spanish. 
Let us now go back a little. Prebisch, telling accounts of having to deal with 
the Western-centric advisers are known to many by word of mouth, but some 
have in fact been published. Here describing his reunion with Jacob Viner:
After the appearance of our first reports, one of the most illustrious 
professors on matters of international trade called in on over here 
( Jakob Viner, C. M.). Formed in the purest classic tradition, submitted 
to long decades of Ricardian logic, few brief weeks in Brazil were not 
enough to seduce him by the spectacle of industrialization which had 
barely initiated, if you take as the point of view the cosmic potentialities 
of this country. Dragging the economists of ECLAC [English acronym 
of CEPAL], in his execration, he condemned the Latin American 
industrialization, which we were advocating. He challenged also 
all forms of deliberate control of economic growth and guidance of 
international commerce. Well at least he left us a unique and positive 
formula of economic development: engage into agriculture and birth 
control! (Prebisch 1953b: 47, my translation). 
To those suspicious of the suggestion, on the other side of the Atlantic, 
around 1963, in Seers’s famous 1963 article “The Limitations of the Special 
Case,” we encounter his usual attitude of “impatience” as he states that:
previous generation of economists failed to cope realistically with 
economic fluctuations until after the depression had brought politically 
catastrophic results. The life cycle of each period in the development 
of an economic doctrine is now familiar. Some great issue of public 
11 Please see volume dedicated to his work: “Dudley Seers: His Work and Influence” (Toye 
1989), IDS Bulletin 20(3).
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economic policy appears. At first, economists at high places refuse to 
admit that this is any concern of the profession. (Seers 1963: 77)
At the end of the sentence, Seers interrupts the reader by adding a 
footnote:
The story is told in Latin America of a Chilean graduate student who 
stated, in answer to a question by a very eminent London professor, 
that he wanted to specialize in economics of development, ‘Oh!’ said 
the professor. ‘What economics is that?’ This was in the 1950’s! (Seers 
1963: 77)
The anecdote must have been told to Seers while he was working in 
ECLAC, during the 1960s in Santiago de Chile by the student in question. 
But the reader is left none the wiser as to the tempestuous nature of the so-
called “conversation” or as to the identity of the professor and student in 
1954. Today we know who those parties were Osvaldo Sunkel and Lionel 
Robbins. In fact, Sunkel was not allowed to sit during the whole exchange 
with the English professor. The retort by Robbins, who recently had polished 
the Mont Pelerin Society manifesto (Mirowski 2009), stunned Sunkel, never 
to be forgotten, when the professor, “red faced,” “answered me ‘angrily.’ He 
said, what you have to do is to study demography; development is just merely 
a problem of population growth!” (Franco 2013: 70).
It’s noteworthy, if only in passing, that Osvaldo Sunkel and Anibal Pinto, 
both functionaries at ECLAC in 1966, interviewed Arnold C. Harberger 
(Sunkel 1966), who by then was already a Mont Pelerin Society affiliate and 
professor both in the United States and Chile. The content of the talk seems to 
be one of the themes that ensues in my book: the obstacles of studying “Latin 
American Structuralism” in Anglo-Saxon Universities. Then the “Chicago 
Boys” had not yet taken hold of economics in Chile, which occurred when 
Pinochet’s military dictatorship ruled the country. It is the extraordinarily 
restrained vocabulary of Harberger in the 1966 interview which I want to 
emphasize, which suddenly, during Pinochet’s regime, transformed itself 
into a totally disheveled, slapdash discourse, to say the least:
When ‘good economics’ was just coming to Latin American (sic) in 
the late 1950s, the path was far from easy. In the way stood a bulwark 
of doctrinaire isolationism and protectionism: the ‘old’ ECLA (...) 
which actively sponsored and fostered the interventionist, statist, 
illiberal policies of the era. That was an era of fierce debate between 
the so-called structuralist and monetarist schools, with the former 
counting ECLAC as one of its principal bastions. I find it hard, even 
from today’s vantage point, to define precisely what structuralism was. 
It did not proceed via rigorous analysis from the ground up, as it were. 
Rather, it referred vaguely to ‘inelasticities’ of various types-of foreign 
demand for raw materials, of domestic supply of agricultural products, 
and so on-that somehow stood in the way of progress, made inflation 
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almost inevitable (even, to some, desirable), and made widespread 
state intervention a sensible ‘solution’ to Latin American problems. 
(Harberger 1995: 306-307)
Indeed, in a posthumously published interview, which was recorded 
in 1985 in English, Prebisch reiterates the convoluted form of the power 
asymmetry and attitude in question, facing David Pollock, the interviewer, 
his collaborator and assistant during the 1960s, while heading the UNCTAD:
Because of second and third-hand reading. And because there is a 
prejudice that probably you have seen, [as] a member of a northern 
university. Really, David, there is a certain arrogance and disparagement. 
They don’t take us seriously. I’m sure that in Harvard they don’t take us 
seriously. We are second-class economists, or even third class. We are 
underdeveloped economists. (Pollock 2001)
Today one of the greatest stats cited in Google, enfolds the terms (in any 
language), “Prebisch-Singer,” or “Singer-Prebisch” thesis. The notion is 
related to the so-called “deterioration terms of trade” of developing countries 
vis-à-vis “industrial” countries, or “Center-Periphery” in Prebisch terms; 
further ahead we will return to this theme. At this moment, what I want 
to underline is the insistence to establish a monopoly by Western-centric 
scholars on the origin and source of its theoretical elaboration.
For example, R. Jolly (2008), claims Prebisch should come “second” 
to Singer given his 1949 publication (Post-War Price Relations Between 
Underdeveloped and Industrialized Countries), despite the fact that Prebisch 
was writing theoretically on the subject since the early 1930s!:
More properly called the Singer-Prebisch thesis after the careful 
detective work of John Toye and Richard Toye showed that, strictly 
speaking, Hans Singer’s work preceded that of Prebisch, strictly 
speaking, Hans Singer’s work preceded that of Prebisch. ( Jolly 2008: 
65, footnote number 50)
Disputing who was first to the post is not crucial in our argument, since 
Prebisch’s examination focuses on its style of theoretical development and the 
importance of the notion of power asymmetries to explain the “deterioration 
of the terms of trade” in question, which in countless accounts, in Spanish or 
English alike, seem to be misrecognized, becoming problematical if Centered 
around the notion of the so-called price demand “elasticities disparities” 
between Center and Periphery countries. 
Recovering the notion of a heterogenous complex (consequence of 
the power asymmetries) among and between diverse agents, Center and 
Periphery alike, opens up the possibility to propound social arrangements 
that can be made more amenable with a perspective that considers the aspects 
of the environment and the sustainability process through the “integrated” 
management of the natural resources. In turn, that means that there can be no 
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“general” strategy, given the presumption of the antagonisms of the diverse 
and heterogenous agents (countries, regions, productive units). Hence, the 
notion of “possessing in separation” certain of the conditions of production 
becomes central to explain the heterogeneous character of agents and the 
limits of the political strategies to transform the social relations. Unlike 
Marxism, Latin American Structuralism’s idea of antagonism and notion of 
the heterogenous characteristics of the agents implies examining the specific 
forms that social relations take: there is no general “mode of production” and, 
therefore, no necessary “productive forces” that may or may not “correspond” 
to specific social relations: in more philosophical terms, there is no general 
form of being given its diverse set of social and historical conditions.12
12 Except Chapter 6 All That Is Solid Does Not Necessarily Melt Into Air, contents of the chapters 
have been published previously in part or totally. Chapter 1 A Southern Perspective on Develop-
ment Studies: Contributions from Latin America in Cinta de Moebio 58: 26-46. Chapter 2 Lord 
Keynes después de su muerte según Raúl Prebisch in Estudios Críticos del Desarrollo 6(9). Chap-
ter 3 Celso Furtado and Development: A Brief Outline (1950-2004) in Celso Furtado: un retrato 
intelectual, Universidad Autónoma de la Ciudad de México. Chapter 4 Theoretical Misrecogni-
tions as the Source of Development Theory Déjà Vu in H. Márquez, R. Soto, E. Roberto an Záya-
go (coords.), El Desarrollo Perdido. Avatares del Capitalismo Neoliberal en Tiempos de Crisis. 
Editorial Miguel Angel Porrúa. Chapter 5 How Economics Forgot Power in Estudios Regionales 
en Economía, Población y Desarrollo 53. I am indebted to Michael O’Brien whose help and sug-




A Southern Perspective on Development Studies: 
Contributions from Latin America
Economic science is universal, like mathematics. Economic science is not Pampa, 
Guaraní or Tehuelche. If its applicable in Europe, in America too 
(quoted in Jimena Caravaca 2011: 35).
As the epigraph goes, in the last decade of the 19th Century, the national congress in Argentina witnessed the then Minister of the Economy 
defending the idea that the government applied policies sustained by 
principles of universal validity. The political confrontation brought to 
light the notion that perhaps those “knowledges” coming from afar are 
not as consistent as they make out to be, and that local theorizations were 
necessary to “discipline” the “science” in question. The following chapter 
stresses the idea that a relatively autochthonous discourse on development 
was constructed in the Latin American region, which can be defined as 
the “Center-Periphery” perspective initially developed by Raúl Prebisch 
(1944b, 1944c, 1948, 1949, 1949a). Ultimately, it is a perspective that 
examines the power asymmetries that constitute social relations, within 
and between regions and countries, therefore the Center-Periphery couple 
is not necessarily a “geographical” peculiarity; it denotes some mechanism 
of exclusion and/or exploitation, within and between communities. At the 
(exchange) knowledge continuum the conception of power asymmetries can 
be made to look similar to Connell’s idea of a “Southern theory” (Connell 
2007, Lander 2000).1 The rise of the “discursive formation” (Foucault 1972) in 
question first entailed a deconstruction-reconstruction of what was accepted 
as social science (economics, sociology, political theory, anthropology) in 
the Western-centric2 universities and vision of the world. In other words, 
it required a decolonizing conceptual strategy, creating a vocabulary not 
only consistent with the new “objects” that it should explain, but also, in 
its aftermath, showing that the theoretical inadequacies of the Western-
centric discourses were unsustainable even within their own perspective and 
universe, which it was supposedly to investigate. 
This aspect has to be mentioned because initially, after World War II, 
there was the belief that economics, for example, could play, as it were, two 
different “scientific” games; one in which its categories were congruent 
1 We generalize Connell’s notion of the “colonial” asymmetries: “Knowledge about a colonized 
society is acquired by an author from the metropole and deployed in a metropolitan debate. 
Debates among the colonized are ignored, the intellectuals of colonized societies are unrefer-
enced, and social process is analyzed in an ethnographic time-warp” (Connell 2007: 44).
2 Origin of the Anglo-Saxon or Eurocentric discourses.
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and “coherent” for “developed economies,” and, simultaneously, another in 
which, certain concepts of the dominant literature in economics were “offside” 
given certain institutional and organizing qualities of those countries pointed 
as “underdeveloped,” and hence requiring and admitting the elaboration of 
differing and distinct categories. In economics, this divergent evolution in 
their respective objects and vocabulary came abruptly to an end by the early 
1980s, in institutions and countries, “Center” and “Periphery” alike, which 
signaled the return of the hegemony of neoclassical thought.3
But two decades previously, by the mid-1960s, the “Center-Periphery” 
perspective itself would evolve into an intertwined stream of two ideas, in 
which some of its proponents would change theoretical camps, in more 
than one occasion during the following years. One was denominated “Latin 
American Structuralism” and the other the “Dependency Approach”. This 
distinction is important because the rise of neoliberalism hegemony early in 
the 1980s was the product of its criticism of certain development strategies in 
the region, conforming a strange alliance with the “dependency” approach 
vis-à-vis Latin American Structuralism.
Before describing the evolution of the Latin American Structuralism 
theoretical perspective and some of the personalities involved, it is important 
to mention certain political and institutional transformations in the aftermath 
of World War II (following section “It’s a Hard Chilliness A-Gonna Fall”), 
which made possible the posing of certain questions hitherto blocked and 
also the appearance of the Latin American discourse or the “will to power” 
in question.4 In the final segment of the chapter (Under the Sweltering Heat 
of the “Washington Consensus”), we attempt to elaborate a brief synthesis of 
the consequences and limitations of those policies and contest its hegemonic 
presence, with some descriptions of the economic and social tendencies in 
the region that should help focus on alternative political strategies.
It’s a Hard Chilliness A-Gonna Fall 
The political and intellectual undercurrents that drove the power Centers 
of the world after World War II are not recognizable today, given the relatively 
“multi-polar” prearrangements of domination, despite the United States 
virtual hegemony. But at that juncture it seemed imminent the face-to-face 
confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The context of the Cold War post-WWII, and the decolonization 
movements of liberation led to the emergence of a host of voices from “Third 
World” countries looking to make themselves heard on the international 
stage, especially in the United Nations. 
The new power Center and guardian of the capitalist ensemble, the United 
States of America, which had arisen from the demise of Great Britain, sought 
3 For the Anglo-Saxon story, see A. O. Hirschman’s classic article (1981).
4 Escobar (1995), Esteva (1992), Mallorquin (1998).
23
new forms with which to organize the world economy. First came the founding 
of new rules for the flow of trade in general. Retrospectively, the Bretton 
Woods (Helleiner 2014) arrangements on the one hand, and the Marshall Plan 
for Europe on the other, intended then as the basis for the reconstruction of a 
war-devastated Europe, formed part of the same process. If great efforts could 
be undertaken to “promote higher living standards,” as the UN declared, 
why not develop specific means to undertake its implementation? This view 
led to the setting up of the Economic Commission for Europe and for Asia; 
and it was only a matter of time before other regions started creating similar 
demands and projects (Toye J., Toye R. 2004).
Within this scenario, a well-organized group of men in Latin America, 
talented and confident in their specific fields and backed by their respective 
governments, managed to present a project for the creation of an Economic 
Commission for Latin America, or ECLAC (Comisión Económica para 
América Latina, CEPAL acronym in Spanish)5. Their diplomatic lobbying, 
with the help of some of their Western European counterparts was very 
successful, given the clear opposition to it by the United States government 
that had other plans: an organization, headed by it within the Organization of 
American States (OAS). Thus, by 1947, ECLAC had come to life for a three-
year trial period, starting in 1948. Equally, it must be remembered that before 
ECLAC’s confirmation in 1951 as part of the United Nations Organization 
family, the United States government hounded its existence until it was finally 
defeated by the alliance of the Latin American governments. One should bear 
in mind that it was Getulio Vargas’s ultimate push that finally made it possible 
to set up ECLAC, contrary to the wishes of the United States (Santa Cruz 
1984, Magariños 1991, Furtado 1985, Mallorquin 2010a).
By January 20th, 1949, the countries of the region had been consigned 
among those “underdeveloped areas” by the inaugurating speech of the newly 
elected President of the United States of America, Harry S. Truman (Truman 
1949). He went on to promise help to develop those “underdeveloped” 
nations which advocated “freedom” and “liberty.” A couple of months later 
that year appeared Prebisch’s (1949b) report to (ECLAC): The Economic 
Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems, hence forward 
becoming a classic in the Latin American social sciences literature on the 
prognosis of the “Periphery’s”6 “development” and “growth”7 vis-à-vis the 
“Center.” The text, branded by Hirschman (1981) since its inception as the 
Latin American “manifesto” for development, flourished worldwide in most 
languages.
5 Later, it will include “the Caribbean” as Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
6 See, for example E. Iglesias’s (Executive Director of ECLAC in the 1990’s) recollections of the 
event during his university days in Uruguay (Dosman 2006).
7 Symptomatically, Prebisch rarely uttered the term “underdevelopment” (“subdesarrollo”) 
until the 1970s; he used “developing” economies, in process of “development.”
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Therefore, “development” is a theoretical construct post-WWII. Before 
World War I, Western-centrism economic and sociological discourse reigned 
supreme: it was unashamedly teleological when it referred to those “backwards 
areas.” Furthermore, Arndt (1981) shows that the notion of “economic 
development” in those areas was seen in terms of opening and “exploiting 
natural resources.” Those notions cannot be made easily harmonious with 
“well-being of the population” and “growth per capita” generated in the 
1930s and 1940s with the construction of the national incomes accounts and 
“Keynesian” macroeconomic models (Danby 2017). As Heilbroner (1963), 
Love (1996), and Arndt (1987) insisted, before World War II little was written 
on the “backwards areas” that was not thought in terms of a “stage” that had 
been superseded by the “industrial” economies.
Although Prebisch was not ECLAC’s Secretary General until 1949, his 
important role in its recognition and creation, a product of his work style and 
passion, which he instilled at the ECLAC, can never be exaggerated (Hodara 
1987, Dosman 2008). In terms of his ideas on economic development, speaking 
in theoretical terms, he can truly be considered a pioneer and progenitor of a 
long-lasting tradition in this field in Latin America, if not in most “Third World” 
countries. Part of his legacy relates to his belief and struggle for the creation 
of an institution representing those countries that had come to specialize 
in the production of primary or raw materials in general, worldwide and/
or particularly in Latin America, which would promote and monitor their 
development. His share of élan in the fulfilment of the ECLAC project could 
be seen once again during the 1960s, when he left the organization to become 
Secretary General of the UNCTAD and subsequently head of The Latin 
American Institute of Social and Economic Planification (ILPES), a project 
and proposal of his own making in 1962 whilst still at ECLAC. During the 
1940s and 1950s in many Latin American countries, universities created new 
Economic and Sociology Departments driven by the political movements and 
governments purporting to sponsor growth and “development” processes. 
The rise and decline of the perspective to be described below can also be 
seen in transformations of the Economic and Sociology Departments in the 
universities in the region between the 1950s and 1990s (Montecinos 2009). 
The description of the development of the region and political milieu of the 
Latin American of post-WWII requires we trace some of the ideas, posing 
them as “ideal types” (Weber), given the ample fertile tradition in Spanish 
and Portuguese of the discourses in question mentioning certain personalities 
within the Latin American structuralist tradition (Prebisch, Furtado) and 
“dependency approach” (Cardoso, Marini).8
8 See also Kay’s note number 5 and 8 of Chapter 6 of his book (Kay 1989: 246). Ironically, up to 
date, the best account is a book written in English by Cristobal Kay. Kay’s PhD dissertation di-
rector was D. Seers; Kay was also alumni to O. Sunkel’s university classes. Unfortunately, given 
the language “barrier” and the power asymmetries among and within the so-called “knowledge 
communities”, the “dependency approach” in Western-centric universities is taught through 
the vocabulary of Gunder Frank’s books (1966, 1967). See also Palma (1978), Love (1990).
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Latin American Structuralism
By the second half of the 1940s, the pre-eminence of Keynes’s work on the 
possibility of resolving the “cyclical” nature of capitalism through planning 
or demand management cannot be put into doubt. Both his name and his 
ideas were synonymous with a “revolution” in economic science at academic 
institutions all over the world. The fruitful results of his ideas over time and 
space, and in practical terms, especially in Latin America during the early 
1930s, were soon to be recovered to argue that Western-centric economic 
discourse has limitations, and that the Keynesian categories had to be 
transformed. This task was soon undertaken by R. Prebisch, J. F. Noyola, V. 
Urquidi, R. Boti, A. Pinto, O. Sunkel, D. Seers, C. Furtado, to name but a few. 
On the other hand, “economic science” could not go further than 
reiterate its new-fangled categories when thinking of the Periphery or the 
“backward countries.” There was a brutal silence and the absence of a specific 
theoretical discourse about countries that were plainly not “industrialized.” 
The emergence of the notion of “underdeveloped economies,” following 
World War II, which singled out late-comers to the growing industrialization 
process or raw material producer countries, was the product of a crucial 
theoretical and political battle fought by institutions like the ECLAC. The 
posing of a process of industrialization and transformations of the Periphery 
(fiscal and land reform, modernization of its state apparatuses) became the 
Center piece of the concerns by Prebisch and ECLAC. 
During the mid-1940s, Prebisch himself was very reticent to adopt the so-
called “Keynesian revolution” vocabulary (examined in the next chapter), and 
was very critical of its work as well as much of economic science (Prebisch 
1946, 1947, 1948, 1949a).9
The asymmetric mechanism of distribution of the productivity gains or 
the “fruits of technical progress,” between the Center and the Periphery in 
Prebisch’s argument has nothing to do with “imperialism” whatsoever.10 It 
just so happened that during “the upward phase” of the cycle, prices of raw 
materials of the Periphery rose at a much faster pace than the correlative 
products of the Center, while in the down swing phase prices of raw materials 
declined at a much faster rate than industrial products and therefore the new 
market “clearing” price of primary products found itself requiring a superior 
quantum of sales of its products to buy a similar proportion of manufactured 
goods during the next cycle. Whether it was a question of differing demand-
price “elasticity” for their respective products and/or because the Center’s 
better organized homogeneous labor associations managed to defend 
9 See next chapter for a detailed analysis of Prebisch’s ideas for the period 1943-1949.
10 The notion does not exclude its presence. Many contemporary commentators, without ac-
knowledgement are really conflating the Rumanian Mihail Manoilescu’s (Love 1996, 2011) 
notion of “unequal exchange,” with Prebisch’s concept of the deterioration of the “terms of 
trade.” Notice that the notion of “fruits of technical progress” is an appropriation by Prebisch 
of a category found in the work of J. A. Schumpeter, transformed into a different meaning.
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its income level better than the respective organizations of Periphery, a 
deterioration of the terms of exchange ensued, which in Prebisch’s eyes did 
not lead necessarily to categorize the overall mechanism as “unequal” (for a 
more detailed explanation see chapters 2 and 5):11
1) Since 1946, Prebisch had been arguing that the notion of 
“equilibrium” was a mystical notion.
2) Therefore, the price mechanism and thus money did not “represent” 
anything external to itself other than being a unit of account, which 
explains his condemnation as “metaphysical” all those discussions 
about “value” in the early days of Marginalism or Classical Economy as 
labor content (“use value” and “exchange value” and so on).
Prebisch argued that there was an intrinsic constitutive reason which 
describes the life existence of the cycle: Time is the culprit in question, and 
more specifically “time disparities,” between the Center and the Periphery. 
Differing time “phases” between the productive and circulatory circuits; 
as will be argued further ahead, it also applies within and between distinct 
capitals (heterogeneity).
Classical and neoclassical economics eluded this issue by introducing 
money as a “vicarious”12 entity to restore a balance between the real and 
financial levels of the economy. But for Prebisch, there is a systematic 
asynchrony between the diverse productive cycles and the financial-money 
cycle (a time disparity), although “money” is reintroduced post factum in 
the orthodox traditional accounts of the economy and history of thought. 
The bank rates managed by the Bank of England in the first “cyclical Center” 
(Great Britain) would attract and/or expel gold during the fluctuating periods 
of the cycle, leaving to the Periphery the task of adjusting its overall internal 
and external accounts to this “untimely” movement. It is the time disparities 
that cause the systematic wave like (“undulatory”) motions of capitalism. 
At the First Meeting of Technicians on Central Banking Problems of the American 
Continent, Prebisch stated: 
I find myself disturbed by the thesis that free competition leads 
to general equilibrium and to the most adequate distribution of 
11 Simultaneously, Prebisch mentions notions such as “disparate demand elasticities” and pow-
er asymmetries as the source of the deterioration in question. It is my contention throughout 
this book that the notion of “elasticities” in fact only clouds the real political and theoretical 
issue: power asymmetries within and between agents: countries, regions, distinct productive 
sectors, and labor segments. Hopefully as the reader prolongs their journey through the book, 
it will be made clearer why I leave for later the explanation of the use the term “class,” since 
it pertains to a distinct theoretical construction which supersedes certain aspects of Marxism 
itself, related to the notion of “heterogeneity,” a theoretical consequence of Latin American 
Structuralist thought. See further ahead Chapter “All That Is Solid Does Not Necessarily Melt 
Into Air.”
12 On the notion of “vicariousness,” see Maffeo Pantaleoni Pure Economics (1957, English ver-
sion, originally 1889), third part; Prebisch’s teacher, Roque Gondra, translated the 1889 Italian 
version of the text during 1916, although presumably Prebisch read the text in Italian.
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the resources and income within the community. I do not see any 
correspondence between these abstract propositions and the reality of 
the economic world. (1946: 227)
“Capitalism” was essentially unstable, thus the importance of money and 
fiscal policies. As Prebisch observed:
I have found only but wave motions, a succession of ascendant and 
descendant wave motions. (...) The cycle (...), in the Center as much 
as in the Periphery, is the characteristic form by which the economy 
grows –the capitalist economy has not had another form of growing 
than the cyclical form.13 (1946: 226-227)
We could also see how Prebisch appropriated some of Pareto’s work. As 
Pareto explained:
In reality, equilibrium is never reached, since, as one approaches it, 
it alters continually because the technical and economic conditions 
of production modify themselves. The real state is, therefore, that of 
continued oscillation around a central equilibrium point, which itself 
moves. (Pareto cited in Mclure 2001: 76)
It must be said, however, that Prebisch did not make explicit these 
theoretical considerations at ECLAC.14 He was adamant that his purpose 
there was to produce practical and well-organized policies and technical 
advice to development projects:
We have presented at different sessions of the Commission a flow, at 
times abundant of documents in which the economic phenomena of 
Latin American countries are analyzed, interpreted, ordered; studies 
that could be judged as eminently theoretical. Gentlemen, it’s true 
that reality persuades us more so that practical action should have 
a theoretical base, be it in economic matters as in any other field of 
knowledge, but to conclude from this that the permanent organization 
of ECLAC is an instrument of theoretical analysis would be a serious, 
a very serious error because it would mean distancing oneself by the 
path traced by this Commission in successive meetings. The ECLAC 
organization is not a theoretical instrument, not a body of scientific 
investigation, but rather it is inspired by eminently practical purposes, 
13 That is “a continuous succession of disequilibriums’” (Prebisch 1948a, in Prebisch 1991c: 
499, my emphasis).
14 And yet Prebisch could not help himself. In 1953, after many recognized economists of the 
“North” from Western-centric universities visited Brazil (G. Harbeler, J. Viner, L. Robbins) 
with the aim to combat and counter ECLAC’s ascendancy, E. Gudin (1953) wrote a series of 
articles in O Correio Da Manha with the title: “The Mystical Planification,” to which Prebisch 
responded with: “The Spontaneous Mystical Equilibrium of the Economy” (Prebisch 1953a): 
“its proof that Dr. Gudin continues to believe in the tendency towards equilibrium, inherent 
in the economic system, when perturbing elements are not introduced in the economy. I don’t 
believe in all of that. The cycle is the typical form of growth of the capitalist economy, that is to 
say, an uninterrupted succession of disequilibriums.”
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objectives that have been defined and reached, perhaps, more clearly 
at the Conference in Mexico (…) ECLAC as an organization of 
international action (…) can examine those forces that act deep in the 
womb of the economy of the Latin American countries (…) (and) find 
a solution to our immediate problems (…) determining the technical 
necessities of the countries (…) the necessities of investment of capital; 
studies of the techniques of investment programs (…) contribute to the 
formulation of policies of development; and (…) training economists in 
problems of development. (Prebisch 1952: 24-25, my emphasis)
Prebisch’s reminder of ECLAC’s mission and reprimand represent just one 
of several difficult episodes at the organization, for Celso Furtado in particular 
(see chapter on Celso Furtado), as a consequence of his first book The Brazilian 
Economy: A Contribution to the Analysis of its Development (1954) dedicated 
to Prebisch.15 The role of the “multiplier” and the “accelerator” were crucial 
to many of the calculations that would be undertaken to postulate specific 
rates of growth. The recommendations towards a “full employment” policy 
admitted that the economy could not be seen as a self-regulatory entity. Fiscal 
policies and management of interest rates as well as budgetary deficits were 
part of a process aimed at maintaining a certain level of employment and 
income. What came to be known as demand-managed economies gave clear 
indications of the results that could be accomplished through the promotion 
of economic “growth,” well above the expectations of “market forces,” in spite 
of the downward undulations and “cyclical” nature of capitalism.
Prebisch’s ideas, and later those of Furtado, opened up a vast uncharted 
theoretical landscape, which henceforth would be mapped by means of 
new categories which would incorporate planning as one of the methods to 
induce a programmed process of development. Since the 1930s, Prebisch had 
been experimenting with great difficulty and not much success with various 
explanations to account for Argentina’s topsy-turvy economic development, 
including those that took their starting point from conventional economic 
categories: the cyclical notions of capitalism and the “Gold Standard” were 
parameters that left much to be desired, and could only be fitted to Argentina’s 
experience through an unquenchable violation of the facts (Prebisch 1944). 
By 1947, Prebisch had initiated a theoretical perspective that would 
culminate in a specific discourse in reference to the so-called “primary 
goods producer” countries or the Periphery of capitalism. In other words, he 
thought that what was needed to address the “Periphery’s” problems, could 
not be deduced from Keynesian and/or neoclassical models of development. 
It was therefore paramount to differentiate the raw material producing 
countries (the Periphery) vis-à-vis the “Center” or industrialized nations. He 
was arguing against the plainly “false” claims of “universality” of the economic 
discourse hegemonic at that time, which in the last instance assumed that the 
15 For more details see the chapter “Celso Furtado and Development: A Brief Outline (1950-
2004).”
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countries of the Periphery should undergo similar structural transformations 
during their development process as those that the industrialized countries 
had undertaken in the past, adjusting themselves to world economic forces; 
a concept of history which L. Althusser (1969), in a polite and paradoxical 
manner has termed as “future anterior.”16 
Under this scheme of things, the “backward economies” had to adapt 
themselves to an international trading organization that blessed its relative 
abundance of factors of production. There arose a version of an international 
structure of trade, which reinforced the hitherto international division 
of labor: the Periphery had to specialize in the production of raw and 
primary products, and the Center had to concentrate on the production of 
manufactured products. 
These countries were supposed to use those “factors of production” in 
relative abundance, and thus cheaper, to produce specific goods. Accordingly, 
there was a “comparative advantage” (no doubt in static terms) that favored 
some countries to concentrate on the production of certain products that 
required diverse intensities of capital and/or labor. The surplus production 
would form part of the trade pattern that would maximize the overall growth 
and earnings of respective economies.
Today’s literature has been evaluating the “robustness” of what has 
become known as the Prebisch-Singer thesis (Prebisch 1949b, Singer 
1949),17 although Prebisch had been showing statistically the “worsening 
terms of trade” or “worsening price relations” since the 1930s for Argentina. 
It seems that those countries that had actually followed the specialization 
path in their trade relations, and had accordingly adjusted their economies 
to the cyclical growth process of capitalism, found themselves, in the long 
run, in a worsening spiral situation. If, as he argued, the diffusion of the 
fruits of technological progress should have favored the Periphery, given 
its lower productive or technological capacity/intensity, so it should have 
manifested itself in lower price levels for manufactured goods imported. But 
the international price index revealed otherwise; this by itself did not prove, 
nor explained, what came to be known as the Prebisch/Singer thesis of the 
“deterioration18 in terms of trade” of the Periphery vis-à-vis the industrialized 
16 Althusser (1969) insisted that the past should not be read in terms of the present, a “future 
anterior”; Marx’s Capital is a theoretical product that repudiated his “Hegelian” days.
17 According to Jolly, it should be more “properly called the Singer-Prebisch thesis after the 
careful detective work of John Toye and Richard Toye showed that, strictly speaking, Hans 
Singer’s work preceded that of Prebisch” ( Jolly 2008: 65).
18 The presentation of Prebisch’s ideas can be followed in chapters 1 and 2, which take into ac-
count his theoretical evolution in much more detail on various aspects, making the reading of 
them once again an important task in the Periphery and Center alike. For the best unsurpassed 
up to date interpretation, see Rodriguez (1980). For example, the narrative offers two versions 
of the thesis on the deterioration of the terms of trade, the “cyclical” and the “accountable” 
one. But my own contention is that those versions are not separable, only at the cost of making 
indefensible Prebisch’s theory of prices-value.
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Centers. What was claimed was that after the continuum repetitive cycle, the 
Periphery, besides not being able to hold on to its own “fruits of technological 
progress,” also lost them through the downward pressure that was exerted on 
the prices of its goods. 
The Periphery’s deterioration, in terms of trade vis-à-vis the industrial 
nations, was due to the existence of a structural asymmetric “elasticity” 
price demand for their respective products. Given the power asymmetries in 
question, the Center managed to preserve its price and cost levels, even, and 
despite the downswing in the cyclical process. It is true, as Prebisch argued, 
that the gains (prices) in primary products during the upswing rose at a much 
faster pace than their counterparts at the Center, but it is also historically 
correct that during the downswing, they declined and lost much more than 
what they had attained previously. The so-called debate on the “strange 
persistence of the terms of trade,” and the proofs of its “deterioration” or 
otherwise, ever since its inception (Powelson 1977, Torres González 2010; 
2006, Ocampo and Parra 2007, Vernengo and Caldentey 2010, Ellsworth 
1956), despite many of its authors contentions, disregards the main contention 
of Latin American Structuralism, which was to question the idea that the 
“international division of labor” is a “natural” phenomenon. In other words, 
the conundrum epitomizes one among other geographical divisions, which 
represents the presence of power asymmetries, within and between different 
economic formations, countries, regions, and periods, and, therefore, not 
an insurmountable iron law. The absence of a “worsening” tendency of the 
terms of trade was not an oversight by the perspective in question: quite the 
contrary, it helped to underline that contingent power asymmetries should 
and could be changed, explaining the importance of the political strategies 
for the structural transformations.
On the other hand, the name Prebisch/Singer or in the inverse order, 
has become a worldwide academic and google phenomenon, when the so-
called “deterioration terms of trade” is written in any research engine, and 
yet Prebisch had already started writing on the subject well before Singer’s 
1949 text Postwar Price Relations Between Underdeveloped and Industrialized 
Countries. In 1934, Prebisch was using a different vocabulary: Argentina 
presented a “worsening of its international exchange terms” (Prebisch 1934; 
189, my emphasis).19
After the appearance of various texts (Prebisch 1949b, 1949c, 1951), 
where Prebisch presents these aspects in detailed fashion, during lectures 
on October 1951 to the Training Center of Latin American in Programs and 
Agricultural Projects and Related Subjects, he explicitly denounces the then 
misinterpretation of his posture:
I was made responsible of having formulated an immanent law of the 
process of economic development by which the prices of primary 
19 “empeoramiento en los términos del intercambio comercial”.
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products tend to depreciate in relative terms with respect to those of 
industrial products. I have not formulated any sort of such immanent 
law, but I simply called attention to the phenomenon that has occurred 
in a determinate period of time under the pressure of certain forces. 
We don’t know what will occur in the future, it depends on a series of 
factors. (Prebisch 1951b: 6-7).20
Another aspect that formed part of the explanation of Argentina’s 
“worsening of its international exchange terms,” had to do with the differing 
import and export coefficients, between the trading entities; previous to the 
great crisis, the then hegemonic cyclical Center, the British Empire, had what 
can be called a relatively high import coefficient with respect to what was 
going to happen to the “world economy” once the USA took the hegemonic 
role during the interregnum of the peace before World War II.
To preserve the hitherto level of export earnings, the Periphery had to 
increase the quantum of its exports, intensifying its productive capacity, 
which in turn increased its demand for imported goods (semi-manufactured 
and manufactured), constraining the diversification of its economy. Thus, 
every cycle saw the imposition of a tendency that presented itself as the 
deterioration of the Periphery’s terms of trade with all the subsequent 
negative consequences to its external balance (“disequilibrium”). The search 
for an elusive “equilibrium” meant a lower rate of investment, higher levels 
of savings, and a reduced capacity to receive foreign credits and therefore 
overseas capital. This had to be resolved by attracting foreign capital through 
an internal deflationary process, all of which stalled the growth of the 
economy.
The growth of income in the Center was not reflected in an equally 
proportionate increase in its demand for products or goods from the 
Periphery. On the contrary, a whole series of substitutes and “demand” 
schedules appeared for other, and more elaborated types of goods, which for 
the Periphery meant a reduction in “demand” for its goods. The Periphery’s 
growth was therefore inhibited by internal and external disequilibrium 
given its lower capacity for imports, which in turn explained its stop-go 
characteristics. Modern literature presumes to have resuscitated this aspect 
of the power asymmetries phenomenon under the Thirwall thesis of “balance 
20 “Problemas del Desarrollo Económico en América Latina,” Third Conference, October 
25th, 1951. Spanish readers should have known better, English readers on the other hand, 
had to deal with a relatively shabby translation of 1949c and 1951. As a rule, the United Na-
tions documents translate them into English and French. (“Crecimiento, Desequilibrio y 
Disparidades: Interpretación del Proceso de Desarrollo Económico” in: Estudio Económico 
de América Latina, 1949 - E/CN.12/164/Rev.1 – 1949c and the 1951 Problemas Teóricos y 
Prácticos del Crecimiento Económico, CEPAL, México, 28 mayo E/CN.12/221. On the other 
hand, the classic text of 1949b El Desarrollo Económico de la America Latina y Sus Principales 
Problemas E/CN.12/89 (May), under a very close scrutiny by the U.S. government fared rel-
atively better in English. Perhaps Prebisch, given the load of work and strain under which he 
was working did not check the translations.
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of payments” (Boianosvky and Solis 2014) constraints in a growing economy, 
converting it into a problem of price-income demand elasticities disparities 
between different economic formations. For Prebisch, the problem was 
not the “absolute export earnings” decline, but rather to what extent they 
generated internally the appearance of sectors whose “productivity” was 
higher than those concentrating on exports. And given the historically 
relatively low “import coefficient” of the United States economy, an “inward 
drive” development seemed the only practical option for the Periphery.
Thus, all manifestations of the Periphery’s erratic growth process 
throughout the first half of the 20th century, largely based on the external 
demand for its goods, pointed towards a policy that required a sponsored 
process of internal productive diversification, which in the last instance meant 
the industrialization and the structural transformations and social reforms of 
these peripheral countries: a change in the social and technical division of 
labor. Simply put, the interpretation of Prebisch that concentrates its reading 
of the 1949 text as only a debate about “industrialization” loses a crucial piece 
of Prebisch’s vision; he clearly states that the “industrialization has a social 
purpose” (Prebisch 1949b: 139) and requires an “adequate social legislation” 
(Prebisch 1949b: 101).
In Prebisch’s proposal, a “programmed” process of industrialization would 
in turn allow for the absorption of underemployed labor or those displaced 
from less productive sectors. The employment of labor in the secondary and 
tertiary sectors would secure a higher level of employment, which would 
in turn destroy the social and political forces which kept wages down that 
reinforced the life of old quasi “feudalistic” relations in agriculture, with low 
costs and extensive methods of land use for production of raw or primary 
products in many countries of the region. The industrialization process 
would substitute some imports, changing its composition, and creating a 
mechanism to hold on to some of the fruits of the technological progress. A 
more diversified economy presumes higher factor “prices,” which in the long 
run could be the basis for the export of industrial manufactured goods.
Prebisch also sponsored a broader common market arrangement (Briceño 
2010), with some important early accomplishments of the strategy during the 
early 1960s in Central Latin America, similar to today’s regional agreements 
in Latin America, which would facilitate the lowering of costs and the use of 
ample economies of scale for new industrial sectors. Initially, some industries 
would produce some goods at higher prices than those in international 
markets, but as the industrialization argument runs, in the long run those 
“Ricardian losses” (Prebisch’s expression) were a positive element in the 
tradeoff between having labor employed in industrial activities or importing 
cheaper products, which through the multiplier effects would generate 
incomes and demand internally. Besides creating a more “homogeneous” 
economic base, the substitution of imports with local production 
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-industrialization-, would also enable a better control of the economy during 
cyclical downturns. In this sense, programming the rate of growth and 
industrialization was seen as a way to help “market forces,” not stifle them, as 
most neoclassical or neo-liberal misinterpretations of Prebisch claimed. The 
same process of reforms to transform land possession meant the creation of 
smaller capitalized productive units generating economic and political forces 
to contest the hegemonic conservative “haciendas” sector, economically and 
politically, giving life to “markets.” Later on, we will return to this aspect 
of Latin American Structuralism, but it’s worthwhile to underline that the 
“dependency approach” perceived from its inception these political features 
which obeyed great part of its criticisms of Latin American Structuralism.
To counteract these policies during the early years of the 1950s we can 
observe a series of “academic visits” to Latin America by members of the 
orthodoxy from the “North,” among them Jacob Viner, by then already a 
member of the Mont-Pelerin Society21 who in the words of Prebisch had the 
“sagacity,” as mentioned previously, to recommend demographic studies 
instead of economic development policies. 
Simultaneously, during the 1940s and 1950s, Brazil, under the sway of 
strong nationalist social forces, became everything that the so-called “ideology 
of developmentalism” represented. The political forces headed by Vargas and 
a large number of institutions like the Superior Institute of Brazilian Studies 
(ISEB) pushed the industrialization process into most of the plans they had a 
chance to come up with, culminating with Juscelino Kubitschek’s (“Targets 
Plan”) economic plans. 
After the war, the National Bank of Economic Development (BNDE) 
was founded and soon made agreements with the ECLAC, and Furtado’s 
involvement, to undertake many development projects. The Joint 
American and Brazilian Commission, which was formed to enhance the 
industrialization process, had Furtado as its Director. Brazil became, in the 
first half of the 1950s, a theoretical paradise for discussing and experimenting 
on the theme of “development.”22 Most of the leading exponents, G. Myrdal, 
R. Nurkse (1953), of a full-speed-ahead-towards-industrialization policy and 
critics, J. Viner (University of Chicago) and L. Robbins (London School of 
Economics), the structuralist’s terror, visited the country during that time 
and discussed the topic.
Furtado (1952) was to establish a specific debate with Nurkse (1953) on 
the issue of the size or otherwise of the market as a limit to the capitalization 
and development process. More on Furtado’s involvement in this process 
can be seen in the third chapter, here it is enough a summary. Furtado’s 
21 See Mirowski and Plehwe (2009). Hurwicz, as early as 1940, found the economists at Chica-
go “very reactionary and orthodox. I met Viner, Knight and the other local celebrities… and 
didn’t think very much of them’” (quoted in Mirowski and Nik-Khah 2017: 75).
22 The work by Bielschowsky (1988) shows the richness of the “economic thought” in Brazil, 
although originally it is a product of a doctoral dissertation in English.
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theoretical and practical interests during the early 1950s examined the history 
of the evolution and transformation of the Brazilian “economy” Periphery 
and “economic theory” then dominant in the western world.23 Hence, 
Furtado’s first published book The Brazilian Economy (1954)24 had two quite 
distinct characteristics. On the one hand, it was comprised of a historical 
description of Brazil’s “economic formation” from its colonization up until 
the decade of the 1950s, and on the other, we had one of the first documented 
histories of economic thought. It focused on the problems of “backward” 
economies,25 demonstrating that orthodox economic categories’ references 
towards “underdeveloped economies,” had only the function of signaling 
“differences,” with respect to “developed” economies, and worthless to think 
the specificities of an “underdeveloped economy.” 
The concept of an underdeveloped economy as a distinct entity with 
its own logic and structure was already being processed conceptually, 
culminating in fully fledged discourse during the years of 1958-1962, 
displacing the teleological and evolutionary notions implicit and explicit 
in conventional economic discourse, Keynesian included. To start with, 
the notion of an “underdeveloped economy” starts dislodging the hitherto 
category of a “colonial economy” dominant in much of the text. By 1958, 
Furtado was convinced, although not yet completely theoretically armed, 
that the Latin American economies were specific historical entities that could 
not be explained with the traditional vocabulary of mainstream economics. 
Paradoxically, Prebisch was very critical of Furtado’s ideas,26 and 
reprimanded, The Brazilian Economy… (1954), which in turn made Furtado 
ponder leaving ECLAC. We could even speculate that to keep him away 
from the Center of attention he was regularly invited to participate in various 
economic reports and commissions, starting in the Brazilian and United 
States Commission and later, through his sudden trips to prepare reports in 
Venezuela and México. 
After 1954, Furtado’s cyclical notions of capitalism as a means to 
jettison inefficient productive sectors started disappearing (Furtado 1950); 
theoretically, Furtado started thinking more in “structural” terms, “obstacles” 
or “structural transformations”; concepts that could think productive agents 
embedded in specific social relations and historical contexts, displacing the 
“rational” maximizing entities espoused in the official economic discourse.
23 For more details see third chapter “Celso Furtado and Development: A Brief Outline (1950-
2004).”
24 A economia brasileira. It is ironical that a book that was dedicated to Prebisch was to cause 
him so many problems at ECLAC; his views were used to put pressure on Prebisch and the 
International Organization, but it must be remarked that it is in great part at odds with the 
economic categories then dominant, including Prebisch’s.
25 In the English language the closest examination of this type was done by Meier and  Baldwin 
(1957).
26 See chapter ahead dedicated to his work: “Celso Furtado and Development: A Brief Outline 
(1950-2004).”
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It followed that a theoretical reconstruction was in order, and accordingly, 
“underdevelopment” could not and should not be thought of as a historical 
phase to be overcome, but rather as the outcome of the hegemony of a specific 
set of asymmetric social relations whose articulation generated many of the 
disparities and “heterogenous” phenomena once thought of in “cyclical” 
terms.
Thus, a specific body of conceptual tools had to be constructed and that 
was precisely what occupied Furtado between 1958 and 1962. As mentioned 
before, the evolution of Western-centric economic thought (Furtado 1954), 
inapplicable for the analysis of the Periphery’s development, and in part 
resembling his own research, appeared in the results of a conference held 
in 1951 at Chicago University (Hoselitz 1953),27 which Furtado read in the 
following manner:
The theory of economic development does not fit, in general terms, 
within the categories of economic analysis. This point of view is quite 
generally accepted today, and it suffices to quote the seminar on 
development organized by the University of Chicago in 1951, in which 
sociologists, anthropologists and historians were gathered alongside 
economists. (Furtado 1952: 264)
The process and evolution of Latin American Structuralism did not appear 
in “one fell swoop,” as it were. In fact, it was painfully achieved during a period 
when Furtado, having left ECLAC in 1957, fought many crucial political 
battles to transform, first the Northeast, in Brazil, as its first Superintendent 
(1959b),28 and secondly, as the Minister for Planning (1962a).29 
After spending a short period at Cambridge University by Kaldor’s 
invitation, he returned to Brazil where he took up the post of Director for the 
Northeast section at the National Bank of Economic Development (BNDE). 
It was during this period that Furtado was to publish The Economic Formation 
of Brazil (1959),30 perhaps the most renowned text in Brazil if not in Latin 
27 For the account of those involved within the perspective of development in the Western-cen-
tric tradition, see Gunder Frank (1966).
28 There he elaborated An Economic Development Policy for the Northeast (1959b), perhaps one 
of the first books to have used the thesis of the deterioration terms of trade within different 
regions (Northeast and Center-South) of a single country’s economic formation. See details 
in Mallorquin (1996) and Love (1996). Prebisch’s notion, always a power asymmetry phe-
nomenon, forms part of the evolution of regions and economies: “if agriculture progresses 
technically by its own impulse independently of the demand in the city (...) lower prices of the 
primary products in relation to the industrial prices,” will generate “an internal deterioration 
of the terms of trade” … “similar...to the deterioration of the international terms of trade”... “the 
fruits of technical progress applied to agriculture will be transferred to the industrial sector, 
receiving primary raw material and foodstuff at lower prices.” (Prebisch 1951a: 12)
29 The three-year plan of the government Plano Trienal de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 
(1963-1965), elaborated by Furtado, was attacked by all social forces.
30 In Mallorquin (2005b) I offer a detailed follow up of the conceptual changes in the theoreti-
cal vocabulary of this book in relation to its original version: The Brazilian Economy… (1954). 
See also chapter on Furtado ahead.
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America. It incorporated most of the historical sections of the previously 
mentioned book The Brazilian Economy… (1954). But this latter version came 
with all the appropriate reformulations to give it a distinctly “structural” 
flavor.
Between the appearance of this book and the period of 1964, when he 
was exiled and forced to leave Brazil by the Military regime, Furtado fought 
on many battlefields. He produced books and articles with distinct political 
and/or academic texts, and some of a controversial nature. The latter can 
be exemplified by the text entitled The Brazilian Pre-Revolution (1962),31 
grouping a series of articles, including one which was used for its title and 
the most politically explosive; a good example of the former can be seen in 
Development and Underdevelopment (1961), also a reordering of some of the 
material found in The Brazilian Economy… (1954), appropriately reformulated, 
and also containing new material from Furtado (1958 and 1959b).
In his first stop of exile in Chile, at the ILPES in ECLAC, Furtado 
offered a series of conferences. On June 3rd, 1964, he was to present the 
origins of his theoretical recent position that was to last until around 1972. 
He represented an economic tendency for Brazil and Latin America, which 
showed a declining process of growth and industrialization. Here we can 
observe the notion of the “structural obstacles” and “stagnationist” thesis for 
the economy as a whole. The conferences initiated the argument which was 
to become subsequently the book Underdevelopment and Stagnation in Latin 
America (Furtado 1964).32 The text exhibits all the genealogical conceptual 
elements that were to appear in F. Cardoso and E. Faletto’s classical text of 
1969 Dependency and Development in Latin America. In turn, Cardoso’s book 
circulated in manuscript form since its inception in 1967, two years before 
its publication, as an internal document of ILPES - ECLAC (Kahl 1976). 
The Furtado lectures were attended by various of the names that are later 
to conform the “dependency approach”: Fernando H. Cardoso, R. Cibotti, 
N. Gonzalez, José M. Echavarría, O. Sunkel, P. Vuscovic, and F. Weffort, 
amongst others.
31 The English version of The Dialectics of Development (1964) appeared as Diagnosis of the Bra-
zilian Crisis (1965), which can also be put in this tradition, but it is a better and very well-de-
veloped case for explaining the unification of the regressive political and social forces of the 
right against the government, which he foresaw with a military takeover, which unfortunately 
turned out to be true. Willard Barber (1966), reviewed the English version of the Dialéctica de 
Desarrollo (Furtado 1964), alleging Furtado’s “deep Leninist ruts.” (Barber 1966: 196). A pos-
itive review in English can be seen in Donald J. Harris’s text “Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis” 
(1966). It is interesting to mention that the author was the father of Kamala Harris, who is the 
2020 vice president of the U.S.A. (see Meireles 2020).
32 Subdesenvolvimento e estagnacao na America Latina (1966).
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The Dependency Approach33
The vision and perspective of the “dependency approach” cannot be 
reduced to the issue as to when was the category first mentioned. For example, 
Kahl remarks (1986: 227), that Cardoso first uses the term “dependency”34 in 
1965. In Latin America there is an extensive discussion as to whether it’s an 
“autonomous theory” or the theoretical product (Beigel 2006) of addressing 
a critique to the economism and “pessimism” of the future of economic 
development of the region, of which Furtado’s “stagnationist” thesis was an 
exemplar for that period of his life. 
Also, the Economic Bulletin of ECLAC’s 196435 prognosis of certain 
difficulties on the future process of “industrialization,” could and was turned 
into a “pessimistic” perspective on the future prospects of the development 
process as a whole, underlining relatively higher costs in comparative 
terms and a difficult process ahead when the capital-intensive sectors 
were considered. The first “stages” in the industrialization transformation/
expansion, of consumer’s goods, substituting imports by local elaboration, 
apparently seems to have reached a cul-de-sac. Also, it gave rise to abundant 
uncertainties on the capacity to pay for imports and/or rates of “exploitation” 
required to pay for them as “dependentists” had pointed out; these aspects of 
the problematical nature of a “development” process articulated to the world 
market, overwhelmed the discussions in the dependency approach and Latin 
American Structuralism, alike.
In the “stagnationist” book, Furtado presented explicitly the first Latin 
American “structuralist” model, its content presented all of the conceptual 
characteristics that would later appear in the writings of those that were to 
adopt or follow the above-mentioned denomination. It clearly highlighted 
the social-political forces that are the basis of “internal” or “external” 
dislocations of an economy and which tended to reproduce the conditions 
that constituted the “underdevelopment” condition, or so Furtado argued 
then, notwithstanding the industrial progression in some of the economies 
in question. 
The text was the culmination of what was to be Furtado’s specific 
“structuralism.” Although this book exhibited a very pessimistic view of 
Latin American economies’ future rate of growth and industrialization, 
today we know that what he was actually criticizing and disapproving of, 
33 With apologies to the many Latin Americans not mentioned, but see note in Kay (1989: 241) 
for just a few of the names that formed part of the vast and fertile discussions in the region, the 
majority of which were exiles, first moving and escaping from the repressive Brazilian military 
regime in 1964, and then repeating the process from Argentina’s, and Chile’s counterparts in 
the early 1970’s. In their great majority the exodus culminated in their reunification in Mexico.
34 In 1956 Furtado published a manuscript entitled A Dependent Economy (1956) [Uma Econo-
mia Dependente]. Its contents are part of chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Furtado 1954 The Brazilian 
Economy. 
35 See Tavares (1964) and Macario (1964).
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and confusing with an inherent “stagnation” tendency, was the structural and 
intrinsic mechanism of exclusion by certain capitalist economic formations 
which marginalize the majority of the population from the fruits of their 
technical progress. For the first time, Furtado’s overwhelming nationalistic 
tone questioned the role of foreign capital in the conformation of the debt 
pattern and its productive role in Latin America. This was a theme that would 
never again become peripheral to his intellectual and political activities. 
ECLAC always viewed foreign capital as merely a transitional phenomenon 
in Latin American economies, required only to undertake the initial process 
of capitalization, given the low level of “savings.” Furtado felt betrayed by 
the United States’ promises and policies for the Alliance of Progress during 
his time at the forefront of development of the Northeast, which in part also 
explains his pessimistic tone following the Brazilian Military Coup.
Furtado started with an examination of the “external” factors that he 
believed crippled Latin American economies (U.S. policy), and then moved 
on to describe the “internal” limits of the industrialization process within 
Latin America. In this aspect, he argued that once the easy period of the 
industrialization process was over (consumption goods), substituting certain 
imports through local production, the next phase (capital goods) posed 
inherent limitations to incorporate a broader number of the population 
within the growth of the economy. Furtado considered that the substitution 
of capital goods imports with local production required an overly intensive 
capital function, which in turn stimulated higher level of imports. The other 
side of the equation showed that it absorbed a relatively low level of the labor 
force from the “backward” sectors of the economy. Aside from the fact that 
a higher capital-intensive function required a much higher level of savings, 
which the upper classes did not and would not supply, given their traditional 
historical behavior, the market size for its goods hindered the benefits of fully 
fledged economies of scale. As a result, everything seemed to work towards 
lowering the productivity level of the economy as a whole -not just the 
capital-intensive sectors- thus ensuring the stagnation process of the Latin 
American economies.
Cardoso and Faletto questioned the inherent stagnation tendency arguing 
that development is “dependent-associated” on the power alliances of the 
social classes involved, but capitalism will certainly continue to advance in 
the region, therefore the actual historical period did not necessarily mean the 
end of the continuation of the process and the transformation of the societies. 
The book by Cardoso and Faletto devoted plenty of space to describe the 
differing historical situations in Latin America, within and between countries 
and the economic formations, to present the case for the possibility of a 
“dependent-associated development,” showing therefore the fertile use of 
some of the elements of the Latin American Structuralism perspective. The 
theoretical consummation of this flank of the “dependency approach” meant 
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displacing the classical Marxist notions of classes to explain the political 
agents and process in question, which is a theoretical aspect that would be 
contested by Mauro Marini in the best part of his work and debates with 
Cardoso and others. 
Furthermore, Cardoso’s perspective also interrogates and disputes the 
Gunder Frank’s thesis of the “development of underdevelopment” (1966) 
as can be seen by Theotonio Dos Santos’s own definition of a situation of 
dependence:
dependency is a conditioning situation in which the economies of one 
group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion 
of others. A relationship of interdependence between two or more 
economies or between such economies and the world trading system 
becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can expand 
through self-impulsion while others, being in a dependent position, can 
only expand as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries, 
which may have positive or negative effects on their immediate 
development. In either case, the basic situation of dependence causes 
these countries to be both backward and exploited. (Dos Santos 1978: 
305).
But the above synthesis represents the undergoing theoretical 
transformation by the dependency approach dominated by its “Marxist” 
vocabulary. Marini’s work (1969, 1972) depicts clearly this aspect vis-à-vis, 
those who followed Gunder Frank’s vocabulary, and those within the Cardoso 
and Faletto camp. The political and intellectual period, marked by the Cuban 
revolution, especially once it was declared “socialist” in 1961, was under the 
presumed alternative that in the last instance countries in the Periphery had 
to leave the “capitalist” and “imperialist” trading complex if they were to 
develop their economies. 
Retrospectively, in reference to the 1964 military takeover, Marini signaled 
that the “conflict would soon explode” (Marini 1969: 150) “between differing 
processes of surplus-value extraction -relative and absolute- between those 
highly concentrated capital sectors” and the small capital “technologically” 
backward ones.
Cardoso and Faletto’s interpretation of the period in political terms is 
similar although the tone and vocabulary differ radically:
Therefore, development, from the moment that it is undertaken 
intensifies social exclusion and not just of the masses, but also of the 
economically significant social strata of the previous stage, whose 
principal alternative was to achieve some form of subsidiary vinculation 
to the modern monopolist sector and the political domination it 
installed. (Cardoso and Faletto 1975: 151-152)
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Marini’s thesis brought to light a specific reading of Marx’s labor theory 
of value to explain the commercial ties with the international market and the 
peculiarity of the labor process and the “extraction”/exploitation mechanism 
dominant in the region. The reading in question forms the basis of his attempt 
to save an explanation for the use of the category of “underdevelopment” for 
the Periphery of the capitalist world economy.36
On the other hand, in its first versions, the theme and vocabulary of Gunder 
Frank on the mechanism of “appropriation of the surplus” generated by the 
“satellites” by the “metropolis” seems to be the product of today’s classic works 
of Paul Baran Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and 
Social Order (1966) and The Political Economy of Growth (1957). The notion of 
“surplus” was not given much explanation or elaboration on the part of Gunder 
Frank, simply assumed as what could be siphoned off from the “satellites” in 
distinct historical periods by the “metropolis” given the power asymmetries 
and the imperialist strategy. The asymmetric contradiction: “metropolis” / 
“satellite” could also be an internal occurrence and differentiation within the 
same region or country. It was this mechanism that explained the oscillating 
manner by which a specific expansion or development of a certain region 
“underdeveloped” its “trading” or commercial counterparts.
There is sufficient literature in the Western-centric world that discussed, 
since its inception, Gunder Frank’s thesis, empirically and conceptually. In 
the mid-1960s, part of those arguments seems to echo in Latin America, 
when the “Latin America’s structuralist” stagnationist thesis was discussed. 
Among the proponents of the dependency approach a profound theoretical 
discussion arose as to the pertinence of the “heterogeneity” notion developed 
by Latin America structuralists and the power asymmetries in the countries 
and regions.
The regional articulation to the world market became the center of the 
analysis via the reconstruction of Marx’s theory of value, therefore establishing 
a conceptual mechanism that could explain different and distinctive processes 
of “extraction” / “appropriation” of the surplus among and between diverse 
social formations, some capitalists or proto-capitalists and so-called “pre-
capitalist” ones (the notion of “heterogeneity” underscored by Latin 
American Structuralism). Simultaneously, this would provide the conceptual 
vocabulary to explain the internal difficulties of the Periphery to continue its 
development path notwithstanding the “underdevelopment” condition.
When talking about the “central economies” Marini argued that the:
general rule has been the intensification of the exploitation and 
therefore, accumulation through the real cheapening of the labor force, 
achieved principally through the reduction of the value of the goods 
that are required for its subsistence (...) the constant devaluing of the 
labor force has constituted the decisive element in the production and 
36 See accounts by Ourique (1994), Barreda (1994), Sotelo (2005, 2014),and Osorio (1995).
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capitalist accumulation of the central economies (...) it is not rigorously 
the case in the capitalist economies of the Periphery (...) these economies 
have undertaken its process of accumulation fundamentally based 
in the production of absolute surplus value (...). In other words, the 
increase of the surplus labor time tends to be realized in fact without 
altering the necessary labor, that is by not reconstituting the value to 
the worker which he creates during this setting; therefore, what would 
seem relative surplus value, frequently is an anomalous case of absolute 
surplus value. (...) Lets make clear the point: the augmentation of the 
surplus time-work always signifies a greater exploitation of the labor 
force (Marini 1974: 114-115, my emphasis) [...] Still, it is possible to 
identify a mode of increasing surplus value, by which the reduction of 
the wage is not in correspondence with a real decrease of the necessary 
labor time. This case tends to be exceptional in the advanced countries, 
but embraces a generalized characteristic in backward countries, like 
Brazil, where it configures the super-exploitation of labor. Exclusively 
for the purpose of simplification, in the text, we use the expression of 
absolute surplus value also to denote this last modality. (Marini 1974: 
148).
Kay’s reading of Marini seems to uphold this interpretation that “super 
exploitation is not identical to absolute surplus-value” (Kay 1989: 145). 
Sotelo has recently underlined once again the political importance of the 
Marini/Cardoso-Serra debate at the end of 1970:37
In contrast to Marini, Cardoso and Serra conceived of labor super 
exploitation as a conjunctural phenomenon and not as a process 
endogenous to capital accumulation in dependent economies. In the 
same manner as Ricardo (whose work Marx criticized thoroughly), 
moreover, they calculated the increase in the rate of profit in a way that 
conflated the rate of surplus value with the rate of profit. (Sotelo 2014: 
544)
In Marini’s interpretation, the Brazilian “military dictatorship” could be 
seen as the “inevitable consequence of the Brazilian capitalist development” 
in its “desperate attempt to open up new perspectives for its development” 
(Marini 1974: 97), with its repressive and exploitative labor laws.
Another way to read Marini’s concepts of surplus-value and super-
exploitation is not to question its “consistency” with respect to a supposedly 
Marxist tradition, as if the notion of the labor theory of value is something 
unproblematic.38 It is precisely this line of thought that the Latin American 
structuralist perspective developed, problematizing Marxist and neoclassical 
notions of value and price alike. It argued that the idea of power asymmetries 
and exploitation between and within production units and the labor force 
37 Marini (1978), Cardoso and Serra (1978), Serra and Cardoso (1978).
38 Dostaler (1980), Mañán (2012). 
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did not require a general conception of value to explain certain specific 
inequalities and indefensible distributional patterns, and in that sense Marini’s 
argument can be defended as a consistent manner to examine the labor 
process and power asymmetries in certain sectors and regions of the world 
(Sotelo 2014). In other words, this means that it is the whole classical political 
economy tradition which has to be overhauled and questioned. A reading 
of the period and its authors in a structuralist fashion converts the notion 
of power as its center of analyses and examines the differing mechanism by 
which social relations delineate and determine the possession in separation 
of certain of the conditions of existence of the productive units, mechanism 
by which a “market” and a commodity circulation emerges. In turn, this 
mechanism explains how the exchange process determines the distributional 
context-pattern between different agents. In this sense, there is no market 
in general and no necessary articulation of certain social relations to specific 
forces of production. These are transitional and contingent upon certain 
historical cultural traditions and specific processes. The heterogeneous 
nature of much of the “economy,” both “developed” and “underdeveloped,” 
belies the idea that there is a unique way to organize the productive process 
and achieve efficiency and equality.39 That is one of the central ideas that 
Latin American Structuralism developed theoretically through its historical 
analyses. Structuralism has always sustained that its perspective theoretically 
supersedes (in Hegelian fashion) the “classical” and post-Keynesian school of 
thought. It is worthwhile, then, to observe some of its vocabulary through the 
work of Furtado. By the mid-1960s Furtado said:
Economic structuralism (a school of thought that arose in the first half 
of the 1960’s amongst Latin American economists) has as its principal 
objective to take into consideration the importance of the ‘non-
economic parameters’ contained in macroeconomic models. Given 
that the behavior of these economic variables depends mostly on these 
parameters they have to be the object of meticulous study. (Furtado 
1967: 81)
Thus, the emergence of economic plans, for example, implied “land 
reforms” (Furtado 1969, Chapter XXIII), so that the “structural picture” 
could be modified and the social agents in question be freed to take up better 
remunerated positions within the social division of labor, which in turn 
would presumably favor a more equal distribution of incomes and resources. 
It assumed an advancement in the “knowledge of real structures,” so that on 
many occasions it demanded the supersession of “conventional economic 
analysis” (1969: 297). Furtado insisted that his perspective had “no direct 
relationship with the French structuralist school, whose main orientation was 
to give importance to the synchronic axis of social analysis and establish the 
‘syntaxes’ of the disparities in social organizations.” (Furtado 1967: 80-81)
39 From a different perspective, notions of the “Pareto Optimum”, efficiency and self-adjust-
ment equilibriums are difficult to sustain (Nadal and Ackerman 2004).
43
Traditional conventional economics cannot take account for, nor explain 
the existence of “structural obstacles” or “heterogeneous agents.” Therefore, 
the perspective rejects the notion of the existence of “homogeneous factors 
with the same technological time horizon” (Furtado 1969: 102). The 
problems of “underdevelopment” needed to incorporate ideas of a non-
unified labor market and the simultaneous existence of diverse productive 
functions (heterogenous), depending on the “surface of the economic 
structure in which the productive agent is inserted” (Furtado 1969: 102). 
The theoretical emphasis, therefore, tries to destroy systematically the 
traditional appearance of these problems within separate compartments, be 
“economics” or “history.” 
In a sense, Furtado rebuilt into a theoretical concept a notion that for 
Perroux appeared to be an obstacle or ephemeral phenomena that needed to 
be reformed: 
Structural inflation has adulterated the very notions of our science; 
that is to say, it has warped or broken the modern instruments which 
are necessary not only for the diagnosis, but also for the treatment or 
operations that are indispensable for its cure.” (Perroux 1957: 263)
Furtado’s theoretical deductions had already appeared in his description 
of the evolution of the development of Brazil during the early 1950’s in which 
he distinguished between “dynamic” and “static” notions of inflation, a 
consequence of power asymmetries between agents and sectors, which later 
with the work of Noyola (1956)40, were to be coined as the “structuralist” 
conception of inflation, underlining power asymmetries between different 
agents-sectors in the economic formation, in other words not a monetary 
phenomenon.
In this sense, the 1954 book The Brazilian Economy shows the initial steps 
of a theoretical transformation that can also be found in Perroux’s idea that 
specific and distinct economic units have differing “arenas,” necessarily 
antagonistic towards each other. The so-called “equilibrium” or “relative 
peace” is the consequence of the hegemony of a definite productive unit or 
sector, which manages to establish a hegemonic role over a specific economic 
space and thus over other economic sectors (Perroux 1950). In other words, 
it is a question of the differing power asymmetries.
Retrospectively, developmentalists and their critics have to reckon with a 
post-WWII period of growth, which before the “lost decade” (1980) showed 
rates of “growth” that have not been attained since. But the real absentee, 
during this period, are the structural reforms required to promote the 
“development” of the region, which can be said are the main dark aspects of 
the history during the epoch.
The historical transformations of land and fiscal reforms were never in the 
40 There seems to be a familiar resemblance of sorts in the Western-centric literature, Aujac 
Henri (1954). Noyola reviewed Furtado’s A Economia Brasileira (Noyola 1955).
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political agenda, distributional aspects that would have provided the much 
need “demand” to defeat the so-called limitations of the “market.”
Ever since the mid-1960s, structuralism policies on development have 
been evaluated in terms of its policy ideas towards the industrial sector, and 
yet that aspect forms part of a much wider perspective of the role of the 
state in transforming the social and political horizon. The differentiation 
and apparent conflict between an “easy” phase of the import substitution 
“industrialization” devoted to the elaboration of the consumer or non-
durable goods vis-à-vis the “difficult” stage that entailed the substitution 
of the “machinery” or capital sectors forgets that the issue was related to a 
change in the “composition” of the goods imported:
the substitution process does not propose the diminution of the global 
quantum of the importation; the diminution, when it is achieved, 
comes imposed by the restrictions of the external sector and not 
by design. From these restrictions (absolute or relative) arises the 
necessity of producing internally some of the goods that before were 
exported. (Tavares 1964: 5)
The Periphery, tied to the limitations of its inherent external disequilibrium, 
given the tendency of the deterioration of the terms of trade and incomes, 
had to concentrate in developing certain sectors and geographical areas 
that could be sustained by a series of closely articulated policies, what later 
(Hirschman 1963) would coin in terms of “backward and forward linkages” 
and the positive feedback all along the productive and sectorial chain.
These aspects also tend to cloud an issue, which is generally appraised 
in terms of the respective levels that can be deduced from capital-output 
and/or capital/labor ratios that present the heterogeneous horizon of 
those economies. And yet the structuralist perspective emphasized that 
“productivity” and investment had to be examined in the context of the power 
asymmetries of the production units and regions involved, that required 
specific analysis in every case, by which it practically sidestepped the so-
called Cambridge capital controversies and “re-switching” (Harcourt 1974) 
of the 1960s in the Anglo-Saxon universities (Boinavosky 2013). The whole 
notion of development implied a distinct version of thinking the “increase” of 
“productivity” levels which meant organizing the labor process in a different 
manner, as well as promoting changes in land tenure or “structural reforms” 
in general: the dynamic view implied that even if some nations produced 
at a higher cost some of its products instead of importing them, it would 
generate in turn new production units and other necessities, changing the 
patterns of production and the “demand” in question. This way of posing 
the problems in ECLAC demonstrates once again that they had no need of 
mainstream economics, nor proto-Keynesian visions: prices and incomes 
were a contingent product of the power asymmetries between and within 
certain sectors and regions. Structuralists assumed the undecidable dilemma 
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trade-off between a relatively higher level of incorporation of the population 
towards the more productive of modern zones, or specific sectorial higher 
wages; it was a dilemma that had no easy answer, whether in the “Paretian 
optimum,” or “second best choice” (Little 1982) of the capital intensity 
required, it simply could not be deduced in advance.
This vision for amplifying the radius and scope of modern “exchange” 
and commodity relations was to be criticized by Marxist theorists (Bernal 
Sahagun et. al. 1980),41 and the “dependency approach” alike. Simultaneously, 
neoclassical criticisms during those years highlighted the investment 
strategies but for different reasons. 
The historical confrontation between, on the one hand, the “Dependentistas” 
who claimed that structuralists aspired to develop “capitalism” aiding 
a “comprador bourgeoisie” (a backward and corrupted capitalist class) 
with profound state interventions, and on the other hand, neoliberal ideas 
underlining high level of protection and certain costly experiments and “state 
interventions” proclivities. This in turn limited the efficiency of the market 
through the “crowding out” effect of private capital investment, which 
obscured structuralists’ policies and views on the role of the “market” for 
transforming Latin American governments strategies. It was argued that the 
states’ intervention turned the whole process of investment and growth into 
a vicious negative circle, which lead to high levels of external debts. 
By the end of the 1970s, it was clear that “development” was not 
synonymous with “growth,” implying among other things a series of reforms 
or structural transformations, reducing income inequalities between 
sectors, differences between various areas and regions, which could not be 
conceived independently of recovering and institutionalizing some form of a 
“democratic” regime. Thus, the 1980 lost decade of growth in Latin America 
withstood all the political struggles and various transitional processes which 
the region had to undergo to reach a form government based on a more open 
and competitive “democratic” process (Foxley 1988).
Under the Sweltering Heat of the “Washington Consensus”
In the 1980s, with an increasing external debt (Bulmer-Thomas 2011, 
Sunkel 1991), the Periphery would show declining rates of growth and 
development. The international environment had changed drastically after 
the U.S. left the dollar free of its gold counterpart, turning to relatively flexible 
exchange rates. In turn, the higher petrol prices during those years created a 
massive liquidity that was to be “lent” at very low interest rates to any country 
willing to undertake the borrowing. An inflationary process surged that 
was to leave the Periphery in a very weak situation to negotiate its external 
debts. The Brady plans to exchange bonds for external debt (Bulmer-Thomas 
2011) did not really solve the insurmountable payments with the level of 
41 A book composed of a series of meetings in 1973-74 at the Autonomous University of Méxi-
co. See also Guillen (1975, 1976).
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interest rates then in process, which with the declining rates of growth of the 
industrial Centers generated a reduced level of imports from the Periphery. 
That explains the negative rates of growth during the so-called “lost decade” 
of the 1980’s, although it can be taken to mean until the end of the 1990s in 
some countries (Perez and Vernengo 2010).
The decline of state support for capital investment/construction (Ramos 
1991) can certainly explain the lower rates of growth and development in 
the Periphery since the inception of the “Washington Consensus” drive and 
the appearance of the so-called “good economics” (Harberger 1995) and the 
“Chicago Boys” in our intellectual horizons; foreign direct capital did not 
occupy the vacuum left by the public and states’ subsidies to local industry; 
the childish argument about the “crowding effect” by state interventions and 
subsidies took many decades before it was questioned (Sunkel 1991, Ros 
2014, Sosa et. al. 2013) given the disastrous consequences for local industrial 
sectors and the economy in general. 
The process stimulating research and development in local industries has 
become one of the main aspects on which the state in the Periphery is beginning 
to concentrate. The so-called market forces have not been forthcoming with 
their benevolent fruits as the globalization and “Washington Consensus” 
initially promised. The great part of the investment and research is generally 
undertaken and “placed” strategically in “developed” economies (Thompson 
and Hirst 1996), leaving for the Periphery other less important tasks of the 
productive process in the best of cases when the direct foreign investment is 
undertaken by the big corporations.
The surplus of foreign currency to pay for the debt and interest in the 
current account, allowed the foreign exchange to be sent home by the great 
migration drive towards the industrial countries, given the absence of local 
alternatives: the Periphery was converted into a vast camp of labor export 
sanctuary for certain economic sectors in the “Center countries.” In contrast 
to capital flight and unregulated freedom by the “globalization” drive, the 
migratory forces were under the constant persecution and racist invectives of 
the local Center states, which was to be intensified once a downward growth 
tendency was perceived, lessening their capacity to increment the “price” of 
its labor.
Invariably in ECLAC a discussion arose as to the mode of sustaining and 
generating higher “productivity rates” and the industrialization process. It 
included a much-reconsidered reflection on the “openness” or otherwise 
of the recent decades of the “industrialization” drive, which as mentioned 
before was not just a “neoliberal” criticism. The trends and direction of the 
generation of endogenous local technological rationalities was the starting 
point with the work of Fernando Fajnzylberg (1983) La Industrialización 
Trunca de América Latina, underlining the importance of developing an 
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“endogenous nucleus” and “creative environment”42 with the corresponding 
social and political alliances to attract some form of foreign capital to 
intensify the accumulation drive, which really meant concentrating on 
sectors with high capital density, in tandem with a much more “open” and 
“free” environment heretofore in the region. Although the discussions linger 
on whether the “structure” of the final demand and incorporation of the labor 
force could be better intensified if industrial innovation strategies concentrate 
on the medium or smaller production units, the work of Sunkel in the early 
1990s (Development from Within: Toward a Neostructuralist Approach for 
Latin America) offered an interesting alternative theoretical twist. The 
work is presented as a supersession of Prebisch’s and ECLAC’s postures on 
its vision of the articulation of the Periphery to the world markets and the 
corresponding industrialization process involved.
By then the region had to attune itself to what was called the “Washington 
Consensus”43 if it was going to receive some foreign lending or respite on the 
drain of its capital towards the industrial Centers. The hegemonic neoliberal 
regime came hand in hand with the imposition of the “Washington Consensus” 
and the myth of the globalization process. The “reforms” imposed, implied it 
had to open up its economies lowering all rates of levies on imports, sell and 
privatize most of its public utilities sectors, and generate a surplus in foreign 
exchange. This meant advocating an export drive that in the short run could 
only be undertaken by the primary sector which generated the commodity 
boom export, whose role in the last instance became the Center piece of a 
strategy reinstating the long run sustainable uncertainties on the nature of the 
transformation of the economies in question.
The opening up of the economies of the region to the world market with 
the promise to receive foreign investment soon showed a declining tendency, 
after an early surge by big international corporations to buy the heretofore 
state public utilities (“un-manageable”, “deficit”, and “unproductive” as the 
tedious neoliberal jargon sung), followed by the cyclical arrival of foreign 
capital searching for higher bond rates earnings in the Periphery. 
Most of the adjustments and reforms consequent on the opening up of vast 
economic sectors to the international competition had also to do with the 
absence of macroeconomic “equilibriums” that were thought to be generated 
by the state’s uncontrolled expenditure, requiring important fiscal reforms 
that had also been a basic postulate of the structuralist modernizing strategy.
In certain arguments it was a question of the distance or “non-convergence” 
between Latin America’s growth patterns, specially of its industrial sectors 
vis-à-vis the benchmarks or model of the industrial Center growth rates; 
others argued that transmission of knowledge and research alternatives had 
to be examined given that differing productivity rates could not be explained 
42 Rodriguez says, “enriched with the advances and understanding of the ‘endogenous’ techni-
cal progress and innovation” (2006: 367).
43 Cypher (1998), Marangos (2012), Kregel (2008).
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solely on factor productivity in question.
Sunkel (1991) was recuperating the structuralist vocabulary with the 
prefix “neo-structuralism,” emphasizing and questioning the critique by 
neoliberal ideas that its strategies were inefficient because it opposed an open 
market44 and the freedom to interact and compete among different countries. 
If Prebisch’s classic formula (Prebisch 1949b) stated that post-WWII 
process of development should take an “inward” direction for the Periphery 
after a century of an “outward” drive, Sunkel (1991: 23-59) generated an 
interesting twist to the issue. He argued that Prebisch’s dictum of an “inward 
looking development,” did not put sufficient weight on the particularities 
of accumulation, emphasizing the impulses that were generated by the 
expansion of the home market, and the replacement of local production by 
imports of goods previously imported.
This last formulation leads to a strategy, which rests in the amplification 
of the internal consumption and the local reproduction of the consuming 
patterns, industrial production and technology of the Centers, via the import 
substitution industrialization, fundamentally oriented by a narrow and 
skewed internal demand, configured by an internal unequal distribution of 
income. The industrial strategy from within has very different implications (...) 
in the words of Fajnzylber (1983), of an ‘internal creative effort to configure 
a productive structure that is functional to the needs and potential national 
specificities’ (...) internal creativity requires (...) a greater and contiguous 
participation and interrelation between different agents and incentives: 
big industrial plants linked to medium and small enterprises, scientific and 
technological infrastructure (...) Once the communication, interaction and 
fluidity of these actors, instances and levels of decision get consolidated as a 
national practice, it would have conformed integrally what is known as the 
‘dynamic technological endogenous nucleus’. (Sunkel 1991: 64).
Therefore, Sunkel’s Inward-Looking Development to Development from 
Within, exhibit a search for a political and theoretical option to counter the 
so-called “globalization” and “Washington Consensus” policies.
It seems to displace the question of the home market’s limitations to absorb 
technological progress, culminating in the idea of generating an endogenous 
technology change emphasizing reforms and structural transformations 
now viewed in terms of the new forms of articulating the local productive 
units and the potentially conceivable associations with the world market 
corporations.45 
First of all, the “structuralist perspective” and its policies were never the 
evil green monster anti-market or state Centered that neoliberalism narrative 
claimed; the post-WWII economic environment of the period imposed on 
some countries exchanged control and state subsidies for industrial and 
44 For the typical criticism, see Lal (1983).
45 See Leiva’s critique (2008).
50
other concerns, which were not very different to what had occurred during 
the evolution and growth of the industrial Centers and inter-war years.46 On 
the other hand, the social and infrastructure development conform to the 
patterns observed in the industrial Centers own evolution as Chang’s (2002) 
book reminds Western-centric academia.
In that context (Fajnzylberg 1983) proposed concentrating on developing 
the uppermost technological phases of industry, which generated an 
important debate with those whom argued instead for the support of the small 
and medium size production units, given its higher rate of labor incorporation 
to the productive circuit, which had a more positive effect on the economy as 
a whole and to the productivity level generated by each unit of capital or labor 
during the growth process. 
Development from within recovered some of the various alternatives to 
think and propose the new ways to incorporate and defend for the Periphery 
the fruits of its own technological progress, transforming the once apparently 
closed circuits between local capital and their foreign counterparts, into a 
more hospitable and competitive environment were the “state” would use 
other types of leverage to sponsor the industrialization and transformation 
of the Periphery. What neoliberalism policies forgot in its “state Centered” 
invective in the region were the authoritarian and undemocratic regimes 
that existed during the 1970s and 1980s, which created many of the obstacles 
to the “developmental process” required for a higher “growth” drive to be 
undertaken. Neoliberalism’s policies were complicit with the Pinochets of 
the region that protected and sponsored so-called “individual enterprise” at 
whatever cost in terms of civil liberties. 
Simultaneously by the end of the 1970s in Latin America, perceptions 
on the undemocratic regimes started to differentiate between “styles” or 
“approaches” of development (Gutierrez Garza 1994),47 as well as O’Donnell’s 
(1982) notion of “state bureaucratic-authoritarism.” They initiated 
challenging the then quite dominant conceptual horizon of the left in Latin 
American of the function of the state as simply an apparatus representative of 
the bourgeoisie “interests.”
Under the dictates of the period “Washington Consensus” we find a 
peculiar historical phenomenon occurrence in the Latin American region, 
especially if gauged by its intensity: the much vaunted process of inclusion 
and development, represents a period were the region intensifies the political 
and economic asymmetries, sponsoring the expulsion and exportation of 
labor: the much needed surplus of foreign exchange to pay for the region’s 
external debt had been resolved through the mechanism of the “exportation 
of labor force” to the Center countries.
Subsequently the social and political struggles in the region confronted the 
46 Booth (1987, 1989), Peden (1989), Cerretano (2009).
47 Graciarena (1976), Wolfe (1976).
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persistence of the neoliberal strategies, under a few political regimes which 
contest some of its main tenets: Venezuela, Brazil Argentina, Bolivia, and 
Ecuador, which more recently have presented an off course with vengeance 
with the return of Bolsonaro and the Macri regimes in Brazil and Argentina 
respectively. At least rhetorically if not in real terms, Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela strove for new policies with a more “distributive” perspective until 
the recent changes, sponsoring an intensification of certain rates of growth 
and incorporating the inclusion of the local populations in their development 
objectives. But we must evaluate these alternatives in the context of what has 
happened with the rise of a whirlwind of neoliberalism and its consequences. 
The level of inequality in the region has not changed practically in the last 
twenty years. Sectorial and geographically debates hinge on its amplitude 
(ECLAC 2010, 2015). 
Weak rates of growth globally again seems to be a basic limitation but 
also the structural reforms in the region have been delinking the productive 
processes internally by sale to foreign enterprises of certain productive units, 
which sponsored “commodities boom” primary exports displacing backward 
and forward linkages, by prioritizing the agricultural -export boom- without 
its “industrial” partner side.48 Also the land tenure and family agriculture 
have not received the subsidies or collateral for its sustainability; in some 
countries, agriculture has had to withstand the most retrograde of policies 
attempting to appropriate and concentrate the land in fewer units; its forms of 
possession in separation of some of its conditions of existence do not present 
any “modernizing” tone in any sense. On the side of its external account, the 
region presents a much more stable and consistent behavior, having tackled 
with success the 2008 financial meltdown in the U.S.
ECLAC’s much professed “hour of equality” (ECLAC 2010) corroborates 
much of the prognoses of a weak growth rate and yet relatively stable 
macroeconomic parameters. Reforms are needed to enhance the development 
in the region. But the elements which new policies should incorporate have 
to do with transforming the actual forms of possession in separation of the 
production units, looking for alternatives in community projects and other 
forms of state and cooperatives participation. Macro demand management 
policies are not enough to change the actual logic of neoliberal “deregulations” 
which brought about a surge of economic, and much more dangerous, social 
polarization forces, marginalizing extensive sectors of the population, which 
previously had been slowly incorporated into the life of the nations.
Concluding remarks
48 CEPAL-Cimoli (2007), Cimoli (2005), Cimoli y Dosi (1995), Cimoli, Primi y Vergara (2005), 
Cimoli y Stiglitz (2008), Cimoli, Nelson y Stiglitz (2006), Cimoli, Dosi y Stiglitz (2008a), Dosi, 
Fagiolo y Roventini (2008), Dosi, Orsenigo y Labini (2002).
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The long trajectory of Latin American theoretical discussions presented 
have not concluded. I tried to describe a certain peculiarity, emphasizing 
its distinctness with respect to Western-centric discourse, and given the 
absence of a privileged or sacred perspective, construction of theoretical 
bridges can be undertaken. Recently, under the authorship of Pérez (2015) 
“neostructuralism” and “heterodox” economics are placed as discussants of 
each other as to their viability of their articulation. Whatever the resulting 
synthesis which we might reconstruct, Latin American “structuralism” finds 
itself placed in the difficult situation of having to choose between a discourse 
that understands the “economy” as simply portraying diverse and contrasting 
“elasticities,” or an antagonistic power asymmetric space between agents. 
Much (time!!!) was lost by Prebisch himself, who did not close the dilemma 
until one of his last books (Prebisch 1981) Capitalismo Periférico: Crisis 
y Transformación, underlining the heterogeneous nature of the agents in 
question, and the power asymmetry, which engendered them. But there is 
still some hope: Western-centric post-Keynesianism has offered something 
in that direction: “Contrary to neoclassical theory, and contrary in fact to 
what many Marxist and classical economists claim, there is no necessary 
inverse relationship between real wages and profits rates” (Lavoie 2009: 
122), a basic tenet of the deterioration terms of trade which surrounds the 
work of Prebisch, which equally can be bolstered by the “explorations” on 
“disequilibrium”, found in the Backhouse and Boianovsky book (2013), as 
well as the reappearance of the “heterogeneous agents” (Hoover 2012).
But the political reforms required in the region require reconstructing 
a much disarticulated “playing” field, which means that we must transform 
the way by which agents, regions, and countries “possess in separation” the 
conditions of their livelihood; it’s not just the question of resuscitating the 
role of the “state,” it also has to do with finding ways of incorporating the local 
populations into their own reconstruction: which brings us back full circle to 




The Unfamiliar Raúl Prebisch 1943-1949
Time precedes existence 
Prigogine (1990: 183)
Time is the substance of which I am made 
Jorge Luis Borges (1996: 148)
Introduction
This Introduction is followed by three sections, A Crucifixion on a ‘Cross of Gold’?, which examines Prebisch’s first steps to explain the role of 
the “gold standard” aiming to generate alternative policies for the Periphery 
while the “White-Keynes” project for a new financial organization at Bretton 
Woods is in process, which is continued with the description of the theoretical 
strategy to jettison “classical political economy”, A Theology for Liberation, 
and finally, The Eternal Return: Time and Asynchrony, that underlines the 
culmination of Prebisch’s ideas on the cycle and time, or to use a pompous 
term, the “ontology” in question.
The chapter hopes to display an episode in the intellectual life of Raúl 
Prebisch, namely, the years following his dismissal in 1943 as head of 
Argentina’s Central Bank until a few days after his departure in 1949 from 
Mexico City to Santiago de Chile, without having concluded the schedule of 
lectures promised. In Chile he was to draw up a report as a consultant for the 
ECLAC, a period just prior to the Manifesto (Prebisch 1949b).1 
On October 18th, 1943, Prebisch received news that he had been fired from 
the Central Bank. This, as Dosman points out, was “the single most painful 
experience of his life” (Dosman 2001: 89), and one that Prebisch himself 
mentions repeatedly in interviews throughout the 1980s (Magariños 1991, 
Pollock et al. 2001, González del Solar 1983). By December 1943, Prebisch 
had already made an important decision to seek financial backing to research 
and write a book entitled La Moneda y el Ritmo de la Actividad Económica 
(Prebisch 1943).2 Argentina’s publishers rejected his proposal, but Prebisch 
went ahead with his plan “while he was teaching at the faculty” (Dosman 
2001: 94). 
1 The title of the original text, El desarrollo económico de América Latina y sus principales pro-
blemas (The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems) is not qualified 
by the term some (“algunos”) when cited by many specialists. Did Prebisch himself change the 
title, or was it due to an error that could not be altered, given the lightning speed with which 
it was published everywhere? I am in debt to Dr. Víctor Urquidi for giving me a copy of the 
original manuscript.
2 I would like to thank Edgar Dosman for a copy of this 10-page manuscript.
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But today´s access to the content of much of Raúl Prebisch work and 
“published” texts during the following year’s requires an explanation. 
Writings such as Conversaciones en el Banco de México S.A. (1944b), were 
dismembered in two volumes, hence the reference “Prebisch 1944b in 
Prebisch 1991c and 1993”, and La Moneda y los Ciclos Económicos en la 
Argentina3 from 1944c, another dismembered text of the period, is referenced 
as appearing in Prebisch 1991c and 1993. The manuscript Conversaciones 
can be found separated in Prebisch 1991c and 1993. Conversaciones are talks 
he gave to a series of public officials of the Mexican government with whom 
he agreed they were not to be made “public.” On the other hand, La Moneda 
(1944c) incorporates substantial parts of Conversaciones (1944b). Editors 
mention that Prebisch allowed for this incorporation. The publication of La 
Moneda (1944c) is presented in turn dispersed as mentioned into specific 
fascicles representing specific lectures by Prebisch (1991c and 1993), but 
includes only 17, excluding fascicle no. 1 (“Introduction,” 11 pages) which 
can be read in Mallorquin (2006). In fact, La Moneda y los Ciclos Económicos 
en la Argentina is actually a full contained text of 342 pages. Editors were 
Julio Gonzalez del Solar, Pascual M. Martínez, and Juan Carlos Menescaldi. 
The volume contains the shorthand notes taken from Prebisch’s lectures 
which were revised under his supervision. In accordance with Argentina law 
12,371 of June 1944, editors expressing no profit motive hoped to recover 
costs. However, notwithstanding the 1944 year as date of “publication” by 
Rotaprint Argentina fascicles 14 to 18 were published during the first weeks 
of January and February 1945. But the latter fascicles can also be found in 
Prebisch’s 1944b. In today’s terms, there was an incredible amount of “copy 
paste” work.
It is my aim here to present the development of Prebisch’s critiques 
and reflections on economic thought. I will touch only obliquely on his 
ideas about economic policy and industrialization, a subject that merits 
consideration but which can be observed discussed throughout most of the 
book. One of the assumptions of my argument is precisely that Prebisch’s 
thinking displays a certain historical unity in this period. This can be analyzed 
independently of the intellectual periods immediately preceding and those 
that follow our analysis. The period between his demise in 1943 as the General 
Manager of Argentina Central Bank and his decision to take up initially a post 
of consultancy at ECLAC in 1949, should be seen in a context fraught with 
very important political transformations in Argentina with the rise of Perón 
to power. The Faculty of Economics of the University of Buenos Aires also 
bears the brunt of changes in process and Prebisch was not an absentee in 
the discussion for the reform of the curricula of the discipline by offering 
an alternative, although “losing” out to the proposals of the then governing 
body of the Faculty in 1948 (Arana 2016). Simultaneously, as his theoretical 
evolution would show, he consciously rejected any necessary “oligarchical” 
3 I am grateful to Dr. Washington Ashwell, who kindly sent me a copy of the manuscript.
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ties in thought and action with the landowning class: in September in 1945 he 
published in Spanish the 1924 conference he offered in Australia to the Henry 
George Club de Melbourne (The land issue, Prebisch 1945d) showing his 
lifelong disgust for the landowning class and parasitical practices in Argentina 
and Latin America. But the inner conflicts in the Faculty of economics, with 
the “Peronist” movement in process, convinced him to leave the Faculty in 
1948 despite his favorable avowed posture for a “responsible” intervention in 
the economy (Prebisch 1945 in Prebisch 1991c: 447).
I will not go into a comparison between the theoretical vocabulary of 
the period 1943-49 and subsequent vocabulary. However, the existential and 
political events that prompt the Prebisch of the Manifesto familiar to many is 
a period I take as “read.” 
In a nutshell, the Prebisch of the Manifesto (1949) and the theoretical 
reflection about the peripheral economy (and therefore the very notion of 
the cycle) that gradually took shape thereafter, was not predetermined by his 
earlier thinking. In other words, the ideas that Prebisch had been developing, 
and was carrying around in “his luggage” when he decided to accept the post 
of consultant to the ECLAC in Chile suggested a different theoretical path. 
We shall see that Prebisch had other theoretical options and may well have 
gone on developing them.
Joseph Love has mentioned that Prebisch read an article by Charles 
Kindleberger discussing the decline of the terms of trade suffered by the 
primary producing countries vis-à-vis the industrial ones and suggesting 
that “production factors for agriculture and raw materials [be] transferred 
to industry” (Kindleberger in Harris 1943). Indeed, Prebisch avoids these 
issues in Conversaciones (1944b) and criticizes Kindleberger (Prebisch 1944b 
in 1991: 197), for assuming that the rest of the world was predestined to buy 
much more from the United States than what it sells, rather than the other 
way around. Using Argentina as corroboration, even called into question 
his own statements about Kindleberger.4 However, we have to remember 
that the discussion at the time was focused on the international stabilization 
plans (the White and the Keynes Plans were already circulating) and the 
“scarcity of the dollar” (Mikesell 1994). Even more important, for Prebisch, 
the theoretical explanation for the different “income elasticities” was not 
relevant as a subject for reflection. During those days, he was examining 
economic theory in general, and although the subject of the “worsening” 
primary product prices had been “reported” and “assessed” by his own pen 
since his student days, he had as yet no theoretical explanation other than the 
classical one of the cyclical rise and downfall of prices.5
4 “Which does not mean he might not be right” (Prebisch1944b in 1991c: 198).
5 An example should it be needed: here the topic discussed is the tendency to disequilibrium 
in the “balance of payments” in 1936: “I am referring to the fall in international prices. If inter-
national prices go on falling year after year, the balance of payments, which tends to balance 
out after the first fall, is again unbalanced with successive falls (...) The case I am considering 
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Indeed, it is rather “odd”, as Love puts it (1996: 118), that no paternity of 
any kind is granted to Kindleberger as one of the precursors of the Prebisch-
Singer thesis about the worsening terms of trade suffered by primary exporting 
countries vis-à-vis the industrial countries. Moreover, if we assume that these 
issues were foremost in Prebisch’s reflections on economic thought, then we 
can rightly talk, as John Toye and Richard Toye (2003: 445) do, of a certain 
“confusion” in his ideas about the mechanism of the “worsening in the terms 
of trade.”
My own interpretation differs in that, rather than talking of “confusion,” I 
aim to show that Prebisch found himself in a process of theoretical transition, 
or at one of the several theoretical crossroads throughout his life, and which 
would in fact be frozen. But Toye's approach fudges analysis of his reflections 
before the Manifesto with the latter. In other words, at ECLAC emerges once 
again a strategic shift in theoretical vocabulary, quite possibly the result of 
a crucial event, as well as the atmosphere of the “Cold War” and prudence 
and calculation produced by international organizations, especially ECLAC, 
hounded by the United States.6
This would seem to have been the case because Celso Furtado, a colleague 
of Prebisch’s in the early days of ECLAC, has said that prior to the famous 
manuscript, Prebisch circulated a “first text” and that, before discussion began, 
“it was abruptly taken out of circulation with no explanation,” aspects of which 
can be observed in our account further ahead. However, the text known 
worldwide today was presented without further preliminaries and reached 
“my hands in mimeograph in its finished form” (Furtado 1988: 53). In fact, 
we do not know what happened to the “first text,” but the new manuscript 
was, in Furtado’s words, no longer on the “defensive”; it was an open call 
for industrialization, in spite of pointing out the “limitations.” According to 
Furtado,7 it is the appearance of Singer’s classic article (1949)8 which explains 
the turnabout and the beginning of the transformation of Prebisch’s theoretical 
vocabulary between the two texts, as Toye (2003) tends to validate.
In Dag Hammarskjold’s celebrated phrase9, was this the period when 
is different. It involves the hypothesis that price levels fall continually over a number of years” 
(Prebisch 1991c: 566), “setting off a new wave of gold exports. That is the characteristic feature 
of this phenomenon” (Prebisch 1991c: 569).
6 There is no better account of these years than Celso Furtado (1988) and Burger (1998).
7 “It was the appearance of H. Singer’s work on the terms of trade that enabled people to think 
globally about the problems of underdeveloped countries, or about the global terms of world-
wide exchange between primary and industrialized products, which is translated into global 
terms of trade. Singer took the relationship between the developed and undeveloped countries 
as a central hypothesis. It was a description of imperialism under another name, in a manner 
of speaking. (...) Prebisch read Singer’s text and it must have had a great effect on him because, 
after tidying up the first version, he worked intensely on a second, introducing a quote by Sing-
er, and the system of exchange data” (Furtado 1998: 85-86).
8 On the vicissitudes of Singer’s article, see Toye (2003).
9 Dag Hammarskjold had said: “Indeed, Prebisch is skating on thin ice, but I fully support him” 
(Magariños 1991: 144).
58
Prebisch started “skating on thin ice?” Notwithstanding it did not prevent 
him supporting the presentation of the report commissioned from him for 
the Quintadinha Meeting in Brazil in 1954 by the OAS’s Inter-American 
Economic and Social Council. It is no secret that, aside from calling for his 
“head,” the United States government attempted unsuccessfully to prevent 
ECLAC being set up after the three-year trial period. There can be no better 
corroboration of this attitude and policy than when Eugene Black, then 
President of the International Reconstruction and Development Bank, 
shouted from the rooftops “Who does this man think he is coming here and 
giving us advice?” (Santa Cruz 1984: 467).10
A Crucifixion on a “Cross of Gold”?
Several years after leaving the Central Bank, Prebisch claimed it had been a 
“true theoretical liberation” (Prebisch 1993: 411).11 It is symptomatic that right 
from the beginning of the Conversaciones (1944b) he draws the limit and extent 
to what he was willing to criticize of the “monetary doctrine”: “Why not seek 
our own principles when the traditional principles themselves are undergoing 
a severe process of critical revision?” (Prebisch 1944b in 1972a: 255).
Although La Moneda (1944c) composed and written some months after 
Conversaciones incorporates much of the content of the latter, critical positions 
much more fundamental to economic theory can already be perceived. These 
positions Prebisch may already have held, but not yet conceptually elaborated, 
and they therefore did not form part of what he expounded previously in 
Mexico.12 The theoretical strategy of La Moneda still spoke of “adaptation” 
and the “modification of theories,” as well as “formulating new ones” about the 
“reality” of his “country” (Prebisch in Mallorquin 2006: 54-55). Indeed, a year 
later he was still trying in some way to defend the limitations of the traditional 
doctrine regarding the Periphery, referring to it in the image of “geographical 
charts” or “old maps” that should be put right contrasting them to specific 
realities (Prebisch 1945 in 1991c: 443).13 Then, in La Moneda, he does not 
suggest breaking with the traditional explanation of “monetary phenomena 
of big countries” (Prebisch 1944c in 1972a: 256), since they “coincide” (albeit 
only “partially”) with the phenomena of peripheral countries.
I should stress that the discrepancy (not to say theoretical “ambiguity”) 
about the usefulness or otherwise of traditional theories, is also present in 
his appraisal of the gold standard. If, on the one hand, this was not “about 
ditching the gold standard as a monetary regime in our country, but about 
finding a way to adapt its workings to our needs, to our economic and 
monetary reality” (Prebisch 1944c in Mallorquin 2006: 54),14 on the other, 
Prebisch also stated that the classical theory of the gold standard “is not 
universal.” Such a regime represented the “experience of the Center,” of 
“industrial and creditor” countries, and not “the experience of the countries 
14 The stance of Conversaciones (Prebisch 1972a) and El patrón oro... are similar: “to perfect,” 
“to correct,” “not to destroy” the gold standard in “our countries” (Prebisch 1991c: 233).
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in the Periphery” (Prebisch 1944c in 1993: 19).15
These discrepancies reflect an ongoing theoretical transition. It is in La 
Moneda (Prebisch 1991c: 286)16 where Prebisch expounds for the “first time” 
the theoretical explanation about the cycle while simultaneously trying to 
displace previous elaborations. This also explains why his arguments against 
Kindleberger in Conversaciones (1944b) are absent in La Moneda (Prebisch 
1944c). Both narratives were elaborated in 1944: Conversaciones preceded La 
Moneda. The new theoretical issues also excluded any kind of rapprochement 
with Kindleberger’s thesis, apart from the fact that Prebisch already had a new 
appreciation of the international ensemble,17 despite being aware of one of 
the factors pointed out by Kindleberger to explain the “worsening” primary 
produce prices, for example a la Duesenberry on the low price elasticity of 
demand for consumer goods which he now begins to consider.18
15 Elsewhere Prebisch says: “As a system the gold standard has been automatic only for cer-
tain countries. It was not so for England, who managed it until the First World War. The 
concept of the gold standard’s automatism is a dogmatic aberration of the kind so frequent 
in economic matters. (...) the gold standard has been a highly directed system, not by a single 
authority, by one government, but by a group of bankers led by the Bank of England (...) di-
rected (...) from the standpoint of British interests, and even more so from the standpoint 
of a social class with great economic and political influence in Great Britain, and extremely 
concerned to maintain domestic monetary stability, despite the consequences that might re-
sult from it for international economic activity” (Prebisch 1944c in 1991c: 317). At around the 
same time, Nurkse was saying something similar, but from a different theoretical perspective: 
“The policy of offsetting is intended not to raise total spending but to prevent it from falling. 
(...) Yet the amount of imports, and hence the gap in the balance of payments, will necessarily 
be greater than if the country allowed depression to spread to its whole domestic economy. 
(...) Under the gold standard, not only were things expected to take their natural course, but 
a country in the situation described was even expected to accelerate the spread of depression 
by pushing up its discount rates and contracting credit as gold flowed out. No doubt the gold 
standard’s ‘rules of the game’ tended to reduce the loss of gold to a minimum; but they did 
so only by speeding up the propagation of depressions. The offsetting procedure described is 
precisely the opposite of that which would be called for under the gold-standard’s rules of 
the game. (...) Even in the best days of the gold standard, of course, the rules of the game 
were not always strictly observed. There is some statistical evidence of “neutralization,” 
on the part of the Bank of France and the Bank of England in the nineteenth century. In the 
inter-war period neutralization of gold movements by central banks became, in fact, the rule 
rather than the exception. (...) Though neutralization by central banks was very common in the 
inter-war period it was nearly always frowned upon; it was widely regarded as wicked and dis-
reputable behavior. (...) it is time to accept it as a normal and respectable procedure” (Nurkse 
1945: 11-13).
16 We should stress that Prebisch states that this is “a hypothesis that should be checked” in oth-
er words, “the nature of the income circulatory process at the monetary Center to and from the 
countries of the Periphery [which] would explain by it [self ] the generation of the cyclical global 
process, with no need for any other reasons, which is not to say no other extremely important 
reasons exist” (Prebisch 1944c in 1993: 30).
17 And the fact that the Bretton Woods Meeting and Agreements had already taken place. 
See Mikesell (1994).
18 “When the personal incomes of the employed population rise -especially those in the rela-
tively high-income bracket- they do not consume more food, but greater quantities of man-
ufactured products” (Prebisch 1944c in 1991c: 271).
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Prebisch then was claiming he was closer to the “classics,” since classical 
economists aimed to observe “reality,” “scientifically” (Prebisch 1944c in 
1991c: 286) in contrast to those who just merely replicate it.
There is a theory then (an explanation) of the workings of the realm of 
capitalism under the influence of a conceptual element that would survive 
throughout the period: the economic phenomenon should give priority to 
the examination of money, which is the “technical yardstick for measuring 
values,” and has an importance that is “absolutely fundamental in the life of 
society” (Prebisch in Mallorquin 2006: 55). By the same token, the descriptions 
of the evolution of the cycle that had for some time been devised under the 
assumption of a “system of communicating vessels” are clearly inadequate:
For this reason, the theory is incomplete, and incorrect on fundamental 
points, for one part of the system could not have been theorized about 
while disregarding the other fundamental part. Which is why I believe 
that the international theory of the gold standard has to be revised to 
give it a general character covering the Center, the countries close 
to the Center, and the countries of the Periphery. (Prebisch 1944c in 
1993: 19).19
The first part of La Moneda (1944c) sets out under various hypothetical 
scenarios (rising or falling imports, domestic expansion of income, or lack 
of it, and so on) a series of examples illustrating the development of the 
economy and the consequences of the circulatory process of income and its 
reproduction. It points out the sectors’ interdependence, assuming different 
rates of income generation and reproduction in each case. Depending on the 
phase of the cyclical process observed (contracting or expanding), Prebisch 
insists that “external or internal influences cause expansion and contraction 
phenomena greater in scope than the numerical significance of the initial 
impulse that causes them in the first place” (Prebisch 1944c in 1991c: 250). 
In every hypothetical model he points out the shortcomings of classical 
monetary theory (Prebisch 1944c in 1991c: 274). But what he really wants to 
introduce into his models is the factor of time. The time it takes the various 
different productive sectors to generate new income implies thinking about 
the time they require to expand or extend productive activity.20 The notion 
will mutate into a much more complex phenomenon in the following years, 
which in my reading subsumes Keynes’s concept of “uncertainty.”
19 A year later Prebisch said it was not necessary to look for “two orders of theories”, a cycle in 
the Periphery, and another in the industrial Center, “as two phases are involved, two different 
aspects of the same international phenomenon. But it is inadmissible to apply the interpreta-
tion of one phase to the events of the other, to the obverse, (...) domestic and international 
economic activity manifested in a continuous process of circulation of income” (Prebisch 1945 
in 1991c: 446).
20 “The time in which the process is completed -its duration- is of fundamental importance, and 
the explanation of this point is of interest in gaining a better grasp of the international mecha-
nism and its flaws” (Prebisch 1944c in 1991c: 280).
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To the time issue, or that of the rate of income circulation and 
reproduction, Prebisch adds the thesis that “income growth” in various 
countries is a function of profits. In other words, this phenomenon would 
explain the concentration and holding of gold crossing their borders.
One of the first phenomena to consider in explaining the serious flaws in 
the gold standard scheme is the different import coefficients among countries. 
In other words, gold holdings do not depend on a country’s opening-up 
or interaction with the international market. They depend instead on the 
distribution of “total profits” (“réditos totales”) between “domestic activity” 
and “foreign trade” (Prebisch 1944c in 1991c: 290).21 This is displayed by 
Prebisch with numerical models for countries with similar, then dissimilar, 
productive structures, but different import coefficients.22
The sterilization of foreign currencies or gold in the upward phase, may 
diminish the effects of continuous drainage of gold reserves, but do not totally 
prevent it, particularly if the “gold standard regime” is followed to the letter.23 
This arrangement, which in the long term concentrates gold within certain 
borders, contradicted the idea that gold was merely a vehicle for carrying out 
transfers and supporting foreign trade. Prebisch indorses theoretically the 
existing asymmetry through the idea of the “expansion coefficient,” which, 
according to him, is not the same as the concept of the Keynesian “multiplier” 
(Keynes/Kahn), as they are each “based on substantially different theories” 
(Prebisch 1944c in 1991c: 350). Whereas for Keynes the “multiplier” is a 
constant indicating the amount by which investments or original income 
have been reproduced, Prebisch holds that his idea of the “expansion 
coefficient” has “limits.” These “limits” have nothing to do with the amount 
of “saving” assumed by Keynes’s theory (Prebisch 1944c in 1991c: 364), but 
with the “time” elapsing between the beginning of a productive cycle and 
the generation of fresh income. This period is determined by two elements: 
“the number of times the money changes hands to produce the income” 
(i.e., its rate of circulation), and the “amount of money lost at each exchange 
in imports payment” (Prebisch 1944c in 1991c: 358).24 What this attempts 
21 “The incremented income which stays in each country is proportional to its profits [réditos] 
(...) “it can be proven that the increment of income which stays in each country at the equilib-
rium point, have between them the same relation (…) That is, the incremented original income 
is distributed proportionally to the profit of distinct countries considered” (Prebisch 1944c in 
1991c: 294).
22 “Therefore, as gold is distributed worldwide according to countries’ incomes and not ac-
cording to their foreign trade, countries with lower returns and higher import coefficients are 
put in a much more vulnerable position in terms of fluctuations in foreign trade and balance of 
payments.” (Prebisch 1944c in 1991c: 296).
23 “There exists therefore incompatibility between an expanding domestic policy or mainte-
nance of domestic economic activity in a downward phase caused by falling exports, and the 
monetary stability inherent in the gold standard regime” (Prebisch 1944c in 1991c: 315).
24 “The economic cycle is thus manifested in an alternate movement of income, contracting 
and expanding in the circulatory process. (...) Whatever the origin of domestic income, it grad-
ually evaporates and is transformed into income of other countries. (...) The extent of which 
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to explain is, on the one hand, the loss of income leaving the circulatory 
process via imports in economies like Argentina’s, and on the other, the rate 
at which different economies generate their own income. It is precisely the 
time factor that explains a certain asymmetry, or “disparity” in Prebisch’s 
terms, in the concentration of gold: economies with low import coefficients 
that “take a long time” to put back a proportion of their income into the 
international market, which generated “gold holdings” within their borders, 
progressively amplified over various cycles. Thus, Prebisch suggests that it is 
the relationship between “total profit” (the rate at which they are generated) 
and foreign trade, that explains the process. If we accept that, in “the upward 
phase” of the cycle “exports grew faster than imports, and the balance of 
payments was positive, whereas in the downward phase exports fell more 
rapidly than imports” (Prebisch 1944c in 1991c: 320), then the different rates 
of circulation of the income and amounts leaving some borders would explain 
the circular accumulative process.25
Given his theory “the greater the profits, the greater the gold holdings,” 
it is understandable that Prebisch would be suspicious of industrialization 
policies per se in shoring up growth and dealing with oscillations caused by 
the gold standard (Prebisch 1993: 210). Hence his reference to Alejandro 
Bunge and his group, and difficulties of adapting to the regime despite a 
clearly defined monetary policy in traditional terms: “It is often believed 
amongst us that Argentina’s industrial growth would make us less vulnerable 
to the effects of these international disturbance factors. The belief is totally 
without basis. I will demonstrate (...) that industrial growth could make us 
less vulnerable” (Prebisch 1991c: 279), only if Argentina takes into account 
political and monetary aspects to counteract the “negative aspects” operating 
under the classical “gold standard.” 
Prebisch is clearly not interested in the different demand/income 
elasticities or demand/price elasticities (nor even the terms of trade). 
Countries, it would seem, are differentiated based on their relationship of 
global rather than sectoral exchange with reference to a financial Center and 
its effects. Although La Moneda and the later Concepto… (Prebisch 1945a in 
1993) both conceive of the rate and circulation of money and income in terms 
of the payment “habits” of the “public” (companies, individuals, the State), 
and/or of the varying number of “transactions required by each economy to 
obtain a given amount of income” (Prebisch 1945a in 1993: 223), Prebisch’s 
text (Concepto…) avoids any reference to the “quantitative theory of money” 
mentioned in La Moneda (Prebisch 1944c in 1991c: 400). Perhaps even 
this substitution takes place has great influence on the evolution of domestic economic activi-
ty” (Prebisch 1945a in 1993: 217).
25 “I can thus prove numerically what I have so often said, namely, that in the downward phase, 
imports fall less steeply than exports. In this way, the remainder of money is consumed, or the 
gold and foreign currencies from the positive balances of the preceding phase -which amounts 
to the same thing in this case” (Prebisch 1944c in 1991c: 354). 
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more significant than the continuous process of theoretical elaboration is 
the fact that he does not mention his concept of the “expansion coefficient” 
in contradistinction to Keynes’s “multiplier.” As we shall see further on, this 
notion would mutate into the concept of the “exit coefficient” (Prebisch 
1949a in 1993: 464)26. Prebisch is clearly still not totally comfortable because 
he does not stop there. More radically, a year later in 1946, at the First Meeting 
of Technicians on Problems of Central Banking of the American Continent, he 
stated: 
I am disturbed by the arguments that free competition leads to general 
equilibrium and to the most appropriate distribution of resources and 
income within society. I see no correspondence between these abstract 
propositions and the reality of the economic world. (Prebisch 1946 in 
1993: 227)
But by this stage he already perceives that the ontological feature of 
capitalism is essentially stochastic: 
I have reached the conclusion that all movements in the economy 
taken as a whole are cyclical in character (...) in the broadest sense, (...) 
a succession of undulatory movements rising and falling (...) The cycle 
(...), both in the Center and the Periphery, is the characteristic way 
the economy grows -the capitalist economy has grown in no way but 
cyclically. (Prebisch 1946 in 1993: 226)
A Theology for Liberation
The theoretical work undertaken in the coming years will be devoted to 
a “dynamic examination of the economy,” because then it was still “in its 
beginnings” (Prebisch 1945a in 1993: 228). Between August 1946 and early 
1947, Prebisch devoted himself to analyzing Keynes’s classic work, The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. It was during this analysis 
that he made his final theoretical transition of the period.
Though the “practical solutions” proposed by Keynes are indisputable, 
this does not necessarily mean agreeing with his critique of political economy 
or its doctrinaire construction,27 less still with the “dogma” his followers 
have made of his work, on the basis of which they devise “new theoretical 
constructions ever further removed from reality as, in my opinion, is Keynes’s 
26 I translate “coeficiente de salida” as “exit coefficient,” and its contrary movement (“coefici-
ente de afluencia”) as “influx coefficient.”
27 “Keynes has also left behind practical solutions that are independent of his theory and that 
can be admitted or rejected, while wholly abstaining from it. These practical solutions are of 
great importance and have not yet been superseded. (...) You will say that there is contradic-
tion in my theoretical position in judging Keynes, and my respect for some of his practical 
propositions. There is no such contradiction, since accepting an interpretation of reality totally 
distinct from Keynes’s own does not imply seeing the positive side which in the absence of a 
better one, certain of his practical propositions could have, within certain limitations” (Pre-
bisch 1948a in 1991c: 505).
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own construction” (Prebisch 1948 in 1991c: 504).28 Prebisch insisted that 
anticyclical economic policy should be defended from a different theoretical 
perspective. Wherever he could, Prebisch emphasized the divergence 
between himself and Keynes. During 1947 Prebisch wrote a series of articles 
analyzing the elementary concepts to Keynes that would later become 
his Introducción a Keynes29 (almost a glossary of sorts). Prebisch did not 
interrupt the flow of Keynes’s ideas with his own or others’ criticisms. He 
also excluded from the book the more scathing of two negative comments 
about Keynes made in the original articles;30 only the following was left in: 
“What correspondence do these theoretical reasonings have with reality? 
Keynes’s book cannot be said to present a systematic analysis of facts to verify 
his theories” (Prebisch 1993: 258).
He leaves for another occasion the matter of whether or not “Lord 
Keynes” carried off “the rational explanation of economic movement, and 
elucidated the principles it obeys” (Prebisch 1991c: 454).31 Yet the strategy 
he was later to embark upon is already very clear here: looking when he 
could on analogies or “coincidences” between Keynes’s ideas and “classical” 
thought, missing no opportunity to point out that the “multiplier decreases” 
(Prebisch 1991c: 454) in an open interrelated economic complex due to the 
fact that some income filters abroad to pay for imports. Prebisch is in fact 
here reminding us of the asymmetric mechanism he developed concerning 
the trading relations under the gold standard.
As his account of Keynes develops, Prebisch emphasizes the undulatory 
wave pattern and cyclical form of capitalism, highlighting its fluctuations, 
a phenomenon that seems not to have been central to the analysis, says 
Prebisch, for it is left until the end of the book. However, basing himself on 
Keynes’s idea of “oscillation around an intermediate position,” so as to avoid 
consideration of major serious fluctuations, he advances his own ideas that 
the cycle and its undulatory form should be seen in a historical, institutional 
28 Much of Prebisch’s disparagement with Keynes has also to do with the then ongoing process 
of the construction of the famous IS-LM “workhorse” that was to dominate economics in the 
Center countries. Hicks´s original diagram posed the vertical axis signaling interest rates and 
the horizontal one as total income with a downward-sloping curve (IS) representing invest-
ment in terms of changing levels of interest rates, and savings in terms of income, which is in-
tersected by an upward-sloping curve (LL) for the money mass demanded which is presumed 
fixed, subsequently redefined as LM; see De Vroey and Hoover (2004), for more details see 
chapter “How Economics Forgot Power”.
29 Introduction to Keynes.
30 “Thus, our author states it categorically, though offering no arguments to prove it other than 
the ones he has just succinctly mentioned” (Prebisch 1947 in 1991c: 476). See the end of the 
first paragraph of the Introducción a Keynes (Prebisch 1947: 57). It is no coincidence that this 
jab appears at this juncture of the argument, since it relates to the theme discussing the multi-
plier. But as we will see, Prebisch’s critique of Keynes takes another spin in subsequent years: 
“his general theory of employment seems to unfold upon a plane independent of the cyclical 
movement” (Prebisch 1993: 260).
31 “[Which] I intend to consider briefly in a more encouraging work on the Keynesian system 
and the economic cycle” (Prebisch 1991c: 454).
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sense, not as a “natural law” (Prebisch 1991c: 482). However, Prebisch’s 
critique of classical political economy in general and Keynes’s in particular, 
had already been set up:
To explain the phenomenon of continuous disequilibrium in reality, 
Keynes devotes a couple of pages at the end of his work, -the so-called 
notes on the cycle- in which he makes no use of the results reached in 
his theoretical discussion at all. He seeks the explanation of the cycle in 
another vague form. He said that the ascendant phase suddenly collapses 
with the falling of capital returns, without explaining his reasons nor the 
relation it has with the phenomena studied in the general theory; that 
is, as with classical economists, we find that his fundamental theories 
are unsuited to explaining cyclical reality. (Prebisch 1991c: 506)32
By mid-1948, in Apuntes de Economía Política33, shortly after finishing 
his book on Keynes, Prebisch was shifting the conceptual vocabulary that 
might almost be described as a “quantum leap.” He proposes no less a task 
than rebuilding “classical” or “traditional economics.” The initially timid 
vocabulary of the course -“to see things with one’s own mind” and “to detach 
oneself from certain foreign theories” (Prebisch 1991c: 495)- is succeeded by 
a full-frontal assault on the whole apparatus of economics as a discipline. He 
stresses that only by:
undertaking a profound revision of classical theory and devising a 
new theory, rather than attaching a theory on to it (...), might we find 
the theoretical elements to guide us effectively and wisely in practical 
action. (Prebisch 1993: 325)
in other words, to reach through “economic policy” that which is 
nonexistent in reality: “economic equilibrium” (Prebisch 1993: 326). As 
a discipline (and even morally) economics was in “serious crisis” due to 
its excessive “exaltation of personal interest as the supreme regulator of 
economic activity” (Prebisch 1991c: 496). As a “scientific discipline” it was 
“incipient” and “indecisive.” As in earlier days, its critical situation had to 
be surmounted through reformulation: an “out-and-out effort to renovate it 
from its very foundations,” as it cannot “rationally explain” the way: 
economic movement occurs, the how’s, why’s and wherefores of 
economic phenomena. And if political economy has not been able to 
teach us that, wrongly we could find in her the indispensable resources 
to act on a reality we don’t know (…) therefore the economy is 
insufficient to encompass, describe and explain the problems of reality 
to give us the means to act upon her with effectiveness. (Prebisch 
1991c: 496). 
32 Introducción al curso de dinámica económica (1948a in Prebisch 1991c) was the first chap-
ter of Apuntes de Economía política… (Prebisch 1948d). All the following chapters appear in 
Prebisch (1993).
33 As mentioned in the previous note, Apuntes de Economía Política (1948d) has been published 
in parts in Prebisch 1991c and 1993.
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If we are to understand how he arrived at his theory of the cycle, we should 
deal with the brief excursion Prebisch made into the history of economic 
thought. First and foremost, Prebisch needed to deconstruct the discipline 
in order to synthesize and conclude the theory he had been devising, and 
to stress the importance of certain notions that “classical” thinking deemed 
marginal: time, money, and profit.
Therefore, there is an explanation and a history of the distinct ruptures 
which the economic discipline has undergone: the first was “provoked 
by Marx” (Prebisch 1991c: 497), which is essentially a critique on the 
embarrassing nonexistence of the “inequalities” and “instability of the 
economic system” but which through the use of an “inconsistent” “theory of 
labor,” became an easy target of classical economics, despite the latter’s own 
limitations to explain these. With Walras and Pareto comes the reconstruction 
and a “superior phase,” whose precision and elegance through mathematics 
shoved the “body of the doctrine,” away from the real world, which was 
supposedly its task to explain, giving us the “means to act over her” (Prebisch 
1991c: 497). 34
Although Prebisch perceived with pristine clarity differences within the 
“compact body of doctrines,” he keeps the term because according to him 
there is a series of underlining principles which authorizes its use: (1) the 
profit incentive under the free forces of competition drives to an “equilibrium” 
situation and an “optimum of production”; (2) the social distribution 
compatible with this “optimum” should not be interfered with by ethical or 
political questions, despite its importance; (3) the absentee state.
Despite the “logical brilliance,” the “classical” doctrine has not been “able 
to explain what happens in (…) the imminent cyclical reality” (Prebisch 1991c: 
499): “Historically the cycle is the typical form of growth of capitalism (…) 
There is no resting point: it ascends to descend, and it descends to ascend once 
again. (…) In the movement, there is no equilibrium point; the movement is a 
succession of continuous disequilibrium (Prebisch 1991c: 499).
The search for profit generates the logic of growth described, and which 
does not achieve “equilibrium.” Classical economics cannot be “reconciled” 
with a reality which is “cyclical.” An “optimum of production” is impossible 
given the upturns and downturn phases and the structure never reaches “full 
employment” properly speaking, rather “productive forces” are squandered. 
The instability cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of classical economics 
and least of all with the way it postulates the “distribution of income” hence 
the “crisis of political economy”:
it’s ineptitude to explain the manner of being and production of the 
economic phenomenon. In other words, if the disequilibrium of the 
cycle constitute an inherent evil of the capitalist process, wrongly 
could we explain the cyclical reality with the classical doctrines which 
34 “Building on thin air” (Prebisch 1991c: 497).
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sustain that the process is conducive towards equilibrium. (Prebisch 
1991c: 500)
This does not mean that those doctrines have ignored the phenomena 
described, but rather that their crisis derives from not confronting the 
conundrum “scientifically” which meant “jettisoned” the theories “which 
do not achieve a satisfactory explanation of the reality” (Prebisch 1991c: 
500). Adopting instead certain “attitudes” when facing phenomena like 
unemployment, indicating “rigidities” or “resistances” on the part of the 
reality like the downturn of salaries, thus eluding confronting the logical 
faults of the “premises.” Even Keynes, despite his efforts to liberate himself 
of those doctrines, presents a “type of explanation imminently classical” but 
here the rigidity lies in the notion of “the rate of interest,” which does not 
decrease sufficiently to counter the “decline in the marginal efficiency of 
capital” (Prebisch 1991c: 501).
Another theoretical attitude assumed by the classics relates to blaming 
the consequences of the “excesses” and depressions of the cyclical process 
on the “abus[e] [of ] the monetary system” (Prebisch 1991c: 501), or state 
intervention, and/or customs duties.
The third attitude which Prebisch underlines among economists with 
respect to the undulatory reality is the “admission of the existence of the 
cycle” but “attributing” to it explanations sustained on the notion that it is a 
product of “alien elements,” “cosmic elements”; “psychological” alterations 
which produce optimism or pessimism: that is “alien factors to the economic 
system” (Prebisch 1991c: 502). The latter liberates the economists of an 
explanation because apparently it is a phenomenon external to the discipline.
Therefore, Prebisch’s first step was to devise a historical explanation for 
the various ruptures in economic thinking, and in the process pointing the 
theoretical incongruities of “classical economics,” while simultaneously 
sharing with Keynes’s term when referring to neoclassical economists. As a 
second step, Prebisch would summarize this in his theory of the capitalist 
cycle, as indeed his own evaluation of the discipline demanded: an “absolutely 
endogenous theory of the cycle where it is repeated systematically through 
the very factors inherent in the system” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 458).
As we will see later, Prebisch would suggest that the “general cycle” theory 
should be devised without:
the false sense of universality from which the major cycle theories have 
so far suffered, concerning themselves exclusively with the phenomena 
of Centers, blithely ignoring what is happening on the Periphery, and 
thus closing off one of the most fertile paths of research. (Prebisch 
1949a in 1993:  414)
But the theory must have a “general” character because the capitalist 
economy grows in a cyclical manner:
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The capitalist economy has grown but in an undulatory form, has 
moved but in this form and any perturbation to the whole gives an 
undulatory form to the movement. Therefore, if the cycle is the form 
of growing and moving of the economy and if the economy moves 
incessantly in this form, it would seem that all the phenomena of the 
whole economy, not only those of occupation and production but also 
those of distribution, should be integrated within a general dynamic 
theory. (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 414).
Therefore, it presumes economics should not enclose itself in a “partial 
field” nor an “specialty”; the explanation of the “overall” economic movement 
requires including the variations and transformations of the “distribution 
of the income of the collectivity” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 415) during the 
cycle. Hence the distribution cannot be seen outside the context of the cycle, 
“outside the undulatory movement” (ibid.). 
Prebisch then hoped that the:
cyclical theory becomes the only dynamic theory of the economy, or 
rather, is the only theory of the overall movements of the economy. 
I do not believe that the overall movements can be the object of a 
static theory which pursues positions of equilibrium. I believe that 
the analysis of equilibrium points has no other fruitful field than the 
study of partial phenomena of the economy. But when it’s about the 
general phenomenon, the equilibrium analysis can only be useful in 
the initial phases of work as an instrument of work, which serves us to 
compare reality with that which could be the image of a state of things 
completely distinct than the one that rules in the world of capitalism. 
(Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 415, my emphasis)
In spite of its “veneer of logic,” “classical” doctrine was not “able to explain 
to us what happens in an eminently cyclical (...) reality” (Prebisch 1948a 
in 1991c: 499), the result of the engine of capitalist growth through profit-
seeking businessmen, and irreconcilable with classical economics, which 
describes the process in terms of “equilibria.” An “optimum of production” 
cannot exist when the expanding and contracting phases are systematic. The 
system approaches, but never reaches “full employment,” there being a waste 
of “productive forces” instead. Instability cannot be reconciled with the body 
of doctrines of classical economics, still less so with the manner whereby it 
postulates “income distribution” (Prebisch 1948a in 1991c: 500).35
There was one further theoretical strategy among the defenders of classical 
postulates, which was the least coherent: it postulated an “endogenous” 
theory of the cycle,36 but did so “independently of the body of traditional 
doctrine” and, in contrast to previous attitudes, “incompatible” with the 
35 “Whence the crisis in political economy, and whence its ineptitude at explaining the form 
and origin of economic phenomena” (ibid.).
36 “A spontaneous logical result of the way businessmen act” (Prebisch 1948a in 1991c: 502).
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tradition due to the impossibility of simultaneously arguing that “the action 
of businessmen” brings “society to a point of equilibrium” and/or to a 
“continuous succession of disequilibria” (Prebisch 1948a in 1991c: 502).37 
In other words, the postulates of classical doctrine are accepted, but reality 
is explained from different premises. To underline this “incoherence,”38 
Prebisch brings up the name of none other than Alvin Hansen, which should 
not astound us when we remember how little “respect” he showed toward 
Keynes.39
By the late 1920s then, political economy was facing the “Great Depression” 
in a state of “ineptitude” and “theoretical incongruousness.” The “deep 
instability” and “excessive inequality in distribution” found no explanation 
whatsoever, never mind a strategy to correct them.
This period of the great world depression brings about the “second 
crisis in political economy” (Prebisch 1948a in 1991c: 503), overwhelmed 
by the labyrinth of the economic depression, we find Keynes suggesting an 
explanation that grants a certain place to “economic freedom.” Its “practical” 
solutions are couched in a “theory of economic movement” which had 
supposedly done away with the principles of “classical economics.” Keynes 
had not therefore “solved the crisis in political economy,” neither had he 
“extricated himself completely” from classical doctrine:
it is surprising that the two most formidable critics of the classical 
doctrine (Marx and Keynes) ran into the same difficulty. Marx because 
he sought to build his whole doctrine and interpretation of capitalism 
upon the basis of a theory of value inherited from classical doctrine. 
The Marxist theory of value, which essentially is the Ricardian theory 
37 Further ahead, he was saying the same thing: “the continuous succession of disequilibri-
ums’” (Prebisch, 1949a in 1993: 413). Prebisch claims that, “Of course, no classical economist, 
ancient or modern, holds that in reality there are equilibriums. What I do want to say is that the 
system by its own forces that move it, tends toward equilibrium; but that, naturally, external 
disturbances always intervene to prevent it attaining this equilibrium. I maintain that these dis-
turbances that intervene and prevent it attaining equilibrium, which lend the system its char-
acteristic wave pattern stem from the interdependence of the curve” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 
462). See graphics at the end of the chapter. For Ralph W. Souter equilibrium involves, “the 
conception of a continual attempted adaptation toward real equilibrium which is continually 
thwarted in some degree by the inequality of time-coefficients plus the constant emergence of 
new evolutionary changes” (Souter 1930: 82).
38 “The very economist who speaks of typical equilibrium has devoted himself (...) to the 
study of the economic cycle and flits from one thing to the other without the slightest theo-
retical scruple. (...) in a first part, they have expounded their theory of equilibrium for us with 
great doctrinaire rigor, and in a chapter on the cycle expound the theory of disequilibrium 
for us without any concern for the fact that they cannot combine two fundamentally different 
theories; if the cycle were a mere accident occasionally registered in the economy, it would 
be possible to combine them. But as the economy’s way of moving is the cycle, the theory of 
economic movement can be nothing but cyclical” (Prebisch 1948a in 1991c: 502). Possibly one 
of the best discussions of this set of issues is found in Mirowski (1985).
39 It was Prebisch himself who called for a “respectful revision of classical theories” (Prebisch 
1993: 325).
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of value. In respect of Keynes, was incapable of letting go of the mental 
habits of the classical economists who led him, in his theoretical 
system, to pursue the search for positions and laws of equilibrium in 
economics. (Prebisch 1948a in 1991c: 504)
Therefore, what should have been transcended was the “quest for laws 
of equilibrium,” otherwise “constructions alien to reality” (Prebisch 1948a 
in 1991c: 505) would continue unabated. Prebisch understood why early 
classical economists were fascinated by theorizing about the “apparent chaos 
of phenomena” in terms of “precise laws of equilibrium,” though these “laws 
of movement” could also be explained in rigorous scientific terms. However, 
the rigorous logical system of traditional thought embellished by mathematics 
had one drawback: it did not “correspond to reality” (ibid.).40 The “crisis” in 
“political economy” was due to its inadequacy in explaining reality.
The crisis occurred when political economy turned its back in horror 
to the “key factor of time”: classical economists view it as “contrived,” and 
Keynes as “arbitrary.” The discipline’s theoretical problem therefore lay in 
how “to introduce time into their theory just the way it is” in reality (Prebisch 
1993: 271).41
The absence of the time element could be seen in the notions of capital 
and saving in classical and Keynesian doctrine because it was through the 
“subterfuge” of the interest rate that it was tackled in theory.42 The interest 
rate then was the mechanism through which the saving that “society is willing 
to supply” matched capitalists’ demand to develop capital: according to the 
demand for saving, the interest rate would rise or fall, and therefore the 
saving “required” by businessmen would emerge. But Prebisch maintains 
that, for any given period, the produce requires a certain time to arrive to 
40 “A scientifically satisfactory economic theory would have to explain cyclical movement for 
us because the type of movement presented to us by reality is a wave pattern, [as well as] the 
reason [why] the capitalist economy does not take full advantage of its productive factors, and 
at the same time give us an interpretation of the periodic phenomenon of unemployment” 
(Prebisch 1993: 303).
41 “Time is a fundamental element of reality, it is not possible to eliminate it arbitrarily as 
Keynes does, nor to view it with the subterfuge of classical economists. A good deal of the in-
vestment that has been -and still is being- made throughout history has been via a mechanism 
different to the supply and demand for saving; and a good deal of the saving invested is not the 
result of what society may choose to do spontaneously according to one of its inclinations or 
tastes, or the interest rate” (Prebisch 1993: 278). I translate “artificio” as subterfuge.
42 “I call the interest rate a logical subterfuge produced by classical economists to solve the 
problem of time because, after long reflection and observation of the facts, I have become 
convinced that the interest rate does not in fact play the regulatory role in production and 
distribution that classical economists ascribe to it. (...) the formation of capital in society is 
quite different, and the interest rate only minimally plays the regulatory role ascribed to it by 
the classical school. (...) If the interest rate does not perform the functions in the production 
and distribution of products assigned to it by traditional doctrine, the problem then arises of 
substituting it with a theory different to the Keynesian one, for such are its inconsistencies 
that it is not, in my opinion, possible to use Keynes’s theory even as an instrument to explore 
reality, since it also has serious defects” (Prebisch 1993: 278).
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the marketplace, and therefore the income in process awaiting products 
has to be higher than the value of the production of the final consumption. 
These facts could clearly not be explained with Say’s Law, which states that 
“supply creates its own demand,” since it would be contradicting the idea 
that “demand” should not outstrip supply at the end of the productive cycle. 
However, classical economists explained this anomaly as being the result of a 
“saving” made by the community given a certain the interest rate. The interest 
rate is the subterfuge that facilitates or limits what amount of saving would be 
used in production in any given period, namely, the total income generated 
at the end of the process. Any “surplus” would be explained by the existence 
of the relevant “saving,” thus fulfilling Say’s law.
Keynes, for his part, tackled the problem of time with a variety of 
“attitudes” (Prebisch 1993: 275). In one case, Prebisch claimed that, with a 
falling “interest rate,” Keynes went hand in glove with classical economists, 
but once marginal capital yield did not keep pace with the interest rate (due to 
a preference for liquidity), then Keynes ditched classical economics behind. 
Savings were left in liquid form, not invested, and a deficiency in demand 
arose. Nevertheless, according to Prebisch, Keynes keeps “within the logical 
game” of classical economics: on one hand, he recognizes “the time factor,” 
but uses the “subterfuge” of the “interest rate” to manage it; on the other, 
this subterfuge has limits after a certain point (the “preference for liquidity”). 
In contrast with this “attitude,” in the theory of the multiplier, Keynes 
“denies” the role granted to the interest rate by classical economists and 
does so without introducing time altogether; saving becomes an altogether 
different phenomenon than for classical economists. Here, the assumption 
of simultaneity in saving and investment is not taken into account, and it is 
simply accepted that saving will come out of the “income from production”: 
this would in turn multiply these “investments” (Prebisch 1993: 276). The very 
multiplication of income (also the product of investments) would by itself 
generate a certain level of saving in the community. Saving is a function of the 
rate of income growth. But Prebisch points out that, for certain investments 
to produce a certain income, a certain time is required, which otherwise 
only “confuses” the present with the future. This, according to Prebisch, is 
precisely the theory of the Keynesian multiplier. Its “logical inconsistency” 
invalidates “Keynesian theory” (Prebisch 1993: 277) and marks the absolute 
rift between him and the classical school.
It is the idea of static equilibrium which should be called into question. 
In this “position,” neither businessmen nor consumers are thought of as 
having any interest in “moving” (nor do savers). The amount saved is the 
one that businessmen demand from a specific interest rate. Wages too reflect 
the position where there is no further incentive to work harder or change 
jobs. Similarly, the price of primary commodities is high enough to keep on 
working “marginal” lands where the production cost “only just” equals the 
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“value of the products (the difference in cost in the best endowed or located 
lands being left as earnings)” (Prebisch 1993: 280). A change in any of the 
circumstances once again establishes a “position of static equilibrium”:
The concept of static equilibrium is a mere instrument of abstract 
analysis of the phenomena as viewed by classical economists to gain 
a better understanding of them. In classical doctrine, one can easily 
switch from the static to the dynamic. (Prebisch 1993: 281)
If classical economists isolated every latent change and interpreted the 
event as a happening which could become unstable, then economic reality 
could be viewed as an “endless succession of disturbances.” It was therefore 
possible to go from the “static equilibrium” of classical economics to a 
“dynamic” theory of reality (ibid.). This theory should be infinite overlaying 
processes tending to reach equilibrium (Prebisch 1993: 281). But it is the 
incessant changes which might prevent it ever reaching “equilibrium,” even 
though one might suppose that “abstractly speaking,” the disturbance itself 
is the point of “equilibrium.” Prebisch offered a definition incorporating the 
very paradox of the economic reality he was attempting to describe: only if 
a certain limit-point is viewed abstractly in the sense that its disturbances 
“end,” can we speak of “equilibrium” in the economic system, which will, 
nevertheless, be unachievable.
According to Prebisch, this explains why classical economists did not 
elaborate “a dynamic” or “general theory”: they presume that the disturbances 
themselves lead to equilibrium, and this excludes any reflection about “how it 
is reached” (Prebisch 1993: 282). A general theory could “be constructed” but 
it would suffer from the “fundamental vice of the theory of static equilibrium,” 
namely, its “mistaken conception of saving, and the subterfuge of the interest 
rate” (Prebisch 1993: 282). As the “theory of static equilibrium” starts from 
mistaken premises about reality, a theory of “dynamic equilibrium” would 
also suffer such consequences. “What we need then is a dynamic theory that 
explains movement, gives us laws of movement, and does not get bogged down 
in the quest for laws of equilibrium which does not conform to reality” (ibid.).
Prebisch then moved on to present the way the interest rate was 
conceived as a regulator of production and distribution. First, he showed 
how businessmen require an incentive to transform techniques to mutate 
into “Professor Schumpeter’s” classical businessman (Prebisch 1993: 283). 
Only in this way will he seek out higher levels of saving, while paying a higher 
interest rate given the proportion of profit achieved in the new productive 
arrangement. Businessmen therefore require saving to put population growth 
on a level with a corresponding employment. “Profit” is the businessman’s 
“prize.” Due to technical innovations, he lowers production costs, which 
will eventually be matched by other businessmen. This makes “profit” a 
“temporary” thing. Competition pushes up wages or prices fall, so that “free 
competition transfer[s] to society the fruit of technical innovations which, 
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during the transition period, is held by businessmen in the form of profit” 
(Prebisch 1993: 287).
Once businessmen have made their investments concrete, the intensity of 
demand for greater savings evaporates, which had previously expanded due 
to a rising interest rate (a consequence of the businessmen’s earlier “creative” 
drive). This would in turn generate a fall in the interest rate. But this new 
equilibrium in the interest rate entails the existence of profits for businessmen 
because of the new fruits of technical progress.
Prebisch then outlined a series of scenarios in which businessmen chose to 
use the same interest rate, without trying to alter it to make new investments. 
But there will also be businessmen looking for greater investment per head, 
who would reduce the employed population, and drive up the interest rate. 
And although, in the latter case, society loses out because “there are fewer 
products and unemployed people” (Prebisch 1993: 291), businessmen usually 
choose this situation because it gives them greater incentives to profit.
But in this case the classical school would say that, if wages are not fixed, their 
levels will fall, and with it the demand for workers will grow once again, reaching 
a new point of equilibrium. To put it another way, wages will pay for the costs of 
the higher interest rate required so that savers supply a growing amount.
One cannot here talk about a point of equilibrium because, as production 
is transformed by new technical inputs, the demand for workers will grow, 
raising the level of salaries, on the one hand, while on the other, reducing 
prices with greater production. Over time this will reach equilibrium, 
compelling “profit” to disappear, thus favoring “society.”
Prebisch concludes that the classics maintain that unemployment is a 
means of reaching a new position of equilibrium by lowering wages sufficiently 
for businessmen to (a) obtain the minimum profit to induce them to extend 
innovations until unemployed is absorbed, and (b) pay the highest interest 
rate demanded by the market for additional savings (Prebisch 1993: 292).
It is therefore a temporary impairment which is surmounted when 
equilibrium is reached, where profit evaporates and the “interest rate falls as 
the supply of saving rises by virtue of the increase in savers’ income” (ibid.).
These examples aimed to underscore the process described by classical 
economists, as they facilitate exposition of the theory of “cyclical movements”: 
in classical and Keynesian models the “dynamic phenomena of reality whose 
disturbances prevent” equilibrium being reached are forgotten. Thus nothing 
prevents in the classical model, in which “businessmen themselves use their 
own saving for investment,” so as not to resort to the market or putting pressure 
on the interest rate: “They may lend to each other, and if the marginal yield is 
lower given the interest rate (once profits are withdrawn), they will prefer to 
lend their saving” (Prebisch 1993: 296). Keynes’s stance is different because, 
when there is unemployment, “saving” inhibits accumulation, and therefore 
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the income multiplier. Equally, Keynes overlooks the reasoning of classical 
economists of the transitory period, in which wages are supposed to fall to 
achieve full employment. However, as “saving” is a “spontaneous” activity and 
requires a specific incentive to raise its total amount, there would seem to be no 
explanation as to how to achieve a lower interest rate to drive up investment.
Prebisch says that this is where Keynes parted company with classical 
economics, especially for maintaining that the “interest rate is a conventional 
phenomenon and is within the reach of the Banks” (Prebisch 1993: 297). It can 
also be manipulated to reduce it and induce higher investment, which will in 
turn generate the corresponding savings, “until a new position of equilibrium 
is reached” (Prebisch 1993: 298). Therefore, the way of thinking about 
money creation, or its way of inducing a certain interest rate is, according to 
Prebisch, a “real revolution” (ibid.). Keynes maintained “just the opposite of 
what the classical school held,” but through the creation of money or “using 
inactive money, the equilibrium of the multiplier is not reached, instead, we 
go through the typical phases of the cycle, which neither Keynes nor classical 
economists have been able to explain because their reasoning is so artificial 
and arbitrary” (Prebisch 1993: 298).
According to Prebisch, at the beginning of the cyclical upswing, the 
supply of saving is meager because recession is still being felt. This means 
that businessmen do not have the “option” of using the spontaneous 
“saving” assumed by classical economists unless they raise the interest rate 
considerably. Instead, a process of money creation by businessmen occurs: 
The typical manner of accumulating capital consists in increasing the 
money supply. The businessman does not go out looking for saving, 
except to a minimal extent. (...) most fixed capital investment is covered 
indirectly with a rise in the money supply, not by turning to the market. 
(Prebisch 1993: 299). 
In contrast to what classical economists say, the rise in the money supply 
which makes technological progress possible does not allow prices to come 
down.43 Such a process involves a wage reduction, but not to be able to pay 
a higher interest rate in order to cover the growing “demand” for saving 
through investment, as classical economists believe: 
but to compel those paying the highest prices to save, and shift this 
saving to the businessman (...), it is not the result of a mechanism of 
incentives and preferences, but of a mechanism of compulsion. This 
is what happens in the capitalist reality. (...) Except that one does not 
arrive at the equilibrium of the multiplier, but the typical phases of the 
cycle. (Prebisch 1993: 300)
43 “It is through price rises that consumer items are transferred to those responsible for the for-
mation of capital. The saving market has only a supplementary function. The increase returns 
to businessmen in the form of profits, thus again performing its function in the accumulation 
of capital” (Prebisch 1993: 300).
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The classical mechanism of the transference of savings is alterable and, 
by not being “complete,” loses the function assigned to it by classical 
economists. What Keynes advocated is then what happens in the capitalist 
reality, with one difference: that, instead of reaching a new position of 
equilibrium, “this way of covering investments” leads “to the typical 
movement of the cycle that characterizes reality” (Prebisch 1993: 301). 
This phenomenon also reflects the characteristic of capitalism mentioned 
by Keynes: “economic instability” and “inequality of distribution.” On 
the other hand, saving in the “collectivist economy” is identical because 
businessmen collectively raise prices, or stop them from declining, after 
bringing about a transformation in production.44
Prebisch moves swiftly on to describe human history as one in which certain 
“groups and dominant classes” have made use of a variety of instruments to 
set up a distribution favorable to its regime: under capitalism the “monetary” 
instrument is privileged. However, the fact that the process is different under 
collectivism does not necessarily guarantee that inequalities are abolished. 
All regimes make use of certain monetary instruments “to favor dominant 
groups” (Prebisch 1993: 303).
To summarize, the savings “interest rate” level has a regulatory function 
both in boosting productive activity to optimum levels, and in the 
“distribution” of income. There is no room for unemployment in classical 
economics where, given free competition, the economy tends to the 
“optimum.” Unemployment is a phenomenon of “system rigidity.” Optimum 
production requires a certain amount of market savings, and if the amount 
required is not forthcoming at the existing interest rate, higher costs means a 
reduction of wages (“temporarily”), to allow businessmen to afford the rate 
in question. In the classical mechanism, this was achieved by displacing the 
workforce, which would lead to lowering wages, and paying a higher rate 
of interest. In the event of lower wages not being accepted, there would be 
unemployment. Unemployment is a phenomenon of “system rigidity.” But 
this possibility also finds a place in the classical system (a case only Keynes 
considers) thus completing the system, and still “remaining classical” 
(Prebisch 1993: 305), but equally far removed from “reality.”
Nevertheless, Prebisch would accept the classical postulate about how 
capitalism transfers the fruits of technical progress, either via wage increases 
or a price decrease. But “the process by which this transfer has occurred, 
the time it has taken, and its quantity are, in my opinion, different to those 
postulated by classical theory” (Prebisch 1993: 311).45
There was also the classical and Keynesian coincidence in terms of the 
44 “And one wonders,” says Prebisch, “whether handing this instrument of inequality from 
private hands to the hands of the State is enough to lead us to the conclusion that inequality 
has disappeared” (Prebisch 1993: 302).
45 “Income that, at different stages in the process, businessmen pay to the productive factors 
employed by their companies” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 417).
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phenomenon of short-term unemployment. This involved an abundance of 
manpower and temporary shortage of capital. The explanatory difference 
between classical economists and Keynes regarding the phenomenon would 
lie in the “remedy” and its correction: classical economists advocate a fall in 
wages, while in Keynes it is attempted by “lowering the interest rate.”
With its conception of money as a mere “veil,” classical theory obscured its 
prime importance. Classical doctrine’s idea of isolating “money” presupposed 
that it could be studied independently of productive and distributive 
phenomena, and that “it intervenes without affecting either the nature of the 
phenomena or the laws that guide them toward equilibrium” (Prebisch 1993: 
317). Money therefore adapts to economic evolution, and with this system 
in “equilibrium,” it made analysis of the monetary phenomenon superfluous.
If for classical economists’ inflation was a “pathological” aspect, 
for Prebisch “certain inflationary seeds” that “upset the tendencies to 
equilibrium” (Prebisch 1993: 319) were part and parcel of capitalism. It 
was really their way of making abstractions that led classical economists to 
certain theoretical errors because they believed that various partial aspects 
could reach equilibrium in themselves and as regards to the whole. Positing 
a theory “closer to reality” (Prebisch 1993: 324), Prebisch suggests that the 
increment in money systematically affects the “three planes” of economic 
reality (a theory of production and distribution, a monetary theory, and a 
theory of international trade), identified by classical economists, which 
culminates in his theory of the “wave movement.” In this case there are 
“disturbances” that lead to “a series of actions and reactions that are in fact 
those that give economic phenomenon their characteristic wave form” (ibid.). 
Their “laws” are different to those that supposedly lead to “equilibrium.” It is 
the “interdependence” between different economic spaces which makes of 
the process a wave phenomenon and makes it imperative to discard classical 
theories.
It is both ironic and unfortunate that Prebisch never considered the Keynes 
of The General Theory as a possible theoretical ally, but rather as a special case 
within neoclassical economics, the so-called “neoclassical synthesis.”46 Given 
the importance of money and money creation in Prebisch’s model (also, 
paradoxically, a crucial topic in Keynes, as is nowadays being recognized) 
when it comes to understanding the cycle and capitalism, it is the Keynes of 
the Treatise on Money whom Prebisch exhibits as constructive for his own 
46 According to Jaime Puyana Ferrara: “It is clear that there was a very solid trust in the ana-
lytical instrument available, particularly in the formal interpretation of Keynes, as outlined 
initially by John Hicks and Alvin Hansen in the late 1930s. It was mainly through this inter-
pretation, better known as the IS/LM model, (...) that key aspects of Keynes’s thinking were 
eliminated, making him a very special -almost aberrant- case in a much broader theoretical 
approach whose roots are deep in general Walrasian equilibrium. (...) It comes as no surprise 
therefore that this construction has been christened “neoclassical synthesis” (Puyana 1992: 
25). See also Guillén (1990: 17).
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theoretical development up till this stage, all the more so because he then 
identifies him as a follower of Wicksell:47 
If we go back to the Treatise on Money, we will find that his reasoning 
over the economic process and the cycle is fundamentally Wicksellian 
(...) I would not know how to explain (...) the reason for such an abrupt 
change in Keynes when, a few years after the Treatise on Money, he 
switches to The General Theory, forgetting everything he had told us 
about Wicksellian theory, and the economic cycle to go and get himself 
hopelessly tangled up in the theory of the multiplier, thus spoiling the 
value of his contribution to economic phenomena (Prebisch 1993: 326).
Prebisch then sets about integrating monetary theory and the theory of 
production. He lays out the shortcomings of the classical theory of money, 
showing that, faced with an increase in the money supply (assuming the 
economy is at a point of equilibrium), it is correct to deduce an increase 
in prices. This is explained by the hypothesis that there is a “proportional 
relationship between price movement and the amount of money” (Prebisch 
1993: 327), which signifies a new “position of equilibrium.” But given the 
assumption of full exploitation of resources from which its starts, “prices 
rise or fall” without affecting production. But a disturbance of this nature 
“makes the amount of businessmen’s profits vary and leads them to expand 
and contract production, distancing them from the position of equilibrium 
postulated by classical theory” (Prebisch 1993: 328).
If full employment of factors is assumed, the increase in the money supply 
undoubtedly:
pushes prices up: Keynes starts from a position of insufficient 
exploitation of resources, and assumes that the increase in the money 
supply only pushes up production without having a bearing on prices, 
except where the production cost for the diminishing labor yield 
pushes up prices  (Prebisch 1948b in 1993: 330).
However, this is an arbitrary starting point because, as the “economy 
47 Gottfried von Haberler: “the process of monetary expansion by way of reciprocal stim-
ulation of consumption and investment -the so-called Wicksellian process” (Haberler 1937: 
306). A good synthesis of Wicksell’s ideas can be found in Pribram: “Wicksell’s dictum that any 
theory of money worthy of the name must be able to show how and why monetary or pe-
cuniary demand for goods exceeds or falls short of the supply of goods in given conditions. 
The consideration implied a repudiation of Say’s law of markets, since the validity of that 
‘law’ was predicated on the assumption that demand for and supply of money were equal. 
(...) Wicksell questioned the traditional relationship which had been established between the 
volume of money and the volume of exchange transactions as a means of defining the price 
level. In support of these doubts he pointed to the observation that the loan rate of inter-
est had been low during periods of low prices -periods of limited supply capital supply -and 
had been high when the supply of capital was obviously abundant and prices were rising. (...) 
Wicksell attack[ed] (...) the almost generally accepted ‘banking principle,’ according to which 
the supply of money was automatically adjusted to the requirement of the economy when the 
prevailing rules of short-term lending were strictly observed.” (Pribram 1983: 323)
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approaches full employment, it is due precisely to a series of phenomena 
in which monetary expansion plays an important part” (Prebisch 1948b in 
1993: 329).
Full employment is something “fleeting” and, in this respect at least, 
Keynes is closer to reality than classical economists, otherwise productive 
capacity could not rise. But in contrast, Prebisch holds that growing 
production involves price rises.
Classical economists are wide of the mark because the nearest thing in the 
capitalist reality to full employment is when “monetary expansion” occurs. 
The Keynesian position misses the point too because, despite assuming the 
existence of unused resources, monetary expansion increases both production 
and prices, and this trend does not necessarily lead to equilibrium.
The “intimate relationship” between production and the monetary can be 
visualized, according to Prebisch, in the “the cycle’s upswing,” where it can 
be seen that the: 
increase in the money supply tends to simultaneously expand 
production and prices (or stops them declining to the extent that 
they would fall due to falling costs arising from technical innovations, 
under a regime of free competition). This process gives rise to business 
profits, and the sequence of actions and reactions. (Prebisch 1948b in 
1993: 330) 
In other words, it is typical of the capitalist cycle. The core of Prebisch’s 
explanation assumes an understanding the variations and global quantity of 
profit. Profit is a consequence of the successive processes of money creation 
used during different periods to form or cover the costs of forming capital. 
It follows a different logic than the simple use of “savings.” If, for the time 
being, we exclude the phenomenon of increases of money filtering through 
to other economic spaces, the function of money left in a given space is to 
“absorb” the “increase in finished consumer production” (Prebisch 1948b in 
1993: 332).48
The process of the capitalist cycle, according to Prebisch, requires an 
“excess” of the “increase in the money supply” in relation to the increment 
of production, which in fact defines its form: prices rise (preventing 
the incorporation of declining prices as a consequence of productive 
improvements) under a regime of competition. The “origin” of and reason 
for the quantity of “businessmen’s profit” is then due to the fact that the 
“increase in the money supply is thus responsible for businessmen’s profit, 
and makes its quantity to vary, with major repercussions for the economic 
process” (Prebisch 1948b in 1993: 332).
Prebisch thus refuses to accept that the mechanism of “savings supply 
48 “In other words, that part of the increase in the money supply left in the economic space 
is higher in the cyclical upswing than the amount of the increase in production which is 
gradually stored from new investment” (Prebisch 1993: 332).
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and demand” assumed by classical and Keynesian theories is so important. 
The “increase in the money supply” is actually the method used (instead of 
“savings”) since at the lowest point of the cycle, businessmen find themselves 
with relatively “large quantities” of money “inactive in their bank accounts” 
(Prebisch 1948b in 1993: 333); they do not require to use the market for 
savings which might actually “force upwards” interest rates.” There is then a 
paradoxical phenomenon at the lowest point in the cycle: savings are in short 
supply, “but there is an abundance of money (a very important distinction 
indeed, for, where there is no savings but an abundance of money, money 
is used by businessmen in substitution of savings to make investments” 
(Prebisch 1948b in 1993: 333).
When the net increase in the money supply “decreases,” or its rate of 
expansion decreases and is “insufficient to absorb the increase in production, 
at the prevailing prices”, the “decrease in prices” is not automatic. There are 
“obstacles,” otherwise we would be back in the realm of classical economics. 
The situation assumed by this perspective, where profits have completely 
disappeared, is a stage unreachable because in the capitalist economy profits 
are “irreversible,” (Prebisch 1948b in 1993: 336), in other words, they cannot 
be “shrunk.” This becomes clearer when we are told that profit does not 
“blossom” in the last stage of production and sale of the produce in question, 
but that it had been generated previously over several productive stages by 
various businessmen as it approaches culmination in the final consumer. 
In other words, in terms of Marx’s metaphor about “the Salto Mortale” of 
commodities, this event has already occurred before reaching the marketplace 
(profit is materialized in product prices).49
Therefore, what halts the continuation of the cycle, is a relatively insufficient 
demand, a result of a slowdown in the increase in the money supply in terms 
of the increment in production. As profit, “accumulated by businessmen,” 
is not “confirmed,” the economy contracts, and the typical phenomena of 
49 “but there is one fundamental difference between the value of the products in process that 
are created at each stage, and their respective income. The value created at each stage is not the 
value of an immediately consumable product. (...) It therefore involves a series of values that 
are gradually added, but that are not immediately consumable until the productive process 
ends. However, the income businessmen pay one another and those paid by the productive 
factors at each of the stages, are immediately expendable, and can immediately be trans-
formed into demand for finished articles. The producer of raw materials paying income to 
factors and receiving profits can spend this income immediately, long before the final produc-
tion of consumer items manufactured with the raw materials that he himself produced has 
appeared in the marketplace. (...) In this fundamental difference between the nature of the 
created value, which is not immediately consumable except at the end of the process, and 
the nature of the income paid, which can immediately be transformed into demand, in this 
difference between the two phenomena [on the one hand, production, on the other, circula-
tion] lies the germ of the wave movement.” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 417). “There are various 
businessmen distributed across the various different phases; and no one waits for the final sale 
to liquidate the profit by distributing it among participants in the process. Businessmen pay each 
other profits in advance of the final sale; (...) set precisely by the duration of the process. We 
are again faced with the time factor” (Prebisch 1993: 338, my emphasis).
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the “downward slope of the economic cycle” (Prebisch 1948b in 1993: 338) 
begins. If the net increase in the money supply cannot guarantee the increase 
of production, according to the value of supply, one cannot turn back and 
reimburse the profit received: the phenomenon is “irreversible.”
The growing stocks held by businessmen indicates that it is necessary to 
reduce production, and thus initiate the cyclical downward trend.50 However, 
if for classical economists profit (the result of cost reduction) decreases with 
competition, for Prebisch competition does not have “any influence on the 
general amount of profits in the economy as a whole”; it is set “exclusively 
by the difference between the increase in production and that part of the 
increases in money left in the economic space” (Prebisch 1948c in 1993: 355, 
my emphasis).
This does not mean that competition is not important, rather its 
function is not to “lower the amount of total profits set by other factors, 
but to establish how profit is distributed among businessmen” (ibid.). The 
quantity of profit is set by both phenomena: productive and monetary 
activity -competition does not alter the “quantity nor the variations” but 
their distribution “within the group of businessmen” (ibid.). On the other 
hand, profit is “concomitant” to the phenomena of the cycle and “has 
nothing to do with the free competition” (Prebisch 1948a 1993: 355) of 
businessmen, regardless of the decrease or increase of the profit which is 
determined by the competition between them.
According to Prebisch (1948a in 1993: 357), in the “real economic 
movement” during the cycle’s upswing, prices rise at the expense of real 
wages, and their decrease does not obey the classical thesis that this is done 
to pay a higher rate of interest to savers; rather, it is “to allow businessmen 
to carry out their own savings with the profit from price rises, that is shifting 
savings from the rest of society unto the businessmen” (Prebisch 1948a in 
1993: 357).
Conventional theory considers other agents as the sectors that save to 
undertake technological innovations, supposedly motivated by a higher rate 
of interest. For Prebisch, different sectors of the collectivity:
are compelled by the system to save more so as to make the investments. 
These are undertaken yielding fruitions, which is a higher productivity. 
How is this fruit transferred in reality? In the classic scheme, by the 
competition, translated in raising salaries or a decrease of prices. In 
reality, this transference exists with more or less intensity, depending 
the circumstances but not through competition but rather during 
cycles’ downward phase. Just as during the upward phase prices rise 
above nominal salaries, and therefore, real salaries decrease with more 
50 “If profits were reversible or only occurred at the final sale, investments could even conceiv-
ably fall without causing disturbance, since prices and profits would fall as increases in money 
supply that had earlier made both rises were reabsorbed” (Prebisch 1948a in 1993: 339).
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or less intensity, and even making plausible investments in a determined 
cycle without a perceptible lowering of real salaries, which by itself is 
sufficient for the businessmen given the high productivity increase; 
during the downswing, the cycle’s inherent forces of its movement 
generate a lowering of salaries by much less than prices (…) While prices 
decrease with salaries declining at not the same intensity, the worker 
gets transferred the fruits of technical progress. Free competition does 
not perform the distribution role which the classic scheme attributes to 
it. In synthesis, in reality salaries decline because of price rises, not to 
draw a higher savings from the high-income sectors by means of a rise 
in the rate of interest but rather so that businessmen can compulsively 
accumulate the savings of the rest of the collectivity. (Prebisch 1948a in 
1993: 357, my emphasis).
Prebisch insists that the justification of profits, and the theory thereof, in its 
classical sense or his own postulates cannot be confirmed given that “objective 
elements” are few and far between. It is therefore a matter of a political or ethical 
posture. Its un-demonstrable how far “competition” would keep on lowering 
the profits of “businessmen who have undertaken technological innovations” 
(Prebisch 1993: 359) because this “reality” has never existed:
and the theory does not allow us to measure the magnitude of a 
phenomenon that is not tested in the real world. Nor could we ascertain 
the scope of the businessman’s incentive (...). We cannot say, for we 
utterly lack any objective elements for doing so. The only thing we can 
say at this stage is that profit has a different origin than that stated by 
classical theory; that its quantity and variations are determined by the 
increase in money supply and production (...), but we cannot ascertain 
how far profit is justified or not because, from an economic perspective, 
we lack the elements of judgment to demonstrate this. (Prebisch 1948a 
in 1993: 359)51
Furthermore, if an aliquot of profit is absorbed to varying degrees by 
most businesses according to their innovations, then we can no longer speak 
of “profit as the prize of those who have introduced technical innovations” 
(Prebisch 1948a in 1993: 359) without forgetting the existence of so-called 
called “free riders.” There can be no such principle by means of which 
businessmen can exert a proportion of the profits by claiming “to each 
according to his innovations” as it were.
Equally, the wave form capitalist reality, driven by the specific structure 
through which the economic ensemble grows, and through businessmen’s 
decisions, cannot be justified. We may complain and object or not, but 
economics, cannot justify the compulsive mechanism of savings in action, 
given the nonexistence of equilibrium, equality or “optimums.” The only 
51 For modern discussions of the accounting illusions of the procedures see Mirowski (2007, 
2010), Felipe (2008), Felipe & McCombie (2014, 2019).
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thing which can be said is that average profit is the prize of businessmen 
who “introduce innovations,” and it is the “minimum incentive that the 
other businessmen require in order to go on” (Prebisch 1948a in 1993: 
360) expanding production. But one cannot ascertain “how far technical 
competition would change technical results” or “what the minimum incentive 
of businessmen would be. Only experience will tell” (ibid.).
Prebisch underlines that, although capitalism requires a “compulsory” 
mechanism guaranteeing society’s savings during the “cyclical upswing,” its 
concept of “forced savings” should not be imagined in terms of “plundering” 
some to “give to others” (Prebisch 1948a in 1993: 360), for on occasions 
“profit” can be null and void, and it is businessmen who “begin to use increases 
in money supply which push up prices and move consumer articles from 
certain sectors to others, generating profit.” Therefore: 
what businessmen take is precisely what is due to them, since they were 
working without profits and now [that] the increase in money supply 
is engendering them (...) this is the incentive that must stimulate them 
to introduce innovations and increase production.  (Prebisch 1948a in 
1993: 361)
In other words, during the upswing there are transfers, but it cannot be 
said to “what extent businessmen take from the rest of society what is due to 
them as a prize or incentive, and what is not due to them” (Prebisch 1948a in 
1993: 361). Therefore, Prebisch’s theory does not “enable us to say what profit 
is justified” either; rather it compels us to undertake a “decision” as to our 
postures with respect of the “Other” given the existent power asymmetries.
If we assume that economic spaces are always linked by “influx” and 
“exit” currents of income, another mechanism presents itself through which 
income filters, and reduces the “net increase” in money supply in one of those 
spaces. This is the thesis of “doctrinaire economists” (Prebisch 1993: 367) 
who, basing themselves on the “brilliant” (“Ricardo’s theorem of comparative 
costs”) prove what should be imported and/or exported between certain 
countries, or what should be produced locally. Prebisch, however, holds that 
this reasoning is only true from the static point of view,” in other words, “when 
it is shown (...) that the protection of B is an economic heresy: [for] it would 
use more labor, and primary income would be lost by seeking to produce 
directly what one can obtain indirectly under better conditions (ibid.).
But in dynamic terms, a certain level of protection between countries A 
and B can bring about significant changes because a “net loss in A” can be 
a “net gain for B” (Prebisch 1993: 368). But this will not always be true, as 
it will depend on how B reduces its “Ricardian loss” (ibid.). And if we also 
take into account the fact that B has been “subject to the cyclical fluctuations 
stimulated in A, having achieved a more stable production even if costlier, 
involves increasing the net gain” (Prebisch 1948a in 1993: 369). Here we are 
back to the “gold standard” disparities-power asymmetries described by 
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Prebisch early in the 1940s, but with a distinct vocabulary toying with the 
idea that B represents a “group of countries” (Prebisch 1948a in 1993: 368)52 
testing out an industrialization process. He also points out how unjustifiable 
and untenable is the posture of deploying “the classical theory of international 
trade” in order to restrict protectionist policies in the B countries, as executed 
by “United States of North America” (Prebisch 1993: 373), whose violation of 
“rules of the game” was never-ending.
The Eternal Return: Time and Asynchrony
This was the context in which Prebisch would make his qualitative 
theoretical leap, leading us to the Center-Periphery theory he expounded 
in a series of lectures in México eight months after his course Apuntes de 
Economía Política (1948d in 1993), the title of which read Teoría Dinámica de 
la Economía (con especial aplicación a las economías latinoamericanas) (1949a 
in 1993). If on this occasion Prebisch is slightly less vociferous in his critique 
of the history of economic thought, he nevertheless salvages and expands on 
his earlier theory of capitalism and profit.
The “countries” “found in the Periphery of the world economy,”53 display 
the effects of the cycle, whose characteristics are: 
different from the ones it has in the big Centers. There is a very clear-
cut division of functions between Center and Periphery. The theory is 
to explain the workings of the economy between the Center and the 
Periphery, and the close connection between the two. (Prebisch 1949a 
in 1993: 413)
The notion of “the laws of movement” forced Prebisch to specify his 
conception of time, and the reason for its effects: the “wave movement.” This 
could be defined using the narrative which points to “time-lags,” but then we 
will mislay the essential forces at hand. Forces driven by a desire of profits, 
a notion of the appearance of profit in a context of power asymmetries 
(“disparities” is Prebisch’s term), a power whose force generates movement, 
which in the last instance crystalizes as “time disparities” (power disparities) 
between the time of the productive process and the time of the circulatory 
process, generated in the process itself. I believe that Keynes’s notion of 
“uncertainty” can be subsumed under this general description of the process, 
since the intervals or the metric of the “units” of time cannot in themselves 
be deduced in advance: the “construction” of these “units” compose the 
antagonistic element of the choice-decision of the agents in the context of the 
(power) asymmetries in question. Hence Shakespeare’s expression “time is 
52 For a presentation in modern vocabulary of the case outlined by Prebisch, see Cypher (1998).
53 “I will take it that the primary production stage takes place in the Periphery, and the other 
stages of elaboration and outlay at the cyclical Center. This is not the only characteristic of 
cyclical Centers; there are others (...) I mean that a cyclical Center and a Periphery can be con-
tained in one and the same country, as in the United States, which has a large Periphery, unlike 
what happened in the British cyclical Center, which had the world economy as a Periphery” 
(Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 449).
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out of joint” is an irreplaceable representation.54 
The disparity in these “units” of times is what gives us the cyclical 
movement with its alternating prosperity and depression. Even “under the 
most ‘perfect’ free competition and a total lack of State intervention in the 
economy,” the wave phenomenon will necessarily occur “due to the time 
disparities” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 416). Agents are under real or imagined 
asymmetric power-time horizons. 
If we accept Prebisch’s assumption that the incomes being paid currently 
are greater than those corresponding to today’s completed production, 
then what he is underlining is the asynchronies between the productive 
and circulatory processes, between the appearance of liquid resources in 
the marketplace and products, which prevents there ever being a “perfect 
equilibrium between the total overall demand for income and profits paid, 
and global supply (the value of the finished items),” for then one would have 
to assume “equality between the time of the circulation process of income 
and profits, and the time taken by the entire production process” (Prebisch 
1949a in 1993: 418).
Therefore, the money or the final “demand” paid today relates to an 
income which was paid long before today’s market transaction, or the actual 
production in process during the same day. In Armando Di Filippo’s words, 
there is an “asynchrony” (Di Filippo 1981: 54), and therefore: 
there is no automatic mechanism in the economy, however perfect 
free competition, that assures a perfect correlation between the time 
of the value formation and the time of the circulation of the income 
generated in the productive process when these values are created 
(Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 419).
Starting out from this asynchrony, Prebisch would present the model of a 
world economy between the Periphery and the Center, which in turn forced 
him to explain expanding and contracting phases, in other words, the reason 
for the changing tempos of the world economy.
This he attempts in a simple graph (see graphics at the end of chapter): 
a series of curves which we could think in terms of three rollercoaster 
wagons starting out one after another and which we will call IP, RI, and PT 
(“paid incomes = production in process,” “returning income = demand”, 
“completed production” respectively) (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 419).55 The 
54 Or Jorge L. Borges (1944).
55 The curves are shaped like sine waves and slopped indicating the different times at which 
they begin (horizontal plane) and vary in “amplitude” from one to the next. See my adapta-
tion of Prebisch’s graphics at the end of the chapter. Perhaps there is only occasion in which 
Prebisch appears to be flirting with “geometrical” deductions as to the “height” and base of 
the curve; “the excess of circulating capital is represented by an amount equal to the vertical 
distance between the point of conjunction and the point of income. Before the demand would 
be above of production. Hence businessmen were being stimulated to increment production 
for which they would initiate developing a circulating capital, and from which, in time, a future 
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brave occupants of the cars IP and PT speed up their movement, amplitude 
and steepness of their ride which will always be more intense than for those 
occupying the RI, the “weaklings” wagon.
These wagons or curves advance uphill in parallel until they reach 
the points at which they cross paths, or as Prebisch calls them, the points 
of “conjunction.” It is only at this instance that the wagons’ occupants can 
wave at each other; from then on, the speed of the trajectory changes. This 
representation tells us that when the “demand” curve (wagon RI) finally 
reaches the supply curve or “completed production” (wagon PT), the latter 
maintains up its upward momentum, whereas demand slows down and 
bottoms out. Meanwhile, the paid income curve (wagon IP) is still on its way 
up. Then, as the curves approach their peaks, the representation of the cycle 
begins just as this curve (IP) is showing a tendency to level its movement, 
and the wagon’s occupants’ yell. After a “while,” the occupants will be able 
to wave at each other once again (a new point of conjunction). This is where 
demand (wagon RI) bumps into “completed production” or supply (wagon 
PT) once more, which in contrast with the first moments of the expanding 
cyclical process, demand exceeds completed production.
This again inaugurates the cycle, and a new line of passengers repeat their 
rides (those inhabiting the Center can repeat several times in the “period” 
which takes those in the Periphery to complete just “one” ride), and once 
again the waves of the occupants as their wagons cross each other: it is the 
disparity (asymmetry) in the time taken to complete the cycle which explains 
why they cannot wave at each other at a point of “equilibrium,” bearing in 
mind income paid and overall gross production.
When the movement is represented through the respective origins of paid 
income or demand (Center and/or Periphery) and the respective productions, 
we can see that, unlike the Periphery, the paid income=demand curve of the 
Center always “exceeds” completed production or supply: in the Periphery the 
curve of its demand always displays an “insufficiency” in terms of the completed 
production curve. The Center’s “excess” is the counterpart of peripheral 
“insufficiency.” If observed from the Center, the “point of conjunction,” which 
can be seen in the cycle in its expanding phase, indicates that this “excess” of 
demand gradually disappears, and is outstripped by the completed production 
curve, which continues upward as the demand curve flattens away (Prebisch 
1949a in 1933: 456). We don’t know in advance where these curves may actually 
intersect each other, these aspects of the time-power asymmetries, are the flip 
side of Keynes’s notion of “uncertainty,”, which Prebisch does not discuss, but 
which requires his ideas on time-power disparities.
Prebisch starts from the idea that, during the “cyclical upswing,” paid 
production would result (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 485, my emphasis); in other words, gener-
ally he evades talking about “minimums” or “maximus” of the curve (s), given the power-time 
asymmetry of the agents-countries in question, which means diverse and asymmetric “time 
periods,” this aspect of his ideas has being generally lost to modern interpretations.
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income “for businessmen” is always higher than completed production (the 
“demand curve exceeds supply”). This process is reversed after the point of 
“conjunction.” Demand outstrips supply because: 
the time of return of the income paid by businessmen is shorter than 
the time taken by the productive process. Therefore, before completed 
production flows in, it is outstripped by income. (Prebisch 1949a in 
1993: 420)
It is the decline or the accumulation of stocks which spurs on expansion or 
contraction, respectively. But completed production or supply always trails 
behind the contraction of income in both the upswing and the downswing. 
The conditions of contraction and expansion are generated at these two 
points of “conjunction”, on the upswing or the downswing. This means that 
“disequilibrium” is inseparable from capitalism’s growth logic: one “goes 
alternately from a situation in which demand exceeds supply” (Prebisch 
1949a in 1993: 421).
The “Center” and “Periphery” divide is central to understanding the 
economics of “our processes.” The origin of a certain demand and the place 
where certain values are generated has distinct effects for their respective 
roles due to the varying amplitudes and rates displayed within each economic 
space. The Center will always have an excess of demand whose shrinkage takes 
“time,” which depends on the amplitude and rates of the time disparities of 
the return of income in question. I should mention that my exegesis presents 
Prebisch’s perspective using terms such as “rate,” when in fact Prebisch 
systematically avoided the term. Therefore the “rate” of “return” of income 
towards the Center from the Periphery actually is slower than the converse 
of the same process.56 In other words, there is a power-time asymmetry 
(Prebisch uses the term “disparity”) between the periods of production and 
circulation, and the time for the “return” of income originally paid in the 
“cyclical Center”: 
the return of incomes and demand, paid by the cyclical Center towards 
the Periphery is extremely long. So that if in the combination of both 
processes, the time of return shrinks and the time of value formation 
in the productive process shortens, the excess demand over supply will 
tend to shrink, because it has been initiated precisely by the contrary 
phenomenon, that is, by a very much shorter return time than the time 
of production. (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 422)
The “wave form” is a consequence of this “Time” disparity, within 
and between production and circulation processes. “Within,” because 
“branches,” “sectors,” exhibit their own specific product-power-time 
56 “Some time elapses between the payment of income by businessmen (payments to produc-
tive factors and payments of profits to each other) and the return of this income to business-
men in the form of demand for the goods they produce. This period of return varies according 
to whether it involves the cyclical Center or the Periphery, and the different circulation pro-
cesses” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 425).
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heterogeneous characteristics (asymmetries). On the upswing there is 
an accumulation of circulating capital investment, while production is in 
process along with completed production; on the downswing, the circulating 
capital is liquidated: investment and/or disinvestment, respectively. Just as 
on the upswing income influx is lower than the payment of income, during 
the downswing “income return” is higher than the “payment[s] of income by 
businessmen” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 425).
What “corrects” the timing disparity in question, between the “demand 
curve” headed to meet the “completed production” curve is the contraction 
of production undertaken by businessmen when they observe that their 
stocks are overflowing and start reducing their investment. This will in turn 
produce the other “point of conjunction,” and inaugurate the cycle in its 
upward phase.
Overall, therefore demand exceeds supply, and retailers initially cover 
the higher demand with stocks instead of putting prices up, by increasing 
unit sales: prices only rarely depend on supply and demand, according 
to Prebisch. It is businessmen’s stocks that regulate the market: they 
simply sell more items. This produces greater demand from retailers on 
wholesalers, and in their turn from wholesalers on industry, which also ups 
demand on primary producers. This chain causes the rise in prices, as well 
as “profits” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 432). But when the “market” does not 
confirm the “speculation” or “anticipation” by businessmen, prices have 
already incorporated these “profits,” which having been paid previously 
and cannot be reduced, as assumed in the classical image of the market 
where supply and demand converge. As prices have already incorporated 
the values by the time they have reached the marketplace, this involves, 
as Prebisch insists, an “irreversible” phenomenon (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 
434), which nevertheless still produces fatal contraction effects. As the 
different productive stages transpire, profit is incorporated into final goods, 
and the “rigidity” which those values convey induces a cyclical contraction, 
that is demand becomes “insufficient to absorb supply after the point of 
conjunction” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 433). Therefore, it is the “disparity 
of time” between the process of return and income, and the outflow of 
production which produces the “disequilibrium between demand and 
supply” during the cyclical upswing. 
Let us not forget either that in this illustration Prebisch claims that the 
most usual thing in cycles is the relatively faster growth of profits in the 
Periphery with respect of those of the Center: 
How do we prove this? It is an established fact that, in general, prices of 
primary products rise faster than those of finished products, indicating 
that the profit incorporated into the primary product has grown faster 
than that incorporated into the finished product (Prebisch 1949a in 
1993: 434).
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This occurs because, between the different stages of the manufacture 
production and sale, each agent buys the goods at one price and sells them 
at another with a given “unitary” profit. But through such buying and selling, 
businessmen pay their peers their respective profits and other income, while 
production has yet to arrive. It is the stocks in the respective agents’ warehouses 
that are sold at a price including the profit, driven by the “demand” generated 
by the ongoing productive process. This explains why the “value of supply” 
increases at each stage, which in turn drives the increasing demand. The 
profit arising among the various businessmen performing these alternative 
activities in turn make possible an increase in demand. Each productive stage 
raises demand above the immediately previous one, and so on.
There can therefore be no “stability of demand” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 
436);57 demand is always contingent, which lends capitalism its typical “wave” 
form. Even in the idyllic scenario of a perfect market with no “rigidities,” it 
would be the time element in terms of process and the “timetable” to generate 
a given production, which ultimately defines the existence of profit and 
explain its total quantity. And since the process of production or response to 
a given stimulus is slower in the Periphery than in the Center, the quantity 
of “profit corresponding to the Periphery will be less than for the cyclical 
Center” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 440).58 This is due to the fact that, in terms 
of the whole picture (Center and Periphery), lower unit profits are not 
necessarily at odds with a higher quantity of the total profit.
To put it another way, when the Periphery itself shortens the time 
response to demand from the Center, it does not necessarily mean that 
“total quantity of profit” declines, as this process would drive businessmen 
to cover demand more quickly, and push up their own production and 
profits, generated by their payments to productive factors and other 
businessmen. This makes a lower profit per product compatible with a 
higher total quantity of the profit.
On this occasion, Prebisch no longer speaks of a “compulsory mechanism” 
57 “In the partial phenomenon -an industry or company- we can dismiss as insignificant the 
impact on demand of the rise in income stemming from the persistent efforts of businessmen 
to increase production. (...) But when it is not only the footwear manufacturer but all busi-
nessmen who, to one extent or another, respond to the growing impetus of the cycle, the in-
come they pay over and above the completed production tends to increase demand in greater 
proportion than supply, and thus reactivates the process of cyclical growth until the point of 
conjunction is reached” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 441).
58 On the next line he says: “It is obvious, moreover, that if this increase in demand were not to 
vary -if it were to remain fixed- and, for whatever reason, the time the primary businessman 
took turned out to be shorter than for the businessmen in the Center, the quantity [of ] profit 
in the Periphery would fall, while remaining the same in the Center: the total unit profit would 
then be lower than in the preceding case” (ibid.). Let us remember that these lectures were not 
revised by the author. It is perhaps one of the very few texts “published” in (Prebisch, 1949a 
in 1993) which show some typos and errors and fragments missing. The original text can be 
found in ECLAC or in El Colegio de México library: “Teoría dinámica de la economía. Con 
especial aplicación a las economías latino-americanas”” (February-March 1949). 
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for savings. He continues to question the traditional “theory” on the subject 
and how it would shape the “interest rate,” but maintains the idea of the 
“inflationary” dimension in order to understand the resources used by 
businessmen to start the phase of the upward cycle, as well as its negative 
social distributive consequences.59
Prebisch wants to show that it is “increases in the money supply” that 
makes capitalism work, since the monetary volume is flexible. “Money” 
then is supposedly an endogenous creation of companies, and it is therefore 
businessmen who are the main agents in explaining the operation of 
capitalism, and its characteristic wave form. It is obvious by now that the 
“Wicksellian” notions on the “natural rate of interest” have been superseded 
in Prebisch’s narrative.
Therefore, investments are started with money created by the 
banking system, or which has been inactive and has been accumulating in 
businessmen’s accounts. During the cyclical upswing, businessmen offload 
their savings, or turn to the banks, and during the downswing, they do the 
opposite, canceling debts and storing up circulating capital to be used during 
the cyclical upswing. In other words, for Prebisch savings are performed in 
the downswing since during the cyclical upswing, the phenomenon signifies 
an expansion of future productive capacity and profits, a process which 
culminates once “fixed capital necessities” have been covered and the rate 
of growth declines with respect to profits, inducing businessmen instead to 
invest a portion of the profit “in circulating capital. This is enough to lead us 
to the point of conjunction, and to unleash the phenomenon of contraction” 
(Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 449).
The notion of the cycle then involves a series of articulated activities between 
Center and Periphery. Businessmen in the Center make resource payments in 
the Center and to the Periphery (see graphics at the end of the chapter). This 
entails resources leaving a certain economic space, and due to the nature of 
the Periphery they take much longer to return to the Center than the income 
and profits paid within the Center itself. And we know that during the upswing 
businessmen pay more resources and profits than they will recoup in the future, 
but “accumulation” occurs because they are manufacturing articles in process, 
and paid resources (two modes of establishing circulating capital). However, in 
the downswing “they liquidate articles in process” and “store money,” for any 
future productive resources or profits.
In both contexts (Center and Periphery), profits grow faster during the 
cyclical upswing than “productive factors’ income,” thus explaining the rise in 
59 “the typical form of capitalist accumulation (…) Is the result, therefore, of an inflationary 
pressure, through which distribution is altered within the collectivity, considerable share of 
the income to relatively small groups of businessmen with which they increment their savings 
capacity, and hence we arrive to this  conclusion: the shortage of savings, a characteristic fea-
ture in the early stages of the cycle’s upward phase, generates the phenomenon of profit, and 
profit generates the growth of savings” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 447).
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prices. But just as profits “grow faster in the upswing,” “they fall faster during 
the downswing” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 452). However, the “distribution 
of profit over the different stages of the productive process does not occur 
proportionally to income” (ibid.), and profits in the Periphery grow relatively 
faster than in the Center.
The movement of the capitalist cycle, regardless of its origin, the process 
inevitably leads to the points of “conjunction,” and the curves between 
demand and supply intersect and the contraction process initiates.
During the upswing, an “insufficiency” of demand concerning supply or 
finished products always manifests itself. The functioning differences between 
the demand and completed production between the Center (“excess”) and 
the Periphery (“insufficiency”) can be explained by the fact that the velocity 
of the rate of “income return” in the Center is relatively much lower than in 
the Periphery but with time, the gap between peripheral insufficiency and 
Center’s excess tends to grow wider.60
If we think about the hypothesis that profits are generated relatively faster 
in the Center than the Periphery, a relatively larger quantity of profits will 
go to the Periphery. But meanwhile, businessmen go on demanding higher 
levels of produce due to the existing surplus demand, and simultaneously 
reciprocally increasing profits and demand. This displacement of profits to 
the Periphery eventually determines the peripheral “insufficiency” and the 
Center’s “excess” to converge.61
According to Prebisch, it is the “spontaneous play of the system” (Prebisch 
1949a in 1993: 461). It is not a point of static equilibrium; it is a point of 
conjunction. It is the “equivalence of magnitudes” of pressures exerted by 
profits towards the Periphery. There can be no convergence of demand and 
supply because then that would mean there would be no profits, least of all 
the “undulatory” phenomenon of capitalism.
“Dynamic” equilibrium and the “succession of dynamic equilibriums” are 
equally impossible (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 463), as it would presuppose 
supply closely shadowing the demand curve, where in fact the point of 
conjunction means that the demand curve begins to lose speed or bottom 
out. Or else his “model would be destroyed,” and “classical theory” vindicated 
(Prebisch 1993: 462).62 Because the dynamic element comes from the 
60 “I maintain that within the same system there are forces which tend to enlarge the deficit 
or insufficiency of peripheral demand with greater amplitude than the excess of the Center’s 
demand. As the upswing heightens both the excess of Center’s demand and peripheral in-
sufficiency increase, but the Periphery’s insufficiency grows much more intensively than the 
excess, until it reaches the moment where the Periphery’s insufficiency is equal to the Center’s 
excess (points [sic] A in the Center and Periphery curves” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 459). See 
graphs at the end of chapter.
61 “Until its quantity has created an insufficiency similar to the excess” (Prebisch 1949a in 
1993: 461).
62 “I believe that these disturbances that intervene and prevent it attaining equilibrium, which 
lend the system its characteristic undulatory pattern which result from the interdependence of 
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decrease or otherwise of “stocks,” forcing businessmen to invest or disinvest, 
“the idea of equilibrium with a possible increase or systematic decrease in 
stocks” is untenable. “The two conditions repel each other” (ibid.).
To demonstrate the systematic and circular accumulative disequilibrium 
of capitalism between the Center and the Periphery, Prebisch 
reconceptualizes his earlier idea of the coefficient expansion into exit 
coefficient. He presupposes a kind of circulatory production process during 
which, as production expands and is replicated, it reincorporates part of 
its income to amplify the established capacity. The Periphery “returns’” its 
income towards the Center in a much more time-consuming interlude than 
the other way around, but since both entities are divergent in terms of their 
respective “exit coefficients,” there is no chance of their respective supply 
and demand curves ever catching up to each other simultaneously. This is 
why Prebisch posits that “excess of Center demand” and “insufficiency of 
peripheral demand” are parts of a single system. To each unit growth of the 
economy (central or Periphery), we should add the outbound proportion of 
income, as well as any investment necessary to keep steady their respective 
growing capacities, therefore the distinctive outflow, or “influx coefficients” 
(Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 466). This movement opposes the possibility that 
their respective demand and supply curves would coincide, because of their 
respective “exit coefficients.” 
Any race to intensify growth or demand from either sector will eventually 
bring about the system to the point of conjunction (intersection), and the 
respective contraction inaugurating the next cycle. What conducts the system 
towards to the point of conjunction and contraction is its virtue, namely, 
profit. As stocks are accumulated in the Center, businessmen react in order 
to lower the proportion of stocks, which in turn gradually reduces profit per 
unit among various businessmen, until demand meets supply the “point of 
conjunction” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 461),63 that is “completed production”.
Nevertheless, the “peripheral insufficiency” grows faster than the “excess 
of the Center’s demand” due to the respective asymmetric exit coefficients, 
or their respective income circulating velocities. This causes the gap between 
the “insufficient [demand] of the Periphery” and the “excess of the Center’s 
the scheme’s curve” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 462).
63 “What happens while the peripheral insufficiency does not coincide with the Center’s ex-
cess? There is a net excess of demand over [the] supply at the cyclical Center, the consequence 
of which is the decrease in businessmen of final produce stocks, causing an increase in demand 
among them with the purpose of increasing production, and in turn brings about an increase 
in profits which, in our hypothetical scenario, goes largely to the Periphery. In other words, 
as long as the point of conjunction is not reached, there will be a continuous fall in stocks, a 
continuous rise in the demand of businessmen, continuous growth in profits, and a shift of 
profits toward the Periphery. Profits go on shifting more and more toward the Periphery, until 
their quantity has created an insufficiency equal to the excess. This is the spontaneous play of 
the system. The equivalence of magnitudes is reached through the pressure exerted by profits 
bound for the Periphery, and by the consequences this pressure has on the difference between 
production and income return” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 460).
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demand” to widen, which in turn brings about the conjunction initiating the 
process that leads to the system’s contraction.
This is precisely what prevents theorizing about the growth and circulation 
of income between the Periphery and the cyclical Center in terms of “dynamic 
equilibrium”:64 it will simply never be reached.65 If different economic spaces 
grow at distinct time rhythms’ disparities, a change in exit coefficients, or 
an acceleration of peripheral growth would not alter the proportional 
asymmetry of income which each of the spaces “retains” for itself.
In a timeless world it is possible to observe positions of equilibrium 
between the mass of income and production. However, businessmen would 
then be none the wiser as to the levels of accumulated or declining stocks. 
For the same reason, “Centers’s excess” “dies out before insufficiency,” which 
is a consequence of the greater slowness of the return of income towards 
the Center. If we postulate a growth or greater productive expansion in 
the Periphery, autonomously from the Center and equalize the income 
magnitudes, then we would move from a situation in which a “net [excess] of 
demand” reign to one where a “net insufficiency of demand” predominates. 
This would in turn involve an accumulation of stocks and reduce production, 
unlike the reverse situation in which businessmen continued expanding 
production given a surplus demand.
Only by neutralizing the “action of stocks on demand” could a “dynamic 
equilibrium” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 470) perspective be made viable, 
but impossible in practice since it is the mechanism that makes the whole 
productive apparatus work, starting with the reactions of businessmen 
themselves. But in the event that the tempo of production, or the farsightedness 
of businessmen begins to slacken, circulating capital will accumulate to be 
used during the recovery, or the start of the cycle in its upward phase.
During his account, Prebisch perceived among his audience a near frenzy 
state, reacting to the merely “passive” function of peripheral economies with 
respect of the Center, insisting on raising the theoretical possibility of an 
autonomous process of expansion and growth. Prebisch would later try to 
show that such a process is absurd.
He introduces a series of alternatives (such as higher levels of investments 
or loans in the Periphery) to see whether the point of conjunction could 
thus be avoided or postponed for a while at least. Now, a higher quantity 
of investment in the Periphery (due to whatever mechanism) would speed 
up the encounter between demand and supply (the point of conjunction). 
Another theoretical option for reaching the point of conjunction is to 
64 “The smaller the exit coefficient of the circulatory mass is, the higher the magnitude of in-
come retained to cause the regular increase that leads to positions of dynamic equilibrium, 
the farther away the point from which these positions of dynamic equilibrium are reached” 
(Prebisch 1993:. 464).
65 “I believe that where there are two diverse exit coefficients, it is quite impossible to reach 
equilibrium” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 466).
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examine an atypical case where income grows at a faster rate during the 
upswing in the Center rather than in the Periphery. Here, unlike the typical 
case, the “excess of Center’s demand” and “peripheral insufficiency” (by 
definition the point of conjunction) cannot be made to coincide. But 
although rising demand will take its course, and exceed supply, it cannot go 
on rising ad infinitum. The point of conjunction will be reached only if the 
tempo of fixed capital investment grows faster than the rise of profits. This 
involves higher levels of fixed capital investment, which in turn implies a 
growing proportion of savings. This would considerably slow down income 
return, which means that the “excess of the Center’s demand” curve begins 
to level out, eventually coinciding with the rate of “peripheral insufficiency” 
(the “point of conjunction”) “via another path.”
If in the typical case, the point of conjunction was reached because the 
“insufficiency of peripheral demand grew more intensely” than demand in 
the “Center,” it is now “Center’s demand” which slows down relative to the 
“Periphery.”66
At his audience’s request, Prebisch examines a case when the Periphery, 
acting autonomously, generates its own process of economic expansion in 
an attempt to break away from its merely “passive” function.67 Such action 
would only “delay” the meeting of the supply and demand curves (the point 
of conjunction) in the cyclical Center, in turn generating full employment and 
a process of inflation. We would be faced with an event in which the cyclical 
phenomenon and the inflationary phenomenon would converge, with much 
more profound negative effects than would occur during any strictly cyclical 
process. But in fact, these considerations only change the “amplitude” of the 
cycle, not its characteristic “wave form”: “it has always risen only to fall again” 
(Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 478). See graphics at the end of the chapter.
Apparently then, the adjustment mechanism for the “phenomena of Center 
and Periphery” would not change, regardless of the variables considered, 
precisely the phenomena that prevent “equilibrium” being achieved: the 
existence of time. When Prebisch describes the depressive effects of the 
cycle after the point of conjunction, demand does not “exceed” production, 
and therefore the accumulation of “the circulating capital” is “excessive” 
66 “A higher retention of income has been developing. This means a slower return, and al-
though the distance between income and production continues to grow, a point will be 
reached at which, due to the saving invested, not in fixed, but in circulating capital, pe-
ripheral insufficiency coincides with the Center’s excess. The point of conjunction can be 
reached in different ways, but always by virtue of the disparity in the time of income return” 
(Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 476, my emphasis).
67 “It creates its own income in a much greater quantity than the Periphery would need in its 
passive function to respond to the Center’s demand. (...) It could happen that the magnitude 
of this expansion distinctive of the Periphery be such that, instead of the net peripheral insuf-
ficiency begetting downward the Center’s excess until it reaches the point of conjunction, we 
will have a net excess in the Periphery and that, in the cyclical Center, the excess of demand 
will be much larger than those cases we have considered” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 479).
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(Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 485). Then the problem of liquidating stocks arises, 
which generally exceed the level necessary to deal with the “demand set by 
the point of conjunction” (ibid.) and it’s when businessmen react:
leading us back to recovery, for, while businessmen see themselves 
accumulating passive stocks, it is natural for them to try to lower 
production, but when they see that their stock in existence is not 
accumulating before the point of conjunction, if they don’t wish to be 
deprived of their existence in time, if they wish to deal with the volume 
of demand reached, they will have to go back to paying higher incomes 
superior to the completed production, thus initiating the system’s 
recovery. (...) Supposing that, for whatever reason, instead of returning 
the income during the cyclical downswing in the way we have seen, 
the Periphery is slower to make repayments making the devolution 
with less rapidity (…) what would happen? Income return would be 
less active, and instead, the point of conjunction where we marked it, 
would be found much lower down. (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 486)
If, during the depression, instead of offloading stocks or circulating capital, 
the Periphery is also able to raise its import coefficient, and prolong the 
repayment of income towards the Center by some mechanism, then “supply 
and demand” would cross much earlier (the “point of conjunction”).
But this is something that has never actually happened. According to 
Prebisch, the history of inflationary phenomena is originally the result of 
the Center’s monetary practices, not the Periphery. No matter how long 
it goes on, the inflationary process will eventually produce the “point of 
conjunction”:
Inflation means an intense and increasing accumulation of profits in the 
cyclical Center. A portion of those profits is made over to the Periphery, 
all the more so, the faster the rise in profits in the Center is, and the 
longer the time the productive period in the Periphery. This would 
tend to make simultaneously a parallel development of production 
in the Periphery increasingly difficult, and neither would the growth 
of the quantity of the outflow of profits towards the Periphery such 
as to make peripheral deficit encounter, sooner or later, the excess. 
(Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 487)
The idea that this process would only stop because there was “full 
employment” was for Prebisch a theoretical madness simply because while 
the inflationary process is at full tilt, businessmen will go on investing and 
receiving profits in view of the rise in prices. Circulating capital will grow, 
and as in any expanding process, will require increasing sums of money to 
enlarge the circulating capital/stocks. But they will also have to use their 
profits to make purchases and investments in the Periphery, which means in 
fact that the “excess of cyclical demand” will be reduced. This will increase 
the “insufficiency of peripheral demand” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 488), and 
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“inevitably” produce a point of “conjunction after which the contraction of 
the system will supervene” (ibid.).
In his last lecture given registered on the March 1, 1949, Prebisch promised 
to return and delve deeper into certain aspects, introducing “world gold 
production and the tempo of technical progress” into his model (Prebisch 
1949a in 1993: 488). But Prebisch did not keep this promise, for he left 
for Santiago de Chile the next day as consultant to the ECLAC, where he 
embarked upon other reflections of a theoretical and practical nature.
I have tried here to describe a period in Prebisch’s critical thinking on 
economics of a specific period. Even during his lifetime, certain devotees or 
detractors of Prebisch’s work have made our protagonist say many things, I 
have, as far as possible, adopted the strategy of presenting his ideas by means 
of his own words, however paradoxically that sounds to non-Spanish speaking 
readers. The development and conclusion of his ideas on the world economic 
cycle during this period involved setting aside certain ideas that he had 
initially espoused. His political radicalization is the flipside of his theoretical 
reconstruction. I believe the history of Latin American economic thought has 
not carefully examined this period in Prebisch’s intellectual development, 
and his further rise to fame after ECLAC’s reunion in Habana distanced him 
from making such reflections.
However, certain faint conceptual traces passed into the phraseology of 
his following texts at ECLAC, and this makes Di Filippo’s work (1981) even 
more worthy. In just a few sentences he transports us to Prebisch’s texts and 
ideas of a quarter century later, around 1975, when he began work on what 
would become Capitalismo Periférico (Peripheral Capitalism). Once retired 
from his international posts, Prebisch crossed the equator to return to tropical 
lands, and took his manuscripts of the period we have been analyzing out 
of the deep freeze. Unfortunately, in the Western-centric academy Keynes 
work as the IS-LM68 instigator, seemed to corroborate Prebisch’s critique and 
distance him as a potential ally against economic orthodoxy. Their notions on 
money creation are close to the versions about endogenous money currently 
being resurrected (Dow 1997, Cutler et al. 1978), which resuscitates Keynes 
himself. For Prebisch, as we have seen, Keynes remained a hopeless case.
Discussion of the economic cycle (Kuznets 1930), standard for the 
course back in those days, and its stochastic nature (Mirowski 1989, 1990, 
1991a, 1991b), would also again become part of the intellectual daily life. I 
am not referring to the “real business cycle,” but Ormerod’s critique (2000) 
of it demonstrating its theoretical incongruities (a version that is currently 
dominant in certain schools of economics in the United States). Also, those 
who feel that the “equilibrium” or “disequilibrium” issue is a myth made 
up by Prebisch, should remember that the economic establishment had 
considered an attempt to “stabilize” Weintraub’s “dynamic” (Weintraub 1991: 
68 See the recent account in De Vroey & Hoover (2004).
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123) to be their main theoretical task, since the notion of “equilibrium” in 
neoclassical economics has always been highly “unstable” (De Vroey 1999), if 
not impossible (Nadal 2004).
Only time will tell if economics will again be thought of in historical 
and institutional terms (Hodgson 2001, Furtado 1983, Mallorquín 2001) as 
Prebisch highlighted throughout his life, an attitude clearly visible in his 
descriptions of the action of businessmen in their zeal for maximum profit. 
What better than to return to the past and some of its thinkers in Latin 
America, who gathered together in the Golden Decade of ECLAC (1950-
1960), providing then as today, theoretical and practical alternatives for 
economic development in a region facing a legacy of economic problems 
bequeathed by latter day neoliberalism.
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Based on Prebisch 1949a in Prebisch 1993: 419.
IP = Paid Incomes; PP = Production in progress; PT = Completed 
Production; IR = Returning Incomes; D = Demand; X = Intersection; 
Prebisch uses overwhelmingly the term “conjunción” which grammatically 
has the role to join two words, (i.e. “and”), on occasions, we also find 
“inflexión”(inflection).
Neither the amplitude 
nor the "minimum levels" 
where they intersect can 
be known in advance. 
Therefore, neither can the 
respective gradients of the 
positive or negative slopes
Neither the amplitude 
nor the "minimum levels" 
where they intersect can 
be known in advance. 
Therefore, neither can the 
respective gradients of the 
positive or negative slopes
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Based on Prebisch 1949a in Prebisch 1993: 484.
I = Total incomes paid, Center and Periphery; P = Production; D = 
Demand, (D = R) R = returning Incomes. Horizontal lines shows expenditure 
and circulation in the Periphery during the upswing. Vertical lines indicates 
circulating capital held in the Periphery during the upswing. After point 
A (supply and demand intersect), starts the downswing of the cycle, and 




Celso Furtado and Development: A Brief Outline (1950-2004)
The main purpose of this chapter is to attempt to give a brief review or outline of the works and ideas of Celso Furtado in relation to development. 
In order to limit the work to a reasonable length, I have sought to emphasize 
only those moments I believe were crucial in his thought process, in the 
hope that Western-centric readers will appreciate the importance of his ideas 
related to the “development” of Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s. 
His exile after 1964 limited much the diffusion of his ideas, although his 
publications did not recede, much of which were the basis for his classes in 
France and conferences, until his return to Brazil in 1984. Aspects of his work 
have today become central to rethink the discipline and economic policies 
appropriate for the future of the region. 
Previously we have already drawn an outline sketch of the conditions 
that made the rise of developmental economics, touching on some of the 
political, economic, and cultural world historical context of the post World 
War II period which established the institutional and theoretical conditions 
in Latin America facilitating the rise of a “southern” perspective. Prebisch’s 
leadership of the process was crucial, although known worldwide for his 
“Central Bank” counsel; in the region the apparent default by the USA, of 
many of its promises in Latin America in the 1940s, generated the fervor 
for a more “nationalist” perspective on development. The International 
Conference in 1947 in Rio de Janeiro in favor of maintaining the Peace and 
Security for the continent, takes up the Interamerican concords realized in 
Chapultepec, Mexico City, in 1945, on problems of war and peace.
Therefore we now follow by examining some pertinent aspects of the 
economic discipline that were confronted head-on and transformed by this 
Brazilian economist (“The Economic Science: the Glorious Days and its 
Deficits”), continued with a description of his first period as a theoretician 
of development (“The Armed Crusader: 1949-1964”), that is, as a “reform 
monger” according to O. A. Hirschman (1963), or “a fanatic” (G. Harbeler).1 
This is followed by a description of his period in exile (“Rethinking Capitalism 
and the Industrialization Process, 1964-1975”), to concluding (“The Prophet 
Returns: 1975-2004”) with a discussion of some of his work produced upon 
his return to Brazil in the 1980s until his decease in 2004. 
The importance of his work has been overshadowed by the rise of 
neoliberalism’s dominance, whose history and deconstruction of Latin 
American Structuralism revolves around its portrait as an “anti-market” 
discourse. And yet it is a suitable occasion to reiterate that the “creation” of 
1 Furtado (1985: 124) from a conversation between G. Harbeler and E. Gudin.
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markets was an explicit aspect of the main objectives in the transformation 
of the social and technical division through the policies promoted (land and 
fiscal reforms). Although “governmental” guidelines or interventions by way 
of programmed sectoral reconstructions of the economy were part and parcel 
of the strategy to boost certain aspects of “development” and “growth,” today 
these characteristics of the discourse are lost to younger generations all 
over the world. Nevertheless, the “market,” left to its own devices could not 
produce the momentum and the force necessary for the transformation of 
societies into more equal and just entities. 
Although Furtado’s name might be a misnomer to many, the economic 
vision nearest to his conception of “structuralism” could be described as “old 
institutionalism” (Veblen, Mitchell, Commons, Ayres, amongst others). If 
their respective ideas could be welded together today, they would not simply 
be a counter-position to revive the “State” vis-à-vis the “Market” dichotomy, 
but rather they would offer a means to argue that the contrasting “opposition” 
is itself unfounded. Furtado’s structuralism shares with the classical 
institutionalists the idea that the “market” is a specific set of asymmetric 
social relationships, which have specific conditions of existence pertaining to 
the agents’ power mechanisms in question (“embeddedness” was Polanyi’s 
term), and which need to be understood in order to construct the pertinent 
economic strategies to disentangle and liberate their action for a “better,” 
equal and just society. Although it is not the present theme of the chapter, I 
have argued (Mallorquin 2006) for their mutual articulation and similitude, 
although Furtado himself disowns any parallel between his structuralism and 
institutionalism.2 
Economic Science: Its Glory Days and its Shortcomings
By the second half of the 1940s, the preeminence of Keynes’s ideas on the 
possibility of resolving the “cyclical” nature of capitalism through some kind 
of planning or demand management cannot be put into doubt; his name and 
his ideas were synonymous with a “revolution” in economic science within 
academic institutions all over the world. The fruitful results of his ideas over 
time and space, not really expected by their progenitor, were soon to be 
discovered by many and especially those working within Latin America. With 
some degree of adaptation and transformation, the Keynesian categories 
could easily become a powerful tool to initiate a description and explanation 
of the economic history of Latin America. This task was soon undertaken by 
R. Prebisch, J. F. Noyola, V. Urquidi, R. Boti, A. Pinto, O. Sunkel, D. Seers, to 
name but a few. 
For some, the “Keynesian revolution” meant that the theoretical 
2 Furtado says that he did not include the “North-American institutionalists, (...) by the simple 
fact that they did not offer a systematic interpretation of the process of growth.” (Furtado 
1961: 8) Which is his particular way of saying that most western-centric discourse is inade-
quate to think the economy in the Periphery.
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importance accorded to its ideas were part of a much broader mutation 
in economic science itself and accordingly, sooner or later they would be 
uprooted, in much the same way as they had once displaced some of the 
“neoclassical” postulates, which, unfortunately as we now clearly know, were 
not after all banished to the rubbish heap of history.
The role of the “multiplier” and the “accelerator” were crucial to many 
of the calculations that would be undertaken to postulate specific rates of 
growth. The recommendations towards a full employment policy admitted 
that the economic complex could not be a self-regulatory entity. Fiscal 
policies and management of interest rates as well as budgetary deficits were 
part of a process aimed at maintaining a certain level of employment and 
income: demand-managed economies became the common name in post-
World War II discourse. In Latin America, these aspects were examined 
within “structural reforms” of all sorts, fiscal, land, and reconstruction and 
integration of the societies in the region.
But Western-centric “economic science” could not go further than 
reiterate its newfangled categories when thinking of the Periphery or the 
“backward countries.” There was a brutal silence, and absence of a specific 
theoretical discourse about countries that were plainly not “industrialized” 
(Arndt 1987, Heilbroiner 1964, Love 1996). The emergence of the notion of 
“underdeveloped economies,” following World War II, which singled out 
late-comers to the growing industrialization process or raw material producer 
countries, was the product of crucial theoretical and political battles fought 
by institutions like ECLAC to push forward the process of industrialization 
and social transformations. Simultaneously, in the Latin American region, 
long existent and new universities would recognize “economics” as an 
independent field in its curriculum, for example, the National Autonomous 
University of Mexico founded economics as a separate discipline in 1946.
Prebisch’s ideas, and later those of Furtado, opened up a vast uncharted 
theoretical landscape, which henceforth would be mapped by means of new 
categories which would incorporate “programing” (ECLAC’s functionaries 
eluded the use of the term “planning”) as one of the means to induce a 
calibrated process of development. Since the thirties, Prebisch had been 
experimenting, with great difficulty and not much success, with various 
explanations to account for Argentina’s topsy-turvy economic development, 
including those that took their starting point from conventional economic 
categories: the cyclical notions of capitalism and the “Gold Standard,” were 
parameters that left much to be desired, and could only be fitted to Argentina’s 
experience through an unquenchable violation of the facts (Prebisch 1944b, 
1944c, 1949a).3 
As seen above, by 1948 Prebisch had advanced a theoretical perspective 
that would culminate in a specific discourse about the so-called “primary 
3 See chapter on Prebisch or Mallorquin (2005, 2006a).
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goods producer” countries or the Periphery of capitalism. In other words, he 
thought that what was needed to address the “Periphery’s” problems, could 
not be deduced from Keynesian and/or neoclassical models of development. 
It was therefore paramount to differentiate the raw material producing 
countries (the Periphery) vis-à-vis the “Center” or industrialized nations. He 
was arguing against the plainly “false” claims of “universality” of the Western-
centric economic discourse hegemonic at that time, which in the last 
instance assumed that the countries of the Periphery would undergo similar 
structural transformations during their development process as those that the 
industrialized countries had undergone in the past, adjusting themselves to 
the world economic forces; a concept of history which L. Althusser (1969), in 
a polite and paradoxical manner has termed as “future anterior.”
Under this scheme of things, the “backward economies” had to adapt 
themselves to an international trading system that blessed its relative 
abundance of “factors of production.” There arose a version of a worldwide 
complex of trade, which reinforced the hitherto international division of 
labor: the Periphery had to specialize in the production of raw and primary 
products, and the Center concentrate on the production of manufactured 
products. 
These countries were supposed to utilize those “factors of production” 
which were in relative abundance, and thus cheaper, to produce specific 
goods. Accordingly, there was a “comparative advantage” (no doubt in static 
terms) that favored some countries to concentrate on the production of 
certain products that required diverse intensities of capital and/or labor. The 
surplus production would form part of the trade pattern that would maximize 
the overall growth and earnings of respective economies.
Above we saw that Prebisch (and H. Singer) showed that those countries 
that actually followed this path, and accordingly adjusted their economies 
to the cyclical growth process of capitalism, found themselves, in the long 
run, in a worsening spiral situation. If, as he argued, the diffusion of the 
fruits of technological progress should have favored the Periphery, given 
its lower productive or technological capacity/intensity, so it should have 
manifested itself in lower price levels for manufactured goods imported. But 
the international price index revealed otherwise; this by itself did not prove, 
nor explain what came to be known as the Prebisch/Singer thesis of the 
“deterioration in terms of trade” of the Periphery vis-à-vis the industrialized 
Centers. What was claimed was that after the repetitive cycle, the Periphery, 
besides not being able to keep to itself its own “fruits of technological 
progress,” also lost them through the downward pressure that was exerted on 
the prices of its goods. 
The Periphery’s deterioration of its terms of trade vis-à-vis the industrial 
nations, was due to the existence of an asymmetric power relationship 
between the parties in question, or as is commonly typified in mainstream 
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economics terms a disparity of the “elasticity price demand” for their 
respective products. Given the Center’s labor force mode of organization, 
they managed to preserve their overall wage-salaries conditions, sustaining 
heretofore price and cost levels vis-à-vis the Periphery, despite the 
downswing in the cyclical process. It is true, as Prebisch argued that the 
gains (prices) in primary products during the upswing rose at a much faster 
pace than their counterparts at the Center’s, but it is also historically correct 
that during the downswing they declined and lost much more than they had 
gained previously. 
To preserve the hitherto level of export earnings the Periphery had to 
increase the quantum of its exports, intensifying its productive capacity, 
which in turn increased its demand for imported goods (semi-manufactured 
and manufactured), constraining the diversification of its economy, in other 
words the technical and social geographical division of labor. Thus, every 
cycle saw the imposition of a descent of its income level. The deterioration of 
the Periphery’s terms of trade with all the subsequent negative consequences 
on its external balance account and the search for the so-called “equilibrium,” 
generated a lower rate of investment, while simultaneously considering 
formulas to induce a higher level of savings, which was generally undertaken 
by cutting health and education expenses. Which in turn reduced the capacity 
to receive foreign credits and consequently overseas capital. This had to 
be resolved by attracting foreign capital through an internal deflationary 
process, all of which stalled the growth of the economy.
The growth of income in the Center was not reflected in an equally 
proportionate increase in the demand for products or goods from the 
Periphery; on the contrary, a whole series of substitutes and demand 
schedules appeared for other, and more elaborated types of goods, which for 
the Periphery meant a reduction in demand for its goods. The Periphery’s 
growth was therefore inhibited by internal and external tendencies, 
“disequilibrium,” given its lower capacity for imports, which explains its 
stop-go characteristics.
Also, the manifestations of the Periphery’s erratic growth process 
throughout the twentieth century, forms part of its heterogenous 
characteristics product in turn of the asymmetric power between and 
among the agents, regions, and countries. An aspect central to Furtado’s 
theorization was the notion of heterogeneity and “underdevelopment” 
related to differing productive organizations, not “stages” to be 
superseded, but rather requiring reconstruction under alternative social 
relations, and geographical integration, hence the importance of regional 
“common market” arrangements. Besides creating a less “heterogenous” 
configuration base, the substitution of imports with local production 
(industrialization), would also make it easier to control the economy 
during cyclical downturns. 
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During strong nationalist social forces in the 1940s, the so-called “ideology 
of developmentalism” reigned supreme. The political forces headed by 
Getulio Vargas and a large number of institutions like the Superior Institute 
of Brazilian Studies (ISEB) inscribed the industrialization process within the 
plans that they had a chance to come up with, culminating with Kubitschek’s 
(“Targets Plan”) economic plans. 
After the war, the National Bank of Economic Development (BNDE) 
was founded and soon made agreements with ECLAC through the work 
of Furtado founding many development projects. The Joint American and 
Brazilian Commission, which was formed to enhance the industrialization 
process, had Furtado as its Director. Brazil became, in the first half of the 
fifties, a theoretical paradise for discussing and experimenting on the theme 
of “development.” Most of the leading exponents, and critics of a full-speed-
ahead-towards-industrialization policy visited the country during that time 
and discussed the topic. For example, G. Myrdal and R. Nurkse with whom 
Furtado was to establish a specific debate on the issue of the size or otherwise 
of the market as a potential limit to the capitalization and development 
process. However, last but not least, the “structuralists’” terror: J. Viner and L. 
Robbins also visited the region to counteract the transformation in process, 
the latter had recently finished polishing the Mont Pelerin Society (Mirowski 
2009), the former an active member of the society in question. One should not 
forget also that it was Vargas’s ultimate push that finally made it possible to 
confirm the existence of ECLAC as a member of the United Nations, contrary 
to the wishes of the United States, after a trial period of three years (Santa 
Cruz 1984, Magariños 1991, Furtado 1985).
The Armed Crusader: 1949-1964
Two aspects dominated and predetermined Furtado’s theoretical and 
practical interests during these years. On the one hand, the examination of the 
evolution and transformation of the Brazilian “economy” from its inception as 
a colonial entity, with particular attention given to the post-slavery period of 
1889; and on the other, a description and reconstruction of the interpretation 
of the rise and history of economic ideas as the royal road to knowledge for 
the Periphery and its development process.4 He clearly wanted to follow 
the critique of economic theory which Prebisch had initiated to its radical 
roots, but considered it too general, and sought a more specific theoretical 
vocabulary rejecting most of Western-centric discourses.
Ever since taking up a post at ECLAC in 1948, Furtado had been working 
on a whole series of projects that kept him in close contact with Brazil and 
the growth of the Latin American economies. Perhaps for the very first 
time in Latin America, at the organization mentioned above, there arose 
a profound consciousness of its possibility to contribute, theoretically and 
practically, to the solution and advancement of economic science but with 
4 For more details, see Mallorquin (1998, 2005).
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a view more geared towards Latin America. New data and statistical series 
were elaborated, with specific objectives in mind; thus, the practicality of 
updating methods for measuring (deteriorating) terms of trade, and external 
“purchasing power” as Furtado coined it in a ECLAC document (1953)5 
under his direction.
Furtado’s first published book, The Brazilian Economy: A Contribution 
to the Analysis of its Development (1954)6 as mentioned previously, had two 
quite distinct problematics. On the one hand, it was comprised of a historical 
description of Brazil’s “economy” from its colonization up until the decade of 
the 1950s, and on the other, one of the first documented histories of economic 
thought focused on the problems of the so-called “backward” economies,7 
demonstrating that these concepts were negative at best, and worthless to 
think the lineages of the specificities of an “underdeveloped economy.”
Since joining the organization Furtado had been taken very seriously 
Prebisch’s thesis of the false universality of the Western-centric economics 
orthodoxy. His first book, The Brazilian Economy (1954), which was dedicated 
to Prebisch, was simultaneously written while undertaking his organizational 
tasks, directing An Introduction to the Technique of Programming (1953) and 
revised in 1955. Between 1950 and 1954 he wrote a series of articles that 
were to become the book mentioned above (1954). Some of the articles were 
published in Western-centric international journals.8
The book (The Brazilian Economy) can be divided in two parts: a historical 
description of Brazil’s recent economic evolution and transformation, and an 
engaging critique with classical political and its more modern theorists: A. 
5 ECLAC (1953) E/CN.12/292, Preliminary Study on the Programming Technique of Economic 
Development.
6 It is ironic that a book that was dedicated to R. Prebisch, was to cause him so many problems 
at ECLAC, his views were used to put pressure on Prebisch and the Organization, but it must 
be remarked that it is in great part at odds with the economic categories then dominant, in-
cluding Prebisch’s.
7 The closest resemblance to this type of examination within Western-centric discourses can 
be seen in Meier and Baldwin (1957). Prebisch’s critique of economic theory, described in the 
previous chapter, was not known outside a few groups of students in the Economics Faculty of 
the University of Buenos Aires; but Prebisch’s stature in Argentina and the region was without 
doubt sustained “worldwide” by his work in the construction and administration of Argenti-
na’s Central Bank (1935-1943).
8 M. H. Dobb reviewed International Economic Papers, No. 4., in which an early Furtado article 
appeared and writes: “[Furtado] thinks that in countries at early stages of development the 
income-elasticity of demand for imports is so high (in the case both of consumer goods and 
capital goods) that progress may be early arrested by balance-of-payments difficulties. From 
this he concludes that ‘the inflation which accompanies economic development … is not a 
monetary problem’; and that while this may require structural modifications in a country’s 
economy to increase either its export-capacity or its capacity for finding substitutes for im-
ports, ‘a reduction in investments, which is the remedy usually proposed … will not necessarily 
rectify the unbalance and will not put the other troubles right.’ But there he stops short, and 
one is left with some sense of disappointment -with a sense of being brought to the threshold 
of an interesting problem and no further.” (Dobb 1955: 515) 
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Hansen, J. Schumpeter, J. M. Keynes, whom with the exception of Schumpeter 
all misunderstood or did not engage theoretically on the problems which 
could be thought within the “underdevelopment” ensemble. 
The second part of the book is indeed paradoxical given that its author, who 
was to be in the years to come the constructor of the “underdevelopment” 
problematic nearly single handedly, exhibited deep theoretical tensions. On 
the one hand its contradictory and teleological characteristics and on the 
other hand, unwittingly recognizing in the Western-centric perspective a 
potentiality to supersede its limitations.
The problematic and questions with which he addressed to economic 
thought have yet to be created which was to be a product of his own doing: 
mainstream orthodoxy examined “backward” countries in terms of its own 
categories, with all the linear evolution suppositions that it entailed. And 
yet one of Furtado’s starting bases to construct the theoretical space of 
underdevelopment is promoted by the conclusions of a Western-centric 
economic reunion in Chicago University in 1951 (Hoselitz 1953), where it 
was decided that the issue of “development,” “evolution,” and “change” in 
underdeveloped countries was not part of economics properly. Additionally, 
the theoretical strategy, through the examination of Myrdal’s (1945), The 
Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory, and Edwin Cannan’s 
(1942), History of Theories and Production… argued that economic thought 
has until then been a fully-fledged comedy of errors.9
But in ECLAC, Furtado’s book did not fare well, especially with 
Prebisch, since his description of economic growth of Brazil in the forties 
and fifties was argued showing that there was no deterioration of the terms 
of trade and that the high rate of capitalization and industrialization process 
was realized under a very positive socializing cost effects that fell on coffee 
exporters and importers of consumer goods: the then existent selective 
foreign exchange controls in force favored the introduction of capital goods 
imports. The narrative questioned the idea that the recent growth of Brazil 
in the 1945-1954 years was a product of an “inflationary” process unless one 
forgets the simultaneous parallel product growth and expansion during the 
period.
The concept of an underdeveloped economy as a distinct entity with its 
own logic and structure was already being processed conceptually by Furtado, 
which culminated into a fully-fledged discourse during the years of 1958-1962, 
displacing the teleological and evolutionary notions implicit and explicit in 
conventional economic discourse, Keynesian included. To start with, the 
notion of an “underdeveloped economy” of the “economic formation” starts 
dislodging the hitherto category of a “colonial economy” dominant in much 
of the text (Furtado 1954). By 1958, Furtado was convinced, although not 
9 It is not until Meier and Baldwin 1957 book that a history and revision with reference to 
“backwards economies” was undertaken.
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yet completely theoretically armed, that the Latin American economies were 
specific historical entities that could not be explained with the traditional 
vocabulary of mainstream economics. 
Paradoxically, Prebisch’s brilliant foresight of the route Furtado’s ideas 
had taken in The Brazilian Economy… (1954), compelled him to reprimand 
the work. The confrontation (Mallorquin 1995) made Furtado think about 
leaving ECLAC. We could even speculate that to keep him away from the 
center of attention at ECLAC, he was regularly commissioned to participate 
in various economic reports and commissions, starting in the Brazilian and 
United States Commission and later, through his sudden trips to prepare 
reports in Mexico (1956), Venezuela (1957), both of which were not formally 
published by ECLAC, and known only internally to its functionaries and 
a few governmental representatives. He did finally leave ECLAC in 1957 
to return to Brazil in 1958, after a ten-month visiting period of research in 
Cambridge, as an invitation sponsored by N. Kaldor.
After 1954, Furtado’s cyclical notions of capitalism started disappearing; 
theoretically, Furtado started thinking more in “structural” terms, “obstacles” 
or “structural transformations”; concepts that could think productive agents 
embedded in specific social relations and historical contexts, which meant 
that the “rational” maximizing entities espoused in the official and mainstream 
economic discourse were insufficient.
It followed that a theoretical reconstruction was in order, and 
accordingly, “underdevelopment” could not and should not be thought of 
as a historical “stage” to be overcome, but rather as the consequence and 
outcome of the existence of a specific set of power asymmetries between 
and among agents, hence the social and geographical heterogeneity which 
generated the many “imbalances” whose effects were once thought of as 
cyclical phenomena.
Thus, a specific body of conceptual tools had to be constructed and that 
was precisely what occupied Furtado between 1958 and 1962. This process 
and its evolution did not appear in “one fell swoop,” as it were. In fact, it 
was achieved painfully during a period when he was fighting crucial political 
battles to transform, first the Northeast, as its first Superintendent (1959c),10 
and secondly, as the Minister for Planning (1962b).11 
As I said, by 1957 Furtado had left ECLAC and spent a short period at 
Cambridge University, during which he became conscious of the asymmetric 
power context of ideas and their command. It seems perfectly plausible that 
Furtado’s reflections on his life in 1985 relates to the theoretical and ethical 
10 There he elaborated An Economic Development Policy for the Northeast (1959c), perhaps one 
of the first accounts to have used the thesis of the deterioration terms of trade between differ-
ent regions (Northeast and Center-south) within a single country. See details in Mallorquin 
(1996) and Love (1996). 
11 The three-year plan of the government, Plano trienal de desenvolvimento economico e social 
(1963-1965), elaborated by Furtado, was attacked by all social forces.
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relation of intellectuals and politics. We have mentioned that by 1954 having 
rejected most of the Western-centric economic discourses as incompetent 
to theorize “underdevelopment”, the then ongoing “theoretical festival” 
(Furtado 1985, 2004) occasioned a reevaluation of his standing within 
“economics,” simultaneously exposing what he then considered an ethical 
imperative:
The formidable intellectual effort to which I was testimony in Cambridge 
[1957] was a new chapter in the permanent process of re-adaptation of 
economic science so that it can comply with the hoped-for functions 
of society. True: the nature of economic knowledge is scientific, but 
the domain which she explores is delimited by ideological motivations. 
The work of economics that strays from the domain of the political 
preoccupations delimited by its age is not good nor bad, its simply 
irrelevant. (Furtado 1985: 224)
During those meetings, he approached James Mead, who having read 
an article in the making by Furtado (“The External Disequilibrium in the 
Underdeveloped Economies”)12 transmits to Furtado, in an apparently 
dismissive tone, that his perspective of the nature of the “external 
disequilibrium” in “underdeveloped economies”13 will be superseded and 
wither away once capital exports are resumed from developed towards 
underdeveloped countries. Furtado’s retrospective reflection to the 
“conversation” is significant: his interpretation presumes an undergoing 
theoretical process guided by a “counter-offensive” to “save the neoclassical 
theory of income.” As such there: 
was no reason to contaminate economic science with institutional 
impurities. It did not escape me that the efforts undertaken by these 
men of exceptional qualifications was to take us back to the starting 
point: the recognition that development had taken place where 
technological progress and the circumstances permit, so that certain 
social agents canalize it for the formation of capital. (Furtado 1985: 
225, my emphasis)
In other words, Furtado’s irony and tautological triviality should not be 
lost to the reader:
The lesson was clear: the work of theorizing in the Social Sciences is to 
a certain extent a prolongation of politics. These reflections made me 
modify the vision I had of theoretical labor, inducing in me a change 
of my plans [1957] for the future in the sense of reevaluating political 
activity. (Furtado 1985: 226)
Having returned to Brazil, he takes up in 1958 the first post of Director for 
the Northeast section at the National Bank of Economic Development (BNDE) 
12 Indian Journal of Economics 38: 403-410.
13 Furtado has said “Professor Mead did not seem to take seriously what I was saying” (Furtado 
1985: 225).
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and wrote the first project to develop the Northeast. Simultaneously during 
this period, he published The Economic Formation of Brazil (1959a),14 a text that 
incorporated most of the historical sections of the previously mentioned book 
The Brazilian Economy… (1954). The subsequent version of the book came with 
all the appropriate reformulations to give it a more distinctly “structural” flavor.
Between the appearance of this book and the period of 1964 when he 
was forced to leave Brazil by the Military regime, Furtado fought on many 
a battlefield. He produced books and articles with distinct political and/
or academic flavor, and some of a controversial nature. The latter can be 
exemplified by the title of the book The Brazilian Pre-Revolution (1962),15 a 
compilation of a series of articles including the one used whose title created 
the explosive political uproar given his governmental responsibilities; a good 
example of the former can be seen in Development and Underdevelopment 
(1961), also a compilation of some of the material found in The Brazilian 
Economy… (1954), similarly appropriately reformulated, and also containing 
new material from 1958a and 1959b.
By 1967, Furtado consciously established the existence of a Latin American 
perspective:
Economic structuralism (a school of thought that arose in the first half 
of the 1960s amongst Latin American economists) has as its principal 
objective to take into consideration the importance of the ‘non-economic 
parameters’ contained in macroeconomic models. Given that the behavior 
of these economic variables depends mostly on these parameters they 
have to be the object of meticulous study. (Furtado 1967: 81)
Hence the importance of the emergence of economic plans, which for 
example implied “land reforms” (Furtado 1969, Chapter XXIII), so that the 
“structural picture” could be modified and the social agents in question be 
freed to take up better remunerated positions within the social and technical 
division of labor, which would improve the distribution of incomes and 
resources. It presumed then an “advancement in the knowledge of real 
structures, so that on many occasions it demanded the supersession of 
conventional economic analysis” (Furtado 1969: 297). Furtado insisted that 
his perspective had:
no direct relationship with the French structuralist school, whose 
main orientation was to give importance to the synchronic axis of 
14 In Mallorquin (2005) I offer a detailed follow up of the conceptual changes in the theoretical 
vocabulary of this book in relation to its original version: The Brazilian Economy… (1954).
15 The English version of The Dialectics of Development (1964) appeared as Diagnosis of the Bra-
zilian Crisis (1965), which can also be put in this tradition, but it is a better and very well-de-
veloped case for explaining the unification of the regressive political and social forces of the 
right against the government, which he foresaw with a military takeover, which unfortunately 
turned out to be true. Willard Barber reviewed the English version of the Dialéctica del Desar-
rollo (Furtado 1964), alleging Furtado’s “deep Leninist ruts.” (Barber 1966: 196). A positive re-
view in English can be seen in Donald J. Harris’s text “Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis” (1966).
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social analysis and establish the ‘syntaxes’ of the disparities in social 
organizations. (Furtado 1967: 80)
Traditional conventional economics cannot take account of nor explain 
the existence of “structural obstacles” or “heterogeneous agents.” Thus, 
there are no “homogeneous factors with the same technological time 
horizon” (Furtado 1969: 102). The problems of “underdevelopment” needs 
to incorporate notions of a non-unified labor market and the simultaneity 
of diverse (heterogenous) production functions, depending on the “surface 
of the economic structure in which the productive agent is inserted” (ibid: 
102). The theoretical emphasis therefore tries to systematically destroy the 
traditional appearance of these problems within separate compartments, be 
they “economics” or “history.”
In a sense, Furtado rebuilt into a theoretical concept a notion which for 
Perroux appeared to be an obstacle or ephemeral phenomena that needed to 
be reformed:
Structural inflation has adulterated the very notions of our science; 
that is to say, it has warped or broken the modern instruments 
which are necessary not only for the diagnosis, but also for the 
treatment or operations that are indispensable for its cure. 
(Perroux 1957: 263)
From a Western-centric tradition, Furtado’s conclusions can be observed 
as theoretical transformations of Perroux’s idea (1950, 1950a) that specific 
and distinct economic units have differing “plans,” necessarily antagonistic 
to each other, and that so-called existence of an “equilibrium” or “relative 
peace” takes place when a certain unit or agent of production manages to 
establish a dominion around a respective economic plan-space and thus over 
the other economic agents (units of production).
At this stage, his theoretical pondering took him explicitly beyond the 
confines of simple economics; his whole vision overflowed typical academic 
disciplinary boundaries; it took turns to wander along the paths of “sociology” 
and “politics” and even veered towards “anthropology.” To contemplate 
social changes or “structural obstacles” in underdeveloped countries, 
Furtado clearly disposed of traditional academic boundaries. In other words, 
he took on a daunting and/or heroic task: he attempted to “bridge” the divide 
between sociology and economics. 
It was also during these years that his political ideas became more 
radicalized; he discovered that he was not just another “technocratic” 
advice agent “free of values.” During this period, Furtado also resumed 
his rapprochement with Marx, which helped ennoble him further; he 
discussed and criticized him, discarded his theory of value, only to finally 
assimilate his notions of social classes and the State, exemplifying just 
how enigmatic and profound the turn of events in 1963-1964 must have 
been to Furtado. 
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Rethinking Capitalism and the Industrialization Process, 1964-1975
Exiled by the military regime, Furtado left Brazil and passed through 
Chile on his way to the United States of America. In ECLAC, at the offices 
of the ILPES, Furtado discussed the material that would become part of his 
next book Underdevelopment and Stagnation in Latin America (1965). Among 
those assisting, were the names of those so often mentioned as the theorists 
of “dependency theory.” 
In the book, Furtado presented the first “structuralist” model of stagnation; 
but the book in its entirety presented all the conceptual characteristics that 
would later appear in the coming publications under the above-mentioned 
denomination. It clearly highlighted the social-political forces that are the 
basis of “internal” or “external” dislocations of an economy which constitute 
the conditions of existence of “underdevelopment,” so Furtado argued, 
notwithstanding the industrial base of some of the economies in question. 
The text was the culmination of what was to be Furtado’s specific 
“structuralism.” Although in this book Furtado exhibited a very pessimistic 
view of Latin American economies’ past and future rate of growth, 
industrialization, and social transformation, with hindsight we understood 
that the aim was to criticize and exhibit his disapproval of the social and 
economic asymmetries of the societies in the region, which was confused 
with an apparently inherent “stagnation” tendency, conceptualizing the 
exclusionary mechanism of social complexes like “capitalism”, which 
excludes the majority from the fruits of its technical progress. Furtado for the 
first time undertook an analysis, with a very nationalistic overtone, of the role 
of foreign capital in the conformation of the debt pattern and its productive 
role in Latin America. This was a theme that would never again become 
peripheral to his intellectual and political activities. 
In its inception, ECLAC always regarded foreign capital as merely a 
transitional phenomenon in Latin American economies, required only to 
undertake the initial process of capitalization and industrialization. Furtado 
felt betrayed by the United States’ promises and policies explicitly stated in 
the Alliance of Progress during his period at the forefront of development 
of the Northeast, which in part also explains his pessimistic tone after the 
Brazilian Military Coup.
Furtado started with an examination of the “external” factors that he 
believed crippled Latin American economies (U.S. policy), and then 
moved on to describe the “internal” limits of the industrialization process 
within Latin America. In this aspect, he argued that once the easy phase of 
the industrialization process was over, in other words the phase aimed at 
substituting certain consumption goods previously imported through local 
production, which in real terms managed to incorporate a comprehensive 
number of the population within the growth of the economy, the next 
phase, involving the more capital intensive sectors, was bound to collapse. 
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Furtado considered that the substitution of capital goods imports with local 
production required an overly intensive capital function, which in turn implied 
a higher level of savings requirements and income for imports. But this phase, 
exhibited certain negative aspects since it only absorbed a relatively low level 
of the labor force from the “backward” sectors of the economy. Aside from the 
fact that the capital-intensive function implied a much higher level of savings, 
which the upper classes did not and could not supply given their traditional 
historical behavior, the reduced market for its goods impeded the benefits of 
fully-fledged economies of scale. 
As a result, everything seemed to work towards lowering the productivity 
level of the economy (not just the capital-intensive sectors), thus ensuring the 
stagnation process of the Latin American economies.
If Furtado was belied by the so-called “Brazilian miracle,” with rates 
of growth in the manufacturing sectors reaching up to 10 and 12 percent 
annually, in the late sixties and early seventies, he soon incorporated these 
new aspects into his future analyses of the Brazilian “model” of development. 
From Underdevelopment and Stagnation in Latin America onwards, Furtado 
would emphasize the historical aspects and role of the social classes leading 
the development process. Thus, Furtado was able to provide reasons to 
explain the (“unexpected”) growth pattern of the economy in question. 
In the Analysis of the Brazilian Model (1972), Furtado started by explaining 
the conformation of the Brazilian State with Vargas, and went on to illustrate 
that the growth pattern of the “Brazilian miracle,” owed its effort to the 
incommensurable concentration of wealth amongst a reduced minority, which 
was the only way to sustain the intensity of growth of the industrialization 
process based on the production of durable consumer goods.
The economic policy was implemented by the “concentration” of 
income in fewer hands, not through its spread across wider strata of the 
population. State intervention in the economy, offering lower interest rates 
to businessmen and to potential consumers of the upper strata, enabled and 
induced a consumption pattern similar to that which existed in the industrial 
Centers, but without the corresponding level of savings. It was this policy that 
drove Brazil’s deficit on its external accounts sky-high during the 1980s which 
generated an un-payable foreign debt pile.
The economy was composed of two unrelated markets,16 a massive 
consumer sector, with a very low productivity turn out, due in part to 
the State’s policy of maintaining salaries low; and simultaneously the 
market that produced durable goods for a modern lifestyle imitated from 
the industrial Centers. Furtado claimed that a very “specific demand” 
was in process, for a very particular structure of production, hence we 
had high levels of growth and at the same time, a growing majority of the 
population untouched by the fruits of the technological progress.
16 This is clearly the theme in Economic Development: A Myth (1974).
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Hence, it was easy for Furtado to leap towards a “cultural” theory 
of dependency, reiterating his sociological theorization of the agents of 
production explaining their behavior. Unfortunately, the “modernization” 
process was anything but a universal phenomenon. Its effect only reached 
and extended to a minority, which managed to impose a developmental 
pattern and values that were nevertheless unfelt by the rest of the population. 
It is obvious that Furtado here used the notion of “modernization” in a 
plainly sarcastic tone, since the so-called “structural functionalist” theory 
of modernization assumed it as an irreversible and universal force once it 
got under way. We cannot but mention the obvious similarities to today’s 
discussion on “globalization.”
By now, the economist ingredients and the iron law of “stagnation,” 
proposed by Furtado in Underdevelopment and Stagnation… (1965), had 
withered away by his historical and sociological explanations. There 
was no automatic reproduction of any “tendency” in the economy, or 
hidden hand guiding it, but rather it was plain that it required a clear 
intervention by the State to give it some direction. And the social 
political forces which dominated the State in Brazil during the 1980s 
put aside the social reforms as well as some form of planification of the 
activities of its public enterprises.
On the one hand, Furtado’s analysis of Multinational Corporations 
(MC) took on a greater significance in his studies of “capitalism” in 
general from 1964, but his perspective and intention to understand 
their dominance, and explain it under an all-encompassing logic swayed 
by US’s global policies, actually threatened, on the other hand, at the 
very least, to undermine the specific structuralist accounts that he’s 
been distinguished for. His insistence during the seventies, that a world 
capitalist superstructure was under construction, led by the US but 
on some occasions and in some versions in combination with the EEC 
(European Economic Community) (to control disturbances of capitalism, 
like the petroleum shocks in 1973, or the regulation on the use of certain 
raw materials), puts his analysis extremely close to those “structuralist 
functionalist” and teleological accounts of capitalism of which he so 
justifiably made fun of on other occasions.
During the 1980s, this problem became more complex in his writings 
because his own descriptions of the USA’s commercial and industrial 
decline, vis-à-vis Japan and the EEC, dictated a new notion to explain the 
heterogeneous forces and politics of the MC and States in question. Thus, 
from a “multipolar” notion of political and economic power at a world level, 
we could end up, under this logic, into a “unipolar” world after the demise of 
the Soviet Union, which could hardly be the case in economic and political 
terms given Japan’s and the EEC’s rapacious nature.
All this was pointing towards a theorization that Furtado was trying to 
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undertake at a much more general level, which explains his onslaught, once 
again, on economic (positive) science, found in Economic Development: A 
Myth (1974). Furtado was thus preparing new theoretical ground, which 
takes us to the next stage.
The Prophet Returns: 1975-2004
In Preface to a New Political Economy (1976),17 Furtado made desolating 
claims: “structuralism” had made an important and heroic assault on the 
fortress of conventional economics. The absence of its categories in the fifties 
and sixties would have been catastrophic for Latin America, but it had served 
its purpose and had entered a process of “diminishing returns.” In isolation, 
such pronouncements might have seemed to many as the end of a long 
theoretical tradition in Latin America. However, for Furtado it was a period 
of theoretical experimentation, proposing nothing other than a complete 
overhaul of conventional and structuralist economics. What was needed, 
Furtado went on to argue, was not so much an interdisciplinary approach or 
method to study Latin America’s problems, which was to be his claim in his 
next book, Creativity and Dependency (1978), but a new “general theory of 
social formations.”
To undertake this theoretical reconstruction, Furtado rescued a forgotten 
view from his younger days: the notion of the “surplus product” (Furtado 
1954). The category was to serve an explanation of the rise and fall of empires, 
nations and the “industrial civilization.” Its appearance and reproduction had 
specific mechanisms of appropriation (“authoritarian” and “commercial”) by 
specific social classes, as well as the way it was distributed. Whereas in Preface 
to a New… (1976) Furtado posed these questions in terms of a “Preface” of a 
book yet unwritten, his future texts provided the new theoretical vocabulary 
emanated therein, which can be seen in his 1980 book A Brief Introduction to 
Development. An Interdisciplinary Approach, which comfortably intermingled 
with his “old” version of “structuralism.”
Furtado turned to the Physiocrats, rather than to classical political 
economics, to reconstruct social theory through a new perspective on 
the role of accumulation but with special reference to underdeveloped 
countries. What was required was a new theory of accumulation, rescuing 
those elements which were omitted by classical and modern economics 
alike. In this sense, although Furtado did not acknowledge it, he moved 
closer to the ideas of Marx. Furtado showed that modern economics, 
especially since Keynes, saw the process of accumulation as a liquid 
corporeality form reservoir, represented in the account books, which could 
be freely put into operation. Furtado explicitly ridiculed the notion that 
17 It is interesting to note that it was during these years that Prebisch too is rethinking the Pe-
riphery through the notion of the “surplus”: his articles appearing originally in the Review of 
the CEPAL from 1975 onwards were to be integrated in his book Peripheral Capitalism (1981), 
according to Furtado it was just plain coincidence. See Furtado (1998b in Mallorquin 1998).
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digging holes to fill them up again or constructing China’s Wall could be 
considered as “productive.”
Examining this theoretical move, it would be difficult to question 
Furtado’s position without simultaneously bringing down with him a long-
established tradition in modern and classical economics. But the theoretical 
status of his postulates changed when he elaborates the distinction between 
the “accumulation” that takes place in the industrialized countries and an 
apparently similar process in underdeveloped countries. Furtado argued that 
in the latter case, a certain “accumulation” was not “productive,” because it 
took place “outside” the productive process. Here he seemed to be pointing 
to a whole series of uses of the “surplus” to generate luxury goods which do 
not amplify the radius of the productive value chain, nor does it intensify the 
productive capacity of an economy. But even if this interpretation of Furtado 
were adequate, it was still not very clear which of the production processes 
were “productive” and which were not, in terms of the existence or otherwise 
of a “surplus.”18 In other words, if the “appropriation” of the surplus is 
achieved through the process of production, which are those components of 
the labor process which were lacking in competence to generate a “surplus” 
in a specific geographical location?
During the 1980s, with the coming to end of the military regime and the 
democratic movement in progress in Brazil, Furtado was allowed to return 
to his country and formed part of a political group built around the former 
Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) that along with the participation 
of other political clusters led to the creation of the Party of the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement (PMDB). In fact, Furtado kept close to the PMDB, 
taking on an advisory role on economic matters during the first five years 
of 1980s. During these years, he decided to concentrate on his theoretical-
political work. 
The notions of accumulation inside and outside of the productive system, 
and the notion of the surplus mentioned above in his previous books, 
remained in the background or they were conflated with the more orthodox 
meanings of the declining “capital-product ratio” for the economy. Aside from 
his return to Brazil, his advisory role, and later incorporation into Sarney’s 
government, he was obliged to write and reformulate answers relating to his 
participation in past economic policies. 
The books that Furtado wrote during this period showed him to be 
“putting history in order,” clarifying and establishing responsibilities. As a 
public figure, Furtado underwent important changes. In 1985, he was named 
Ambassador to the European Economic Community, and shortly later 
Minister of Culture, a responsibility from which he resigned at the end of July 
of 1988. 
18 Prebisch also has a series of similar problems to differentiate between “productive” and “un-
productive” investments, during his theoretical transition after 1975.
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During this interlude, in contrast with his immediate past, his writings 
suggested an eminently “political” strategy which formed part of his 
commitment to a democratic regime and the reconstruction of a more just 
social economic development. 
These years saw the publication of three almost autobiographical texts. 
The Fantasy Organized (1985), which narrated of his activities prior to and 
during the 1950s while he occupied his post within ECLAC, the struggle for 
its creation. The Wrecked Fantasy (1989), which dealt with the interlude in 
which he headed certain governmental departments in Brazil (1958-1964) 
until he became the Superintendent of the Northeast (SUDENE) and as 
Minister of Planning (these two books, by way of retrospective, described 
his intellectual formation and insertion into the administrative apparatus of 
the Brazilian State). Finally, The Winds of the Change (1991) concentrated 
its deliberations around an endless number of thematic theoretical-political 
discussions, as well as his experiences as an “exile” in different countries 
between during the sixties and eighties. Special reference was given to his 
visits to various universities and international institutions. The text also 
included several unpublished texts from the past which were censored by 
the military regime and his reflections on some countries. Nevertheless, I 
reiterate that these were texts that tried to pinpoint “the responsibility that fit 
him” as the intellectual and State policy designer. 
Finally, an account in his own words of his theoretical evolution appeared 
as an article in 1987 “Underdevelopment: To Conform or Reform.” The 
autobiographical books (the two “fantasies” of 1985 and 1989), The Winds 
of the Change (1991), as well as Brazil After the “Miracle” (1981), are integral 
texts in the sense that they apparently were designed as such.
Previously, The New Dependence... (1982) revolves around two central 
chapters, and the format is directed towards the academic establishment. In 
contrast to the latter books, we see No to Recession (1983), and Culture and 
Development (1984), which incorporated a series of articles with relatively 
dispersed themes, initially in the form of journalistic notes and writings 
appealing to the general reader. In the former book, Furtado’s position is 
spelled out with respect to the problem of the external debt, a thesis that was 
practically adopted by the Government of Sarney when Furtado oversaw the 
Ministry of Culture. The latter, through the thematic progress of its chapters, 
clearly denotes the exercise of his role and responsibilities assumed under 
Sarney’s government. 
On the other hand, almost all the articles produced during this decade 
showed an approach towards the “culture” of Brazil and the participation 
and misfortunes of the diverse and heterogenous regions in their process 
to constitute the “nation,” as well as their latent fragility given the 
incommensurable inequalities between and within them: the inherent 
heterogeneity of the social relations product of the power asymmetries. 
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Therefore, Furtado seems to be presenting the need for a new sort of federalism, 
which he viewed as vital to integrate the great masses that had remained 
unempowered by the “bad” development of the Brazil under military rule. 
In Culture and Development (1984) we find a chapter dealing with the notion 
of an “endogenous development.” Likewise, he spoke about the functions of 
universities, and especially those located in the Northeast, where the role of 
a simple instrumental rationality, if not questioned, could only but delay the 
enormous projects of research still needed to be undertaken. 
The discussion centered around the role of the “creativity” of man seen 
previously in other books, and the fundamental importance of a clear 
political will to materialize its visions and projects. Retrospectively, he tells 
us that the existence of greater quantities of information to face the crisis 
that afflicted the country made it feasible to surpass the role of “spectators 
of history” (Furtado 1984: 33), and become its true agent. Furtado believed 
possible, notwithstanding the conceptualization of the world economy and 
the diagnosis of Brazil, an “endogenous development” process for the country 
which could break the chains of the transnational capitalist exclusionist model. 
In fact, we had to wait many years to hear him propose concrete approaches 
and measures around the “self-transformation” of Brazil, a problem that 
recalled his perspective of the first years of the 1960s. 
The discourse on the role of national sovereignty, as the means to treat 
the problem of external debt, and how to confront social inequalities, 
exhibited an eminently political diagnosis. At the same time, the detailed 
analysis of the Brazilian situation and how to defeat adversities and promote 
its development under the logic of an “auto-centric” capitalism, echoes the 
return of his “structuralism” as a central guide with its emphasis on internal 
and external structural factors. 
We could also note that he incorporated the theoretical vocabulary present 
in the texts of the recent past about the conformation of a new “capitalist 
world totality.” The analysis of the configuration of world capitalism under 
the leadership of the MC, a totality safeguarded by the United States, does 
not seem to give rise to a “political superstructure” that could organize the 
new emerging entity. On certain occasions this was advanced as a process 
still in the making; or alternatively, the power of the United States was simply 
assumed as the organizing umbilical Center of the whole. 
Furtado emphasized simultaneously the consequences of a relatively high 
growth rate of the Brazilian economy, and the fact that it might be materialized 
within its domestic market, without forgetting its highly negative exclusionary 
effects. He held that the future of Brazilian capitalist industrialization, 
supported within its own domestic market, would suffer serious traumatisms if 
deep “structural transformations” were not carried out. 
The description of the so-called “economic miracle” underlined most of 
its aberrant consequences: vast inequalities at the level of personal incomes 
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as well as intra and inter-regional dislocations. It was by no means an 
apologetic description of the growth of the Brazilian economic formation; 
the description of its economic history was overturned to emphasize that the 
“miracle” created debt and dismantled the economy. Under the weight of a 
sizable foreign debt burden correlated to the pattern of the industrialization 
adopted during the 1970s, the economy began to lose control of its 
“coordinating Centers,” and Furtado now presented its recovery as one of the 
first tasks to carry out; the economy had entered a process of total financial 
disorder as a consequence of the internationalization and the modus whereby 
many pompous projects were financed.
The State’s participation in economic infrastructure and productive 
sectors was carried out without any type of programming or control. Brazil 
After… (1981) and The New Dependence… (1982) showed the vital need to 
transform Brazil’s industrial pattern. The central theme of No to Recession... 
(1983) was therefore already implicit in the texts. The industrialization pattern 
generated in Brazil, with highly intensive capital production functions, 
required a relatively higher degree of savings. The government opted to index 
savings invested in domestic bonds to the foreign exchange rate, which led 
to the conversion of the dollar into a currency of “first” importance and the 
cruzeiro, the national currency at the time, into one of “second” importance. 
In addition, the Treasury paid interest rates according to international rates 
and lent in local currency at almost a negative rate of interest. 
Public sector companies “hypertrophied,” lacking any control or any kind 
of programming, simply fell heavily into debt with the euphoria of the Brazilian 
“miracle,” even though they were created primarily with the intention of 
raising exports and acquiring foreign currencies. Inflationary “pressures” (No 
To Recession... 1983) were essentially the consequence of low productivity 
levels and disarticulated production units, not a “monetary” phenomenon. It 
was more than obvious that they required restructuring, reminiscent of the 
“structural” theory of inflation developed in the early 1950s.
Subsequently, when Brazil came close to moratorium and was forced to 
renegotiate its debts with the IMF, the strategy promoted by this institution 
implied repaying the debt and simultaneously dismantling large parts of its 
industry, as had been previously experienced in Argentina and Chile. 
But the inflationary phenomena could not be resolved by the application 
of monetarist medicine because two quite different forces were in play. On 
the one hand, the “propagation” was the fueling mechanism of the inflationary 
“pressures”19 related to the control of the financial apparatus and the manner 
by which they were articulated within the Brazilian economic structure, and 
on the other, “pressures” the means by which distinct sectors defended their 
income level. The restoration of the industrial organization was necessary 
19 These concepts first appear in Furtado 1954 and become the basis for the “structuralist the-
ory of inflation,” which subsequently appeared in the classic texts of Noyola (1956) and Sunkel 
(1958), see Danby (2005).
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to down-tone the origin of the “pressures.” In other words, “inflationary” 
processes are not a monetary phenomenon, they represent the antagonism 
and the manner whereby agents struggle for a pattern of redistributing 
income. 
He maintained that a greater integration into the global market through 
the export of manufactured goods was necessary and unavoidable, but argued 
that given the technological surpluses of industry and the circumstances of 
the “world economy” at the time (mid-nineteen eighties), a selective positive 
discrimination should be made in favor of some of its branches and sectors. 
If the economy, and especially public sector industries had been held on 
some kind of leash, they would not have been able to get into the disastrous 
debt situation that they did, and their produce would have been incorporated 
quickly into the productive circuits, reducing the demand that they themselves 
procreated, which would have lessened much of the inflationary “pressures,” 
and “propagation” forces that ensued. 
The problem resided in raising domestic productivity so that it could 
cope with the enormous existing demand. According to Furtado, the pre-
eminence of the neo-liberal discourse on the market, viewed as the savior of 
the situation, complicated matters because what was in fact needed was the 
establishment of an internal globally programmed strategy and a consensus 
among the diverse social and economic forces, so that a fair distribution of 
the sacrifices among them could be constructed. 
Rising prices are little more than a sign that certain social groups are 
being sacrificed. In an analysis of the serious inflationary situation afflicting 
Brazilian companies, it was necessary to distinguish the basic causes (the 
generating foci of pressures) from the propagating mechanism of these price 
pressures. The expansion of the means of payment and monetary correction 
are simply the propagation mechanisms (Furtado 1982: 45). 
In Furtado’s view, freely escalating wages by themselves do not generate 
inflation, but they do enable its “propagation,” that is to say, they enable the 
materialization of inflationary “pressures” to occur. Wage compression breaks 
the process of propagation and complies with its assignment to concentrate 
income. Inflation does not end through an institutional setting, in terms of a 
change in the statutes of the central bank or fiscal reforms, etc. It is:
necessary that a consensus ensue at the level of those who make 
decisions with respect to the environment of action of the government 
regarding the priorities which the action of the state should obey. 
In modern pluralist societies that consensus is obtained, with the 
mediation of the political class, through the representative organs of 
the popular will. (Furtado 1982: 46) 
The roots of the inflationary pressure stem from excessive incentives given 
to the private sector which in turn generated excessive public sector spending. 
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To eliminate these roots, relative prices should be restructured, to maintain 
levels of exports without subsidies, and to adapt global expenditure of the 
State to its effective capacity for collecting real resources (instead of bonds 
articulated to a rate of interest established externally), without reducing the 
private sector’s productivity and without generating social tensions. 
The illusion of the “Brazilian miracle” was empowered and deepened in 
the Brazilian economy through the country’s external debt. It was believed 
that the economy was at its full peak when the circumstances of world trade 
were not promising. With the oil “shock” of 1973 came the need for extensive 
structural transformation and an alternative pattern of economic development 
which was less reliant on the consumption of oil. In fact, external debt as a 
momentary “solution” obstructed viewing the fact that the trade balance was 
no longer favorable, and that an intense restructuring of the whole economy 
was required. The capital account showed a surplus due to the ridiculous 
conditions that were imposed on capital entering or leaving the country; at 
the same time, both the form in which domestic bonds or treasuries were 
indexed to external rates of interest as well as the fluidity of debt, procreated 
the idea of an endless economic “boom.”
Notwithstanding, Furtado argued that the strategies to face the problem of 
external debt and its repayment required that its “solution” should be posed as 
part of a policy “problem” and its alternatives. In the first instance, the payment 
of interest on the debt should not sacrifice growth, which should necessarily 
conform the basis for the continuance of such repayments without restricting 
economic policy, which obeyed a view of opening up the economy without 
any sort of differential discrimination towards specific sectors. The insertion 
into the international marketplace should be promoted in those branches 
and sectors whose possibilities of adaptation and survival were more reliable. 
Nevertheless, the reports of the IMF policies prompted the adoption on the 
part of Brazil of an internal/external policy with the aim to produce dollars, 
which invariably meant reducing domestic social expenditure, assuring the 
free incorporation of international segments into the national economy and 
the dismantling of the national productive apparatus. Through “recession” and 
the decrease in public expenditure, imports vital for continuing the process 
of industrialization were reduced considerably, which implied elevating the 
overall cost of this process.
Subsequently, Furtado did radicalize his position on the debt of Third 
World Countries, and argued that “moratorium” as the “smaller of all evils,” 
(Furtado 1999) founded on the basis of the eleventh chapter of the Code of 
Bankruptcy of the United States of America.
On the other hand, the context of the political struggle for the 
reconstruction of democracy in Brazil at the beginning of the eighties, and the 
structural instability of its economy, cannot explain the theoretical passion 
with which he returned to the issue of the Brazilian Northeast. The question 
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of the “Northeast” was always one of his crucial life existence themes, both in 
personal and political terms, whilst the interpretation of the industrialization 
process was the other. 
One should, therefore, examine the evolution of the Northeast post 1964, 
and their effects on the views of this Brazilian “Northeastern” economist. 
Almost two decades after the coup d’état, he proposed again that the SUDENE 
acquire independent functions of direction over the future of the region, 
which under the military regime had been destroyed, losing its executive 
capacities in exchange for a more deliberative participation. Because it was 
an important advisory entity to the Executive it was integrated, like other 
entities, within the confines of the Ministry of the Interior. 
Without a doubt, important changes in Furtado’s perspectives were 
clearly visible here. In the first place he gave a high priority to the promotion 
of self-administration of the Northeast on the part of its population so that 
it could solve “its” own problems. The thesis repeated was that a new model 
of development would have to be invented by the people of the Northeast 
themselves. The importance was fundamental and thus invited the need to 
constitute “cooperatives” and a process of land reform which could release 
the “creative capacity” of the local population. 
The leading discursive element was its “anti-technocratic” stance and the 
demystification of the role of the “Prince” as a supreme guiding Center of the 
process, which went a long way to criticize his own previous conceptions 
and policies. Overall, the industrial structure had not undergone great 
mutations in the Northeast; the industrial sector did not elevate its relative 
participation in a resounding way, and the agricultural sector maintained its 
relative regional importance. The absence of interregional industrial links 
can be explained by the predominance of “the dynamic” industries, highly 
dependent on resources and products originating from the Mid-South. Thus 
Moreira (1976) concluded that it is easier to explain the situation of the 
Northeast as part of a centripetal expansion of capitalism, than as a regional 
problem unto itself.
Furtado’s more pragmatic vision underlines the issue that the fundamental 
problem is no just eradicating inequalities, which exist everywhere. Although 
eliminating inequalities is important, what is needed is rather the:
transformation of society in Brazil’s northeast in order to enable 
development to effectively benefit the mass of the population. If 
the standard of living of the northeastern rural man is not raised 
deliberately, if he continues to be subjected to hunger and ignorance, 
the social structure of the whole country will tend to remain semi-
immobilized, reproducing and worsening the extreme inequalities 
that characterize it at the present moment. The strategic target should 
be to open up space so that those that are really at the bottom of the 
social scale can become active agents of development. That first boost, 
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which can finally break the structures that imprison those that are the 
lower social levels, will only be produced as a consequence of a decided 
political will. (Furtado 1981: 121)
During the 1990s, Furtado reiterated the need for social reforms and ways 
to sponsor a policy which could break the stronghold of the exclusionary and 
imitative Western-centric pattern of Brazil’s development: Global Capitalism 
(1999) and Looking for a New Model (2002). In terms of these ideas, many 
dependence theorists and critics of Furtado in their younger days became 
part of his entourage and came under his sway. He offered his intellectual 
support everywhere, especially to the “movimento sem terra,” (landless 
movement), as well as to President Lula, on whom he lavished plenty of 
elegant words hoping he would have the “courage” to undertake the land-
reforms so vital to kick-start the social changes Brazil needed. He struggled 
for social equality until his very last days through an endless array of proposals 
and proclamations. 
Celso Furtado died on the very same day that Lula administration deposed 
his protegé, Carlos Lessa, from the presidency of the Banco Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Economico (BNDES. National Bank for Economic and Social 
Development). At his death, he had become a world-renowned personality, 
and various universities had acknowledged his considerable abilities and 
achievements by awarding him honorary doctorates. In 2004 a movement 
grew within Brazil, which put him forward as a candidate for the Nobel Prize 
for Economics of that same year. In recent decades, few intellectuals in Latin 
America can be said to have kept the flag of democracy and development 
flying so long and as high as Furtado. Long live Celso Furtado!
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Chapter 4
Theoretical Misrecognitions as the Source of Development 
Theory Déjà vu
Ah, what happened to you, written and painted thoughts! 
Not long ago you were so colorful, young and malicious, 
so full of thorns and secret spices that you made me sneeze and 
laugh –and now? Already you have doffed your novelty, 
and some of you, I fear, are about to become truths: 
so immortal do they already look, so distressingly honorable, so boring!
Nietzsche
Introduction
This chapter describes an episode in economic theorizing in Latin-America during the 1950s. After a brief glimpse at economics (The 
End of Postmodern Economics), it examines Albert O. Hirschman’s 
theoretical evolution before his work on development (On the Road to the 
Mecca of Development). Then the story moves to examine the structuralist 
vocabulary of Celso Furtado and Raúl Prebisch (Disembarking at the Mecca 
of Development) and returns to Hirschman once again to scrutinize his classic 
work on development (Mr. Hirschman Through the Looking Glass). Lastly, in 
(Remembering the Future) I argue that structuralism can certainly be examined 
as a feature of a cyclically found and lost tradition in economic thought 
that insists on highlighting the power asymmetry of the social relations to 
understand the evolution of the economy and its agents. In this last segment 
I attempt to make a defense for Latin American Structuralism, contradicting 
the worst and perhaps silly occurrences which were said about the perspective. 
Given that this story tries to recover the notion of development for today’s 
reexamination of policies in the “Center” and “Periphery” alike, we can say 
that if it wasn’t for Hirschman’s work, perhaps Latin-American structuralism 
would have not been heard at all, given that nobody was obliged to read or 
publish in Spanish or Portuguese then or now. I was told once by perhaps one 
of the most important sources in Western-centric academia on these issues 
( Joseph Love) that having asked for a research grant to develop a work on 
these matters, one of the reviewers said he had never heard the name of Raúl 
Prebisch, circumstance which perhaps the chapter might redress a little!!! 
But today we are under an inverse phenomenon, paraphrasing Mirowski and 
Nik-Khah (2017), a vast amount of “knowledge” on Prebisch and Furtado is 
lost to the “information.”
Although development theory had its heyday between the fifties and 
the mid-seventies, recent revivals (Chang 2003, Toye 2004, Vernengo 2007) 
bring to mind a series of theoretical misinterpretations which are valuable to 
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recall, especially for Western-centric readers. Some even find the discourses 
surrounding the notions of growth and development as part of a forgotten or 
lost world. As Jolly et al. explain:
One of the more interesting discoveries that digging into UN archives 
of the 1950s brings out is the central role of the UN in development 
thinking regarding two major issues which have been at the genesis of 
the emergence of development economics as an autonomous branch 
of knowledge and which even today are at the heart of the debate 
on development. These are the role of the state versus the role of the 
market and the role of external versus internal factors. (2004: 51, my 
emphasis)
Certain aspects of Krugman’s work on geographic economic differences 
are interesting, however we find a phrase which establishes that “the theory 
of economic development was correct” (Krugman 1995: 29) mentioning 
A. O. Hirschman as its genealogy and intellectual hero, and yet nearly the 
whole story is left untold or “skewed.” Much of Hirschman’s classic work 
published in 1958 (The Strategy of Economic Development) leaves out most of 
the theoretical and practical debates of the fifties and sixties at the Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLAC)1 and other institutions. 
As seen above much of which was constructed in Latin America as 
“structuralism” during the fifties had a very specific theoretical source and 
perspective: 1) the questioning of orthodox economics, 2) the construction 
of a theoretical tradition, and 3) the theoretical recovery of the historical 
conditions of the agents to understand their behavior and their calculus. 
Indeed, like the institutionalism of the 1920s, most of its promoters were 
intellectuals that composed the first generation of ECLAC functionaries. 
This could be put in a somewhat more elliptical fashion: if Keynes 
thought that neoclassical thought was a “special” case, structuralists like 
Raúl Prebisch and Celso Furtado argued that Keynesianism was just another 
“special” case within the corpus of the economics mainstream in general, 
which in turn should be transformed to think not only the Latin-American 
problematic, but mainstream’s own conditions of existence and its pretense 
of “universality.”
We will see that in a similar fashion Hirschman’s vocabulary on development 
went through an analogous conceptual transformation once he discovered 
that those elements perceived in “underdeveloped” economies that inhibited 
its “proper” functioning could also be found in “developed” ones.
Initially the theoretical strategy adopted by Latin-Americans in the fifties 
(later on called “structuralists”) was to refuse the relevance of economics’ 
general categories, arguing that they could not explain the specific structural 
features of “underdeveloped countries,” and therefore the reconstruction of 
the theoretical vocabulary was required for its own specific field of application, 
1 Later its acronym includes “the Caribbean.” 
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but the process finally culminated with a general perspective which could be 
used to examine and explain the “Center” and “Periphery” economies alike.
Krugman’s reminder of Hirschman as one of the most important pioneers 
in development thought is not in doubt here, but Hirschman certainly took 
his time to signal or articulate much of his ideas to Latin America’s own 
pioneers in the field. In his classic work The Strategy of Economic Development 
(1958) much of his vocabulary seems consciously constructed so as not to 
be confused with them, in other words, pardon the pun intended, they both 
shared some similar notions.
Nevertheless, the publication of Furtado’s review (Furtado 1959a) of 
Hirschman’s book The Strategy… (1958), scolding its author for his omissions 
of ECLAC theoretical and practical discussions on growth and development 
in Latin America, brought about important changes in the way Hirschman 
communicated certain intellectual currents. Undisturbed, Furtado stated:
This book is an extremely useful reading because it shows much more 
a desire to comprehend a reality of underdevelopment and lagging 
development than a preoccupation to submit reality under a pre-
established academic scheme. He is a heterodox in his own way (…) 
Analyzing this interesting book by Hirschman, we cannot but reflect 
on this point. Large part of what is said in the book was already said 
and repeated by Latin-American economists. Particularly, the analysis 
of the problems of the external disequilibrium and of inflation is for us 
extremely familiar, that is why they are less interesting. Meanwhile the 
author nearly does not quote the Latin-American bibliography and, in 
particular, the contributions of ECLAC. Given that the bibliography 
is well known by Hirschman, who opened his eyes to the problems 
of underdevelopment in Latin America, it is possible to deduce that 
there exists a deliberate purpose to ignore the contribution of the 
organ that acted as an authentic pioneer in the field of the study of 
underdevelopment and especially, in the analysis and interpretation of 
the Latin-American economies. (1959a: 64)
Without a doubt this brought on an important change in Hirschman’s 
evaluation and acknowledgement, to say the least, of the issue about the 
presence of “indigenous theories” (Hirschman 1961a: 5). Judging by the latter 
book, the vocabulary of “structuralism” takes on a much more prominent 
place and mention, especially as an alternative explanation of inflation vis-
à-vis the orthodox perspective, including Prebisch’s perspective and theory 
on the “Center”/ “Periphery” where it gets a short and honest presentation. 
But from then on, for example, in the book Journeys Towards Progress 
(1963), more than four years after his classic work The Strategy… (1958), 
Hirschman never lost the opportunity to recall the structuralist perspective.2 
Indeed, Journeys Towards Progress is dedicated to one of its founders: Celso 
2 See also Hirschman on “structuralism” (1961).
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Furtado3 as a “reform monger.” Notice nonetheless, that the notion is much 
closer to a “dealer,” a “haggler,” a “negotiator,” or politician instead of an able 
theoretician.
The End of Postmodern Economics
Hirschman’s own social milieu and political proclivities of his early 
days as an anti-Nazi operator (Hirschman would immediately retort saying 
“my Weltanschauung”), as well as his intellectual formation explains to a 
punctuated degree his intrinsic subversive tendency to question orthodoxies 
in general. Meldolesi emphasizes that:
It is important to remember that, for a series of reasons, generally not 
considered, economy in that epoch in France [in the thirties] some 
peculiar characteristics have occurred: a practical inclination towards 
the description of economic facts, some tolerance with respect of 
the several different schools of thought (liberal, historical, social, 
mathematical, sociological, etc.,) and a marked interest for the political 
aspect of the economy. From here (and from Henry Pommery’s course 
at the École on money and banking) probably grew his interest 
[Hirshcman’s] to start an investigation on France’s monetary policy 
of the twenties and thirties, conceived in London and concluded in 
Trieste. (1997: 20)
For our story, similar positive conclusions can be derived from the 
promiscuous and “postmodern” intellectual and academic landscape 
under which Celso Furtado received his academic formation, especially his 
doctoral thesis in Paris in 1948, under the guidance of Maurice Bye, one of 
Perroux’s disciples. In contrast, Raúl Prebisch (18- and 13-years Furtado’s 
and Hirschman’s senior respectively) was a totally different kettle of fish. 
The social and political milieu at the Faculty of Economics of Buenos 
Aires had just undergone a reform in 1918 when he started his studies, 
outstanding among them was the freedom of students not to attend classes, 
which Prebisch exploited to the fullest. What marked the difference in 
the Faculty, until he was forced to leave in 1948, was the presence of two 
prominent intellectuals: Alejandro E. Bunge (1880-1943), the “first apostol” 
of industrialization (Prebisch 2006), and Luis Roque Gondra (1881-1943), 
perhaps one of the most outstanding of Pareto’s disciples. Thus, on the one 
hand a F. List follower, and on the other a guardian of “Laissez-faire,” up to 
a certain point. With Gondra the mathematization of economics was based 
on the hegemonic currents of mathematics of the time, the influential views 
of Vito Volterra (Weintraub 2002). Part of this work was carried out by Ugo 
Broggi (another professor of Prebisch), from whom, perhaps in his younger 
years, Prebisch heard that he was trying, long before Gerard Debreu, to prove 
the existence of general equilibrium (López 2000).
3 Also, to Carlos Lleras Restrepo, a Colombian intellectual and politician.
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On the Road to the Mecca of Development
As discussed further on, notwithstanding certain similarities between the 
Latin Americans mentioned, and Hirschman, as to the role of reforms and 
reconstructing the economy as well as the appropriate mechanisms induced 
through which the growth/development gets started, their divergence 
cannot be any further apart with respect to the theoretical strategies of 
reconstruction, and supersession orthodox economic thought alike. 
Among the factors that promoted growth and development as a political 
and conscious policy objective in Latin America was the creation of ECLAC 
in 1947, which in turn was born under the drive for the political and economic 
reconstruction of Europe after World War II. The Marshall Plan and the 
Economic Commission for Europe were the basis for the “impertinent” 
idea by Latin Americans at the UN to create a similar organization for the 
region. The U.S. had alternative plans because it wanted to launch its project 
of development under the tutelage of the Organization of American States 
(OAS), created in 1948 and under its control. ECLAC started initially with a 
first three-year life trial; subsequently, a decision was to be taken if it were to 
become a permanent UN body. With the support of France and other Latin 
American countries, the opposition of the U.S. was defeated and in 1952 
ECLAC established its new lease on life.4
Hirschman was quite close to these developments in Europe before he 
decided to move to Colombia in 1952. Before his arrival in Latin America, most 
of his work from the late thirties onwards concentrated on the international 
economic order: in 1939 he ventured into a study on the statistical trends 
of foreign trade (Hirschman 1939) and by 1945 he published his first book, 
National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade5 where Germany’s foreign 
policy for the post first world war period and the rise of the Nazi regime were 
analyzed. Its focus was the function of commerce and foreign trade as the 
basis for enhancing national power. Therefore, the central role in the book 
of examining the trends in world trade between different nations and the 
importance of economic policies which tends to diversify the commercial 
external flows of some countries became the basis to curb their “dependency” 
or some sort of domination vis-à-vis other countries.
In National Power, Hirschman also illustrates the inadequate established 
view that the great bulk of world trade was undertaken between countries 
producing raw materials versus manufactured goods. Thus, Hirschman 
shows early his ability to question the prevailing orthodoxy, emphasizing the 
heterogeneity of the countries in question as well as their trade patterns.6
4 For more details see first chapter, Santa Cruz (1984), Mallorquin (2006, 2009).
5 Hirschman published his seventh chapter in 1943 as “The Commodity Structure of World 
Trade” in Furlo-Blasco (1998).
6 Although rather naively, Hirschman says: “Any future reconstruction of world trade should 
take into account the complexity of its structure which our statistics reveal. (…) The policy of 
all countries during the period of mercantilism was to prevent the spreading out of their par-
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That work is followed by a few texts which examine inflation and deflation 
as well as exchange control in certain European countries; much of which was 
done when he became a functionary at the Federal Reserve.7 And apart from 
his studies of the structure of world trade, Hirschman was quite oblivious of 
the economic conditions of the “underdeveloped” countries in Latin America.
His arrival in Colombia in 1952 (staying until 1957 working as a member 
of the Council for National Planning of Colombia during the first half, a post 
suggested by the World Bank, and the latter half as a private consultant), 
marked his first experiences and contact with the magical realism of the 
tropical rationality.8
As early on as 1951, Hirschman was already mentioning the “Notoriously 
inconsistent” policy of the most technically advanced countries towards the 
less advanced in hindering their policies and their desires for promoting some 
manufactured activity: “alternatively and sometimes simultaneously helped, 
feared and obstruct the efforts of these countries to acquire technical and 
industrial machinery” (Hirschman 1951c: 285); he was mainly focusing on 
the east central European countries.9 He insisted reminding us of some of his 
1945 conclusions on foreign trade and market power that:
This development need not have any sinister consequences for 
the future of international trade; there will surely be space left for a 
profitable division of labor between nations. But it could be asked if 
this division of labor based on ability differences and the past history 
of the industrial development might not be more unstable than the 
simple and ‘natural’ labor between industrial and agrarian nations. 
(…) In each individual case, the loss of the preexistent international 
specialization will be small, although in aggregate figures these losses 
could be considerable. For this reason, the detailed disintegration of the 
ticular skills and industrial arts. But this vestige of mercantilism has assumed a most beguiling 
disguise -that of the maintenance of “sound” international division of labor. An encouraging 
aspect of present thought on postwar reconstruction is therefore the radical change from the 
traditional outlook in this respect. Today [1945], schemes for the future industrialization of 
underdeveloped countries (…) are proposed and discussed on many quarters; and the future 
economic mission of the older industrial countries is conceived less as the mechanical work-
shop of the world than as the initiator and educator in industrial processes. International trade 
has nothing to fear from these developments, since there will probably always remain a fruitful 
division of labor between the various countries and parts of the world. But it is highly improb-
able that any particular pattern of the international division of labor will last forever. (…) But 
to conclude that the world trade is doomed because the traditional pattern of the international 
division of labor seems imperiled is one of these flights of imagination at the start of which we 
find a lack of real imagination: and incapacity to conceive of a state of affairs radically different 
from that which we have been acquainted.” (Hirschman 1945: 150)
7 As an example of some of his work of the period see Hirschman 1948a, 1948b, 1948c, 1949a, 
1949b, 1951a, 1951b, 1951c, 1952a.
8 Example of this work in that period: Hirschman 1954a, 1954b, 1955, 1956, 1956a, 1957a, 1957b.
9 There is something which must intrigue anybody that has analyzed his work up to this period of 
his life and perhaps even there after: I have yet to find some mention or discussion in Hirschman 
of the Romanian Mihail Manoilescu (see Love 1996) or the German Frederick List!!!
130
international division of labor that we have in mind here is dangerously 
probable while the nations continue in freedom to follow autonomous 
internal economic policies, while sectoral interests put pressure under 
the banner of the national interest, and while the special risks that 
affect the international trade, in contrast to the internal ones, have not 
been eliminated. (…) This division of labor is based more on a historical 
accident than on any basic difference in natural or human resources. 
(Hirschman 1951c: 296) 
Even in his subsequent text he had not extricated himself totally from 
what can genuinely and legitimately be an industrialized country perspective 
and interests. Also, he spoke as a United States citizen. Thus, unlike those 
fears that in other industrialized countries prompted some policy strategies 
to inhibit the industrialization of some of their trading partners, Hirschman 
stated:
In the United States those fears never became very important because 
the dependency of our economy from external supplies has always 
been quantitatively and qualitatively of a much smaller magnitude than 
those of the industrial countries in Western Europe. (1952a: 310, my 
emphasis). 
Without any intention to downgrade in any way Hirschman’s early work, 
which in some sense can be branded as very brave indeed, in Colombia 
and South America (1952-1957), much of it can be defined as “advisory” 
and “technical” with none of the “curse” which haunted D. Seers’s work. In 
contrast to what could be thought as the run of the mill economic histories, 
the presentation of the economic descriptions of Colombia and Central 
America, and those aspects emphasized, seemed written as manuals to 
attract investment to the region. Nevertheless, although in similar light to his 
previous work in Europe, in Latin America he allows himself a much more 
open and participatory position in his evaluations of the themes, in part 
imposed on him given the scant information and certain limitations on the 
information gathered and the national accounts in question.
But once stationed in the tropics we can also see that he is willing to go 
further politically and theoretically and question several of many economic 
theses. His colleagues at the Federal Reserve would certainly have been 
flabbergasted to hear Hirschman state:
There is no economic law that demands narrow and automatic 
parallelism between the means of payment and level of prices even 
though the experience of a period of several of years nearly always 
shows an approximate parallelism with the observation that prices 
nearly always stay a little behind the means of payment for the reason 
given in the previous point. (1954a: 325, my emphasis)
But an overhauling of the monetarist conception was not yet in his mind. 
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As Hirschman argued:
(…) or when the means of payment rise without a corresponding rise in 
prices, it’s obvious that the velocity of the means of payment has risen 
(…) having said this, nevertheless, even if it sounds scientific, it does not 
explain nothing rigorously (…) The problem consists, precisely in knowing 
why the velocity of money has risen… .(1954: 325, my emphasis)
In other words, Hirschman shows an interesting period of experimentation. 
He insists as “artificial” (Hirschman 1954a) the polemics on the topic as 
to whether the origins of the rise of prices is monetary or non-monetary 
(Furtado 1954). As discussed later, those years exhibit the deliberations on 
the nature of inflation, a crucial theoretical and political issue in the region; 
and perhaps Hirschman forms part of those few scholars able to understand 
its basis given his experience in the region. As Hirschman states:
Equally, the economist does not have to wait for the economic 
and statistic documentation, even the most complete, to produce 
mechanically and automatically the best recipe; such documentation is 
an indispensable work instrument, that permits his orientation and the 
avoidance of many errors; but in the last instance (and this is in turn the 
most irritant and pleasurable of our profession), there is always an area 
of ignorance, variable interpretation of the facts and possible hesitation 
and discussion. (1954a: 336)
In Hirschman (1954b), where he describes certain experiences in the field 
in Colombia, we find what appears to be his first break with economics as 
a stabilizing recipe for macroeconomics misadventures. It is in reference to 
that work (a confession in 1961) that Hirschman says: “first work written on 
general problems of economic development,” of which “various ideas, (but 
not all of them) were structured in a more systematic form in The Strategy of 
Economic Development” (1954b: 338).
In the latter text, Hirschman is not very amicable to ECLAC’s role. His 
thesis against the notion of “balance growth,” although not expressed in 
these terms, lurks huge in the background. He questions the “myth of 
integrated and global plans of growth” (Hirschman 1954b: 341) arguing 
instead for precise planned projects by sectors. Apart from various notes of 
“skepticism,” (Hirschman 1954b: 353), ECLAC appears as one of the culprits 
of global planning,10 as much as all those projects of growth and capitalization 
10 For many reasons, both theoretically as well as politically, in ECLAC the word “planning” 
was not used, especially during Prebisch’s reign, but instead, the term “programing” which is a 
way to start questioning Hirschman’s reading, that as mentioned previously had changed after 
Furtado´s recriminations in 1959. From 1961 onward Hirschman started speaking of “close 
adversaries” referring to Prebisch, Nurkse, Rosenstein Rodan. Also, the issue of the term “bal-
ance” comes to light, since most of the translations of Hirschman to Spanish and Portuguese 
use the term “equilibrio,” that is “equilibrium,” so unbalanced growth means in Spanish “crec-
imiento desequilibrado” or “desarrollo desequilibrado.” It is interesting to note that in his letter 
to Andre Gunder Frank in 1959, Hirschman talks in terms of “disequilibriums” (Hirschman 
1984: 105). The not so speculative point on my part is that Latin American structuralists used 
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thought in “The Point IV of the United States.” Hirschman also complains 
that Nurkse’s “demonstration effects,” solely in terms of consumption, forgets 
or bypasses its counterpart: the “investment demonstration effect” given the 
high capital or technological intensity of the machinery used in Colombia 
and other underdeveloped countries. Years later Nurkse would be, if not the 
central focus, one of the most important theoreticians of “balance growth”11 
critiqued by Hirschman.
Just prior to The Strategy of… (1958), Hirschman’s work involved, 
as mentioned before, simultaneously economic macro descriptions of 
Colombia and Central America, and a project and diagnosis for the creation 
of an electricity plant. Most of which is coauthored with George Kalmanoff.12 
On the other hand, having returned to the U.S. he published “Economic 
Policy for Underdeveloped Countries” (Hirschman 1957a), which is a 
preface to his classic work: the pervasive presence and importance and 
impertinence of “national plans of development”; the problematic nature 
of the recurrent “inflation” and the distinct social and political conditions in 
underdeveloped countries vis-à-vis developed ones. The problematic nature 
of the characteristic of the region opens the possibility that perhaps economic 
discourse may need some overhauling to explain them.
Disembarking at the Mecca of Development
Retracing a little our steps, by the year 1954 many theoretical and political 
events had taken place in Latin America. Prebisch’s irruption at ECLAC 
Habana13 in the 1949 reunion with his The Economic Development of Latin 
America and its Principles Problems was to be branded from then on as the Latin 
American “manifesto” for development, a depiction elaborated by Hirschman 
himself. In retrospect, Furtado’s own explanation of the appearance of 
Prebisch’s as having superseded the previous manuscript discussed in ECLAC 
as “monetarist” (Furtado 1985: 53) only points to the theoretical evolution 
of Prebisch’s perspective unknown to many and the political difficulties 
surrounding USA’s scrutinization of ECLAC. Notwithstanding Prebisch’s 
openly “desequilibrio,” that is “disequilibrium,” on the one hand, and on the other, it may 
perhaps be too much of a heresy if used by Hirschman. That would have obliged him to en-
gage with the general equilibrium debate in process in Western-centric academia. Perhaps this 
strategy, perceived in Hirschman’s vocabulary, hoped to keep simultaneously both perspec-
tives at a distance liberating him from a futile discussion on the notion of “equilibrium,” hence 
the use of “balance-unbalance” couple. As we have showed above, Latin American “structur-
alists” were perhaps more theoretically and politically transparent as to the (ir)relevance of 
“equilibrium.” Both Furtado and Prebisch were disequilibrium theorists: so what is there of 
so-called price stability or of some sort? The answer was elaborated via the notion of power 
and domination of certain unit or sectors of production in specific geographic locations. For 
more details, Di Filippo (2009, 2009a, 2013) and the fifth chapter up ahead.
11 Thus, the paperback edition of The Strategy of Economic… pays homage to Nurkse with a long 
note in its “Preface” insisting on the importance of his notion elaborated as the “unbalance 
growth sequence” (Hirschman 1961: viii).
12 Hirschman and Kalmanoff (1955, 1956, 1957).
13 I intentionally use the “Spanish” spelling.
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manuscript was published under his own signature and not as an anonymous 
official U.N. document.
The famous text not only claimed that in the region “reality” was 
undermining much of past and present economic doctrines and the 
international division of labor, it also argued that the Periphery had an 
inherent external disequilibrium (“desequilibrio” not “desbalanceado” = 
“unbalanced”) tendency. Its stop and start shaky growth process denotes the 
limitation of the traditional external pull of the Periphery’s growth: its export-
led growth (“hacia afuera”) process of the past now required an alternative 
driving force mechanism, one of which is the industrialization process 
of certain sectors, which in turn presupposes a whole series of “structural 
reforms”: land, fiscal, state reform, etc.
The inherent disequilibrium is not simply a product of fiscal 
mismanagement or badly thought investment priorities, in the long run, 
balance of payments receipts decline as the deterioration of its terms of 
trade vis-à-vis the products which the Center manufactures makes its 
presence felt.
Prebisch thought that this process materialized through the cyclical 
repetitive process, which meant that unlike the industrial Centers, the 
Periphery did not manage to retain the fruits of its own technical progress. 
The Center even manages to appropriate for itself those productivity gains 
via price decline of raw materials elaborated by the Periphery. He argued that 
the asymmetry between the Center and the Periphery and its negative effects 
can be seen in many areas of the industrial countries and within the Periphery 
itself, a notion of power that would be developed extensively by Furtado in 
his interregional and country analysis.
But what a well-designed and programmed process of investment did 
ensue in Prebisch’s proposal, requiring the incorporation, the integration, of 
higher numbers of the population within the “modern” circuits of production, 
especially given the importance of the reforms (land, fiscal). The “liberation” of 
the work force from traditional forms of “bondage” of all sorts (heterogeneity) 
was also a prerequisite, industrialization and the cities were to soak up that labor 
producing a sort of “social mobility” coupled with the rising of productivity 
levels and standards of living. That explains Prebisch’s insistence in the Central 
Latin American common market and other arrangements between and within 
countries to expand markets and make possible economies of scale.
Prebisch was well aware of the ubiquity of the “heterogeneous” nature of 
much of the technical and social relations in the region, a notion which in the 
coming years, especially with the work of Furtado, would become central: the 
“structural heterogeneity” of the Periphery was to be transformed through 
structural reforms: at the technical and geographic social division of labor.
He agreed with Furtado on the transformation of those societies and 
their industrialization, but always thought industrialization per se had its 
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limits given the asymmetries involved.14 The issue was not “caching up” 
with the West but rather simultaneously prepare the Periphery to withstand 
the necessary downswing of the cycle as well as promoting the conversion 
of the technical division of labor: economic development was precisely 
the transformation and the rise of the productive capacity of its societies. 
As mentioned previously, distribution of productivity gains between the 
Center and the Periphery was an issue related to the power asymmetries 
in question, theoretically examined through the lenses of time. Classical 
and neoclassical economics eluded this issue by introducing money as a 
“vicarious” entity to restore a balance between the real and financial levels 
of the economy. 15 
Although Prebisch did not make explicit many of the theoretical 
considerations,16 he was adamant that his purpose for heading ECLAC’s 
project for Latin America was to produce practical and well-organized 
policies and technical advice to development projects (Prebisch 1952: 24). 
Prebisch’s reminder of ECLAC’s mission and objectives represents just one 
of a series of difficult episodes at the organization, among them with Furtado 
as mentioned previously. Especially, Furtado’s argument of a specific 
version of the growth process examining the power asymmetries among and 
between diverse heterogenous agents evading the so called “inflationary” 
policies, aspects of which remained an unresolved problematic between 
Prebisch and Furtado.
Growth in Brazil was realized under a very positive socializing cost 
effects that fell on coffee exporters and importers of consumer goods 
given the existent foreign exchange controls then in force, which in turn 
favored the introduction of capital goods. The narrative questioned the 
idea that the recent growth of Brazil in the 1945-1954 years was a product 
of an “inflationary” process unless one forgets the parallel product growth 
during the period. The accounts of inflation, which later was to be named 
“structural,” implied differentiating the “static” orthodox notion vis-à-vis the 
“dynamic” heterodox one in Furtado’s terms. It was the Mexican colleague J. 
F. Noyola (1956)17 who managed to synthesize those views a couple of years 
later as “structural.” Noyola, following the trails of Furtado, argues:
14 See Toye in Mallorquin (2003), also Mallorquin (2006).
15 See chapter on Prebisch for the evolution of his ideas.
16 And yet Prebisch could not help himself. In 1953, after many important economists of 
North-American universities visited Brazil: G. Harbeler, J. Viner, R. Nurkse, L. Robbins, in 
a sense to counter ECLAC’s ascendancy, E. Gudin wrote a series of articles in O Correio Da 
Manha with the title “The mystical planning”, to which Prebisch responded with “The Spon-
taneous Mystical Equilibrium of the Economy”: “its proof that Dr. Gudin continues to believe 
in the tendency towards equilibrium, inherent in the economic system, when perturbing ele-
ments are not introduced in the economy. I don’t believe in all of that. The cycle is the typical 
form of growth of the capitalist economy, that is to say, an uninterrupted succession of disequi-
libriums.” (Prebisch 1953a)
17 Noyola seems to be the only one to have reviewed Furtado 1954 (Noyola 1955). On Furtado 
and Noyola relation, see first chapter in Mallorquin (1998, 2020) and C. Danby (2006).
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inflation is not a monetary phenomenon; it’s the result of disequilibriums 
whose characteristics are real that are manifested in the form of a 
general price level rise. The real character of the inflationary process 
is much more perceptible in underdeveloped countries than in the 
industrial ones. (1956: 67)
Although Noyola said that “inflation is in each Latin American country a 
specific and distinct problem” (1956: 68), its comprehension needs a distinction 
between “basic inflationary pressures” and the “propagating mechanisms.” 
The first aspect refers to its causal origin which generally is observed in 
growth “disequilibriums localized nearly always in two sectors: foreign trade 
and agriculture”; the second is about a “propagating” mechanism that could 
vary among many, but they can be “grouped around in three categories: fiscal 
mechanism (in which it has to be included the system of social welfare), 
and the mechanism of readjustment of prices and incomes” (Noyola 1956: 
69).18 But for Furtado, the original forces of the inflationary “pressures” were 
the antagonistic mechanisms generated by the agents through which they 
defended their income, or the distribution patterns in place. Therefore, the 
intensity of the inflation is measured not by the circulating mass money or its 
velocity, but rather considering the “pressures” (the antagonistic moment) 
and “propagating” forces (by Banks and monetary logic). 
Years before Nurkse’s visit to Brazil in 1952, we encounter one of the first 
“misunderstandings” on the role of growth/inflation couple between Furtado 
and Nurkse, claiming he was misread by the latter:
If I understand correctly, he advocates in the last part of his essay a 
deliberate concentration of domestic as well as foreign investment on 
export industries and on industries producing import substitutes, as 
a mean to meet the pressures on the balance of payments that arise in 
the process of economic development. I must confess I have little faith 
in this prescription. It will not avert inflationary trends and balance of 
payments difficulties unless an attack is made on the root of the trouble; 
the tendency of money income to run ahead of productive capacity. In 
my view these pressures may have not even be related to high income 
elasticity of demand for imports. Besides, the very concept of income 
elasticity is usefully applicable only if the basic relationship between 
income and imports (that is, the ‘import function’) can be assumed to 
be fairly stable. If, as I am inclined to believe, the main trouble lies in the 
so-called ‘demonstration effect’ and its influence on the propensity to 
consume, a change in the direction of the current flow of investment may 
accomplish little or nothing. The problem is rather to ‘make room’ for 
his investments by keeping a firm check on the growth of expenditures 
18 O. Sunkel published a similar article two years later, but here he talks of three types of “pres-
sures”: “basic,” “circumstantially inflationary,” and “accumulative”, which turns problematic 
the causality explicitly developed by Noyola who insisted, on the double pronged division be-
tween “pressure” and “propagation” of the inflationary forces. (Sunkel 1958)
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other than capital outlays. To recognize that inflation may have various 
underlying causes is one thing; but to say (as Furtado seems to say) that 
inflation is therefore not a monetary problem is quite another thing and, 
in my opinion, misleading. (Nurkse 1953: 80, my emphasis)
Prebisch certainly took his time to get involved in these discussions. Given 
his insistence on the importance of taking care of monetary aspects with 
anticyclical policies, he still thought he could find room for a non “orthodox 
monetary stabilization” formula (Prebisch 1961: 53). Prebisch argued that 
income contraction per se was not recommended when the structural factors 
were the primary origin of inflation, but:
It would be a serious error to attribute exclusively to the structural 
vulnerability of the economy the cost and investment inflation. Because 
Latin American experience has shown repeatedly the importance 
of monetary and financial policies. There is no automatic relation 
between the structural vulnerability and inflation or the intensity with 
which it develops. (1961: 58)
Certainly Prebisch, during the 1950s, did not think structuralism could 
encompass the whole field of economics, Furtado on the other hand 
developed a general conception that not only referred to specific problems 
of the “underdeveloped economies,” but also could explain the “structural 
obstacles” of developed countries. In Furtado’s vision, the power asymmetries 
which Prebisch brought to light between the Center and the Periphery could 
be translated to any other social or geographic spaces, because what was 
at issue was the disparity, power asymmetry between and within certain 
economic agents whose main characteristic was their heterogeneity. The 
structural heterogeneity was a universal phenomenon, manifesting itself in 
a wide variety of power and institutional forms through which certain agents 
possess in separation certain of their conditions of their existence.
In Hirschman’s terms it could be said that the driving force and 
organizational structure of the production units within and between sectors 
and regions depended on their inherent “unbalanced” empowerment. Hence 
the importance of structural reforms that addressed those “disequilibriums.” 
This is one of the aspects of Latin American Structuralism which has 
been less understood: the state was needed not just for implementing and 
creating investment opportunities, just as important was its role in “creating” 
the “market(s).” Establishing rules of possession in separation of the 
conditions of the existence of the units and sectors of production, as well as 
more “modern” social relations for the labor force which was going to join a 
new social-technical division of labor, aspects of which had to be taken into 
account by the industrial policy to follow. Structural obstacles meant that the 
incorporation and articulation of new technologies and social relations was 
not an automatic process.19 
19 For an expanded discussion of these issues see section “Mobile Army of Metaphors: 
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Mr. Hirschman Through the Looking Glass
If Muslims are obliged at least once in their lifetime, if conditions permit, 
to visit Mecca, Western-centric economists should themselves be under the 
same constraint to stopover at the Mecca of Development. Hirschman made 
it his lifelong laboratory center: theoretically and existentially.
By the mid-fifties Hirschman also had reached a notorious disbelief 
about the capacity of economic discourse to explain specific rationalities 
that motivate change and transformation of societies; he initiated the task 
of reconstructing a perspective that could be “fitted” in underdeveloped 
regions.
Once you assume that capitalization or aggregate investment cumulatively 
does not tell the whole story of development, that it does not incorporate 
various human and capital resources, an argument is required in respect of 
the best way to combine these elements. In other words, you need a “binding 
agent” (Hirschman 1958: 6) to explain the particular way in which it will make 
decisions and get the economy growing, in other words, Keynesian remedies 
are insufficient. The growth models have no problem in this respect because 
they consider investment or “induced investment” as an automatic behavioral 
process of the functional relationship between output and capital formation. 
Therefore, Hirschman deliberates on the importance of the inducement 
mechanisms of investment, a phenomenon that in contrast to the developed 
nations, in underdeveloped countries saving and investment decisions are 
“interdependent” (Hirschman 1958: 32).
The notion that development requires a simultaneous process of investment 
along a series of sectors or production units, or otherwise a negative 
vicious circle ensues, is also questioned by Hirschman. In underdeveloped 
countries, something else is required, a mechanism which Hirschman calls 
the “complementary effect,” it:
Reinforces and supplements the slowly growing ability to invest (…) 
The investments of one period call forth complementary investments 
in the next period with a will and logic of their own, they block out 
part of the road that lies ahead and virtually compel certain additional 
investment decisions (…) is therefore the essential mechanism by 
which new energies are channeled toward the development process 
and through which the vicious circle that seems to confine it can 
be broken. To give maximum play to this effect must therefore be a 
primary objective of developmental policy. (1958: 42)
The complementarity effects dissipate as the economy reaches “higher 
levels of development,” some investment exhausts its importance since the 
input-output matrix of the economy has most of its boxes filled. But all in 
all, Hirschman has no intention to displace Rostow’s notion of the “take off ” 
period. H. A. Simon (Hirschman 1958: 48) is brought to the rescue to explain 
Post-Keynesianism and Latin American Structuralism” in chapter 6.
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the learning process of investment by which is meant that the preliminary 
process of development will need some initial force to enhance the pace so that 
the agents in question don’t give up once they become conscious of the cost of 
reaching the task in hand. Thus, Hirschman insists that he is not proposing a 
“rigid” model of development, but steady growth has to do with the ability to 
invest, considering the great variety of negative forces that can appear, which is 
the reason why a conscious “development strategy” is needed.
One of its ingredients supposes the deconstruction of the “balanced 
growth” perspective (Rosenstein, Nurkse, Lewis) which presupposes an 
initial effort of investment in various sectors at the same time so that they can 
complement each other, but the theory fails as a theory of development. As 
Hirschman observes:
Development presumably means the process of change of one type of 
economy into some other more advanced type. But such process is 
given up as hopeless by balanced growth theory which finds it difficult 
to visualize how ‘underdevelopment equilibrium’ can be broken into 
at any one point. (1958: 52)
But that perspective assumes an absence of differences between sectors and 
production units, and wants to impose an “entirely new, self-contained modern 
industrial economy […] on the stagnant and equally self-contained traditional 
sector” (Hirschman 1958: 52). This is not “growth” since in a dualistic division 
conception both aspects of the economy require an articulation. According to 
Hirschman, even if this is an exaggerated view of the balance theorist’s account, 
what makes it its worst ally is the notion that it:
requires huge amounts of precisely those abilities which we have 
identified as likely to be in very limited supply in underdeveloped 
countries. (…) In other words, if a country were ready to apply the 
doctrine of balance growth, then it would not be underdeveloped in 
the first place. (1958: 53)
Hirschman maintains that if the balance growth theory is put forward 
precisely to get governmental intervention, then it’s “hardly “convincing,” 
because what “private enterprise” does not undertake, public authorities 
may not be able to guarantee. There are thus some activities which cannot be 
undertaken, no matter who it is entrusted to realize them. And a multitude of 
centrally planned investments so that it internalizes only “external economies” 
and simultaneously excludes external diseconomies and social costs of new 
ventures is hardly possible. But the image behind it, says Hirschman (1958: 
56), is what defeats it since it presupposes sectors that won’t be touched by the 
process of development while maintaining the idea of a rise of a “brave new 
sector to be built from the ground up in isolation”. In this fashion, all those 
who might possibly suffer losses in the course of the development process 
are effectively assumed away. (...) But in general, economic development 
means transformation rather than creation ex novo: it brings disruption of 
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traditional ways of living, of producing, (...) and (...) social costs. (Hirschman 
1958: 56)
Thus, Hirschman’s answer is “unbalanced growth”:
Just as on the demand side the market can absorb ‘unbalanced’ advances 
in output because of cost reducing innovation, new products, and 
import substitution, so we have isolated forward thrusts on the supply 
side as inputs as redistributed among users through price changes, 
and at the cost of some temporary shortages and disequilibria in the 
balance of payments or elsewhere. In fact, development has of course 
proceeded this way, with growth being communicated from the leading 
sectors of the economy to the followers, from one industry to another, 
from one firm to another. In other words, the balanced growth that is 
revealed by two still photographs taken at two different points in time 
is the end result of a series of uneven advances of one sector followed by 
the catching up of other sectors. (…) this kind of seesaw advance over 
‘balanced growth’ (…) is that it leaves considerable scope to induced 
investment decisions and therefore economizes our principal scarce 
resource, namely, genuine decision-making. (…) An ideal situation 
obtains when (…), one disequilibrium calls forth a development move 
which in turn leads to a similar disequilibrium and so on ad infinitum. 
If such a chain of unbalanced growth sequences could be set up, the 
economic policy-makers could just watch the proceedings form the 
side lines. (1958: 62-63 and 71)
Thus, development presupposes a “chain of disequilibria.” The retroactive 
decisions to invest will produce the possibility to precisely jettison those 
forces and disequilibria which brought it on. As Hirschman explains:
our aim must be to keep alive rather than to eliminate the disequilibria of 
which profits and losses are symptoms in a competitive economy (the 
task of development policy is to maintain tensions, disproportions, and 
disequilibria. That nightmare of equilibrium economics, the endlessly 
spinning cobweb, is the kind of mechanism we must assiduously look 
for (…) Therefore, the sequence that ‘leads away from equilibrium’ 
is precisely an ideal pattern of development from our point of view. 
(Hirschman 1958: 66)
Although all investment can be considered as induced investment, 
the notion of the complementarity effect mechanism supposes that those 
investments are “net beneficiaries of external economies” (Hirschman 1958: 
71). Therefore, each induced investment should remind everyone of the 
multiplier effects: each new investment induces a series of subsequent ones, 
although not all investments will necessarily converge. Now, obviously 
external diseconomies will appear with new investments, damaging 
established plants, but its effects will spread over longer periods while novel 
investments inaugurate and renew a positive cycle of external economies in a 
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different sector. It is in this context that Perroux is brought to the attention of 
the reader as “closer to our viewpoint” (Hirschman 1958: 74).
The election or “guidepost” of the optimal developmental strategies 
requires a reflection on the order or sequences of the investment pattern, 
which means that “profitability” per se cannot be assumed a priori to be the 
best way to generate a continuous reinvestment process. Thus, the election 
process for Hirschman requires a more complex system in terms of a jigsaw 
puzzle: “The fitting in of individual pieces would represent the taking of 
discrete development steps. The problem would again be to minimize the 
time needed to put the puzzle together” (Hirschman 1958: 81). Since the 
aim would be to surround the neighbor’s parts, “the process becomes more 
determinate since you’ll chose those pieces that take less time to install” 
(Hirschman 1958: 82). Thus “efficient sequences” will necessarily entail 
a variable dependent on the pieces that have been installed initially. The 
exercise is a way to establish that there is no preordained order or sequence 
that the productive chains should follow. This also takes Hirschman to discuss 
the issue as to the priority or otherwise of pushing the investment in Social 
Overhead Capital (SOC) versus Directly Productive Activities (DPA). Again, 
no necessary order can be established beforehand. Although investment in 
SOC is “safer” than in DPA, since it is supposed to materialize throughout 
the economy it can also be a burden because planners are basically blinkered 
and thus unable to articulate it to the DPA sectors. Thus, only history and 
economic analysis can help to see which would be the more “productive” 
sequence: “whether DPA investments lead to SOC or vice and versa, better 
still which ‘maximizes’ ‘induced decision-making,’ as Hirschman observes:
it is the experience of unbalanced growth in the past that produces, 
at an advanced stage of economic development, the possibility of 
balanced growth” (1958: 93).
What makes Hirschman much more than just the “traditional 
developmentalist” of the epoch is that he is willing to reconstruct a series 
of categories to fill the theoretical void once you question the basic notions 
implied by the maximizing agent. Thus, the process of industrialization 
does not have a preordained sequence either in terms of the sectors or the 
factories. Within the DPA sectors, the derived demand can be thought in 
terms of “backward linkage effects” (Hirschman 1958: 100), that is, the inputs 
needed for the unit of production, or output utilization products: forward 
linkage effects, in other words, intermediary inputs needed by other sectors 
or production units.
Thus, traditional complementarities and external economies, cumulative 
causation, etc., cannot help to think a “developmental path,” even though we 
might have the input-output statistics requirements at hand. But with the “well-
known backward and forward effects” (Hirschman 1958:  100) development 
policy can supersede traditional analysis and evaluate the strength of the 
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stimulus between certain industries vis-à-vis each other. Interdependence of 
the input-output matrix is a consequence of the industrialization process, but 
some modes of linkages, especially if they involved export and or import ties, 
can be difficult to displace. But it is much easier to perceive backward linkage 
effects than forward ones. Forward linkage effects presuppose a backward 
linkage effect, which drives on certain demand, in contrast forward linkages 
have no “independent inducement mechanism,” and it “acts as an important 
and powerful reinforcement to backward linkage" (Hirschman 1958: 117).
Thus, Hirschman states:
The ability of underdeveloped countries to start industrialization in this 
fashion by giving the ‘last touches’ to imported materials is no doubt an 
advantage inasmuch as it permits industries to be started even in areas 
where markets are small and technical knowledge and organizational 
know-how are scarce. But it is also a disadvantage, for it builds resistance 
for every new step in the trickling down process. In dealing with 
backward linkage effects, we have thus far taken it almost for granted that 
as soon as domestic demand passes the threshold of minimum economic 
size, domestic production will be undertaken. (1958: 118)
However, given the resistance or antagonisms by various interests, 
importers or exporters for the establishments of new industries, gradualism 
may not be the best option.
On the other hand, paradoxically, protectionists and industrialization forces 
are oblivious to the connections between imports and industrialization and 
adopt self-defeating policies instead of promoting certain imports, which in 
turn reinforces the comparative advantage for the elaboration of these goods.
Yet the “cohabitation” (Hirschman 1958: 125) of modern and preindustrial 
industries, sometimes even “neolithic techniques” or so-called dualism, is 
an important phenomenon to be understood in Hirschman’s perspective, 
because it is not just a question of technological discontinuities, it also has 
to do with important existential parameters relating “attitudes” and “ways of 
living” (Hirschman 1958: 126).
Unlike the preindustrial experience in Europe, in underdeveloped 
countries the incorporation of new machinery and technological advances do 
not necessarily eradicate previous techniques or ways of doing things. Also the 
appropriate labor or levels of capital intensity that the production functions 
has to be seen in light of past and present processes of industrialization 
because “today’s underdeveloped countries” can concentrate on a wide 
range of useful and desirable products that are entirely new to the economy 
(Hirschman 1958: 126), and therefore handicrafts and cottage industries 
are not necessarily involved in a tenacious competitive classic cycle such 
as it occurred during the industrialization in the West, which in turn means 
that wage differentials are not the best horizon to measure efficiency. Thus 
“dualism” may bring many tensions but also some rewards since it leaves 
142
untouched a whole set of sectors and firms by the new capitalization evolution 
of several portions of the economy.
Orthodoxy’s insistence on the market and competitive struggle among 
firms as the inducement mechanism leaves out of the picture market size as 
well as all sorts of “collusive agreements” in custom driven economies. Thus, 
there are reasons for imposing strategies to construct “complementary” and 
“competitive relationships” (Hirschman 1958: 135). Given certain collectives 
practices20 in underdeveloped countries the nonexistence of “proper” 
motivations, an interesting cultural phenomenon arises: an “imbalance” 
between their ability to promote new ventures which fly way ahead of their 
capacity to run them efficiently.
Once the classic notions on “maximization” are left out, there is the 
problem to find the criteria for the decision to gauge the appearance or 
creation of new products as well as the mechanisms of inducement. The 
question of “maintenance” seems to be one of the processes which could be 
most effective as a guiding hand to undertake projects “which do not require 
it” (Hirschman 1958:  141):
We have argued that economic development typically follows a path 
of uneven growth, that balance is restored as a result of pressures, 
incentives, and compulsions: that the efficient path toward economic 
development –and therefore the one that will often be instinctively 
taken if we can rely on the ‘principle of least effort’– is apt to be 
somewhat disorderly and that it will be strewn with bottlenecks and 
shortages of skills, facilities, services, and products; that industrial 
development will proceed largely through backward linkage, i.e. will 
work its way from the ‘last touches’ to intermediate and basic industry. 
(Hirschman 1958: 158)
Likewise, following Chester Barnard, Hirschman would argue that 
“product-centered” industries do not contribute as much as “process centered” 
ones to enhance labor’s efficiency, since in the latter case technology imposes 
a logic and a specific process of coordination. In other words, the technology 
enhances management with its own labor competence.
Given the apparent ingrained instability of underdeveloped countries, 
the question of inflation and balance of payments difficulties is an obligatory 
theme. Having laid waste classical explanations on inflation (“long discarded 
theories”), Hirschman concentrates on the “inflationary” impulses which 
are a consequence of certain types of “development sequences.” A price rise 
(given the short-run supply limitations of underdeveloped economies) seems 
a disproportionate response, but it could be argued that it has always been the 
case also in today’s Western nations during their transitional period towards 
20 In a very cryptic note Hirschman also mentions that the absence of “growth mentality” 
and difficulties in the administration of firms is also “found in advanced industrial countries” 
(Hirschman 1958: 136). 
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industrialization. Hirschman insists that those forces were “less powerful,” 
and received simultaneously a matching response in terms of a periodic price 
decline. But in latecomers the pressure towards a downward price movement 
cannot be compared with those of the industrialized world because the 
equipment in use has already gone through the competitive price/cost cut 
struggle. The benefit in the “high” technological advances is exhibited in most 
capital imports. Thus, avoiding inflation in underdeveloped countries is much 
more difficult given the sectoral price movements. But Hirschman seems to 
have forgotten his thesis that not all of imports are manufactured goods.
Therefore, the relative high price rises make for better signals for 
investment in certain sectors, but low supply elasticities do not explain the 
whole picture since it also depends on the skill and “determination” of the 
monetary and fiscal management (Hirschman 1958: 161). 
Of a possible scenario of four types of price and output behavior, the most 
convenient one is that which promotes investment in certain sectors where 
price rises acted and thus overcome those “imbalances” that engendered 
price rises. As Hirschman argues:
But there is a real difference between an economy that solves new 
supplies problems in every round of inflation and one in which it is the 
same supply problem that is constantly causing prices to resume their 
upward course. (1958: 162)
And yet in some areas Hirschman argues that price signals are not 
always the only or best incentive mechanism: “Fortunately the strategy of 
unbalanced growth does not stand or fall with the efficacy of price signals” 
since alternative “methods for restoring balance between sectors” create 
those “uneven growth” and “economic tensions” (Hirschman 1958: 163), 
which in turn promote additional forces for development. 
Unlike Latin-American structuralists, Hirschman seems dubitative to say the 
least on shedding traditional notions of inflation: although the so-called “price-
price spiral” (Hirschman 1958: 163) is more akin to the “wage-spiral inflation of 
developed nations,” its problems and difficulties are much more pronounced than 
the usual excess demand for “investment and consumption,” notwithstanding 
that the latter explanation is “correct at times”. As Hirschman explains:
Nevertheless, anti-inflationary policies must certainly be re-examined 
if excess demand is not considered to be the only or even the principal 
villain. In the first place, we can understand why both the commercial 
banks and the central bank are often taken aback by the admonition 
that they must not finance an investment boom. All they are doing, 
they will maintain, is adjusting existing credit lines to the higher prices 
that have come to rule for some commodities. We see now that this 
opinion may not be as naive as we usually tend to think. The role of the 
banking system in a price-price spiral inflation is far more passive than 
in a demand inflation. The banks merely permit their clients to pass on 
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all price increases, in the interest (…) maintaining economic activity at 
previous levels, not of expanding it. (1958: 164)
He concludes that inflation in “underdeveloped countries arises principally 
from supply imbalances that are characteristic of the growth process” 
(Hirschman 1958: 164). On the other hand, balance of payments difficulties 
is seen because of excess demand. But in underdeveloped countries balance 
of payments difficulties could be a product of the typical growth sequences 
and hence not a reflection of domestic inflation. Shortages could be solved 
importing goods under that circumstance, if foreign exchange is available, 
and the demand in question will not necessarily generate any rise in prices. 
In these cases, it will be sane for a government not to allow the price to signal 
movements in demand, especially if it cannot guarantee that additional 
production will be forthcoming.
Thus a “respite granted” by an import surplus can be extremely valuable, 
provided it is utilized by the public authorities to push through some of the 
reforms required to “increase supply elasticities” (Hirschman 1958: 167).
The thesis that the balance of payment difficulties are seen as a consequence 
of “output-input imbalances and disproportionalities” during the growth 
process, becomes something close to the notion of “structural factors” as 
the cause of those complications rather “than the inability of developing 
countries to live within their means” (Hirschman 1958: 169).21
Also, fluctuations in foreign exchange earnings are an endemic part of 
the underdeveloped economy given the price fluctuations of their products, 
however Hirschman does not waver an inch to convey his support for the 
Singer-Prebisch thesis.22
Whereas much of Hirschman’s argument on unbalanced growth can be 
seen in terms of interregional and international power asymmetries, terms 
which evoke much more within structuralists’ circles, he prefers the use of 
the “polarization effects” within and between different regions or sectors, or 
countries. But then power asymmetries become central in his consideration. If 
a region could in some instances be “treated as though they were a country and, in 
some others, treat a country as though it were a region” (Hirschman 1958: 199), 
it would be easier to create situations favorable to all parties in development.
Much depends on the mechanisms of transmission of growth which 
he labels the “trickling-down” and “polarization effects.” Instead of using 
the developed and underdeveloped couple or for that matter Prebisch’s 
Center-Periphery one, Hirschman uses “north and south,” a kind of spatial 
21 Hirschman’s “Preface” (1961: viii) of the paperbound edition of the book acknowledges sim-
ilarities with the Latin American “structuralists.”
22 The only appearance of “Prebisch” in Hirschman’s classic work can be seen in the longest 
footnote of the book in which he mentions the Singer-Prebisch thesis and the negative effects 
of the deterioration terms of trade: “need not be a losing proposition for the primary pro-
ducing countries provided they industrialize” (Hirschman 1958: 159), a thesis which does not 
necessarily contradict Prebisch’s argument, as I hope I made clear. See the first two chapters.
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metaphor to portray the process of growth via their interaction to think the 
policies necessary to limit the “polarization effect.” One of the effects of the 
north’s growth as a stimulating force on the “south” would be the “trickling-
down effects” by certain demands for its products. But it could also be the 
foundation of the profound interregional polarization, which in turn could 
drive the south to sponsor policies to counteract these effects. 
But the fact that the trickling-down and polarization effects can be 
overturned shows that what is needed is some sort of “sovereignty” for 
the south as a mechanism to counteract the polarization effects. Therefore 
“the polarization effects will be stronger when there are no frontiers to 
cross, [and] so will the trickling-down effects” (Hirschman 1958: 197). In 
an international context between countries, the “trickling-down effects 
will mean an important force as a promoter of development if some sort of 
mutual dependency is involved. The problem is when a country has no goods 
or resources to articulate itself to the international transmission of growth 
pattern, which can be seen when a region is integrated into a larger country” 
(Hirschman 1958: 197). Although interregional, the north might have the 
possibilities to acquire its necessities outside the shared space with the south, 
internationally the obstructions for the trickling-down effects are much 
“stronger, just as the trickling-down effects themselves are weaker, than in 
interregional relations” (Hirschman 1958: 198).
In other words, given the absence of an international entity, “forces making 
for interregional transmission of growth are likely to be more powerful than 
those making for international transmission” (Hirschman 1958: 198).
But for Hirschman there are no general optimal institutional arrangements. 
The mere posing of the question is a mirage because “closing the gap” between 
“north and south” requires the use of instruments that would ordinarily be 
thought to be disruptive of the very integration they are designed to achieve. 
While it is the purpose of these instruments to cut down the strength of the 
polarization effects, great care must be taken, of course, not to interfere with 
the efficacy of the trickling-down effects: 
Thus, economic policies are designed to insulate the South sufficiently 
so that it may undertake certain industrial and export activities in 
competition with the North; but, at the same time, the complementary 
relationships that make the South a supplier of the North must be 
preserved and intensified. (1958: 200)
In contrast, Hirschman asserts:
For international transmission of growth (…) The task here is to 
keep the polarization effects as weak as they normally are among 
independent nations, but to increase the strength of the trickling-down 
effects. In other words, the underdeveloped countries ought to retain 
the developmental advantages of sovereignty. (1958: 200)
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Nonetheless, Hirschman feels “uneasy” about the argument that “pressures,” 
“tensions and disequilibrium” are virtuous, which is the extension of the 
argument that “economic growth creates profitable opportunities and the 
concept of disequilibria include these opportunities” (1958: 208),23 since not 
all productive sectors and induced investment have the same scope for growth. 
Remembering the Future
It could be assumed that the recovery of Latin American Structuralism 
as perhaps one of the earliest theoretical currents to engage on issues of 
development forms part of a Latin-American nationalist chauvinism or worse 
still “fanaticism.”24 A case for its paternity can certainly be made. But it would 
take a Hirschman’s like stance, but which is frowned upon in other quarters. 
Hirschman is explicit in assuming the role of grandfather to “dependency”25 
theory, and equally in his revised version of his 1945 book National Power 
and the Structure of Foreign Trade, he states priority for developing the notion 
of “Gini index or coefficient” (Hirschman 1945: xviii). 
But what is at issue is a very distinct problem: Latin American 
Structuralism forms part of a very long tradition in social and economic 
thought that once in a while reappears to reiterate the theoretical central 
importance of power asymmetries in social relations, and the examination 
of the calculating agent in specific historical contexts. Perhaps Perroux 
and his followers had said something similar having also questioned the 
mechanical notions of general equilibrium, hence the study of inter and 
intra-regional asymmetries (“poles of development”), power asymmetries 
that underlie the exchange/production mechanisms among the various 
sectors and production units. 
Economic thought has been haunted constantly by this future, that is, 
the return of power relations to think the economy: see the Schumpeter 
and the German historical debate Morishima (1998), or the early questioning 
in classical political economy (William Thomas Thorton) of the price and 
market mechanism as simple consequence of the supply and demand 
schedule (Mirowski 2004), as well as Talcott Parsons whose strategy during 
the 1930s simultaneously assigned the question of power to “political theory” 
and evaded the matter which was preeminent among those who were until 
then his intellectual mentors: the institutionalists. 
Structuralists in Latin-America certainly constructed the tradition from 
which they searched alternatives and emancipation, and although their reading 
of the classical Western-centric tradition could be a source of debate, what was 
central was the need of a new vocabulary for its own policies. We mentioned 
that Furtado denied classical political economy as simply a comedy of errors 
because it did not address the question of “underdevelopment” and also 
23 “development also draws new strength from the tensions it creates.” (Hirschman 1958: 209)
24 Term used about Furtado in the conversation between Gudin and Harbeler (Furtado 1985: 124).
25 For an account of dependency theory, see Kay (1989).
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Prebisch’s critique of economics and its downfall for not considering the notion 
of “time.” Hirschman in turn with the question of the inherent “disequilibria” 
of the economy as its driving force certainly did not attempt to retrace these 
notions in economic thought but given that there was already, in its initial phase, 
a theoretical space in academic life that maintained that “underdeveloped 
countries” had to be treated with a different set of lenses, it was perhaps futile. 
And yet much of his subsequent work is undertaken in the field of the history of 
social thought especially around the notion of the “market.”
The most important part of this episode, in terms of Furtado and 
Hirschman alike, is that it became the laboratory which was to witness the 
transformation of a particular discourse that privileged its questions on a 
specific geography of the world economy into a general conception. In this 
context, Hirschman observed: 
It appears, therefore, that the very characteristics on which I had sought 
to build economics specially attuned to the underdeveloped countries 
have a wider, perhaps even a universal, range and that they define, not 
a special strategy of development for a well-defined group of countries, 
but much more generally valid approach to the understanding of 
change and growth. In other words, I set out to learn about others, and 
in the end learned about ourselves. (1984: 95)
On the other hand, Latin-American development process between 1950 
and 1980 cannot be seen simply as the materialization of “structuralist” 
policies, although it’s a period of high rates of “growth,” which it’s difficult to 
compare with what happened afterwards under the so-called neoliberal era.
The “black legend” created by neoliberalism on state intervention and 
“closed economies” of the region to engender changes in policies cannot 
be read simply as the result of structuralists’ proposals during the 1950s and 
1960s. ECLAC and Prebisch were the first to criticize the exaggerated level of 
protection in some industries and countries in the region. And perhaps what is 
the most misunderstood aspect of the structuralist thesis is the so-called state 
and market opposition (especially in Western-centric literature): great part 
of the aims of the structural reforms during the 1950s was to reconstruct the 
rules of the game, institutions, not state intervention. To recreate the relations 
of possession in separation of the conditions of existence of production units, 
generating the “market.” How the articulation of the production units gets 
organized is a different matter and debate. But structuralist analysis of the 
region’s economies found that they were hardly consolidated as “totalities” 
as such, and sometimes not even at a regional level. State “intervention” not 
only meant facilitating financial help for potential entrepreneurs but also 
sponsoring policies with the aim to establish the social and political conditions 
for the market. Which did not mean that the heterogeneity, technologically 
or socially speaking, would just evaporate with the reforms, but that was 
precisely what a developmental perspective had in mind. Given the notion 
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that structural heterogeneity is the product of diverse and distinct power 
conditions, the more “modern” were those institutional rules, the better.
Another aspect of the history of the policies sponsored by structuralists 
has also been “misconstrued.” Let us hear it from the man himself. For 
Prebisch, the option whether to produce locally certain industrial products 
or to import them had to consider the proportion of the income which was to 
remain in the local economy:
Let us first clarify one important point. Industrial costs higher than import 
prices do not necessarily mean that an industry is not economic for a 
country as is sometimes assumed. Of course, the smaller the difference 
the better. The problem has to be considered from another angle. It is 
not really a question of comparing industrial costs with import prices 
but of comparing the increment of income obtained in the expansion of 
industry with that which could have been obtained in export activities 
had the same productive resources been employed there. (1959: 255) 26
Also it was never recommended that countries should fill all their input-
output matrix sectors by local production: it was always thought that as 
economies evolved what actually changed was their import composition, 
a rate of substitution which could not be sustained given foreign exchange 
limitations, hence the inherent disequilibria of these economies and the need 
to think of rates of growth by sectors. Last but not least, industrial countries 
were not, and have not been a haven to the export of manufactures from 
economies “in development.”
This brings us to another theme which was only to become clearer later in 
the sixties: “development” is the way economies evolve, how they transform 
themselves, which in turn requires certain “rates of growth” but development 
and growth don’t necessarily coincide.27 That is why structural reforms 
26 The paragraph sends the reader to a foot note: “This was the assumption made by the Currie 
Mission on the iron and steel industry in Colombia, in the report presented to the Internation-
al Bank some years ago.” It has been argued by Villamizar (2013) that Colombia could be clas-
sified as the country in Latin America where “structuralist” ideas were the least important, and 
where Lauchlin Currie invested much of his lifelong academic and political ideas. But Albert 
Hirschman and Lauchlin Currie diverged as to the role of the economic expert. According to 
Maas: “both were concerned with the patchwork approach to economic planning which they 
experienced during their consulting work in Colombia, they took opposing messages from 
this, with their respective positions premised on their divergent perspectives on the inter-
play between ‘sound economic principles’ and the force of local circumstances. While Currie 
was a believer in both sound principles and the need to adapt them to local circumstances, 
Hirschman was more skeptical about the existence of any such principles” (Maas et al. 2019: 
203). In fact, the publication of “Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries (from 
the point of view of Latin America)” of 1958 has a unique characteristic given Prebisch’s pos-
ture. It was planned as a text in English with the view to open up a channel of communication 
with the “Western-centric” academy and published before its Spanish version. Published in 
American Economic Review 49(2): 251-273.
27 Latin-American structuralists should appropriate for themselves Hirschman’s graphics 
(1984: 107) on “balanced and unbalanced growth” and “antagonistic growth” to represent the 
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were thought as the generators of reservoirs of capital and social energy 
unaccounted for by our national statistics.
But tracing these problems and theoretical debates to World War II 
“planning debates” as Arndt (1987) does leaves unaccounted the theoretical 
work done in the region. Is this to be blamed on the absence of reading of 
Spanish or Portuguese literature? It is easier to confront Latin American 
Structuralism if it’s made out to appear as an anti-market discourse when 
what was at issue for structuralists was precisely how to think the market 
and reform institutions so that “markets” could be thought of as more 
precise “information” providers.28 Thus the importance to analyze the 
specific social relations of the agents and the productive units, as well as the 
notion of heterogeneity in terms of power symmetries of the social relations 
and technologies, and the time horizons of the entities in question. The 
structural obstacles that could be the causes of a series of “bottlenecks” as 
Western-centric discourse theorists name them, required specific policies 
and structural reforms. But in the last instance all economies are ridden by 
heterogeneities and structural obstacles. 
Before I conclude some readers must be wondering what transpired to the 
whole deterioration of the terms of trade conundrum, the so-called “Prebisch-
Singer” thesis.29 The point is that even if the deterioration in question could 
not be “proved” some structuralists would still argue that their conception of 
how to reorganize the economy and transform its technical division of labor 
is much more efficient and profound with respect to its aims to incorporate 
the masses to its circuits of production than orthodox versions of economics. 
Given that the price mechanism is the reflection of power asymmetries these 
are always the object of struggle to be transformed with all sorts of policies 
which are practiced in a day to day basis in the industrial countries and last 
but not least it’s plainly a matter of making “sovereignty” matter through our 
own policies. 
process of development.
28 I mean, has anybody out there read Polanyi’s The Great Transformation..? Is economics in 
such a state, that with all due respect which Chang’s (2002) work deserves, the latter book 
needs to be produced?
29 Luis Daniel Torres (2006) has reviewed the whole literature of the past 30 years, and incor-
porated new calculations and cross references of new data and the case for the existence of a 
deterioration of the terms that the Periphery endures is difficult to avoid.
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Chapter 5
How Economics Forgot Power
That much economic theory is based on ridiculously narrow assumptions and unrealistic 
a priori premises should, at this stage, be obvious. But it is worth being clear how the 
types of people that espouse this sort of thing can be used by political forces that they 
do not understand and cannot comprehend. I have always been averse to the idea that 
economics as it is currently taught is some sort of organic outgrowth of the ideology 
of the ruling class. I do not find the Marxist story convincing that economics as it is 
currently taught is a mere reflection of the interest of the ruling class. Rather, I think 
that the explanation is much simpler: economists have cast such darkness over their own 
discipline that they can make themselves believe in basically anything that suits them at 
any given moment of time. All one has to do is feed them a very simple argument that 
seems internally consistent, and they will mistake this consistency for some Absolute 
Truth about the real world. Such people are very useful to the powers-that-be (…) 
Contemporary mainstream economics is less the ideology of the ruling class than it is 
the opiate for the establishment intellectuals who find that their little models and their 
ridiculously simplistic arguments get them invited to all the right parties 
Pilkington (2016: 332)
Introduction
The heading of what follows takes its title paraphrasing a book by G. Hodgson (How Economics Forgot History), revealing the central aspects 
of my comments on a book written in 2016 by P. Pilkington (The Reformation 
in Economics: A Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Economic Theory). 
My critique has a “southern” tone vis-à-vis the “northern” theoretical 
vocabularies (Connell 2007, Lander 2000), irrespective of which, it is a 
book which should be cheered by academics in general.1 Interestingly, and 
unknowingly it vindicates “economics” as reconstructed in Latin America 
from the 1940s onwards in its goal for an alternative, independent theoretical 
vocabulary from the Western-centric “imports,” centering its analysis on 
the role of power asymmetries. In terms of the conception of a “discursive 
formation” (“power-knowledge”) a la Foucault (Foucault 1972), the “war 
of interpretations” repudiates the notion of the existence of a necessarily 
“superior” discourse. 
Pilkington’s theoretical “demolition” reminds us of the Latin American 
Structuralism perspective. The author of this book is certainly very brave 
and daring to pronounce and publish what many members of the economic 
profession think about the dismal state of their discipline, theoretically as 
well as codes of conduct, but of which are disinclined to express overtly. 
The image of the congeries in question, its manners and shallow “natures” 
are reminiscent of the Luis Buñuel movie The Exterminating Angel (no 
pun intended!), which in Buñuel terms deals with a plot in which “a group 
1 I thank equally Philip Pilkington and Colin Danby for their inputs; responsibility for what 
follows is absolutely mine.
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of persons [inexplicably] cannot do what they wish to do: leave the room” 
(Buñuel 1982: 232).
With profuse perseverance, given the unveiled discussions dedicated to 
the “profession”, the narrative shows little leniency, bestowing very “harsh” 
words towards its incumbents (Pilkington 2016: 353). However, an absence 
in certain sections of the text related to an explicit concept which might help 
differentiate “ideological” from “nonideological” theoretical discourses 
replicated by these “well meaning” persons, gives the impression that they 
should be forgiven, for as the Christian saying goes: “they know not what 
they are doing.” The Neoclassical or marginalism cloak is presented as a 
misguided “ideology” chasing the “Holy Grail,” with an erroneous role of 
mathematics in the “real sciences”: “everyone remains trapped in his/her 
own personal political prison. But it is a happy incarceration” (Pilkington 
2016: 353).2
A book of this nature is a prologue, a “promise,” which carries severe 
responsibilities. It might sound strange that a book dedicated to something 
called “economics” implicates a decision, an ethical command to act 
otherwise. The question is whether Pilkington is ready to fully embark on 
that path. If not, then the procedure of “deconstruction” undertaken is 
just another irresponsible ploy of the kind he so thoroughly and correctly 
critiques in “mainstream” and/or “marginalism economic” profession. 
“Philosophizing with a sledgehammer” (paraphrasing Philip Mirowski), 
implies a critical decision to reconstructively pick-up certain pieces given the 
fallen (?) edifice of mainstream economics. It is difficult, given my political 
perspective and Latin American prejudices not to share much of the criticism 
of “equilibrium economics” stated by Pilkington. It’s the logical and political 
consequence of Raúl Prebisch and Celso Furtado’s work (among others), 
whose reconstruction of development discourse during the 1950s and 1960s, 
for and from the “south”, assumed querying the discourses emanating in the 
“north.” 
Absence of space and objective of what follows only touches in passing 
Pilkington’s critique of the IS-LM and Krugman’s interpretation of the 
“liquidity trap” concept, but once it is accepted that money is an “endogenous” 
creation, and not related necessarily with its supply and the “rate of interest,” 
the LM-curve is always flat and the “liquidity trap theory” “loses one of the 
legs on which it stands” (Pilkington 2016: 181),3 and therefore the level of 
economic activity does not automatically grow with “cheap money.”
2 See also Mirowski and Nik-Khah (2017) and Lawson (2019).
3 The model is “not innocent” (Pilkington 2016: 181), it shapes the mind of those trained by it, 
and is “inherently conservative,” in a sense it is an “updated version of the Quantity Theory of 
Money” but “harder to attack,” because its underlying assumption of the “LM-curve” is that 
“money is scarce” which “if money is not created in line with some very rigid, mystical and usu-
ally arbitrary rule or set of rules, something awful will happen. Typically (…) hyperinflation” 
(Pilkington 2016: 182). See also De Vroey and Hoover (2004).
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On the other hand, if Krugman’s statement is sincere (“the theory of 
economic development was correct” (Krugman 1997: 29) it follows that 
economics recovers and supersedes in Hegelian fashion “classical political 
economy” in both its “neoclassical” and “Marxist” offspring, which implies 
the examination of the power asymmetries constituting the social relations 
and agents in the “economic” realm.
Having displaced the IS-LM “workhorse,” Pilkington does the same 
with mainstream’s theorization of the rational calculator, “maximizing” 
or “representative agent,” which hinders comprehending “investment”/
accumulation,” growth and/or evolution of economies. Equally the agent in 
question should not be accorded the theoretical role in question since the 
economy as a whole cannot be reduced to the respective sums and actions 
of those “agents” in their capacity as individuals, and therefore “economics” 
should deal with “general categories” privileging macro abstractions related to 
“accountancy” rather than “sociology” or group psychology, those categories 
associated with “income flows.”
An approach to recover the importance of considering the productive and 
distributive aspects of those social categories, implies linking theoretically 
the latter in terms of the asymmetries of power of which are its effects: agents 
and their conditions of existence are the consequence of the antagonisms 
and power asymmetries, and these agents need not necessarily be “human 
individuals” (all sorts of corporations, “universities,” “trade unions,” 
“households,” “states,” etcetera), all of which have the pertinent recognition 
mechanisms through which to undertake choice-decisions. On the other 
hand, their antagonistic mode of constitution (the social relations), are always 
a contingent, transient characteristic, which forms part of the explanation to 
understand the heterogenous features of most agents. The power asymmetry 
generates the heterogenous characteristic of the agents: relates to the mode 
by which agents possess in separation certain of their conditions of existence 
or of the production units, the “remainder” of which have to be, negotiated, 
bought, etcetera, especially with other “economic” agents strictly speaking.4 
Therefore the antagonistic moment, always contingent, is constitutively 
associated with the “price” or “value” which they can enforce or assume, 
whether “capital” or “labor”: Latin American Structuralism claims that these 
categories have no general form of being or unity: on the one hand, these 
entities are not necessarily “human,” but on the other, most importantly 
they possess in separation, with respect other agents, no more than specific 
aspects of their conditions of existence. The heterogeneous quality of 
the agents presupposes no “general conditions,” given the contingent-
antagonistic power asymmetries of power within and between agents. 
Therefore “price demand and supply elasticities,” as well as “comparative 
advantage specialization” are theoretical concoctions of marginalism, which 
4 Pilkington’s use of the “kaleidoscopic” (see further ahead) or the “non-ergodic” (Pilkington 
2016: 55) logic of the realm in question require assuming these notions.
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hide the historical construction and the power asymmetries involved as well 
as their potential transformations.
Both within and between specific economic formations, as “Center-
Periphery” entities for example, as Prebisch purports, refer to notions which 
are not necessarily a geographical “developed-developing” couple, since 
the “Periphery” also exhibits a mixture of “Center-Periphery” antagonisms 
and power asymmetries. The heterogenous constitutive aspects within and 
without of the “economies,” “Center” and “Periphery,” alike, are the product 
of those power asymmetries mentioned before, and which, can be reinforced 
with Pilkington’s Kaleckian vocabulary.
What ensues intends to portray the interesting aspects of his proposal, as 
well as the ambiguous nature of certain facets of his work to revert economics 
to theorize power,5 by incorporating Latin American Structuralism and 
Kaleckian vocabulary. The text is subdivided into various sections, namely 
“Businessmen Pay Profits To Each Other,” in which we devote much space to 
the reconstruction of the investment-profit elaborated by the author. Next, 
there is a segment (“Ruling the Roost”) that concentrates in certain aspects 
of the narrative on the “international trade” logic among differing economic 
formations, and finally, in the last part “You Want the Social?” we insist on 
the importance of engaging “politically” or “ethically” in economics, which, 
paraphrasing Marx, then becomes much more a strategy to transform the 
world than to interpret it.
The persistence and dominant characteristics of the institutions that 
generate the diffusion of mainstream economics or “marginalism,” those 
“social and ideological” practices that doubtlessly require a discussion 
and explanation, and of which there is plenty in Pilkington’s book will be 
left aside for another occasion. What we wish to underline is the generally 
explicit theoretical insistence that agents and “markets” are constitutively 
“antagonistic” given the power asymmetries and although this nomenclature 
might be distasteful to Pilkington, it is necessary to stress this aspect 
since on certain occasions the ambivalent quality of his “deconstruction-
reconstruction” initiative could be associated with dodging the ethical 
political consequences involved.
“Businessmen Pay Profits to Each Other”
The expression with which we initiate this section, using Prebisch’s words 
(Prebisch 1948b: 336, 1949a: 417), represents one of the mechanisms by 
which profits, and the macroeconomic investment carrousel process can be 
5 I use the term revert because “political economy” lost those potentialities with the hege-
monic role which Ricardian economics instilled during the 19th Century. There is no space 
here to develop the idea that Marx unwittingly forms part of a discourse which also requires 
“deconstruction,” which in part the account here in process conveys. For example, Armando 
Di Filippo’s theoretical recent description of the past is interesting in this line of thought (Di 
Filippo 2013), as well as that of Osvaldo Sunkel (1970).
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explained, or equivalently, Kalecki’s singular turn of phrase “when workers 
spend what they earn capitalists earn what they spend” (Kalecki in López 
and Assous 2010: 31), both alike point to the same outcome. Both focus their 
account in terms of power asymmetries among and between the agents. 
Although Pilkington’s very interesting posing of the problem of “investment” 
and/or accumulation incorporates some Kalecki’s and Keynesian themes 
(especially Shackle’s work), Kalecki’s explicit notion of “degree of monopoly” 
(López and Assous 2010: 78)6 to understand the investment decision process, 
tends to recede in the background in Pilkington’s account, aspects which will 
be discussed later.
On the other hand, the undulatory or wave-like movement, or “cyclical” 
image of “capitalism’s” growth in Prebisch’s work, which can be represented 
by Minsky’s remark: “Keynes put forth an investment theory of fluctuations in 
real demand and a financial theory of fluctuations in real investment” (Minsky 
in López and Assous 2010: 243), is obligatory by the narrative in question and 
of which Pilkington is well aware. Growth and investment observe a “rise to 
either a stable path of low-inflation equilibrium growth” or “unstable path of 
high-inflation disequilibrium growth” (Pilkington 2016: 198), but the story 
sometimes does not assimilate fully the antagonistic contingent existential 
element determined by power asymmetries, which in Pilkington’s own words 
“ultimately determines the profit margin” (Pilkington 2016: 197).
Although aiming to formalize Keynesian “marginal efficiency capital 
argument” (Pilkington 2016: 251), he concedes that allusions to the question 
are not necessarily an “accurate depiction” of  how “investors make investment 
decisions”: 
there is good reason to suspect that this is not an altogether accurate 
depiction of how investors make investment decisions and it needs to 
be modified. Shackle reports that when he interviewed businessmen, 
they did not think too much about the levels of interest rates when 
6 Not to be confused with “monopoly power” (López 2008: 52). Furthermore, as López and 
Assous insist: “Kalecki rejected the view that macroeconomic results can be reached by simply 
adding up what is valid at the level of a particular firm” (Kalecki in López and Assous 2010: 
74); “firms operate in imperfect markets, within which they possess a certain monopolistic 
power, due to the differentiation of their products. In this context, firms can fix their price 
by applying a certain margin to their unitary prime unit costs. The existence of this margin, 
whose level depends on the firm’s monopolistic power, implies that the marginal productivity 
of labor will exceed the real wage per worker, so that there is no univocal association in existence 
(least of all a negative one) between employment and wages. As to the relation between the 
price and prime unit costs established at the aggregate scale, [Kalecki] calls ‘degree of monop-
oly’ (a concept which is distinct from ‘monopoly power’)” (López 2008: 52, my emphasis). 
For an interesting account of Kalecki’s meeting with Joan Robinson and the Cambridge group, 
see Chapter 1 (López and Assous 2010). Robinson’s recollection in 1977 declares: “I received 
a letter, evidently from a foreigner visiting England, who said that he was interested in my 
article as it was close to some work of his own. I thought this very strange. Who could claim to 
be doing work that was close to this –the first fruits of the Keynesian revolution?” (Robinson 
in López and Assous 2010: 7).
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making investment decisions (Shackle, 1966, pp. 150-59) (…) Shackle 
found that businessmen typically make decisions based on whether a 
given piece of capital equipment can pay itself off (amortize) over a 
short period of time (…) based on their subjective evaluation or their 
animal spirits, but these are cast over the short term because they 
believe that they are completely uncertain with regard to the long run. 
It seems likely that different people within a modern firm undertake 
investment decisions to the people who allocate internally generated 
funds and seek to borrow money. (…) it is likely that the people who 
make decisions about how much to invest are typically given a sort of 
menu of the funds available to them (…) they (...) weigh up potential 
profits against their potential losses and try to come to a decision 
about how much to invest. (…) the above framework is probably still a 
good starting point to understand the complexities of the investment 
decision-making process. (Pilkington 2016: 251).
The emphasis above aims to characterize those heterogenous aspects of 
the internal organization of the agent, and the “participants” of the decision-
choice response process, and likewise the agency itself with respect to other 
potentially antagonistic agents. We therefore encounter a double contingent 
moment of the choice-decision process: internally, the disparate sectoral 
management’s division of labor and those engaged in the final decision-choice 
vis-à-vis the “external” contesting agents.
Hence, the double heterogenous movement complex, a kaleidoscopic 
form of organization, as an outcome of the power asymmetries, in a context 
in which their conditions of existence are themselves “heterogenous”: they 
are not general, nor predetermined, given their intrinsically antagonistic and 
contingent character: “markets” are themselves composed of heterogenous 
motley of agents, whether in “financial” or in “productive” sectors, in other 
words, they do not conform a unity form of being. 
Notwithstanding the above, firms (agents) and their pricing mechanisms 
or profit schedules have relatively few problems to calculate since these 
aspects, like “prices,” are a convention or an “institution,” which are sustained 
by a set of “habits” (Hodgson 2004, 2006).
Prices do not represent “marginal revenues” at all, they are the consequence 
of simple summation of “direct material costs, labor costs and overhead costs 
determined at a ‘standard’ volume of output” (Pilkington 2016: 196), after 
which, firms simply added a “percentage-based” ‘mark-up’ “that included 
both a profit element and also took into account any costs related to selling 
goods together with any interest payments the firm had to make” (Lee in 
Pilkington 2016: 196). Also, and most importantly, Pilkington and Lavoie 
(2006) recognize production units rarely work at full capacity, hence their 
ability to increase production immediately if demand rises.7 In other words, 
7 (1 + 𝞱) AVG = p; p prices, 𝞱 percentage mark up, AVG, average costs. Now this formula can 
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the book excludes the typical section explaining the cost and supply-demand 
schedules as an outcome of the relative “demand-price elasticities” of the 
goods in question.
According to Pilkington, firms check each other’s profit margin levels, 
which in turn serve to give the industry a sense of “stability” (Pilkington 2016: 
196), avoiding undercutting each other, or price wars, nor aiming to raise too 
much their profit margins. The logic of this action stabilizes the horizon for 
the decisions-choice in an uncertain environment, conforming to certain 
patterns fitting common practice (Hodgson 2004, 2006) notion of agency 
and routines guide example, the “mark-up theory of profit” explains why 
“profit does not simply disappear over time. Profit margins are conventions 
and they exist in the form that they do so as long as people believe that they 
should exist in this form.” (Pilkington 2016: 197). The important principle 
of this long explanation aims to underline that profits are a “creature not so 
much of competition as they are of convention” (Pilkington 2016: 197), but 
Pilkington, having grasped the image of the profit logic, strives to answer a 
further question which is not necessarily mandatory: why is the “customary 
norm” not broken? It hinges on something he mentions as “toleration” 
(Pilkington 2016: 197) wage and/or profit margins and/or higher prices, 
which can be reframed instead in terms of the respective asymmetric power 
relations among and within agents.
In an ambiguous fashion, the description above tends to underplay what 
is crucial to the whole explanation, which Pilkington calls “tension” or “class 
tension.” Again, it seems that what can be called the antagonistic choice-
decision moment is evaded: agents need not necessarily keep the same profit 
margins or level of wage/prices. It is an antagonistic contingent existential 
element determined by power asymmetries, which “ultimately determines 
the profit margin” (ibid.: 197) and it is this “tension” that gives “rise to either 
a stable path of low-inflation equilibrium growth or unstable path of high-
inflation disequilibrium growth” (ibid.: 198). In marginalist economics, this 
attribute only belongs to specific “monopolistic” firms, assuming a certain 
“size” and the rule of economies of scale, otherwise it has no sovereign 
power to impose “mark-up” costs to establish certain “prices” and hence 
“profit margins,” which must be said, is contradicted by most of the literature 
which examines firms’ costs and behavior projections. The “mark-up pricing” 
(Pilkington 2016: 198) responds, as mentioned before, to that which Kalecki 
terms as the “degree of monopoly,”8 or “asymmetric power relations” (in 
Latin American Structuralism), notions which are not ubiquitous nor 
constant, given the heterogeneous characteristics of the agents in question 
and their conditions of existence. The potential profit “margin” within and 
be broken up into money value (Pilkington 2016: 196): I + SAL + π ≡ 𝜣; 𝜣 mark-up in money 
terms, I payments on interest and SAL, cost incurred, transactions costs, and π actual profit 
of the firm.
8 Not to be confused with “monopoly power.”
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among production units, the unitary prices, and wage-salary levels, are the 
consequence of these power asymmetries. On the other hand, in Prebisch 
and Kalecki’s argument, there is no “unique and univocal (much less a 
negative one)” tendency “between employment and salaries” (López 2008: 
52). In Prebisch’s vision, the pricing procedure does not assume nor require 
following a general rule, and salary levels are related to the “unions’ action,” 
(Prebisch 1948b in 1993: 358) “workers’ pressure” (Prebisch 1948b: 341),9 
whether at the micro or macroeconomic scale: during the “upswing” prices 
rise, at real wages expense, or other sectors, allowing henceforth for profits 
to materialize in the entrepreneur’s hand, as well as incrementing the savings 
rate, but it is during the downswing that the “fruits of technical progress” 
are transferred with less or greater extent depending on the antagonistic 
context of the community in question, aspect which has nothing to do with 
“competition”: as prices rise faster than nominal wages during the upswing, 
during the downswing of the cyclical movement the same forces in action 
are those which reduce the “prices,” but since prices “don’t decline with the 
same intensity” as wages, it is precisely during this moment of the cycle that 
the “fruits of technical progress are transferred” to the collectivity (Prebisch 
1948b in 1993: 358).10 In other words, “wages” are lowered during the rising 
9 López and Assous: “income distribution is the result of the clash between the two opposite 
classes. To quote Kalecki’s words used in the title of his last paper on the subject, the ‘Class 
Struggle [determines the] Distribution of National Income’ (Kalecki, 1971 [1991]). But the 
class struggle manifests itself both in the labor market and in the market for commodities in 
general. The degree of monopoly reflects the relative force of capitalists and workers in these 
two markets” (Kalecki in López and Assous 2010: 71, my emphasis).
10 Kalecki, despite his own efforts to establish a “rigorous and mathematical business cycle 
model” (López and Assous 2010: 223), that is, a general theory of an endogenous “cycle,” fi-
nally conceded to the unlikelihood in question, which meant maintaining a certain specific 
parameter to explain the cycle’s (“endogenous”) movement and, simultaneously, accept that 
the contingent historical antagonistic logics of investment-choice decisions could not be gen-
eralized. Prebisch, although sharing Kalecki’s idea of an inherent “disequilibrium,” “wave-like 
motions” of “capitalism” as its essence par excellence, presents no general theoretical effort to 
argue the “endogeneity” basis of the historical movements which are represented in a graphi-
cal image (see the chapter on Prebisch), with no formalization or mathematical representation 
of the model. In Prebisch’s perspective, graphical representation of the movements in question 
(Prebisch 1949a: 484) assumes the inclusion of the notion of time, which is introduced in the 
realm of the agent’s decision-choice horizon, transforming the very concept of “time”; “Time” 
itself paradoxically has no “symmetry,” whatever its units, “instances,” or metric or “clock-
time,” it cannot be made to follow a monotonically series of monetary units and investment 
and profit calculus. Literally, as the famous Shakespearian quote reads, for Prebisch, “time is 
out of joint,” refers not just to the issue of the asynchronous feature of the articulation between 
the circulating and productive capital, “cycles” in space and “time,” in which the respective 
“Center-Periphery” divide shows a constant reversal and “return” of income flows against the 
Periphery; but also that times “differ”: Time’s divergent logic is the consequence of differ-
ing antagonistic power asymmetries of the capitals, for Prebisch (in a certain sense Prebisch 
shares with his compatriot Borges his notion of time), “time” itself could not be made sense of 
in “economic” or “price” terms (Mallorquin, 2015). Hence, the “disequilibrium” implies jetti-
soning notions of equilibrium, or “imperfect markets”; “competitive” or “monopoly.” Kalecki, 
in contrast, with no detriment to his general perspective, as an aggregate demand effective 
158
prices, but not to draw, as the classical doctrine would have it, a greater 
“savings” ratio from top income sectors through a raise in the interest rate, 
but rather so that “businessmen can accumulate compulsively the savings of 
the rest of the collectivity” (Prebisch 1948b in 1993: 358).
Using Prebisch’s expression: “businessmen pay each other profits,” in the 
context of Pilkington’s description of the growth process, implies the idea 
that higher unitary profits per product during the upswing do not mean 
unescapably a lower “aggregate” level of total “profits” as a consequence of a 
price decrease per product during the downswing. Although the rate at which 
prices drop during the downswing is greater than the corresponding change 
of prices during the upswing, lower unitary profits per product requires 
considering the “distribution” antagonism between certain sectors, and/
or between differing economic formations (time disparity between those 
incomes leaving certain areas and the time lapsed during its return Center-
Periphery). Profits, in Prebisch’s perspective, depend on two elements: 
the productive process and the monetary mass generated during the last 
and all preceding productive processes, therefore whatever antagonisms or 
“competition” for profit may have prevailed among entrepreneurs, it does not 
“alter its quantity or its variations,” only the “distribution within the group of 
the businessmen” (Prebisch 1948b in 1993: 355, my emphasis).11
The pricing procedure forms part of a contested “ritual” or of habits 
ingrained in the agents’ behavior repertoire, through which in turn they 
sail into antagonistic uncertain waters, domains where the “rational or 
theorist, on par or even prior to Keynes’s famous work of 1936, understood what it meant 
to construct the formalization of a general model of the business cycle: “what was logically 
required for constructing a mathematically robust endogenous explanation of fluctuations is 
that the stationary equilibrium must be unstable, so that the system will never reach it. Thus, 
abandoning the reference to random shocks, he developed a new explanation fundamentally 
endogenous in which fluctuations result mainly from waves of optimism and pessimism. In 
the second place, he enlarged the scope of his model, with the aim of formulating a dynamic 
system whose solution would encompass both the cycle and the long-run development of the 
capitalist economy (López and Assous 2010: 92). Nonetheless, there is no space to discuss that 
perhaps the “Frisch-Kaldor-Kalecki,” “endogeneity,” “rocking chair” illustration, to theorize 
the causality in question might not be a “problem” at all. See Besomi (2010), Louçã (2001).
11 No space to expand on Prebisch’s theory on the appearance of “profits,” suffice for now is to 
mention he has an “endogenous” notion of the creation of money (Prebisch 1944a, Mallorquin 
2015) on which most of Pilkington’s book is well versed. The idea of profits, combines the 
notion that a greater mass of money-income is presumed before the one but last productive 
process locates its goods in the “market,” the corresponding money mass enables to “soak up” 
the “fruits of technical progress”; the sources of money income in question are explained by 
the progressive enlargement of the monetary mass generated previously and by those pro-
ductive investment projects in process: paradoxically, “today’s product” and its correspond-
ing profits are “realized” by money incomes that were generated before. These aspects of the 
materialization of profit and of the productive process are irreversible, subsequent productive 
cycles assume certain expected profit levels from past experience. This process stalls or begins 
to slow down, amongst other reasons, if entrepreneurs consider a too high level of inventory 
accumulation and which, therefore, induces a lower rate of future investments in accordance 
with what is considered pertinent. 
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representative agent” is off-base: “businesspeople set prices long before the 
goods are even produced, let alone brought to the market” (Lee in Pilkington 
2016: 198), denoting the materialization of the respective differing profits 
rates, an “irreversible process” (Prebisch 1948b in 1993: 336). The indecisive-
uncertain image, which Marx portrayed as the Salto Mortal, is simply 
impertinent: the money which will “buy” or “clear” the market of its products 
has been previously emerging during the ongoing or the earlier stages of the 
production cycles, the current act of selling is the consequence of money-
income, the sources of which were initiated in previous production processes 
(Prebisch 1948b: 337). In performative terms, profits are established 
the minute when the entrepreneur does the bookkeeping. The so-called 
“bargaining process” to establish “prices” and “costs” of goods has taken place 
“before” their appearance in the market, including the divergent profit margins 
and shares among and between the antagonistic heterogeneous units-agents 
of production, related to the power asymmetries and antagonisms of the units 
in question (labor/firms; firms versus firms). This is an aspect associated in 
marginalist economics only within the “monopolist” span of agents. Given 
the heterogeneous nature of the agents, which is a consequence of the power 
asymmetries, “marginalist” economics in Pilkington’s words, executes an 
“enormous violence to the real world” (Pilkington 2016: 199).
However, Pilkington’s critique of marginalism underlines an intromission 
which he sometimes typifies as an “inherently totalitarian” mode of thought, 
given the varieties of “violence” which “data” and “agents” have to withstand 
given the “a priori” framework. It generates negative effects in the mode 
of thought of students, encouraging viewing the world in a twisted and 
“distorted way”. At issue once more are the power asymmetries, which 
form the basis of the mechanism by which some information/ideas are 
incorporated when specific policies are promoted and elaborated. And 
although Pilkington’s critique might be turning on its head the sovereignty 
of the “marginalist” individualist perspective, his general view of “power,” or 
its ambiguous references to “Kalecki” tends to obscure the specification of 
the asymmetries in question. For example, an alternative and more uniform 
arrangement of income distribution requires some form of “compulsion,” 
direction, regulation, which we are not sure Pilkington is willing to defend.
Another of Pilkington’s quote of Joan Robinson is instructive to highlight 
the ambiguous nature of the notion of power in his critique: “The search for 
the theory of a normal rate of profit is a bit like looking in a dark room for a 
black cat that probably is not there” (Robinson 1953: 227, my emphasis).
If profit margins are “largely a political, cultural or social question” 
(Pilkington 2016: 199), more important, and interestingly is “where profits in 
the aggregate come from” (Pilkington 2016: 199), and yet in the discussion of 
aggregate profits, Pilkington uses the classic marginalist narrative ploy of the 
“island,” a “silly parable” that he acknowledges in a footnote (Pilkington 2016: 
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215), but which allegedly in his case, in contrast to marginalism, adopts more 
realistic “assumptions” (Pilkington 2016: 215). In the last instance, the debate 
that balances a specific set of “realist” presuppositions vis-à-vis a different 
scheme has always been determined by a “conventionalist” discourse, 
the substratum of which changes easily with new trends. Therefore, in 
marginalism, the Robinson Crusoe imaginary, as a ploy to evade the political 
examination and hence power asymmetries among and between agents, 
wishes to escape the notion of power, or in Wade Hands’s terms (2005), it 
does “not want the social” as we will argue further ahead.
For the explanation about the appearance of aggregate profit, Pilkington 
recovers the imaginary narrative of the “silly island,” which unlike its 
“marginalist” version, portrays some institutionally established rules like 
an obligatory minimum wage (a government), and a guaranteed stock of 
food to sustain the workers while it labors its first working period; a bank 
that lends the money to the capitalists, for them to undertake the payments 
for the building of the factory and producing the food in question, which 
the workers in question will buy. At the end of the first period, there is no 
need to employ the same number of workers, since the factory has been 
completed. The capitalist has accrued to its bank account the aggregate 
expenditure of workers (his profit) minus the proportion he pays as 
interest to the bank. The possibility of laying off some workers for the next 
production period means that aggregate expenditure or investment will 
be reduced. Hence, a potentially reduced level of aggregate profit, which 
ultimately could generate a “deflationary” situation since the workers 
will receive an excess of products greater than their income. It is at this 
stage that Pilkington brings in “government” spending to underline that 
in a “closed economy with no net government spending profits are equal 
to investment” (Pilkington 2016: 201). Pilkington’s illustration brings to 
light the importance of government expenditure to sustain a certain level 
of investment. Government creates, through the Central Bank, the extra 
cash “out of thin air” (as explained by his critique of IS-LM workhorse, 
underlining the role of the Central Bank’s target to set the interest rate 
and not the total stock of money),12 the proportion of expenditure to 
12 Let us mention in passing that “creditor-debtor” entities declared are not necessarily “human 
individuals.” The social relations seem to determine interest rates (according to Pilkington), 
which are related to the asymmetries of “extractive power”. Having rejected the existence of 
“objective probabilities” that presume knowledge of future income and default prospects, Pilk-
ington built a basic interest rate ratio: a debtor’s income (y) or the “information” and debtor’s 
“default rate” (dr) : i = dr / y, and if future income (information) and probability of default are 
unknown, given the absence of “objective probabilities,” it could still be argued, from a more 
“pragmatic” view that what is at stake here are the waves of optimism and pessimism in the credit 
cycle. Fortunately, Pilkington does not follow that line of thought underlining a key variable: “ex-
tractive power” (ep), which is integrated into the equation. A further aspect in the asymmetries 
in question i = dr / y • ep. An analogous category, instead of “extractive,” which could do the 
same job is “asymmetry”: “the relative extractive power, ep – the threat - that the lender holds 
over the borrower also plays a role in interest rate determination. The lower the magnitude of the 
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sustain the level of investment previously reached, which means that 
the aggregate profits will return to their previous level. And profits will 
depend simultaneously on the “private sector” and on government sector 
investments. Capitalists’ profit flow level will continue the same, and with 
each subsequent period of production, capitalists’ profit stock will grow 
systematically. Obviously, if the capitalist decides to cancel their debt with 
the bank, the latter’s profit stock stops increasing. Until now, prices have 
been stable, wages and investment “clears” the market of products, but 
with a rise of a salary by the government in favor of a specific sector of the 
work force (increasing expenditure), the proportional share which each 
group appropriates has shifted, within the class of laborers: the higher 
earning sector bids up the prices and the asymmetric distribution of the 
product initiates its course. Meanwhile, the capitalist’s profits have been 
amplified through the “inflationary” wage rise procedure, but soon other 
workers’ sectors bid for a wage rise to recover their proportional share of 
the product lost by the original wage hike level. After an initial erosion 
of profit stock levels, given “inflationary” pulls, it subsequently recovers. 
Given that the banker ties his debt in nominal terms, not real terms, which 
is not based on the basket products it can buy, inflation swallows his 
interest payments away, while the capitalist’s debt in interest payments is 
lower in real terms as time ensues, henceforth “in an inflation real wealth 
will be redistributed from creditors to debtors” (Pilkington 2016: 204). 
This focuses on the famous Kahn multiplier,13 in which a certain increment 
in expenditure generates a further outflow of disbursement giving rise to a 
boost in the product output. It revolves around the notion of the marginal 
propensity to consume, which is relatively divergent among different 
income sources, given specified consumption threshold rates for the same 
set of goods on the part of certain agents.
The so-called “Levy-Kalecki Equation” Y ≡ π + W14 is fetched to portray 
gross profits of the “economy as a whole” (Pilkington 2016: 209) (GDP) in 
an economic formation, which in terms of investment and consumption and 
excluding government and financial entities, as well as GDP, equals the gross 
profits plus wages and salaries.15
threat, the higher the interest rate will be, and vice-versa” (Pilkington 2016: 247).
13 (1 / 1 - MPC).
14 Y = income, π = profits, W = wages.
15 IR + Cp - SwR = πR is the profit formula with no government (p. 272). National income with 
taxes can be expressed as Y ≡ (π – Tπ) + (W – Tw) + (Tπ + Tw + Ti ) (p. 210); taxes on profits, 
Tπ; taxes on wages, Tw; and Ti indirect taxes. Therefore, gross profits excluding taxes: I + (X 
- M) + (G - T) + Cp - Sw = (π - Tπ); net gross profits are the sum of I, gross investment + net 
exports + budget Deficit + capitalist consumption – worker saving; X - M net exports, exports 
minus imports; G - T is the budget deficit, government expenditure minus taxes again, Cp 
consumption out of profits (capitalists consumption), Sw, workers savings. Notice that in the 
latter expression, the three-bar denotation has given way to a causality implied by the two-bar 
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Also, profits can be revealed with the following formula I + Cp – Sw 
= π.16 But this expression has excluded the possibility of examining the 
intrinsic potentiality of the antagonism in question, for example, a recurrent 
recap of another cycle of higher wage demands by labor, since these shares 
or proportions cannot be ethically upheld or reasoned by the so-called 
“marginal productivities” dictated by the “competitive” market narrative of 
marginalism. The agents “might not know” their actual standing income level 
regarding their experience. 
The expansion of the money mass, through the appropriate financial 
channels, to cover these advances, is often perceived as essentially 
“inflationary”, a perspective from which Pilkington perhaps has not fully 
distanced himself. A narrative that claims that all “inflation” is “too much 
money chasing few goods” or a “monetary phenomenon.” Therefore, the 
“low-inflation equilibrium growth” or “unstable path of high-inflation 
disequilibrium growth” (Pilkington 2016: 198) specification tends to obscure 
those antagonistic moments characterized by the growth process. Although 
Pilkington discusses four types of inflation, “demand-pull inflation,” “cost-
push inflation,” “speculative inflation,” “exchange-rate inflation,” which he 
says may overlap, he considers sufficient the assertion that it relates to a 
“complex phenomenon” (Pilkington 2016: 175).17
Having “demolished” the “maximizing individual” or representative 
agent, Pilkington must incorporate a mechanism to explain the logic 
and practice of choice-decision related to investment. Equally having 
displaced the pertinence IS-LM model as a source of a unified horizon 
to reflect on the manner by which agents can be seen to undertake their 
identity (=) symbol which means that it is in the left-hand side that we find agents’ decisions 
changing the process in question. Pilkington is aware of the tautologies of formulas or “tru-
isms” in Fisher’s terms (Fisher 1911: 157); see also Sunkel (1957).
16 I is gross investment, Cp consumption out of profits (capitalists’ consumption), Sw, workers 
saving (wages minus consumption of workers, or W – Cw; (Y ≡ E) Income in terms of expen-
diture, hence E (≡) I + Cp + Cw and W ≡ Cw + Sw. It follows that I + Cw + Cp ≡ π + C + Sw, 
cancelling and reshuffling I + Cp - Sw = π. The three-bar notation (≡) is a sort of “truism” (p. 
223), while the two-bar notation is the identity symbol, which has “behavioral connotations” 
or a presumed causality. So, Pilkington’s notation is a different way to distinguish dependent 
from independent variables.
17 Latin American Structuralism discussions, for which there is no space here, treats this “com-
plex” phenomenon questioning the classic quantity theory of money and its impertinence for 
the Periphery, but unlike Pilkington, “inflation,” is “always and everywhere” an antagonistic 
moment, a defiance of the “distributism” pattern which Pilkington discusses, but on which 
he does not expand theoretically nor its consequences: “inflation is fundamentally a struggle 
among groups for the redistribution of real income and the price level rise is just one outward 
manifestation of the phenomenon” (Furtado 1954: 181), “inflation (…) as we have seen is not, 
in its origins, a monetary phenomenon. It results from the action of certain groups that pre-
tend to increase their participation in the real income” (Furtado 1954: 183).
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investment choice-decisions (interest rate-investment), and/or financial 
markets, Pilkington is under an obligatory theoretical mandate to explain 
the indeterminate realm of “savers and investors” (Pilkington 2016: 223) 
and the “varying interest rates” and investment projects, especially given 
the heterogenous and/or “kaleidoscopic” (Shackle) characteristics of the 
agents in question.
It initiates by distinguishing two processes, which Pilkington formalizes 
mathematically, whereby agents take decisions-choices, whether related to 
“financial investment sector”, where liquidity preference (Lp = Bear / Bull), 
plays a primary role and the “real investment” activity represented as “animal 
spirits” (AsR), although he concludes with a more general formula subsuming 
the former within the latter:
the bear/bull ratio (i.e. liquidity preference) is actually synonymous 
with the velocity of money in the market in any given period. As the 
amount of bears increases relative to bulls, the velocity of money in the 
market slows as those bears hoard money and the price of securities 
in that market falls. As the amount of bulls increases relative to bears, 
the velocity of money in the market speeds up as bulls increase their 
expenditure of money and the price of securities increases. (Pilkington 
2016: 241-242)
Certainly, by breaking with “Keynesian” or “post-Keynesian tradition”,18 he 
uses the notion of “animal spirits,” reconstructing the concept by incorporating 
aspects of the “marginal efficiency of capital” to which Keynes pointed only to 
ponder on the formal aspects of the investment process. This line of argument 
implies that the notion of “liquidity preference” also must be brought to shoulder 
the agent’s action course. Thus, to explain the activity of the “real sector,” which 
corresponds to the “animal spirits” dominium: “animal spirits”: ( (AsR) • (1 / i) 
• QR = IR )
19 (animal spirits AsR; i = interest rate in that particular market; QR, 
18 “Note that Keynes used this terminology in his Treatise on Money, but we are using it in 
an entirely different way, one which incorporates Keynes’s more mature ideas about liquidity 
preference (Keynes, 1930). The present usage is more similar to the manner in which Joan 
Robinson used the terminology in her monetary theory, but she abstracted away from the 
existence of bulls themselves (…) an enormous step backwards (…) the closest to the present 
usage is G. L. S. Shackle” (Pilkington 2016: 269). The formula would be 1 / [Bear / Bull] • M 
= A • B; M is money; A refers to the price of the first but last bid of an asset / bond which is B. 
The formula for Capital Gains t +1 ≡ A t +1 • B t+1 . Therefore, Lp = Bear / Bull: 1 / [Lp] • M = A • 
B ≡ 1 / Liquidity preference • Money = A • B • Lp ≡ Bear/ Bull.
19 Subscript “R” represents real investment in contrast to “F”, financial investment: “If we refer 
to the actual money that changes hands due to financial transaction as financial expenditure or 
financial income, then we can say, again being careful to distinguish from real expenditure and 
income, that” (Pilkington 2016: 237) EF ≡ IF ≡ YF ≡ SF. In these cases, we are dealing with “fi-
nancial expenditures”, a bond (EF), or financial investment (IF), or if the receiving of an income 
(YF), financial income, or financial saving (SF), it’s just an analogy to the real economy, it “does 
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expected profits; IR = real investment), Pilkington advances the idea in which 
“animal spirits” are “the liquidity preference of the real investment market. They 
are, however, the inverse of liquidity preference” (Pilkington 2016: 249). The 
“liquidity preference” refers to the ratio movement of pessimism/optimism, 
bidding, buying, or selling bonds/assets. The yield-price vitality (Bear / Bull) 
in the “financial” market can be seen simply as the inverse of “animal spirits.” 
Synonymous to the money velocity notion.
The contrast between the notion of “animal spirit,” viewed as the 
inverse (Bull / Bear) of the liquidity preference (Lp ≡ Bear / Bull), 
means, paraphrasing Pilkington, a rising impulse to the increment of “real 
investment,” enlarging new “productive capacities,” borrowing money 
or liquidating financial holdings, which culminates in new “productive 
capacity” (Pilkington 2016:249), contradicting the liquidity preference ratio 
that entails a reduction of acquisitions levels by financial investors protecting 
their purchasing power by amplifying their “liquid assets” or cash.
Perhaps, the distinction between Lp = Bear / Bull and the ASR formula, 
financial and real investment respectively, becomes an important necessary 
qualification in the investment process for those economic formations in the 
“Center” which exhibit an important multi-layered and “deep” bond-assets 
and “stock-market institution” and all sorts of money substitutes (Ms), which 
cannot be generalized to reflect the investment process in the peripheral 
countries. In certain center or core economic formations, these financial 
underpinnings are crucial to the investment choice-decisions patterns, the 
rise of the hegemonic role of the “bullish” “vitality” of the market, whether 
“financial” or “real” forms part of the changing transient antagonistic 
conditions between and among agents or firms.
Pilkington insists that the agents in question (Bears / Bulls), are “people,” 
optimistic-pessimistic about a future increase (decrease),20 of bonds-assets 
yield-price, but for the critique that follows, I underline the notion that the 
reference to “people” as those whose pathway between “Bear” to its opposite 
“Bull” (indeterminate in time and process), are not necessarily “human 
individuals.”
It refers to movement of the “ratio”: proportions of changes of those flipping 
from one position to another, a consequence of a diverse set of heterogenous-
not add or subtract anything from it.”
20 Pilkington’s explanation underlines a crucial point at issue, the contrasting logic of the price 
of bonds regarding stocks: “the price of a bond is inversely related to the interest rate or yield 
on that bond. Thus, when the price rises/falls, the yield will fall/rise. This is, however, not 
the case with stocks. Stocks do not have interest rates per se. Rather they pay out dividends 
and the relationship between the price of a stock and its dividend is by no means simple. The 
reason that economists historically discuss bonds rather than stocks is because of the simple 
price/interest rate trade-off that characterizes the market. The stock market is a far more com-
plicated beast, but the basics can still be understood by utilizing the liquidity preference theo-
ry. Just remember that when the price on a given bond rises, its interest rate declines, while when 
the price on a stock increases its dividend should not be directly affected.” (Pilkington 2016: 267)
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kaleidoscopic agents, but most of which are not “people,” among whom we 
can mention great corporate entities or bond-stock associations and their 
respective “algorithms” coupled to decisions/options: 
in what proportion those in the market are net selling and to what 
extent they are net buying. The manifestation of the bulls and bears 
represents the liquidity of the market as a whole at a given moment 
in time. As liquidity preference rises bulls turn to bears and as it falls 
bears turn to bulls. So, the liquidity preference rising leads to a heavier 
weighting of bears in a given market than of bulls and vice versa or: (Lp 
≡ Bear / Bull). (Pilkington 2016: 239)21
The “animal spirits” are displayed through the “kaleidoscopic” notion 
of Shackle’s work: a diverse and non-determinant mode of calculating 
(assessing) modes of investment projects, the “equiprobable” case of certain 
future events occurring is excluded, and stresses the “potentially infinite” 
(Pilkington 2016: 286) events or outcomes, which means that we are in a 
completely “different space” to the “dice” or the “coin” illustration of “chance” 
implied by certain models of econometrics or schools, whether Bayesian22 or 
not. Shackle is brought to enlighten the “subjective” nature of our evaluations: 
“human imagination and storytelling comes to the fore, we are no longer in 
a world of the probable, rather we are in a world of the possible” (Shackle 
in Pilkington 2016: 286). The “individual’s” “uncertainty”23 in question, can 
nevertheless separate “sense from nonsense” (Pilkington 2016: 287), putting 
aside conjecture and imagining alternative situations, which is defined 
through Shackle’s work as “bounded uncertainty” (Shackle in Pilkington 
2016: 287) which, in turn, reminds us of Simon’s use of “bounded rationality” 
(Hodgson 2004).
Before describing the description of the formalization process by which 
“animal spirits” (ASR), investment-profit are realized, in bookkeeping terms, 
it is necessary to represent the notion of profit in question.
The “animal spirits” (ASR) are the consequence, the result of the ratio 
movement of Bulls to Bears in the market for “real investment,” which 
Pilkington formalizes:
                     
21 The reason that explains why the capital market horizon does not reflect a hurricane of un-
tamed forces has to do with “social norms within investment communities. Optimism and pes-
simism tend to come in waves (…) and during these waves, swings are somewhat bounded. But 
there is a deeper explanation, and it is one that economists like James Steuart and Karl Marx 
knew well: the interest rate is a question of distribution grounded in legal, social, and political 
norms. The interest rate - or the rate of return on accumulated wealth- is determined by the 
relative social power of creditors” (Pilkington 2016: 246).
22 The book also presents a well-prolonged theoretical discussion, between different “schools” 
of econometrics and the role given to “objectivity” of the calculus in question.
23 Pilkington devotes much space to discuss the notion and its differences between Keynes and 
Knight. For his part, Danby (2017: 158) merely distinguishes the Keynesian idea as necessarily 
an “ontological” condition; see also Hodgson (2011). 
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Pilkington launches the discussion of investment to an endnote and 
in which he is aware of a similarity with something “like an ‘accelerator 
principle’” to think the notion of the “rate of investment” (Pilkington 
2016: 271).
According to him, the:
accelerator principle performs rather well empirically, but it fails to 
explain why investment every now and again simply falls. This can 
be explained much better using a framework that integrates liquidity 
preference and animal spirits. We should also note that while the above 
is a good way of thinking about the economy, it is not entirely accurate. 
After the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent recession, corporate 
profits in the USA soared due to the large government deficits that 
were being run at the time. Nevertheless, investment was extremely 
slow to pick back up. This was because the firms were able to meet their 
present orders without needing to expand their productive capacity, 
and so they turned to wash their profits back into the financial markets. 
In Keynesian terms, we might say that the marginal efficiency of capital 
was very low relative to the going interest rates in the financial markets 
at the time. This example shows quite clearly that it is to oversimplify 
to say that profits determine investment in some mechanical manner. 
(…) We have only laid out the above provisional account as a sort of 
guide, which is by no means definitive. In order to understand the real 
24 The interest rate thus determined is the consequence of irt (overnight target interest rate), Tc 
transactions costs for borrowing money and Lpirt stands for the liquidity preference in an IRT 
market, in which “the central bank does not intervene directly in these [financial markets] by 
engaging in assets purchases” (p. 244), hence the interest rate i = irt + Tc + Lpirt  (Pilkington 
2016: 245). But “liquidity preference” under the IRT market liquidity preference has to take 
into consideration the Default risk (Der) and the expected change in the overnight target inter-
est rate, hence Lpirt  ≡  Der  + ∆iert   (∆ = proportion of change). Therefore, the expression irt  + Tc  
+ Der  + ∆i
e
rt = i, means that as the number of bonds grows money mass expands, which in turn 
entails the issue of money’s risks, whether to keep idle or invest it.
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nature of investment, one must be appreciative of the kaleidoscopic 
nature of investment decisions in capitalist economies and be prepared 
to fully engage with the ‘state of the news.’ This is why economics can 
never aspire to being a ‘hard’ science like physics or chemistry. The 
subjective and evolutionary element therein is simply far too great. 
(Pilkington 2016: 271-272)
“Ruling the Roost”25
The title of this section intentionally aims to provoke certain ambiguities 
of Keynes’s famous aviary image by which he advances the argument 
explaining which particular “asset” becomes the dominant benchmark for 
examining potential investment strategies, which is also a distinctive aspect 
when analyzing diverse economic formations, or the Center-Periphery power 
asymmetries. In other words, that which appears a clear-cut choice decision 
response on the part of certain agents, is belied by the context and by the 
power conundrum. The “ruling” and “rules” dichotomy implies some explicit 
dominium and following instructions. An evaluating agency and a “policing” 
practice, hence the role of the FMI in most negotiations to restructure loans-
debts, for example, and/or credit rating agencies.
The “broader conclusion” is that “the interest rate is ultimately determined 
by the relative power of creditors in a society” (Pilkington 2016: 270).
Since the loan shark operates outside of the law, his extractive power is 
higher than that of the bank which operates inside of the law. This means 
that interest rates are always determined by the prevailing structures of 
the era. (…) always precede the existence of capital markets (Pilkington 
2016: 247).
Bankruptcy laws represent the embeddedness of “legal frame works” 
(Pilkington 2016: 248), there is always a regulatory, customary, and / or 
traditional regime. Capital markets function because there are all sorts of 
regulatory regimes:
The key determinate of interest rates is the relative social power of 
creditors. We as society determine this relative social power. If a 
society is set up in such a way that the creditors control the mechanics 
of power, then the relative return on wealth should be low, then it will 
be low. What is more, there is no ‘market rate of interest’ prior to these 
arrangements already in place. Certainly, there are various market rates 
of interest within a given legal-institutional, but there cannot logically 
be any market at all prior to the legal institutional arrangements being 
25 “For it may be that it is the greatest of the own-rates of interest (as we may call them) which 
rules the roost (because it is the greatest of these rates that the marginal efficiency of a cap-
ital-asset must attain if it is to be newly produced); and that there are reasons why it is the 
money-rate of interest which is often the greatest (because, as we shall find, certain forces, 
which operate to reduce the own rates of interest of other assets, do not operate in the case of 
money)” (Keynes 1936: 223).
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in place. (…) because mainstream economics can say nothing about 
the relative power of creditors in society, (…) their theories are still 
completely irrelevant because they say literally nothing about the 
relative power of creditors in the economy. (Pilkington 2016: 248-249)
Power asymmetries between the Center-Periphery antagonism, focused 
within the context of trade policies, are equally central to the Latin American 
perspective, initially defined by Prebisch as the “Ricardian loss” probe, which 
unfortunately does not receive much space in Pilkington’s book: one chapter, 
the shortest, bringing once again to light a certain undecided theoretical 
aspect of his work, the antagonistic character and power-driven nature of 
the notions of agents and their milieu. In “Non-Dogmatic Approaches to the 
Economics of Trade,” the critique of the relative comparative advantages 
of the international “division” of labor doctrine, underlines once again the 
importance of “uncertainty” to deliberate on investment decisions and 
their diversification: you “should never put your eggs in a single basket.” 
This is coupled with revealing the shallowness of those arguments that 
sponsor “free trade” under whatever circumstance. Therefore, that which 
is taught as “the theory of comparative advantage,” is portrayed as David 
Ricardo’s struggle in the 19th Century to promote the “free trade” strategy 
by the then ruling “Empire.” But today, in the so-called “promotion,” by the 
“Washington Consensus,” of trade between “open economies,” Pilkington’s 
representations of its consequence are underlined by the simple example 
of the role of production specialization on those products with which a 
country performs better than its trading counterpart, allegedly propagating 
a higher total product for those economic formations involved, a perspective 
which hides a series of unsustainable presuppositions, which “development 
policies” should challenge, especially in the Periphery.
The criticism stresses the distance, once again, between the models and 
the “abstract world of ideas” (Pilkington 2016: 326). Models of comparative 
advantage assume full employment in both entities/countries implicated, 
and the existences of unemployed resources can be put to work literally 
“cost-free.” Free trade deals often bring about the loss of employment and the 
narrative in question insists that these losses are “matched by gains in a new 
export sector” (ibid.). Synthetically, it resuscitates “free market clearing” 
arguments as well as the assumption that a more dynamic efficient productive 
sector will materialize. But as economic formations not only in the “Center” 
but especially those in the “Periphery” as well have found out:
it becomes by no means clear that if a factory geared towards domestic 
production closes down in Detroit due to a free deal, it will be replaced 
with a new factory geared towards export production. A whole host 
of factors will have come into play here to rebalance the economy 
from this shock and ensure that it reaches some sort of equilibrium; 
otherwise, the result will simply be unemployment and a serious 
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downward pressure on wages in the higher wage country. (Pilkington 
2016: 326)26
Pilkington’s USA example elaborates the narrative on the importance of 
the positive effects of free trade and open economy generating a higher level 
of efficiency around the world, but which simultaneously and collaterally 
undermines “worker organizations” through unemployment augmentation 
which, in turn, induces some form of stagnation in effective demand, debt rise 
and instability. Once again, the comparative advantage doctrine assumes away 
institutional factors, resuscitating “flexibility” and perfect factor substitution. 
This theory is certainly “static” in the sense that the specializing trajectory 
in certain sectors or segments inhibits their future development into higher 
technological areas. Ricardo’s Portugal/Britain open trade example (cloth/
wine respectively), obviously was pondered from within the British empire 
perspective, which might have ruined an impending “textile” industry. The 
example of protection policies in the USA is a clear case that demolishes 
any sort of “level playing” field by limiting imports and thus generating local 
positive effects for local companies. 
The dominium of the aviary image of the dominant “rooster,” (“ruling 
the roost”), in the context of “open economies” and “free trade” in a world 
of multiple antagonistic “exchanges” obscures the latter configuration, to 
say the least. Hence, “free trade” specialization can become a negative and 
damaging long run consequence in certain areas or Center countries too. 
In the Periphery, the prices of their export (primary) products exhibit 
a haphazard tendency, which, contrary to Center economic formations, 
have limited power trade mechanisms by which to counteract internally 
and externally a “purchasing power” loss, or income level vis-à-vis the 
“external shocks.”
Prebisch’s arguments on these aspects during the early 1950s are clearly 
reflected in the negative consequences for the balance of payments and the 
functional income distribution within the Periphery. The predominance 
of policies for an “inward growth” strategy vis-à-vis the one sided “export 
driven” perspectives of “pre-Second World War,” implied recovering the 
importance of the “multipliers’” effect of local capital investments.
Once a period of deterioration of the terms of trade sets in, the Periphery’s 
limitations to sustain external payments to cover not only certain aspects of 
current but also the capital account to maintain certain levels of imports is 
underlined, a thesis which again, during the 1970s, in the Eurocentric discourse 
was tangled (sorry for the pun intended) to the name of A. Thirwall’s27 thesis 
26 No space to touch on Pilkington’s rejection of the notion of equilibrium or Latin American 
Structuralism critique, but Nadal’s deconstruction of the mathematics in question is counter-
poised by Debreu’s dictum that: “in proving existence (…) one is not trying to make a state-
ment about the real world, one is trying to evaluate the model” (Debreu in Till and Roy, 2014). 
For a general appreciation of the concept of equilibrium, see Russett (1968). 
27 Again, no space here to describe Prebisch’s theoretical vocabulary during the 1950s which 
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on the “balance-of-payments-constrained growth models.” Pilkington is all 
for “diversification” of the economy, which allows the economy to withstand 
the:
unforeseen swings in the supply and demand of certain goods. Again, 
we should always remember that it is not a good idea to put all one’s eggs 
in one basket lest that basket fall to the ground. (Pilkington 2016: 328)
Nonetheless, first, it is urgent to displace the aviary vocabulary, and the 
“chicken run” images, which do not reflect the antagonistic characteristics 
of the realm in question. Previously, we mentioned the semblance related 
to the inadvertent “dropping the basket,” which only masks the potential 
power asymmetries among some countries (agents) to undertake and 
sponsor policies to counteract the negative consequences of the reduction of 
purchasing power of its exports and hence its imports level capacity. During 
the 1950s and 1960s, the movement to construct a sort of “buffer stocks” to 
stabilize prices for certain primary goods like coffee, cocoa, sugar goods, was 
defeated during the 1980s with the neoliberals’ narrative of “open economies” 
and non-intervention in the so-called “market” by the State. Although the 
encouragement of export policies for certain sectors was not an antithesis to 
an inward led development policy proposed by Prebisch and Latin American 
Structuralism, the struggle to undertake reforms in the Periphery to selectively 
open certain sectors of those economic formations became prohibited during 
the external debt renegotiations during the 1990s negotiations.
Terms matter (Center-Periphery antagonisms) especially when the aim 
is to explain agents’ behavior and outcomes vis-à-vis each other during their 
“interaction.” The early illustration that Pilkington posed in the book, on the 
outcomes of a certain football spectator’s behavior, forcing or determining 
the “upright” position to those behind him if he stood up, evades the 
consideration that the event reflects a potentially antagonistic confrontation 
with those spectators that do not want to see the game in an upright position 
and, worse-case scenario, those groups of individuals that have “organized 
themselves” to act otherwise as a “unified” agent, bringing to light the 
indeterminate heterogenous nature of the agents in question, “individuals” 
or a “unity of spectators,” both of which require some sort of deliberation 
of the choice-decision moment. The process might generate a collective 
would certainly displace the “odd couple” narrative repeated in Western-centric academia in 
the 1970s with the so-called “Thirwall-Prebisch” thesis, in López’s words: “the Prebisch-Thir-
wall notion (…) has become a workhorse in Keynesian-inspired open-economy macroeco-
nomics. Its main message is that when exports grow (or when the import elasticity of output 
falls), private demand is stimulated. Besides that, note that growth of exports induces growth 
of imports, which, however, is lower than the original growth in exports, such that the govern-
ment has room to implement expansionary demand policies without endangering the trade 
balance.” (López 2018: 337). Furthermore, the insistence in recent decades with policies for 
the Periphery, which exclusively concentrates on the “export driven” sectors as the only pow-
erful multiplier dynamism for growth vis-à-vis local capital development investment can be 
questioned (see Perrotini and Vázquez-Muñoz, 2018). 
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“agency,” pushing, shoving, and threatening those in front if they don’t sit 
down, it is an undecidable and contingent “situation.” We cannot discern 
what response will ensue due to the behaviors in question. That requires 
us to examine the historical data, otherwise, we would be receding into the 
predetermined rational actions of the “representative agent of marginalism,” 
which Pilkington demonstrates as being unviable. 
Although Pilkington, as mentioned previously, is not consistent on the 
vocabulary and its tone, since he advises awareness of the “institutional 
nuance” (Pilkington 2016: 329) of “free trade,” which he acknowledges: “free 
trade is an inherently political issue: what political forces within the countries 
in question are for the free trade policies and what political forces are against 
them” (ibid.):
What changes will opening up an industry to free trade have in the 
countries in question? Is there reason to believe that the labor that 
loses employment will automatically find it elsewhere and will the jobs 
be of equal quality? Are we making a country too reliant on a single 
good when we open them up to free trade and enforce specialization? 
What effects will the opening up of a country to free trade have on 
income distribution? (…) In order to understand the agenda behind 
any trade policy at any given moment in time, you must examine it 
in critical detail. What free trade dogma does is it tricks economists 
fooled by their own simplistic narratives into becoming propagandists 
for whatever powers-that-be want to impose on various countries at 
any given moment in time? (Pilkington 2016: 331)
Accepting Pilkington’s dictum that “free trade” is not always “bad,” and 
contingent on the political and economic forces in question, a “development 
strategy” is of prime importance in countries at the extreme end of the 
asymmetric power contingent chain effect, which again cannot be examined 
independently of the specific power asymmetries in question: countries and 
enterprises (agents) involved, the range and capacities of debt, evaluated by 
agencies in Center countries. The Periphery’s product’s future, or purchasing 
power incomes is equally examined, and “policed” with WTO rules, which 
limit the pertinency of using the “market” narratives as the best pick of the 
bunch to elaborate the long and short view of the investment projects. Equally, 
the sole idea of “free trade,” as well as “opening up a country,” accepts most of 
the presupposition of the “Ricardian Zealotry,” evaporating the asymmetric 
power relationships which world trade organizations enforce systematically 
and sometimes even against the trade conventions, a consequence, as said 
before, of the power the asymmetries between the nations in question. It is 
in this discussion that Pilkington’s strategic critique of “Ricardian Zealotry” 
might miss the mark, since he assumes a “consensus,” “quite terrifying” 
(Pilkington 2016: 330) among economists, about the positive role of “free 
trade.” Although it is very easy to agree with Pilkington’s critique of the 
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“Ricardian Zealotry” in question, which underlines the substantive childish 
theoretical presuppositions originating in “market efficiency” and EMH 
arguments, Latin American economic discourse, as seen before, contradicts 
the apparent “consensus” by Eurocentric academia. Sharing Pilkington’s 
“exasperation” and “shocking” disbelief of the theoretical vocabulary and 
preaching when Eurocentric economists discuss the issue of “free trade,” this 
opinion is not unanimous, as the above has shown among “economists” in the 
“Periphery,” despite its hegemonic role in most of the economic reforms over 
the last three decades by the Latin American governments.
In order to underline my argument, and perhaps to reinforce Pilkington’s 
use of Krugman to that effect, I may concur with most of the limitations 
which Krugman’s position’s “patronizing tone” generates in the theoretical 
discussion about the status of the “comparative advantage” narrative, but 
then Pilkington himself could be under the same insular sway by not taking 
into consideration the distinct and alternative discourses outside his own 
geographic milieu, notwithstanding his allusion to the struggle by French 
students to reform the economic discipline.
Krugman’s theoretical evolution shows just as well the “exasperating” 
institutional conditions of the profession in question mentioned by Pilkington, 
in which confessions on theoretical waverings are not really made to count. 
Let us not forget Pilkington’s presentation of the ambivalent nature of most of 
Krugman’s appreciation and position on the IS-LM model discussions, with 
the “comparative theory” narrative, and the “ambiguous nature” of the author’s 
ideas. Krugman’s discussion and propagandist thesis on “Ricardo’s difficult 
idea” was followed (and I am not going to say paradoxically, because it is exactly 
the practice of the economic profession which I wish to underline), by a text, 
during which it is claimed, A. O. Hirschman’s work on development theory, 
“proves” that “equilibrium theory” was wrong and “the theory of economic 
development was correct” (Krugman 1997: 29). And yet there seems to be not 
even a hint or impression of the theoretical consequences which should follow 
from this revelation, for his own previous “decades” of work or the economic 
profession at large for that sake. I am not just implying the “limited” knowledge 
of Hirschman’s work28 by Krugman, rather it relates to the inexistence of any 
sort of theoretical reconsideration which such a recognition should generate, 
and especially because “disequilibrium economics” presupposes a totally 
different set of notions about the agents’ conditions of existence and their 
perspective to undertake certain decisions-choices.
Hence, “disequilibrium economics” implies taking seriously the terms of 
trade and their consequences especially for the Periphery vis-à-vis the Center. 
If we retrieve Pilkington’s final profit equation, with no government (IR + Cp 
- SwR = πR ) (Pilkington 2016: 272), and twist it a little, national income with 
taxes can also be expressed as Y ≡ (π – Tπ) + (W – Tw) + (Tπ + Tw + Ti ) 
28 See chapter on Hirschman above.
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(Pilkington 2016: 210); and global profit as: I + (X - M) + Cp - Sw = π, which 
is the sum of I, gross investment + net exports + budget Deficit + capitalist 
consumption – worker savings; X - M net exports, exports minus imports; 
G - T the budget deficit, government expenditure minus taxes again, Cp 
consumption out of profits (capitalists’ consumption), Sw, workers’ savings. 
Notice that in the latter expression, the three (≡) bar denotation has given 
way to a causal process implied by the two-bar identity (=) symbol, which 
means that it is the left-hand side where we find agents’ decisions changing 
the process in question.
The antagonistic “trade” relations between Center and Periphery are 
hidden somewhat, since the Periphery’s export volume is concentrated 
in a reduced number of products, often “primary” products, although 
not necessarily. Therefore income, which in distinct periods tends to 
display a deterioration of its value in terms of those it acquires from the 
Center (industrial goods), becomes the source that generates the series of 
“devaluations” and “higher import prices” and not necessarily a financial 
mismanagement. Aspects of which, in Western-centric academia, Prebisch’s 
name is joined to Singer.29 Given the Center-Periphery power asymmetries,30 
it’s the Periphery that modifies its “prices” or “costs” during the downturn 
of the cycle, while in the Center, a better organized labor force manages to 
retain certain levels of income previously reached, and therefore manages to 
keep those “fruits of technical progress,” an entitlement, to which, it must be 
emphasized, is deservedly acquired in view of their previous toil and sacrifice, 
but a process towards which the Periphery wants access through a selective 
process of social and technical transformation, by a variety of industrial and 
social reform policies. The deterioration of the Periphery’s terms of trade vis-
à-vis the core countries, in Prebisch’s view, is not an “iron law” (Prebisch 
1951b: 6-7)31. The wave, undulatory “movement - reality” of “capitalism,” 
the upswings and downturns, imply taking into consideration aspects of the 
balance of payments and the trade relations as intrinsically “uncertain” and 
volatile, which in the last instance are the consequence of time disparities 
29 Once more the “Prebisch-Singer” thesis requires a theoretical “decoupling” process: the “de-
terioration” process appears in his writings during the early 1930s and the vocabulary “Cen-
ter-Periphery” is quite dissimilar to Western-centric academia notions of trade between indus-
trial and primary producing countries.
30 Please take note that we do not use the term “unequal,” which does not mean the absence of 
imperialist policies.
31 After the appearance of various texts (Prebisch 1949b, 1950, 1951) where Prebisch presented 
these aspects in detailed fashion, in a course of lectures in October 1951 to the Training Center 
of Latin America in programs and agricultural projects and related subjects, he explicitly de-
nounced the then misinterpretation of his posture: “I was made responsible for having formu-
lated an immanent law of the process of economic development by which the prices of primary 
products tend to depreciate in relation to those of industrial products. I have not formulated 
any sort of such immanent law, but I simply called the attention to the phenomenon that has 
occurred in a determinate period of time under the pressure of certain forces. We don’t know 
what will occur in the future, it depends on a series of factors” (Prebisch 1951b: 6-7). 
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among and between economic formations (Center-Periphery) and the 
productive and circulating realms. 
The current mode of organizing a selective “open” devaluation process 
among and between diverse economic formations, Center-Periphery, does 
not allow for much room for an autochthonous adjustment without penalizing 
“development” policies in the Periphery (Nadal 2004). The Center-Periphery 
power asymmetries are related to the existent, although challengeable, 
constraints imposed by certain historical trajectories, requiring reconfiguring 
the previously diverse and heterogenous conditions of existence of trade and 
productive exchanges. 
Furthermore, the periodical relative reduction or purchasing power “loss” 
of income by the Periphery given its trade and commercial links, contributes 
negatively to its “external” balance sheet, and capital account, requiring 
borrowing from the “Center” at a certain interest rate, with a currency unit 
(generally the dollar) as an “asset” whose value as Keynesians say, “own 
rate of interest,” oscillates, not only regarding the Periphery’s monetary 
unit, but also other international standard currencies (euro, yuan). As we 
know from Pilkington’s presentation, local and international interest rates 
are the product of power asymmetries themselves. Different trade zones 
and economic formations (Center - Periphery - agents) aspire to “control,” 
through their portfolio, the payment’s management, which is articulated and 
pegged to the value of the dominant and most used currency in the zone in 
question. Corporations, commercial enterprises, and countries must fine-
tune their payments to the changing nature of what Keynes described as the 
“rules of the roost” antagonism (Keynes 1936: 223) or the asset/commercial 
entity whose value level “disciplines” a ranking order by which debts and 
investments are calculated (Minsky 1986). Recently, it has been argued that 
there exists an asymmetric “hierarchy” of international monetary anchor-
units (dollar first, euro often second, and Japan’s currency third in its region),32 
a ranking order, once again, a power asymmetry relation between and within 
Center and Periphery dominating the scale and shares worldwide used of the 
international currency which clears the great part of the “transactions.”
Unlike the post-World War II international agreements of Bretton Woods, 
which pegged on “dollar-gold” the currencies in question, the current open 
and antagonistic struggle to occupy the “rule of the roost” position, or 
convert to a certain anchor currency preference as the unit for trade, and 
therefore debts, it’s “normal” to encounter contingent and transient periods 
whereby countries balance accounts change dramatically, as the unfortunate 
image goes, several agents transform their assets and “fly to safety” from the 
Periphery headed towards the Center, anchoring its portfolio value set into 
32 Rogerio P. Andrade and Daniela Magalhães Prates (2013); Bruno De Conti, Daniela Maga-
lhães Prates (2018); Luiz Fernando de Paula, Barbara Fritz and Daniela M. Prates (2017); Da-
niela Magalhães Prates (2017); Daniela Magalhães Prates and Luiz Fernando De Paula (2016); 
Meireles (2016)
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those international monetary currencies considered of the highest relative 
“value.”33 Once again, displacing the “aviary” metaphor, it’s the “monopoly” 
of the possibility to create and use the dollar, by the U.S.A, lowering 
transactions costs both internally and externally, which forms the basis for its 
dominant international role as an account unit: fewer negative dangers and 
risks of the so-called “flight to safety” conundrum, despite all vulnerabilities 
and impending crisis intimated since remote times, by the economists of the 
Bretton Woods era (Triffin 1960, Kregel 2018, Minsky 1986). 
Since the 1980s debt “crisis” that the Periphery sustained, the 
IMF has become (which was not its original role)34 the “financial and 
monetary agent” of the private banks in the Center to negotiate debts 
and new loans vis-à-vis the Periphery, which unshackled those entities 
(corporations) individually from assuming the responsibilities and risks 
of bad lending and low insurance predispositions when dealing with 
the Periphery. On the other hand, the Periphery’s representation in the 
administrative echelons of the IMF, given its very low voting rights, has 
limited areas where it can induce certain discussions to push for a reform 
of the institution or a worldwide financial reform, despite very important 
economic transformations within the appearance of several countries like 
China and Brazil, for example.
“Do You Want the Social?”
It is in a note at the end of Chapter 10 that we find Pilkington 
contemplating the reasons of the persistence of why “people” or economists 
hold “marginalism” as a worthy academic enterprise, despite information 
to the contrary. He makes references to some sort of explanation, relating 
to a certain “fatal attraction” among men, their belief, with “certain types 
of theory” (Pilkington 2016: 319), and points to the fallacy of struggling to 
convince people otherwise:
it becomes obvious that you really cannot convince people who adhere 
to these theories that they might be wrong. So, the goal becomes rather 
to allow a space within economics for those that think they might be 
and see who, in the aggregate, produces more functionally useful work. 
(Pilkington 2016: 319)
But this is the nitty-gritty of the matter of the dispute as to “who 
decides?” and which are the mechanisms available for that undertaking?, 
the construction of such a contested space is what is at issue, it is a political 
issue on which Pilkington is ambivalent, and which simultaneously 
acknowledges its existence by demonstrating the hegemonic struggle which 
“deconstruction” implies: a decision of some form, of some type of “coercion,” 
exclusion/inclusion or rule with which to uphold the space in question. It is 
commendable Pilkington’s use of the “justice model” example as a contesting 
33 See also Regantiquili (2016).
34 Furtado (1989, 1981), Ugarteche (2014), Danby (2017), Helleiner (2014).
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ruling behavior resolution procedure precisely because it reiterates the 
importance of undertaking a “judicious democratic decision.”
Hence, the gross profit equation and its sources are how Pilkington 
displays the question, which be an undecided ethical-political problematic, 
since according to Pilkington we are not sure whether the issue is “political” 
or “partisan” (Pilkington 2016: 219). Having posed “profits as a moral 
dilemma” (Pilkington 2016: 211), the narrative transforms both Marx and 
the marginalists into a “subjective” “war of interpretations” story, steering 
clear from aiming for an “objective” description of their respective notions 
of profits or their existence. Pilkington does mention the unsustainable and 
contradictory version of the marginalists’ story of the non-existence or, un-
normal “presence” of profits in the literature, and/or the cuasi orthodontist 
Marxist “extraction” metaphor of surplus labor power by the capitalist. And 
yet “hidden,” in a profound note number 13 at the end of Chapter 8, we are 
offered a brief theoretical description that questions the notion that income 
“is distributed in line with the marginal productivities of capital and labor” 
(Pilkington 2016: 218). The mention of the Cambridge Capital Controversies 
underlines precisely the narrative that should have been introduced into the 
text given its importance: 
They were trying to demolish any deterministic distribution theory 
and put forward the idea that the distribution of wealth in any given 
society is a moral, political, and historical issue. This opens up the 
space for us to have a real discussion as to whether any given income 
distribution is fair or not, and it prevents the zealots from telling us that 
left to itself the system will largely determine this distribution in some 
sort of efficient manner which, if we tamper with it, will result in chaos 
and disorder. For a decidedly politically partisan view of the question, 
although one that does succeed in getting to the heart of the issue in a 
way that economists are generally unable to do” (Pilkington 2016: 218)
Therefore: 
the competitive market economy no longer contains any necessary 
mechanisms pushing the various wage rates or the profit rate to any 
determinate level. Rather, history and custom, as well as politics, laws 
and struggle, will determine who gets what. It’s a system of grab what 
you can. (Ackerman in Pilkington 2016: 219) 
If “wage income and profit income are merely two types of income” 
(Pilkington 2016: 107), there is no necessary inverse relation between 
those incomes, which was precisely the reason for introducing the name 
of Kalecki in the story. Marx’s account of the process may well be branded 
as “metaphysical” (Prebisch 1949a in 1993: 417), given its value/price 
dichotomy, but which should not be the excuse to dodge the mother of all 
issues: the asymmetries of power among and between agents (labor-capital; 
capitals vis-à-vis capitals), which evolve through the mechanisms by which 
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certain conditions of the productive and circulatory process are held: the 
possession in separation thereof. That possession in separation of certain 
conditions of the productive among and between diverse heterogenous agents 
becomes the foundation of what is called the “market,” the links of the units 
or production among themselves and to labor power, are the consequence of 
a series of contingent rules and historical practices which, in turn, can explain 
the absence of a “representative rational agent.” The antagonism between 
and among agents in their struggle to determine their “prices” generates, 
instead of a general “rational” mechanism, a multiple heterogeneous universe 
of agents with no guaranteed representative agent kingpin, required by 
“marginalism” and its “system” of equilibrium. On the other hand, the same 
antagonism, within the multiple and heterogeneous agents, breeds a variety 
of alternatives (a heterogeneous milieu) in which agents have to organize the 
production process, under no necessary logic or relation to the evolution of 
the “organic composition of capital” on which Marx’s narrative depends. Not 
the consequence of “competition” nor its opposite “monopoly,” but rather 
the outcome divergent profit margins and prices, each an outcome of the 
contingent configuration of asymmetric power relations among and between 
agents, “degree of monopoly” in Kalecki’s term.
In occasions, Pilkington’s narrative is not scrupulous enough to distinguish 
the degree to which the “distribution of income” implies a political partisan 
examination which supersedes “moral aspects,” although he does assert that 
the “relationship between wages and the mark-up will determine to what extent 
income is distributed between wages and profits” (Pilkington 2016: 211).
But the use of the notion of the “mark-up” amplifies the conundrum, the 
implied antagonism, which is the mechanism we are trying to underline, but 
lies hidden with the reiteration that it is just a “conventional” contingency:
Conventions are not immutable. They are subject to moral or ethical 
evaluation and the political change that may result from such an 
evaluation. When discussing profits (…) we can never lose sight of the 
moral dimension. Marx and the marginalists sought to hide this moral 
dimension behind a veil of what can only be described as metaphysics, 
in the most pejorative form in which that word can be used. The 
marginalist sought to justify the existence of profits as a sort of 
transitory phenomenon stimulating entrepreneurship that had nothing 
to do with power or underlying social relations. Marx, on the contrary, 
completely ignored that profits might stimulate entrepreneurial activity 
and instead insisted wholly on power relations. His implicit working 
premise was that only labor adds value to goods produced and those 
who come up with the idea and take the risk in putting it into action 
by investing and hiring workers are vile leeches. (Pilkington 2016: 212)
For Pilkington, both narratives are fictions to justify their divergent 
perspectives since each of them has an “element of truth” (Pilkington 2016: 
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212). Therefore, if entrepreneurship is encouraged by profits, they are also 
the consequence of power asymmetries organized by the social relations 
in question. Simultaneously, both aspects of the account are considered 
as pertinent, endorsing their own particular “a priori political position” 
(Pilkington 2016: 212). On the one hand, marginalists insist on the fairness 
and efficiency of the free market organization, while Marxists highlight 
the importance of abolishing profit so that a free society can arise. While 
Pilkington rejects the idea of generating a new “gospel”. His own task is 
to propound these postures as merely subjective “moral judgements” and 
should not be surrendered since it reflects “our ability to be individuals and 
ultimately our freedom as individuals” (Pilkington 2016: 212). Hence, those 
who are trying to impose their brand of subjective truth in economics as the 
“robe objective science” (Pilkington 2016: 213), are merely zealots unlike 
“moral philosophers” that help us explore certain moral dilemmas.
Economists can sustain arguments about profits because they can 
establish where these “profits come from” and how “they work through 
the system. But there is really nothing that we can say with regard to the 
justness or unjustness of profits that a non-economist can have just as valid 
an opinion on” (Pilkington 2016: 213). Economists have no “more objective 
validity than a similar statement made by, for example, a trade unionist or an 
anarcho-capitalist” (ibid.). Although in principle Pilkington’s posture seems 
impregnable, it can be argued that specific and “relative profit shares” of a 
certain set of class agents, can be “reduced,” which entails an “ethical or moral 
political judgment” and yet “objective” in the sense that it is simply a question 
of adding and/or subtracting taxes, or differentiating levels of subsidies for 
the productive sectors/agents involved.
The standpoint, although defensible, reluctantly finds itself undoing its 
own evaluation: “economics” is a “non-conservative” discipline, implying 
that the “system can be changed”:
It is based on conventions, opinions and evaluations of what is good and 
bad in a given society at a given moment in time. It is not immutable 
or ‘natural’ and, above all, catastrophe will not occur if it is tampered 
with (…) It gives us the tools we need to make changes to the system to 
produce desired outcomes. It does not tell us that we should definitely 
make particular changes (…) mankind should have no more need for 
those silly pseudo-objective stories sought to buttress certain political 
tendencies while shutting down the debates surrounding them. Anyone 
who requires such stories to justify their political proclivities is likely 
not someone who has much to contribute to real, practical and moral 
political debate. (Pilkington 2016: 213-214) 
However, certain specific policies, for example, distributional struggles 
require the use of clear and concise arguments, even if not explicit, these 
contain “subjective” or ethical-moral judgements: relative shares of profits 
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and/or salary levels, between and among agents and potential consequences 
cannot be washed away through a purely “objective” formula. The clear 
cut or un-stained distinction between the ethical and evaluative space 
and the objective formula are problematical for the same reasons that 
Pilkington underlines in much of his book: “social relations” are organized 
by conventional standards imposed by power asymmetries, the struggle for 
their transformations require politics and thus ethical-moral viewpoints, 
and hence, in the last instance, it implies “upsetting” to say the least, 
certain “liberties” or “individual freedoms.” In other words, reconstructing 
politically the “individual-collective” divide. It is true that no discourse or 
discipline can offer a general objective conception of the “truth” which 
should be followed by all or else pay the consequences here or in heaven, 
but “deconstruction,” and thus the disappearance of ultimate foundations, 
offered in Pilkington’s book, implies or compels him to make a decision on 
matters which he sometimes rebels. On occasions, the sanctity of the idea 
of “individual freedom” on which he sustains certain arguments cannot be 
safeguarded without the liability of reverting to marginalism and its notions 
of the attributes of the agents in question.
On the other hand, the problem with the metaphor or analogy for an 
“objective” formula, and “switching” concepts of the hard sciences as a 
support to construct the conceptual realm (social) of the social sciences, 
finds an uncanny disruptive irony as we travel along Pilkington’s book, 
since among one of the main arguments stressed to sustain the flawed 
character of marginalism, Pilkington points that the “material we deal with, 
economics” (Pilkington 2016: 283), is unlike modern sciences, and therefore 
“replicability,” “causality” and calculability of experiments are a nonstarter.
Pilkington appropriately underlines that the “material” with which it deals, 
the phenomena, molecules, etc., cannot be generalized in the social realm. 
In other words, even if we concede and accept the hegemonic consensus 
that in the “hard sciences” the notion of “emergent properties” is pertinent, 
its incorporation as an explanation into the social realm begs thousands of 
questions, not only pertaining to the anthropomorphism which it engenders, 
but also notions of causality and determinism both implicit or explicit in 
the “hard sciences.” But what must be underlined is the effort and decision 
to engage theoretically in this problem among others, which has become a 
kind of folklore by the publication of recent texts (King 2012, Hoover 2012, 
Backhouse and Boianovsky 2013, Chavance 2008, Hodgson 2004, Wade 
Hands 2012).
Although I am aware that the process described by Pilkington by which 
an individual football fan’s behavior creates a specific “collective” response, 
is assuming the analogous outcome posed by Keynes’s example of the 
negative effects when a “community” behaves in terms of the individual 
action by clearing his debts, the argument of the inadequacy of the metaphor 
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“emergent properties” becomes theoretically unmanageable given the 
heterogenous characteristics of the agents, on the one hand, and Pilkington’s 
own appreciation that the “realm” of “social sciences” cannot be examined by 
the logic of the “hard sciences.”
My genuine concern is not really this aspect of the debate, but rather 
that agents (individuals, humans, non-humans) have to be observed as 
“heterogeneous” entities, within an antagonistic power-institutional realm, 
which, again, cannot be posed as a consequence and product of a necessary 
“individual” decision-choice, as the “methodological individual” posture 
portrays it. In contrast, a contingent instituted power process, whose “origin” 
does not need to be known in advance, does not require the banishing of 
“individuals’” decision-choices, and/or insisting that the “social comes first.”
The undetermined and contingent nature of the “social” realm (individual, 
agents, institutions)35 is the theoretical aspect which is in dispute, and which 
in certain sections of the book becomes central. On the other hand, the 
empowering relations which individual or agents can generate, producing the 
“order” and “rules,” whose origin in some quarters is argued as “spontaneous” 
(for example, the “Austrian” approach. See Hodgson 1994, 2007) as an 
“emergent property,” tends to challenge the most important aspect of the 
argument: the antagonistic and contingent character of the social relations 
which would in turn demolish the assumed association and ties between the 
“elements” and “properties,” on which the concept of “emergent properties” 
is built and on which “hard sciences” thrive.
As a concluding note, Pilkington’s book should be an opportune 
publication, both brave and daring given the academic and political context. 
I tried to develop only specific theoretical aspects regarding the historical 
nature of agents, and the “economies,” as well as the power asymmetries, a 
discourse which unwittingly was developed by Latin American Structuralism 
during the 1950s. Explicitly, I have radicalized certain themes which I 
believe follow from Pilkington’s own argument and problematize certain 
apparently ambiguous theoretical and ethical standpoints; a new text would 
be needed to discuss his idea of the “subject” in Sartre, or his appreciation, 
of the discourse-reality distinction in his “schematism” model. Hopefully, his 
Shackle-Keynesian renovation, to think the investment process, was not lost 
by the “peripheral” reading and the critique carried out in this chapter. 
From my personal prejudices, the decisive par excellence theme of the 
book was the examination of the “economic” realm and its agents, as a set 
of asymmetric power relations. That cleared the ground to underline the 
ethical-political obligation to undertake a critique of the actual situation of 
the discipline, which in turn, given the contingent characteristic as to the 
manner income is generated and distributed, economics cannot become the 
35 See De Vroey’s notion of “trade technology” to think the problem of the organization of the 
“market,” which is not solely related to “labor”. De Vroey (2004a, 2004b)
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theoretical fountain to “justify” the latter. Given that the origin of profits is, to 
say the least, distinct from the fable portrayed by “mainstream economics,” 
and as Prebisch contends “its quantity and its variations are determined by 
the increment of money and production” then “it is impossible to know to 
what extent profit is justified or not, because we lack elements of judgement” 
(Prebisch 1948b in 1993: 359), from the economic point of view. 
But if we accept the existence of a monetary “compulsory mechanism” 
(Marxists perhaps use “exploitation mechanism”) through which 
businessmen, after some interlude or cycle retrieve a supplement over their 
original inputs, it becomes a political issue as to what extent this enhanced 
amount of purchasing power is “justified.” “Economics” cannot decide this 
aspect if it is accepted that the notion of “efficiency” can only make sense 
in terms of “profit.” If during the upswing businessmen seem to “reap 
where they did not sow” (independently whether they incorporated new 
technology or not), the brunt of the decline of prices during the downswing 
is on their shoulders. The ethical-political dilemma implicit in the schematic 
representation of the antagonistic contested space is clearer if we, for example, 
incorporate the idea that the agents in question are not “human individuals” 
but rather, cooperatives or certain other collective forms, which possess 
in separation certain of their reciprocal conditions of their existence, then 
equally the issue of distribution and price bounds and the residual or “profit” 
does not evaporate. Hence, we cannot evade the individual-collective divide 
(Mirowski 2019), we cannot negate the “other”: a decision is to call forth a 
political engagement to discuss our forms of economic organization.
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Chapter 6
All that is Solid does not necessarily Melt into Air
Introduction
Scholars looking for a new vision to rethink economics and its evolutionary story may find no better service than Colin Danby’s 
text The Known Economy: Romantics, Rationalists, and the Making of a 
World Scale.1 It personifies perhaps one of those rare, unique unprovincial 
theoretical moments, which disrupts “Western-centrism”2 social science by 
acknowledging and describing the appearance of “alternative” discourses 
beyond its traditional language and geography. The angle from which I 
will undertake the assessment of Danby’s critique of economics reports a 
theoretical lineage back to Latin America in the 1940s, which is generally 
designated in English or French academia as “Latin American Structuralism.” 
The quotations are important given the internal theoretical variations.
My critique of Danby’s account on the discourse of “modernization” 
while acknowledging his dazzling seductive and un-submissive tone when 
demonstrating the unsustainable conceptual conditions of its existence and 
the images generated thereof by the discursive formation in question (which 
is beyond reproach) wants to convey that the author’s strategy of exposition 
may actually hinder, unwittingly, alternative modes of presentation, and 
thereby constrain radicalizing political strategies to transform the “cruelly 
unequal” (Danby 2017: 162) world we live in. However, although I imagine 
sharing significant aspects of the author’s critique of the “European self-
imagination” (Danby 2017: 98), my analysis aims to supersede certain of 
Danby’s positions in various aspects of his story.
The critique of economics that emerged in Latin America in the second 
half of 1940s relates to a period that runs correlatively to Danby’s own object 
of analysis in certain sections of his text. The discourse in question challenged 
Western-centric discourses as inadequate and impertinent to comprehend 
the “Periphery” as an economic formation (on the term see ahead), and 
therefore requiring the displacement and reconstruction of the Western-
centric economics vocabulary, a process which ultimately culminated in 
questioning its validity within those very “spaces” (the “Center”)3 from which 
the discourse surfaced. In other words, Latin American Structuralism was 
simultaneously rebuffing the indefensible vehement ethnocentricity of the 
1 Danby, C. (2017) The Known Economy: Romantics, Rationalists, and the Making of a World 
Scale. Routledge.
2 Anglo-Saxon and/or Eurocentric discourses.
3 For an “outline,” see first three chapters.
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Western-centric economic discourse in question,4 and also its problematical 
theoretical characteristics for examining the “developed” economic 
formations (the Center).
Therefore, Danby’s “post-colonial” economics experience is an important 
substratum of his narrative and criticism, but what is certainly singularly 
distinct is the author’s description of a unique chapter in the history of 
“economics” highlighting the rationalist/romanticist divide, a “combination 
of repulsion and attraction,” a “bad- tempered collaboration” (Danby 2017: 
9)5 through which the discourse of modernization gets its life and force. 
Limitations of space will not permit the detailed descriptions whereby the 
rationalist/romanticist dichotomy allows a stylistic mode of analysis of a 
great range of authors and periods. The “productive nature of the rationalist/
romantic split” (Danby 2017: 94) can be stabilized by thinking the dichotomy 
through Max Weber’s category of the “ideal type” with which to understand 
the counterposed camps and on the other, the modernization discourse as a 
sort of an “iron cage” (Weber), which should certainly be questioned as an 
unescapably encompassing force. I share Danby’s profound disbelief of the 
“fantastic” qualities of Western-centrism’s “European self-imagination,” a 
fairytale more akin to the likes of Borges or Lewis Carrol.
What follows this “Introduction” is a section (“Where Does Modernism 
Come From?”), describing the rise of those conceptual entities constructed 
by the “rationalist/romanticist” dichotomy of “modernism” in economics 
and the source of the “household/business” split which explains the income-
productive carrousel: the theoretical accounting definitions as the mother 
of all debates during the 1940s. This is continued by “The diffusion of the 
‘European self-imagination’: Western-centric Discourse and the Rise of 
Development Economics,” which expounds the economics taught in the 
Western world and the initial efforts to transfer it to the Periphery of the world 
economy having previously underlined Danby’s own sui generis presentation 
of the vision “auto-imagination” in question the IS-LM model. The partition 
(“‘The White Man’s Burden’ Curse”), examines in detail the theoretical 
and practical consequences and difficulties encountered by succession of 
economists trained within the “statistical” and “Keynesian” revolution, but 
whose categories became an obstacle to understand the African plains under 
its gaze, a horizon dominated by peculiar social relations. The last section 
4 See also Connell (2007) and Lander (2000). Collaterally, the critique includes considering 
how certain theorists from the so-called “developed” economies faced having to deal with the 
specter of the “‘The white-man’s burden’curse,” aspects of which haunted Seers’s work (see 
further ahead), despite having traversed theoretical routes coinciding with the Latin American 
structuralists in the 1940s and 1950s. 
5 “Modernity is not just the doctrine that human societies tend to move from a solidaristic, lo-
cally rooted tradition to an individualistic, functionally divided modern society. It’s also a styl-
ized ritual combat between two variants of this story, the rationalist and the romantic. Ideas 
about economy have played key roles in the shared doctrine, and in the ritual combat between 
its two variants” (Danby 2017: 7).
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(“Mobile Army of Metaphors: Post-Keynesianism and Latin American 
Structuralism”), is an effort to engage with and transform-radicalize Danby’s 
own account of “Post-Keynesian” economics by means of Latin American 
Structuralism’s insistence on converting the study of “power asymmetries” as 
the object of economics.
Notwithstanding the above, Danby insisted that the “modernist ideology” 
“is a poor way of sorting out the complex social world” (Danby 2017: 162), 
and, in fact, “hides” “much of the world from view” (Danby 2017: 162) (with 
which I have no “beef ”). However, Latin American Structuralism, focuses on 
the existent power asymmetries as its economic object of economics. In other 
words, in contrast to Danby it does imply proposing a “political alternative” 
(Danby 2017: 162) which Danby seems to explicitly eschew, which to some 
perhaps is not unescapably negative.
As I hope to show further ahead, to transmute what apparently implies a 
counterposed theoretical difference, a general notion of power asymmetries 
of social relations is necessary, compelling a decision on alternative political 
strategies, in other words ethical foundations are important.6
From a Foucauldian perspective, there seems to be no univocal rule by 
which categories in certain discursive formations evolved or reconstructed, 
not univocally “episteme”7 constraining the enunciative modality strategy, 
in other words, the enunciative modalities and the agents/subjects in 
question, are in a sense “polymorphous.” Danby recognizes the proliferation 
of discourses in the modernist conundrum narrative, through the presence 
of an “obligatory,” “power-knowledge complex” (Danby 2017: 8). Hence, 
discourses do not possess any necessary unity and/or consistency, a thesis 
inclusive even when “mainstream” economics is cited. However, the 
dichotomous and strategically “ideal types” counterparts (“rationalists” 
and “neo-romantics”) as distinct fields of research in academia storytelling 
jettison any sort of potential theoretical bridge or trans-disciplinarity, where 
economics and psychology dominate the former camp and “interpretative 
social sciences,” the latter. Both mainstream and “heterodox” (Danby 
2017: 10) economics suffer from a cultural specificity blind spot syndrome. 
Therefore, an inescapable ethical obligation seems in order: an engagement 
and theoretical “disagreement” with “modernist” discourse in a quest for a 
“non-modernist” and “trans-disciplinary Economics.”
We intend to question specific conceptual assumptions implicit or 
explicitly in the “modernization” narrative by radicalizing Danby’s critique 
put forward in Marx’s classic phrase in the Communist Manifesto of 1848: 
6 “Ethical doctrines are vulnerable to ethical critiques. Might it be wiser to avoid the danger of 
ethical critique by disclaiming any ethical foundation” (Danby 2017: 26).
7 Hence, in my interpretation, the Archeology of Knowledge (Foucault 1972) seems the more 
profound of Foucault’s books, to comprehend specific discursive formations, notwithstanding 
the encyclopedic nature of the The Order of Things... (1970).
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“All that is solid melts into air”,8 which is simply the zenith of a hegemonic 
theoretical trend or style of the period (Berman 1988, Said 1978).
Through the “rationalist/romanticist” protracted counterparts or war of 
interpretations since the 19th century, Danby explains the proliferation of the 
“modernization” discourse.
Here the idea is to assess the possibility of alternative discourses whose 
logic of evolution may disrupt the dichotomy between rationalist/romanticist 
divide making the “modernization” narrative superfluous.
Danby retraces and appraises, within the field of “economics,” the fantastic! 
(my term) modernization narrative, simultaneously termed “the modernist 
template” (Danby 2017: 162), “European self-imagination” (Danby 2017: 
98), and “modernist ideology” (Danby 2017: 63).9 The account can be said 
to have done one better on today’s classic text: Marshall Berman’s All That 
Is Solid Melts Into Air (1988), which by no means is a small feat. Amongst 
other objectives of the textbook, one of Danby’s central strategies examines 
how Post-World War II mainstream “economics” constructed its “object 
of knowledge” (Danby 2017: 29), by instantaneously running theoretical 
rings around the dominant vocabulary by showing its elusive and unstable 
conceptual basis:
What Marshall, Kuznets, Rao, and Gilbert share is the story that the 
‘economy’ as an object of knowledge emerges via a modernist split of 
home from business, a split which in turn lets us divide the world into 
fully modern (where the split has happened) and non-modern (where 
it has not happened) (…) It’s a folk theory about mentalities. It’s an 
8 According to Berman: “The innate dynamism of the modern economy, and of the culture 
that grows from this economy, annihilates everything that it creates -physical environments, 
social institutions, metaphysical ideas, artistic visions, moral values – in order to create 
more, to go endlessly creating the world anew. This drive draws all modern men and women 
into its orbit, and forces us all modern men and women into its orbit, and forces us all to 
grapple with the question of what is essential, what is meaningful, what is real in the mael-
strom in which we move and live” (Berman 1982: 288).
9 There is no space here to delve on the category of “ideology” but for what follows, I assume 
discourses as the means by which certain specific set of practices are materialized; another 
occasion is necessary to scrutinize the theoretical assumptions whereby we might be able to 
differentiate “ideological” from non-ideological discourses, without excluding the possibili-
ty of questioning the very worthwhileness of the distinction. Danby’s note number 15 in the 
“Introduction” exhibit these worries: “I use terms like ‘full modernity’ or ‘tradition’ to refer 
to images in an ideology, not to the actual state of the world. It remains a discursive hurdle 
that ‘modernity’ is often used by adherents to mean both the specific assumptions described 
above and the entire thinkable social/historical horizon, a ‘how we are’ with no conceivable 
outside. I follow Latour (1993) and Fabian (1983) in denying the reality of ‘modernity’ as a 
historical stage and finding it counterproductive both as a category of social science and as an 
ethical guide” (Danby 2017: 12). My disagreement with Danby refers to the statement that we 
are dealing with an “ideological project” (Danby 2017: 98), since it requires presupposing the 
existence of a general discursive mechanism whereby to discriminate among discourses those 
“free” from the iron cage. Rather, discourses should be evaluated as forming part of the war of 
interpretations.
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assertion that there has occurred a profound shift in how some people 
think and act, and how they understand themselves, their surroundings 
(…) It’s the people who have made this shift who are the subjects of 
economic science. (Danby 2017: 29)
Equally, it is an account that unravels the theoretical conditions of 
existence of the “love” and “money” divide, the “domesticity” and “work” 
couple or the “household/business” split implicitly, if not explicitly, linked to 
the so-called “statistical revolution.”10
Contrary to what may be believed, L. Robbins’s move towards 
expelling the “ethical” (Danby 2017: 28) from economics, the theoretical 
sentimentalizing of households essentially abounds in the literature. Danby’s 
discussion about the concept of what constitutes “domesticity” unravels its 
hegemony and proliferation as an “ideological category” (Danby 2017: 28). 
The problematization of its theoretical consistency, “the folk theory” (Danby 
2017: 29) described by Collier and Yanagisako, is actually the flip side of the 
“modernity” narrative critiqued by Danby:
I question the emergence of economy and find that it has a required 
opposite in households. The two halves are distinguished not by the 
kind of work done, but by what is imagined to be in the minds of people 
doing work. The ‘folk theory’ that Collier and Yanagisako describe 
corresponds fairly closely to what I am calling (…) modernist ideology. 
(Danby 2017: 29)
Where Does Modernism Come From?
Danby’s distaste of the “modernist” narrative is unhesitant:
My beef with modernity is that it reduces this shaggy social world to 
individuals and nations. Modernists are fascinated with the individual’s 
psychology, mentality, rationality. And culture. When they recognize 
larger institutions like firms and households, modernists prefer to 
theorize them as though they were individuals. Modernists rely on the 
nation to explain how individuals came to be the way they are. The nation 
embodies the individual’s ‘culture’. It guarantees and provides the rights 
that the individual needs to act freely. Its government is called on to 
provide whatever individuals cannot manage. (…) that humanity exists 
in discrete societies, (…) by a simple typology: ‘traditional’ societies 
are face-to-face, solidaristic, and have little functional differentiation; 
fully ‘modern’ societies are impersonal, bureaucratic, exhibit a sharp 
functional differentiation, and contain only little islands of face-to-face, 
personal ties in the form of the nuclear families. (…) all societies start as 
‘traditional’ and then move at different speeds towards full modernity, 
driven either by internal dynamics or competition with other societies. 
They assume that more ‘modern’ people or societies enjoy some 
10 Morgan and Bach (2018), Moshe (2018).
187
advantage over their ‘traditional’ counterparts, an advantage that more 
or less explains history. The theory of space and time functions for 
adherents as a social ontology, which is to say something you assume 
before you begin to study society. (Danby 2017: 8) 
Hence, ‘modernity’ encompasses “two sub-discourses” (Danby 2017: 9), 
namely the rationalist and the romantic ones, and their differentiation, “boils 
down to whether the modernist narrative is told as triumph or tragedy”:
Rationalists are unimpressed with traditional knowledge and are 
anxious to escape obligations to kin and clan. In their view, full 
modernity frees us to pursue our disparate ambitions. Modernization 
theory is a good example. By contrast, romantics are deeply impressed 
with the psychological integration and deep understanding they 
attribute to ‘tradition’. In the romantic view, traditional society was 
solidaristic and attuned to nature. Goods and services bore meanings 
that expressed the culture everyone shared. (…) intermediate family 
and church (…) [are] (…) mainly mechanisms by which individuals are 
taught the single shared culture. (Danby 2017: 9) 
The second difference within the “two sub-discourses” relates to whether 
you mourn the dying of traditional society or not, reconstructing the demise 
of cultural “homogeneity” and its “alienating” effects.
As we can see further ahead, the economy/household distinction is 
theoretically articulated to the romantic/rationalist dichotomy, although 
Danby’s questions equally relate to the process by which certain hegemonic 
discourses were constructed, culminating in a “powerful global apparatus” 
(Danby 2017: 15). Its dominant status required examining how “nations” were 
to be defined in accounting terms, through which theoretical experiments 
could then be enacted, for example in “Palestine and British colonies in 
Africa where the ‘nation’ of national income accounting did not yet exist” 
(Danby 2017: 15).
Genealogically the idea of romanticism is traced to back to Herder in 
Danby’s narrative. The romanticist discourse explanation seemingly appears to 
be opposing the role and function of GDP data construction as the fountain 
head to represent the well-being or lack thereof by citizens. Given that national 
accounts do not represent certain types of “well-being” and were not elaborated 
to represent them, this aspect is exemplified by the exclusion of the female 
“unpaid” labor role in the household. The household/economy distinction was 
constructed by establishing distinct roles for the gender born “body.” 
For Danby the rationalist/romanticist modernist divide plays a decisive 
role in the intellectual history of the last two and a half centuries, although 
I must retort, within the “Western-centric” intellectual gaze. The rationalists/
romantics disputes, or “war of interpretations,” on notions of markets, trade, 
consumption, and commodification made “plausible,” simultaneously, the 
“economic ideas” in “the modernist theory of history” (Danby 2017: 9).
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The consequence of the “experience of modernity” that Danby described:
confined to a quintessentially modernist debate, holding the national 
unit sacred, [was] committed to the idea that the world is divided into 
discrete social units that are closer to or farther from full modernity, and 
confirming itself to a stereotyped back-and-forth between (rationalist) 
modernizationists and (romantic) traditionalists. The back-and-forth 
works for everyone: rationalists economists get to create new measures; 
romantic traditionalists get to keep their permanent grievance against 
economists; politicians get to empathize with suffering citizens. These 
performances license both earnestness and cynicism about statistical 
representation. (Danby 2017: 7)
The rationalist/romanticist divide established the symbolical or theoretical 
conditions of existence for a series of practices in the contested realm of 
measuring and comparing the promotion of certain policies. The romantic 
thinkers would praise those critiques that relativize the importance of the 
category of “price” as a medium to evaluate “quality of life” within those 
partaking similar geography, language or “nation.” The realm of commercial 
transactions of all species cannot be the basis of a consistent privileged unit 
of “value” to gauge “objects” or the cultural hierarchy; however, romantics 
deny and conflate (consciously), distinct notions of “value” when using the 
category, which results in non-ending debates as to which values “should” be 
primal, as well as the incumbent “costs” of reaching them.
The “national unit” is the sacred entity: a world divided by a diverse set 
of these groupings exhibit their distance from or “vicinity” to the modernist 
conundrum in two “spaces”: on the one hand, an internal configuration 
within and between their own “subjects,” and on the other, that which relates 
to other (dis)similar totalities. 
The author insists that the produce, distribution, and services reflect 
activities in “varied institutional contexts” (Danby 2017: 8), which can include 
households, “kingship networks,” small firms, large firms, governments. In 
turn, these imply “markets” with distinct characteristics, such as competitive, 
oligopolistic, monopolist, regulated, unregulated, “financial systems” and 
“legal systems” (Danby 2017: 8), which hinder or empower “different kinds 
of production,” distribution, and consumption. 
“Different kinds of institutions interpenetrate. (…) Institutions that 
undergird economic activity typically exclude some people in order to include 
others” (Danby 2017: 8) Hence, the “material world” is “messier and more 
variegated” (Danby 2017: 8), a phenomenon that Latin American Structuralism 
reconstructed with a more general category called “heterogeneity.”
According to Danby the “national economy” and the “world economy” 
distinction implies an economic/non-economic differentiation as well as the 
bonding of economic parts into a representable national ensemble, which in 
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turn refers to a superior totality: a “world economy” in which the national 
compartments are to be found. Equally, the distinction between economy 
and household is theoretically articulated to the dichotomy between romantic 
and rationalist. The analysis of the hegemonic discourses that culminated in 
a “powerful global apparatus” (Danby 2017: 15), entailed examining how 
“nations” were to be defined in accounting terms. 
Chronologically, the inception of the narrative regarding the divide 
between household and business advances the seemingly deceptive traditional 
figure of A. Smith in political economy. I said “deceptive” because Danby’s 
reading contradicts most of the deliberations espoused by “neoliberalism” as 
its intellectual hero.11
In contrast to Smith, J. S. Mill “fences” off a specific area for “business,” 
deconstructing Smith’s “holistic” idea of a unified field of action for the agents in 
question. Political economy is reconstructed on a “narrower” and “easy” ground:
a sentimental division between a loving and self-sacrificing household 
sphere, and a competitive and rational business sphere. For 20th 
Century modernists, this division became not just a background 
assumption, but an imperative: once you accepted household/business 
as an essential divide, as a condition of civilization, then you had to take 
care lest either compartment contaminate the other. (…) Exclusion of 
housework from contemporary measures of national output is often 
regarded as a scandal. (Danby 2017: 17, my emphasis)
Danby argues that the “exclusion of love is the constitutive taboo upon 
which a visible ‘economy’ has been brought into being” (Danby 2017: 17). 
The taboo in its Levy-Strauss’s or Freudian genealogy, necessarily implies 
a ratification of a universal principle reinforced or materialized by means of 
distinct and particular cultural-historical configuration.
Although for A. Smith it was senseless to assume an autonomous, separate, 
“market psychology” to understand agents’ behavior, Mill’s critique in the 
context of the recent emergence of “modern political economy” (Danby 2017: 
18), is met in turn with an audacious repellent diatribe by the “romantic” 
prose, and although too “disparate” to be “easily summarized” (Danby 2017: 
18), rejects notions of “self-interest,” which is perceived as cultures’ foe or the 
collective will of the nation.
Mill’s countered with the traditional move: first, he mocked Coleridge 
and company’s incomprehension of Political Economy’s object, giving way 
to theorize the object despite its aberrant quality: “With respect to those 
parts of human conduct of which wealth is not even the principal object, to 
these Political Economy does not pretend that its conclusions are applicable” 
(Danby 2017: 19).
Mill inaugurated the modernist discourse: “a society divided into separate 
compartments with distinct rationalities and distinct sciences” (Danby 2017: 
11 See also Tribe (2008). 
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20). Danby then assisted the story with the participation of Marshall as his 
most important “successor” (Danby 2017: 20). Marshall historicized the rise 
of the differentiation of the economy from distinct aspects of the social. The 
“primitive” and “modern” divide presupposes a teleological movement by 
which an “emancipation from custom” materializes in the quintessential 
mentality of modern “industrial life”: family life becomes more “intense” 
and therefore the traditional “neighbors/family” congeries are relocated, in 
which “neighbors” and “strangers” now conform the “distant” positioning 
with respect to the secluded family. Modern configuration of society exhibits 
a double “virtuosity”; “thoughtful planning in businesses” and “loving self-
sacrifice in families”:
Marshall presented a more sophisticated and confident response to 
the romantics. Instead of conceding loyalty and love, Marshall argued 
that the romantics were wrong about both the household and the 
business spheres. And rather than conceding that the business sphere 
was governed by the selfish desire for wealth, Marshall contended that 
the core principle of business was thoughtful and deliberate rationality. 
(Danby 2017: 22)
A social ontology guided by “separate” and diverse motivations 
presupposes the demise of traditional society, but Marshall vetoed as 
impertinent “romantics’ ethical valuation” as exclusive to the household. 
The economic ensemble is the consequence of “motivated” acts, “feelings 
and sentiments,” but whose distinct rationality were to be specialized: 
“love” was to rule in the household and business “deliberateness” within 
the firm. Hence, Marshall’s opposition to women’s remuneration exhibited 
a clear militant modernist project in which gender politics implied the 
salvaging of the “family” by disallowing women’s incorporation into the 
educational structure precisely because they were as “capable” as their 
“male” counterparts of the household.
The advent of debates to “measure national income,” which were initially 
a scholarly individual effort, gets supplanted by a clear state-run strategy by 
the 1930s. Early in the 20th century, an evenly divided field among scholars 
was perceived arguing in favor or against “inclusion” of “housework in 
national income” (Danby 2017: 22); “unpaid domestic work” estimates in 
some countries may well show a 20 to 25 percent augment in “total national 
output”; “disagreements” did not arise just from the apparent technical 
inconvenience of its monetary representation.12 Danby highlighted the 
12 Mitchell’s and Kuznets’s “perspective” was sidelined by the new Keynesianism, to say the 
least. Rockoff has pointed out an interesting estimate on the “value” of unpaid household ac-
tivities during the 1920s: Income in the United States, Its Amount and Distribution, 1909–1919 
was published in two volumes (National Bureau of Economic Research, Mitchell et al. 1921). 
Nearly 600 pages in all, it far surpassed anything that had come before in terms of the amount 
of data utilized and the care taken in thoroughly double-checking the component estimates. 
The study made a clever use of the circular flow. King was tasked with estimating national in-
come from the payments-for-final-products side, and Knauth with estimating it from the pay-
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theoretical episode among its participants, aiming to offer an explanation 
through which to comprehend why quite important scholars, like Kuznets, 
for example, repudiated the existence of a highly antagonistic theoretical field 
with regard to whether “cleaning, child bearing, child minding and the like” 
(Danby 2017: 23) should be considered as “economic activity.”
Danby contended that these postures represent an “ideological, boundary-
policing” mechanism:
These economists were operating from the same ethical and social 
template as Marshall, in which the exclusion of the loving household 
made economy possible and conceptualizable. In different language, 
the taboo on housework was a productive taboo, because it licensed 
a particular vision of economy: large-scale, rational, and impersonal. 
Hence any suggestion of including housework in the measured 
economy had to be ruled out” (Danby 2017: 23).13
The economy is made up of agents whose aim is to make “a living” vis-à-vis 
those destined to make “profits,” respectively “households” and businesses, 
and, therefore, it is “motivated by forces of quite different nature” and it 
has an “approach to income as an appraisal concept” (Danby 2017: 23, my 
emphasis). In other words, national accounting categories can be viewed 
as a representation of “appraisals” and “motives.”14 We must not forget the 
contested instability of the theoretical space of the measurable power complex 
space by those elaborating the national income categories.
Economists Kuznets and Mitchell, considered “institutionalists” in their 
days, were central in the statistical construction of the national income 
accounts and, therefore, can be easily conjoined to the German “historical 
school” and “romantic nationalism,” and thus be made unwittingly into the 
heirs of Herder’s relativism. In the U.S., they commanded the central data 
gathering machine without parallel, displaced-defeated (take your pick) by 
Keynes’s hegemonizing alternative project, which jettisoned those potentially 
specific “historical” aspects to construct data in terms of income, placing his 
proposals in a better standing to “generalize” data gathering across the world. 
ments-for-productive-services side. The two estimates turned out to be reassuringly close. The 
study identified and tried to deal with many of the problems inherent in estimating national 
income that continue to be sources of debate and criticism. For example, it noted that its esti-
mate of the national income in 1918 of $61 billion did not include the monetary value of unpaid 
work in the household, which probably amounted to “several billions” (Rockoff, p. 155).
13 Notwithstanding the consistent substantive narrative of the taboo in question, a construction 
of “women’s household activities” requires, both in ethically and political terms, an alternative 
discursive strategy in which what seems decisive is what is considered “productive.” The cate-
gory might need deconstruction and/or reconstruction, which in turn implies examining the 
implicit or explicit power asymmetries in question not just of the household participants, but 
also between and among the heterogenous agents (all kinds of “businesses”).
14 But anticipating my doubts, not all agents are individuals or “people,” and furthermore, 
those very same “appraisals” and “motives” are constructed by an ensemble of antagonistic 
discourses for the accomplishment of those objectives. In a power asymmetric context, het-
erogeneous agents are not necessarily “economic,” nor human individuals as such.
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Those “relativist” assumptions of the institutionalist school which aimed to 
highlight specific historical processes appeared as a deficit in the struggle for 
a general perspective on data gathering.
Hence, Kuznets’s distinction between “business” and “household” in 
“highly developed” economies intended to “draw a line between economic 
activity and economic goods” and “active life,” a distinction which would 
“not be easy to formulate” for both “primitive tribes” and “nations of North 
America and Western Europe” (Danby 2017: 24).15 
For Kuznets, the “fundamental institutional fact” (Danby 2017: 25), and 
social diversity is presented as the question that “underlays” (Danby 2017: 
25) the categories through which to measure the economies and endorse the 
“exclusion of housewives’ services” because these activities are “motivated 
largely by non-economic considerations and form much more a part of life in 
general than of professional economic life proper” (Kuznets in Danby 2017: 
25).
In Danby’s reckoning, Kuznets’s “economy” was an entity “outside” 
households, whose role was the provision of a “flow of good and useful things” 
(Danby 2017: 25). These objects of desire became the potential entities 
to be measured. The stream of flowing objects “desired” by households 
simultaneously explains Kuznets’s understanding on the basis on which to 
exclude “criminal enterprises” as conforming an aspect of “national income” 
output: “their illegality was a societal judgement of the badness of their 
output. The excluded household, therefore, stood outside the ‘economy’ in 
order to provide the ethical standpoint from which to measure it” (Danby 
2017: 25).
The calculating procedure and its ethical categorial underpinnings 
to measure national income were, according to Danby the source of 
Kuznets’s “welfare approach.” National income accounts can actually be 
quite diverse in their modes of “partitioning of a common, underlying” 
(Danby 2017: 32) entity which is being measured, and the “list of ‘evils’” 
necessary “to make a living, could be potentially very long” (Danby 
2017: 25) to estimate “net services” to the individuals and households. 
Quoting Beckerman, who worked under M. Gilbert, Danby underlines 
the practical consequences:
the whole economy would be included inside the productive sector. 
Even the household sector would be included, since it would be simply 
one more industry converting inputs of food, clothing, shelter, and 
recreation and so on, into another intermediate product, labor, which 
would be inputs into the other productive sector. (Beckerman in 
Danby 2017: 32)16
15 However, as we will see ahead, the same could be said of the alternative Keynesian victorious 
discourse on data reconstruction and its assumptions.
16 See note 21 in Danby (2017: 32).
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Therefore, the theoretical existence of the “household” was substantiated 
by differentiating an inside/outside divide, a specific cultural distinction 
(love/money) that enabled a measurable flow. Kuznets’s measures of estimates 
of individuals’ “welfare,” by means of the monetary unit, could be translated 
as comparing so-called “valuable” objects of production and simultaneously 
as the preferred elected “valuable” in terms of a pre-established ordinal scale. 
The “valuable” intervenes as a monetary and/or “ethical” entity. Hence, a 
“tight focus on benefits to households” (Danby 2017: 26) limits clarity in the 
estimations, since countless activities may be helpful to increase livelihood 
(“welfare”).
However, despite Kuznets’s frustration, the household/business divide 
remained “foundational.” It persisted under the veil privileged by so-called 
“economic” qualities, which excluded the “love” side of the equation, a move 
which was accomplished through the reintroduction of the figure of Marshall 
via the work of Robbins. Danby’s reservations about Robbins economics as 
a mechanism to calculate “scarce means to alternative uses,” derives from 
the absence of an “obvious criterion for excluding household production” 
(Danby 2017: 26) since “laundering, cooking, cleaning, and child-minding 
consume scarce time and energy” (Danby 2017: 26).
When Rao’s work is being discussed, “ideology is powerful” (Danby 
2017: 26), housewives’ “services” (“non-economic motives”) should be 
excluded from the national income ledger and given the characteristics in 
question could not be conceptualized in terms of choices between “scarce 
resources” a la Robbins; but significantly Rao did not dismiss the probability 
of considering those “household” chores in a forthcoming society. In the 
time being, American economist Milton Gilbert enrolled under Keynes’s 
model of national income accounting, reinstating worldwide the modernist 
household/economy divide:
The precise difference between economic and non-economic activity 
is not that one is useful and the other is not, but that the effort spent in 
non-economic activity is not available for an alternative use in economic 
sphere. (…) knitting a garment, (…) helping with the children (…) 
Neither of these activities should be included in the national product. 
(…) one or the other does not affect the supply of scarce factors of 
production. (Gilbert and Kravis in Danby 2017: 27)17
The household/business couple split, “lets us divide the world into fully 
modern (where the split has happened) and non-modern (where it has not 
happened)” (Danby 2017: 29), which enables the notion of a “heteronormative 
theory of gender” (ibid.) without specifying the features of the agents and 
practices which apparently must be institutionalized. Hence, the household 
is posited as the unitary agent, necessarily run by individual human beings, 
17 “The household emerges as a space of leisure, of non-work. Rao’s and Gilbert’s descriptions 
of what goes on in the household sphere (…) are romanticized” (Danby 2017: 27).
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but it must be advanced, that kids need not be “raised” necessarily in the 
traditional “household” unit, it could be an “extended” space where distinct 
“families,” like the school, leave their offspring to be cared for.
But most significantly, Danby perseveres with the idea that modernity 
does not relate necessarily to the presence of “urban” or industrial images. 
The ideological narrative, its folk theory, is about “mentalities”:
It is an assertion that there has occurred a profound shift in how some 
people think and act, and in how they understand themselves, their 
surroundings, and their opportunities. It is the people who have made 
this shift who are the subjects of economic science. (Danby 2017: 29)
The Diffusion of the “European Self-Imagination”: Western-centric 
Discourse and the Rise of Development Economics
The evolution of the history of economics within the Western-centric 
vision often describes as an interregnum period that which relates to 
studying “backwards” areas, which became dominant after World War II: 
it underscores the existence of “economies” whose features seem singularly 
out of place within economics’ vocabulary. But Danby tends to displace the 
centrality of the latter narrative by examining theoretical alternatives through 
the “instituted” “romanticist/rationalist” dichotomy, as the guiding thread to 
understand the discursive evolution on “economics.” Escorting the reader 
to the period underscoring the unique manner by which those theoretical 
obstacles are encountered through the Western-centric imaginary, it is 
important to mention that Latin American Structuralism engendered its own 
species of economics during the 1950s. With hindsight, it is easy to display 
the conceptual transformations which bore fruit the so-called “economics for 
development” worldwide during the period, as well as its demise with the 
return of “neoclassical” thought during the 1980s, but generally the rise and 
revolt of alternative discourses is mostly forgotten including Latin America’s 
own brand of “Marxism,” a principal theoretical adversary of the region’s 
“Latin American Structuralism.”
Before depicting the theoretical transition, the “European self-
imagination” needs to be described. Therefore, a “messy social world” 
(Danby 2017: 50) was reorganized theoretically into “households” and 
“businesses,” entities which “interacted” with each other through their 
respective “flows”:
the monetary flows (…) must equal each other over any span of time: 
all payments to the business sector produce incomes for somebody, 
which are spent on output (…) it is customary to specify two ways of 
looking at the same flow of output from businesses to households: 
as expenditure on output, from the household point of view, and as 
production of output, from the business point of view. (Danby 2017: 
50)
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Hitherto, national income estimations had been a sporadic and private 
endeavor. Income, expenditure, and output were targeted individually. The 
period that Danby described refers to alternative efforts to “measure all 
three” (Danby 2017: 51) and “check them against each other” (Danby 2017: 
51).18 What counted “as national income/output” (Danby 2017: 51) entailed 
excluding “domestic production,” “goods/services,” childcaring and cooking 
meals, activities inside the household. Danby underlines the theoretical 
discussions arising from those perspectives that lost out to Keynes’s disciples, 
concentrating on “capital goods” and “government.”
The first formal “appearance” (Danby 2017: 69) of the “framework” Y = C 
+ I + G was in Keynes’s 1940 text How to Pay for War, which had previously 
undergone a sustained theoretical dispute, to say the least, vis-à-vis the then 
denominated “Treasury View.”19 The identities Y = C + I + G and Y = C + S + 
T20 describe the consumption/productive carrousel: the circular nature of the 
flows from households as payments for business firms’ goods, and businesses 
generating income through their payments to households.
The inclusion of the “government purchases” and its potential role in 
generating inflation were central to Keynes’s whole view of the economy, in 
which “Keynesian national income accounting shines an especially bright 
light on what governments do -it brightly illuminates government’s taxing and 
spending and borrowing” (Danby 2017: 54), a legacy asserted and enforced 
by the IMF’s discourse. Hence the impulse by “international bureaucrats” 
to standardize the Keynesian “national income accounting” to scrutinize 
“national governments.”
Keynes had “imagined a new thing, a national economy linked by money 
flows and guided by financial markets” (Danby 2017: 56), which was turned 
into the IS-LM “workhorse” contraption, losing, perhaps, the most interesting 
theoretical aspects of what Keynes “really meant” (Danby 2017: 56), although 
“easily-shared representation” which in turn the Newlyn-Phillips machine 
sought to upstage (as we will examine ahead).
Danby illustrates the IS-LM into an “image”: “the body visible,” through 
a “hydraulic computer” (Danby 2017: 56). In 1949, William Phillips and 
Walter Newlyn developed a “physical model” of a “two-equation” model of 
a national economy , which should serve for teaching purposes, aiming to 
enlighten the circular nature of income and expenses flows, through a pipe 
connection with a series of valves which would open or close depending 
on the water level of the tanks, which in turn would automatically reach 
some sort of equilibrium level, generating a signal for a control mechanism 
to action initiating the opening once again of the chambers of the tanks 
permitting the flow of water.21 
18 Bach (2018). 
19 See also Chapters 5 and 7 in Peden (2000 and 2004).
20 Income (Y); Consumption (C); Investment (I), Government (G); Saving (S); Taxes (T).
21 “Gresham’s Law” is represented by Fisher’s (1916, pp. 105, 116, 119, 128) as water-gold-silver 
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Danby’s description of the Newlyn-Phillips machine explains all but one 
of the impulsion processes, and just to get an idea of the picture exhibited as 
the “body” by the water flows lets quote Danby:
The top flow (…) represents the flow of production of a good. The tank 
represents the total unsold stock of that good in the shops. The lower 
flow represents consumer purchases of that good. A rise in unsold 
stocks causes mechanisms to reduce the market price; if stocks fall 
merchants raise market price. (Danby 2017: 59)
Hence the fantastic “European self-imagination,” and its general approach 
to measure and compare economies can also be represented by a mechanical 
contraption. The quote underlines one of the criticisms which can be 
generalized to all the “mechanical” representations still implicit if not explicit 
in economics, where an antagonistic contingent event like “price making” 
is exemplified as a simple “pressure” point between counteracting “physical 
forces,” or alternatively as analogies/metaphors to a body or a machine22 
ignoring the fact that those “machines” require a “first push” so to speak, to 
initiate the flow to transfer the liquid upwards and in a circular fashion during 
its downward phase. In other words, it entails a mechanism “outside” of the 
machine, a “switch,” or someone to initiate its dynamic process.
According to Danby the “model” is a: 
physical analogue of a social institution. It is a model of how a 
competitive market in a single good might function, with a single 
market price equilibrating two flows. The idea for a ‘micro’ (just 
one market) model of this kind was not original to Newlyn and 
Phillips. Their originality was in recognizing that you could construct 
a ‘macro’ (national economy) model incorporating multiple 
adjustment mechanisms of this kind within a larger circular flow (…) 
Other relations hypothesized in Keynesian theory, such as the idea 
that consumption spending was a stable function of income, could 
be turned into physical connections between flows. You could set the 
machine up to simulate a particular set of theoretical assumptions plus 
policy variables, turn it on, and let it ‘solve’ the system: when it did 
this it was essentially computing multiple simultaneous differential 
equations. (Danby 2017: 59) 
Danby’s daring compactness narrative of the working “machine,” as a 
veritable example for what “Keynesian” (“hydraulic”) economics post-World 
reservoirs, connected by pipes as a hydraulic automatic process, although driven by forces 
whereby bad money pushes good money out, its “propulsion” mechanisms aimed to show 
the accumulation and drain of “gold” reserves which induced changes towards an alternative 
coinage.
22 Paradoxically, the metaphor itself, of the machine or the body displays a visibility previously 
inexistent: “multitude of social processes and restless circulatory that we call the economy and 
recognize only via its abstractions can, with this model, be viewed in its entirety” (Stevenson 
in Danby 2017: 64). 
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War II stood for (De Vroey and Hoover 2004), corresponds to the amazing 
Western-centrism “self-imagination” (Danby 2017: 98). Rather, what should 
be assessed more critically is the discursive tone of note number 15: since 
notwithstanding Danby’s affirmation, the so-called “dramatic” “process 
of finding equilibrium”23 (Danby 2017: 65) might be impertinent if one 
proceeds from the apparently smooth “mechanical” movements presumed 
by the “physical model” (Danby 2017: 65), or the machine, but Danby’s 
“institutional” presumptions have surreptitiously intervened, since we owe 
to “women/men” those “dramatic” antagonistic actions of “price setting.” 
We will return to certain negative theoretical consequences when the 
analogy “body/machine” is presented, although in the last instance, Danby 
actually acknowledges that the ploy in question is more akin to a Borgesian 
“fantastic” story. 
Keynes’s theoretical adversaries had in the new “Keynesian” categories: 
“a machine in which all markets self-equilibrate: the labor market, the 
market in loanable funds, and all markets in goods and services.” (Danby 
2017, pp. 59-60), and therefore, contrary to Keynes, government could 
not fix the appropriate levels in the “national economy”: “internally 
self-regulated differently” (Danby 2017: 60).
But the “Newlyn-Phillips machine was a way of demonstrating those 
different internal connections and working out how a national economy 
would behave under Keynesian assumptions” (Danby 2017: 60), or any 
other for that matter, if delimited with alternative theoretical assumptions 
(Danby 2017: 65). Notwithstanding Danby’s subtleties, in his majestically 
didactic exhibition of the Keynesian “workhorse” (IS-LM),24 he echoes a 
disengagement from the discourse in question. If you “listen” closely to 
Danby’s analogy to a “machine,” “law governed,” it does not necessarily imply 
to its author any theoretical recognition of the consistency of the categories 
and “Keynesian” perspective: if students “learn classical mechanics” (Danby 
2017: 61) through their lab bench “experiments” (Danby 2017: 61) they 
may be able to “see what the equations describe” (Danby 2017: 61), which 
amounts to saying that familiarity with “Newtonian mechanics” facilitates 
understanding the “Newlyn-Phillips” machine as a “law governed,” but 
most significantly, they acquire the skill to comprehend the role of “habits of 
analogy” (Danby 2017: 61, my emphasis), without which the representation 
of a “national economy” becomes irresolvable. In other words, Danby’s 
narrative is surfing from one analogy or metaphor to another: it does not 
state, nor corroborate the theoretical consistency of the “workhorse,” it is an 
23 “The physical model dramatizes the process of finding equilibrium: the plumbing apparatus 
will not instantly find the equilibrium price but will only gradually converge on it, with some 
overshooting and undershooting and general sloshing about” (Danby 2017: 65). 
24 For an alternative and equally wonderful critique see Pilkington (2016) and previous chapter 
for my assessment.
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account, among others,25 devoted to the task of assembling the very “being” 
of the theoretical object.26
Anticipating my critique, certain aspects of Danby’s theoretical strategy, 
involve dodging (I hope unwittingly) the construction of an alternative 
political-pedagogical strategy, since notions of the body-machine tend to 
generate anthropomorphisms, which hide those contingent antagonistic 
moments (“economic processes”), a stance fortunately superseded in other 
parts of Danby’s book:
Haunting the physics is just a little of the old Newtonian alchemy, 
because the machine is also readable as a living thing, a struggling 
organism with its own will. Numerous observers have commented on 
its body-like qualities. Phillips dyed the water red for visibility, and the 
machine resembles a stylized model of a body’s circulatory system. 
More interestingly it did not behave like a simple machine (say, a 
kitchen appliance) in which changes to controls cause direct changes 
in the machine’s behavior. Rather, you changed a control and then 
watched a series of adjustments, over 5 or 10 minutes, as the machine 
gurgled its way toward a new equilibrium. Such adjustments are called 
homeostatic in biology: an example is your body’s ability to regulate 
its internal temperature. The circular flow is a powerful metaphor. It 
is founded, let us remember, on the sentimental household/business 
split (…) mapping the interaction between these two spheres and 
signifying their complementarity. It is elaborated by Keynes to highlight 
capital investment, government, and the financial sector, producing 
a circulatory anatomy useful for certain policy questions. But it had 
an aesthetic extension, producing visual confirmation of the integrity 
of the nation, its beating heart and coursing arteries and veins. The 
national economy became a body with organs. (Danby 20018: 61, first 
and last emphasis are mine)
The machine is a “physical analogue of the IS-LM model” (Danby 2017: 56), 
since it can change its movements and/or speed, but Danby’s metaphorical 
depiction is a simile of his own unbearable role, as a “ventriloquist”: a narrator 
bringing to life an important theoretical episode in economics and policies. 
Danby’s “distance” from the problematic discussed opens the ground for an 
undecidable commitment on his part whether to corroborate, or dispute the 
narrative, which depicts an astonishing story in which the “social” and the 
contingent antagonistic moments of any necessary exchange or productive 
25 It is difficult, after Mirowski’s (1989) book, and certainly not least Naredo’s (1987), to find a 
better reflection on these issues.
26 Danby’s “confession,” if I may be permitted the term, speaks not just volumes -again pardon 
the expression-, but “tons”!!!: “Part of the experience of teaching macroeconomics is strug-
gling with this metaphorical thicket: students are primed to think of the nation as an organism 
possessing its own spirit and will, thriving and competing with like organisms” (Danby 2017: 
65, note number 18).
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moment have been abolished. And as such, we have come more than “full 
circle” as Danby would retort. The moment of a decision is left, so to speak 
to the “reader”: on the one hand, if the decision taken implies changing 
and repudiating the direction of the narrative (power/knowledge), it is the 
“romantic” ingredient of the narrative which has gained the discursive upper 
hand, but on the other, taking passively for granted what comes to pass as the 
calling of a necessary economic evolution, prefiguring a rational mechanism, 
then it is the “rationalist” antinomy which has gobbled our “being” bringing 
politics to an end. The route and mechanisms by which to deconstruct the 
power asymmetries, whose “logic” generates the plural ensemble of the 
heterogenous agents,27 can be questioned by an alternative political discourse.
Keynes displays ambiguous romantic characteristics, but the discursive 
“instability” in question might actually obey, simultaneously, the cultural 
elements of the age, and the unfounded notion of the unity of the “modernist” 
discourse:
the romantic elements are always discursively contained, allowed 
to run briefly and then reined back. But regardless of his underlying 
views, it is remarkable how much of the positive romantic doctrine 
of economy shows up in Keynes’s mid-1930s writings: economy is a 
matter of communication and shared knowledge; national economy 
can create national sympathy and solidarity; the nation is the 
appropriate unit for shared knowledge and common culture; these 
virtues exist at a wider level than individual freedom and initiative 
and in certain balances outweigh them. As with the contemporaneous 
development of a Jewish economy in Palestine (…) romantic ideas 
breathed life and purpose into mathematical abstractions. In these 
moments, romanticism was not the antagonist of rationalism, but its 
complement. (Danby 2017: 62)
The Keynesian national income accounting “conquer[ed] the world,”28 
the “choice” meant highlighting the household/business split, a product of 
“modernist ideology” (Danby 2017: 63), a view of the productive process into 
“two categories” distinguished by “the state of mind of the people doing that 
activity” (Danby 2017: 63), monetary spending, households and businessmen/
27 I disagree about the feasibility of a general consistent, non-circular, representation of the be-
ing/knowledge, or power/knowledge dichotomy, hence my rejection of closing the sentence 
with “a distinct heterogeneity of being.”
28 “In a nutshell, a set of international organizations emerged after WWII that needed stan-
dardized nation-level concepts. Richard Stone and Milton Gilbert had forged a common An-
glo-American position during the war on National income accounting: There was no serious 
competitor. No alternative system of national accounting had such well-placed advocates or 
was as well poised to claim global applicability” (Danby 2017: 68). No space to describe the 
above process, the rise, and the predominance of the “triumvirate”: Lord Keynes, Milton Gil-
bert and Richard Stone, whose work reconstructed the statistics traditions, which were ex-
tended throughout the world by the international organizations after World War II. See Chap-
ter 4 of Danby (2017).
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government, which alternatively can be differentiated by regrouping into 
one single flow “of disparate ‘real’ goods and services” (Danby 2017: 63) 
with money as the underlying “unit,” or neglecting the “real” products and 
services, and “treat money as important in itself, as a financial asset with its 
own properties” (Danby 2017: 63).
Therefore, in Danby’s description, the economy can be perceived as a 
“discrete body with linked organs” (Danby 2017: 74), implying a government 
and organs with certain tasks, a central bank, a business sector, which borrows 
from financial entities, and “savers,” who buy “domestic financial assets,” in 
other words, simultaneously, we can assume a closed model, separate “from 
the rest of world,” and the procedure by which economies are articulated. 
Those entities enclosed can then be considered without reconsidering or 
rethinking the “national” institutions. (Danby 2017: 74).29
Thus, this narrative assumes the existence of flows between different 
borders, although in certain economic formations, the absence of a formal 
set of assets framework, is contradicted by IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics:
two assumptions are not only built into globally-applied national 
income accounting, but actively advertised and promoted by the 
published data: that every country is in the same way integral and 
complete with similar institutions, and that the relations between 
national economies are relatively thin and inconsequential. (Danby 
2017: 74)
These
“accounts begin by imagining a self-sustaining, self-contained national 
economy, and add the foreign flows later. The Newlyn-Phillips 
machine is a wonderful representation of this, built (as a teaching 
tool) to operate on its own, a visual and mechanical metaphor for the 
self-containedness, the institutional self-sufficiency, of this national 
economy (Danby 2017: 74, second emphasis is mine).
Therefore, national accounting data misses the “dependent” character 
between and among different economic formations. No “data concept” 
(Danby 2017: 75) can symbolize this “relation.” Danby questions the 
appearance of national units as discrete entities, relinquished through the 
concept of an:
abstract global space of goods and financial flows without power or 
politics, without alliances, antagonisms, or spheres of influence. And 
it appears as though it had the same internal institutional structure. 
(Danby 2017: 75)
29 Foreigners purchase domestic financial assets, which can be considered as gross foreign sav-
ings, but residents buy foreign financial assets, which means gross foreign investment. Balance 
of payments X – M = Net exports; then = NFI, which means Net Foreign Investment, which 
can be included in the classical workhorse: C + I + G + (X – M) = Y = C + S + T + NFI.
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The “accounts hold up a mirror in which” certain countries see “themselves 
as discrete” (Danby 2017: 75) nations, which internally, via the distribution 
policies, help reconstruct their “national” coherence and “self-knowledge” 
and/or “integrity,” aspects which are reflected in the “data” “embra[cing] the 
interconnection of its fractious parts” (Danby 2017: 75).
The international economy can be portrayed by several interconnected, 
self-sufficient “Newlyn-Phillips” machines:
But to model and international economy, two mirror-image machines 
were built, linked so that the exports of one were the imports of the 
other, [with] an interstitial space connecting them, a ‘space of flows.’ 
That near-empty space through which Meade strides is the space of the 
international economy, the space the IMF would later invest with its 
own spirit. (Danby 2017: 75)30
Therefore, the model facilitates a bilateral or multilateral surveillance, 
through which monetary or counter-cyclical policies can be scrutinized. But 
the “linking” together of two machines allows resurrecting a theoretical “lack” 
mentioned previously, when examining the single case: Who or what initiates 
the machine so that it pumps the water up and down. This problematical aspect 
is mentioned in note number 22, on page 81, where the precise characteristic 
nature of the “creature” (Danby 2017: 81) is problematized, by distinguishing 
the linkage as being “mechanical” “instead of hydraulic” (Danby 2017: 81).
Before touching Danby’s “mathematical” exposition of the interlocking 
“machines,” the story exhibits (surreptitiously) a wonderful double parable 
of Foucault’s “representation” of “The Meninas” painting: in Danby’s book 
the photograph (Danby 2017: 76) exhibits the “gaze” of the “students” on 
the interlocking machines (world economy), followed by an invitation to the 
reader to “gaze” on those staring at the students in the photograph, who “are 
being trained to see the world economy” (Danby 2017: 77).
The mathematical model was drawn from Jacques Polak (who became a long-
standing IMF employee). It starts from a simple single-country, self-contained 
“autonomous factors” (Danby 2017: 77) described in three chapters, through 
which the national income and imports are determined, and then proceeding to a 
“world” model in “less than a page” (Danby 2017: 77). By plugging together both 
imports and exports equations of the countries into a “single world equation,”31 it 
exhibits “imports as a function of exports” (Danby 2017: 77):
30 See photo in Danby (2017: 76). See chapter on Furtado and his encounter with Mead in 1957.
31 The nation equation mi = ρi σ´i xw + ai ; mi and xw are national imports and world exports, re-
spectively. The world equation is ∑i mi = xw ∑ρi σ´i + ∑ i ai : “the expression ∑ρi σ´i stands for the 
weighted average of pi´s of the individual countries, with the σ´i’s (the ‘marginal propensities 
of the world to import from country i’) as the weights.” (Polak 1954: 54), while ai stands “for 
the total effect upon imports of all exogenous variables” (Polak 1954: 54). The symbol “ρ”, re-
fers to an intensity, a “fraction” indicating a “change in the volume of exports and the ensuing 
change in the volume of imports” which Polak names as the “international reflection ratio,” to 
evaluate how certain countries revert back “impulses” received “from the rest of the world.” 
(Polak 1954: 42).
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Each national economy is treated like any other in its internal structure. 
Each one interacts not with other particular economies, but with a 
composite entity called ‘world trade’ (Polak 1954: 16). The ‘autonomous 
factors’ that affect a country’s income and import behavior are internal 
to that country; no re-specification of the isolated national model is 
made once the country is imagined as part of the world. This is a world 
without international power, and without any institution aside from 
‘world trade’ that spans multiple nations – no transmigrants of families 
resident in multiple countries, no transnational unions or transnational 
businesses or border-crossing financial systems. (Danby 2017: 77)
Danby underlines the “illegibility” of power and institutional specificities 
generated by the Keynesian categories and national income accounting.32 
The “world model” posed by Polak: 
simply reduces the national model to a single equation for each country 
and sums them all up to produce a world equation. This is how the 
world is made! Each national economy is treated like any other national 
economy in its internal structure. Each one interacts not with other specific 
economies, but with a composite entity ‘world trade’ (Polak 1954: 16) 
(…). There is no category – no conceptual category, no measurable 
thing – in which the structure of international financial system might 
appear. In this way, the international market is conceptualized as a space 
of pure flows, a space without people or institutions, who are all tucked 
away inside national economies (…) markets, as efficient, anonymous, 
smoothly adjusting mechanisms to facilitate flow of goods and services 
and exchanges of assets. (Danby 2017: 77)
The world’s cartography was defined by a series of “discontinuous empires” 
in which “power,” or international power, was at plain sight, “post-WWII 
international organizations, dividing the world’s population into national 
cells and spotlighting their condition by means of statistics-gathering” 
(Danby 2017: 78).
The diffusion of Western-centric governmentality discourse (government 
and governed) is transmuted into a three-layer governmentality: “households 
and firms,” “self-governing units” (“people-goods”), and national 
governments, which are responsible for the latter’s surveillance, which are 
in turn “gazed” upon by a top layer of “international organizations” (Danby 
2017: 78).
32 Danby writes: “close relations between any particular export sector and particular foreign 
buyers are illegible. There is no category –no conceptual category, no measurable thing– in 
which the structure of the international financial system might appear. (…) the International 
market is conceptualized as a space of pure flows, a space without people or institutions, all 
of whom are tucked away inside national economies. This effect is strengthened by the way 
orthodox economists like to model markets, as efficient anonymous smoothly adjusting mech-
anisms to facilitate flows of goods and services and exchanges of assets” (Danby 2017: 77, my 
emphasis).
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The description above is perhaps one of the best illustrations of 
the problematical nature of those aspects needing replacement by the 
evolution of “developmentalism” in economics and hence Prebisch’s 
insistence on the power asymmetry of the “Center-Periphery” worldwide 
or within regions. 
At the pinnacle of Danby’s argument, the narrative suddenly pivots, 
aiming to exhibit33 the description of the difficulties uncovered in 
the British colonies, under the “rule” of the newly nascent national 
accounting categories. In the “Center” countries, even before the dust 
of the theoretical debates on the accounting categories was dissipated, 
Keynes was sponsoring their “transference” to colonial territories, with 
which to generate reliable data despite the presence of peculiar social 
relations where “production” and “distribution” are apparently associated 
by “non-market” mechanisms.
The author’s description of the epoch is admirable. For example, the 
representation of an “economy in Palestine” in the 1940s (A Jewish Economy 
in Palestine), had to theoretically supersede social relations absolutely out of 
“touch” with contrasting and violently contested notions of “sovereignty” with 
regard as to which “community” (Arabs/Jewish-Zionism) should “govern” 
the geographic perimeters of the economy in question; these characteristics 
mystified evermore the “gaze” and discourses from which the construction 
and estimate of the data and income account were to be undertaken.
If “national income accounting” refers to some pre-existing geographical 
perimeter or to the existence of a “nation,” the existence of a heterogenous 
horizon, both in economic and cultural terms, turns problematic the 
“translation” of the Western-centric economic categories into a whole set 
of apparently ontologically incongruent social relations. But it seems that 
the overlapping of Jewish and non-Jewish economies can be made to evolve 
simultaneously within the same territory, especially if it is imprinted by 
the then ruling British Empire until 1948, by means of a League of Nation 
command through the “Jewish Agency for Palestine”: 
its economists separated, the most finely grained possible, the available 
data on production, consumption, investment, and so forth into Jewish 
and non-Jewish parts – down to markets in individual vegetables” 
(…) not merely trying to persuade foreign supporters and the British 
government of the plausibility of a Jewish economy (and ultimately 
Jewish state) in Palestine. It was also persuading Jewish settlers in 
Palestine to act as though they were part of an integrated and distinct 
‘economy,’ (…) The Jewish Agency’s work is a token of a shift in the 
1930s in many parts of the world toward the idea that the national 
economy is a coherent whole whose behavior might be influenced by 
government policy. (Danby 2017: 34-35)
33 “Discovering Economies in British Africa,” Chapter 5.
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The Keynesian crusade is conveyed to represent the “national economy” 
by which a discourse on a Palestine economy emerges exhibiting those very 
theoretical categories embedded in the romantic/rationalist genealogical 
trap. Zionist thought and policy aim initially to recover the loss of a unified 
entity called “agrarian ethos” as the founding source for its colonization 
crusade in Palestine:
close interpenetration of romantic and rationalist conceptions of 
economy, melding a romantic ‘agrarian ethos’ that emphasized 
the spiritual benefits of farming with a rationalist ‘ethos of rapid 
development’ which held that Jewish economic activity was distinctly 
modern, efficient, rational, and dynamic. (Danby 2017: 35) 
Ruppin’s complaints to the effect that for “two thousand years we had had 
practically no contact with agricultural work,” entails a “way back to it spiritually” 
(Ruppin in Danby 2017: 36), resembling those theoretical tropes that critiqued 
“urban life,” the “wholesomeness of rural life” (Danby 2017: 36) “sweat” “soil 
and spirit,” while instantaneously, dodging the necessary self-closeness of the 
romantic discourse by examining “investment,” “growth” and “efficiency”: 
repeatedly contrasted the rationality and dynamism of the Jewish 
farming with the capital-poor traditional farming of the Arab fellahin. 
The combination of romantic and rationalist modernization is one of 
the most noticeable features of this literature. (Danby 2017: 36)
It is through the figure of Horowitz, director in 1935 of the economic 
department of the Jewish Agency, that we encounter the scorn directed to 
the above assumptions of the “agrarian ethos” (Danby 2017: 37), and yet 
embellishing, in a “precociously Keynesian” way, the “potential dynamism of 
a multi-sector Jewish economy” (Danby 2017: 37).
Horowitz’s notion of an integrated Jewish economy within the Palestinian’ 
territory implied a dynamic multi-sector, with goods and labor shifting 
between the distinct “economies” in question. But given “that markets were 
unreliable engines of national integration,” Horowitz and Hinden drew on 
alternative vocabularies to make the idea of a “distinct and unified Jewish 
economy plausible” (Danby 2017: 38), among them, imagining non-Jewish 
Palestinians as “feudal,” “precapitalist,” or alternatively pointing to the 
“European” heritage of the Jewish settlers, “bearers of Western civilization” 
(Danby 2017: 39), and not inconsistently exhibiting a disastrous ambiguity 
when “comparing” Jews and non-Jews, or refusing the operation in question. 
Therefore, difference “inheres in their bodies” with respect to “Western 
civilization” (Danby 2017: 40).
According to Danby Gaathon’s analytical role in developing a “double-
entry” model producing a “detailed input-output matrix for a two-
community economy (Arab and Jewish)” (Danby 2017: 41), reveals links to 
the “structuralist” position and to Dudley Seers. 
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Unfortunately, the narrative in process by Danby is recovered only 
within the contours of the Notes section of the book, unwittingly, and 
unfortunately, disguising the theoretical evolution of the idea that national 
economic accounting and “development” economics became the “flip” 
side of each other: in two distinct senses a) the examination of the power 
asymmetries among and between agents (individuals, firms, corporations, 
“nations,” and hence “Center-Periphery” antagonisms -Prebisch), and b), 
the obligation and hence the risk to undertake a theoretical transformation 
by displacing Keynesian and macroeconomic discourse (“European self-
imagination”).
In other words, during the 1950s, the narrative on “developmentalism” 
with its two lanes cleft imagination (a) and (b) above, denied the pertinence 
of the Western-centric economic categories, granting certain features 
of those economies “in development” (Periphery) as “sui generis,” and 
simultaneously, maintaining a partisan approach which anticipated 
teleologically the coming into being of a “development” process. In Latin 
America, the dominance and “authority” of Western-centric discourses were 
circumvented by the unconventional move of transforming Western-centric 
categories for all “economies,” through which an alternative “other” can be 
constructed via the transformation of the power asymmetries (R. Prebisch, 
C. Furtado, D. Seers34, for example). Accordingly, it is during this period 
when a distinctive theoretical line was drawn between an “economics”35 for 
“integrated” industrial economies (Center) and those areas which apparently 
required alternative categories (Center-Periphery), an absence which was 
to be “patched up” and reconstructed by a sort of “second best” theoretical 
formulations (Guillen 2018, Alacevich and Boianosvky 2018). Currently, 
economics has blurred the legacy of the period’s war of interpretations 
and hence P. Mirowski’s admirable struggle to reconstruct the “history of 
economic” thought.
The theoretical limitations of the hegemonic economic discourses, the 
war of interpretations in course during the following years of the 1940s and 
1950s, took on a singular stratagem early in the 1980s with the so-called 
“fall” of development economics: overnight, all the attributes of the social 
relations of production and distribution ensemble of the “industrial” nations 
had magically resurfaced all over the world.
In the 1940s, South African economist Herbert Frankel, also pre-eminent 
in pioneering experiments on national income accounting straightforwardly 
negated the Keynesian categories as pertinent to the African continent, “too 
culturally different from Europeans to make the accounts meaningful” (Danby 
2017: 42). Equally, the “economic theory” and Palestine encounter that 
Danby described also considers, simultaneously, the romantic undercurrents 
34 Indeed, geographical provenance and language are not necessarily a limitation to ethical and 
theoretical alternative transformations.
35 Seers would use the term “special case.”
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engendering the discourse. In other words, the “racism” of the “white man’s 
burden” curse36 (see further ahead). Significantly, Danby’s description of 
the “caged” discourses amplifies significantly the “East and West” ongoing 
pigeonholing, and effectively naming “names” for the period of economic 
theory discussed, topped with experts’ portrayal of the Palestinian economy. 
In this case, Horowitz’s “unconscious” Anti-Semitism (Danby 2017: 47),37 as 
well as the absentee voices of “non-Jewish Palestinians” (Danby 2017: 45) 
in the narrative “speaks” volumes (pun intended!): the Anglo-American 
Committee’s38 “documents” and testimonies, are presented as necessarily 
superior to the “weak” and “ill-prepared” Arab Case: 
“Over the course of the mid-20th Century, economic rationality 
became the dominant way of differentiating the deserving from the 
undeserving, the haves from the have-nots. Poverty became evidence 
of some more fundamental lack, a lack to be addressed with discipline 
and dispossession (Ravela, 2013)”. (Danby 2017: 45) 
Having acknowledged Keynes as the intellectual hero of the “national 
income categories” design, economic theorizing made no sense without data 
to face and guide the “body of the nation,” but mainly the economy had to 
be assimilated to a “machine”; but paradoxically, Danby’s discursive tone, 
during the wonderful description of the Keynesian “work-horse” contraption 
(IS-LM) seen above, although an excellent academic “didactic” strategy, may 
actually wither away, in gargantuan fashion, those very conditions and social 
forces which could make the economic ensemble more understandable, 
silenced by mainstream economics: power asymmetries.
The extraction of “exact” knowledge and enhancing power within those 
territories governed by the British Empire entails the sine qua non idea of 
“surveillance” or “rational administration,” shouldered on Kipling’s “white 
man’s burden” curse.
This sort of “bilateral surveillance” will be generalized into a “multilateral 
surveillance” with the “global” diffusion of the national accounts categories 
whereby a “technocrat” could simultaneously “gaze” various countries and 
“national policies” (Danby 2017: 50).
36 Said (1978).
37 “Nonetheless, the views he [Crossman] ascribes to Horowitz are consistent with Hasho-
mer Hatzair’s ideology of a Jewish rebirth through land and labor, and more broadly with the 
“agrarian ethos” described earlier (…): the idea that there was something false and artificial 
about a diasporic existence that could be fixed by returning to the land of Palestine. It was the 
nationalism that resonated with Crossman, redeeming Horowitz and his colleague (‘their na-
tive country’) as opposed to the American Zionists, which had aroused Crossman’s anti-Sem-
itism” (Danby 2017: 44).
38 “Rather than being a group of experts, the Anglo-American Committee was a sort of jury, 
made up of six middling-prominent men from each country, none of whom had prior knowl-
edge of the region” (Danby 2017: 43) 
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‘The White Man’s Burden’ Curse 39
Summoned by “technical” accounting conundrums, theoretical disputes 
were obligatory to describe and generate alternative vocabularies to explain 
the specificities of those peripheral “nations.” Danby’s bewildering moves 
to send the crucial conceptual specificities and “war of interpretations” to 
the “Notes” section (Danby 2017: 99-102), should incense many readers. 
Western-centric discourses’ differentiation between love and money 
had to be submitted to the test in Africa’s “stormy” social relations while 
instantaneously courting with the statistic indicators by modernizing the 
contours. Alternative strategic discursive possibilities can be observed if 
Frankel’s and Seers’s legacy is observed, despite their displacement: “Frankel’s 
romantic view that Africans had a fundamentally different notion of economy 
from Europeans” (Danby 2017: 83), drove him out of economics, and “Seers’s 
preference for country-specific analyses sensitive to linkages to the outside 
world fell on deaf ears” because they denied an “easily replicable statistical 
practice” (Danby 2017: 83).
The African overview displays the national income accounts “estimations” 
through a series of authors. Africa’s “explorations” by the Western-centric 
auto-imagination intended to comply with the trinity knowledge-surveillance-
surveying a “promise” requiring construction. Scarcely “anthropologists” 
prevailed when Keynes’s earnest researchers arrived at the African plains.
The process in no way means “exactness”: “crude” estimates can be 
produced and checked with each other if we have a slice of the picture, by 
finding out via the residual, the absent element. If A + B = C, then, ignorance 
of B, is established by simply pirouetting one of the elements across the equal 
sign B = C - A. 
The war on statistical dearth was a struggle assumed by all parties involved 
in the “metropole,” hence “national income accountants became expert 
scavengers” (Danby 2017: 84), Danby quotes an early appreciation of African 
accounts:
A national accounts calculation cannot be started in a vacuum, 
although many statisticians must have felt that this was what they were 
doing! But once a minimum amount of information is available, more 
will probably be gained by fitting it together crudely to provide some 
over-all picture of the economy than by improvements in the coverage 
of any particular sector. (Lury in Danby 2017: 84) 
Early incursions in the field of income estimations by skilled technicians 
are exhibited as heroic figures (Doblin in Danby 2017: 85). Retrospectively, 
aspects of the war of interpretations of “collecting data” gets confused:
An example is unpaid household labor. Given an adequate system of 
household surveys, estimating unpaid household labor is easy – or 
39 Kipling’s expression represents a truly power discursive regime par excellence a la Foucault. 
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at least, no harder than estimating many things currently included 
in standard measures of national output. But because it is excluded, 
uniform standards are lacking, and there is little official support for 
household surveys. After seven decades it becomes easy to attribute 
the exclusion to the poor quality of available data, but the causality is 
the other way around. (Danby 2017: 85)
Africa’s savannahs were open for the taking by “junior economists, 
some barely out of their twenties” (Danby 2017: 86). However vigilant the 
“curator” of its “representations,” it is their will to power that hegemonizes 
conversation given the power asymmetries.40 
In retrospect, those names that Danby mentioned, by their “pioneering” 
efforts to build Africa’s colonial accounts, Phyllis Deane41 and especially 
Dudley Seers (who worked at ECLAC in Santiago de Chile) were noteworthy 
in the following years, especially if gazed from a Latin American perspective, 
but for distinct reasons: Deane’s historical account of the process of the 
“industrial revolution” and the description of the evolution of economic 
ideas, unwittingly became a powerful theoretical ally to Latin American 
Structuralist’s development ideas, while Seers may have undergone a “soul-
searching” process, “renewing” himself into quite a different theoretical 
kettle of fish, among the Western-centric economic community, by his 
parallel “pioneering” work within “Latin American Structuralism,” 42 despite 
allegedly “recanting,” according to Toye (2017: 283). 
Deane’s appointment in 1941 for the task in Africa is considered a profound 
act of lucidity, like Meade’s and Stone’s appointment in the second part of the 
1940s. Robinson’s words to that effect are: “At that time there were hardly any 
statistics for a colonial territory (…) We were lucky enough to recruit Phyllis 
Deane to do the work” (Robinson in Danby 2017: 86).
Deane’s own story corroborates the account (no pun intended!):
I was invited to go down to join the National Institute of Economic 
and Social Research (…) asked to do a project inspired by Keynes and 
by Richard Stone and James Meade, who had just set up a system of 
social accounts for the UK national income accounting. And what they 
40 It is ironic that models of truth a la Davidson, in which the “translation” of stories between 
diverse languages or discourses, actually originates with making references to “anthropologi-
cal” discourses in colonial Africa! The advent of “truth” will be the product of a reconstruction 
and translation between discourses and their respective vocabularies, but in which the notion 
of “charity” between the “speakers” is mandatory; by “charity” is meant a situation in which 
the conversation with “the other” implies a mutual endeavor to tell each other the truth (!) or 
trusting the “nature” of the “storyteller” as “truth.” By the way, it is worthwhile to mention that 
one can agree with Davidson’s procedural examination to understand the process by which the 
discursive transformations and translations attain “truth” and dominance, without assuming 
the pertinence of the notion of “charity” and instead recover Nietzsche’s images of the sparks 
of the clashing swords. (Malpas 1992).
41 Deane (1989, 1965).
42 For example, Seers and Dudley (1962, 1963).
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wanted to do was to apply it – what Keynes wanted to happen – was to 
apply this particular system to a completely different economy than 
the UK and they thought they would apply it to colonial territories (…) 
to work out a national income for Northern Rhodesia and Jamaica. 
(Danby 2017: 86)
Deane’s arrival to a hitherto “distant economy” and the theoretical 
controversies in process show an uncanny similar historical parallel with the 
rise of Latin American Structuralism. In contrast to Deane’s previous efforts 
in Jamaica, the generation of national accounts required an active presence 
in the territory to understand “the soil and economic structure of Central 
African peoples” (Danby 2017: 87). Such aspects pertain to production and 
exchanges unsoiled by “monetized” categories which obstructed accessibility 
to “measurement.”
Given the power asymmetries, the perspective charted the vocabulary 
heard in the Palestinian studies in a consistent manner. “African studies” start 
with the “racial division”:
Data for income, output, and expenditure were split between 
European, Asiatic (traders of South Asian descent), and African 
sectors. Deane made no division of that kind for Jamaica. This 
reflected British colonial policy that aimed to keep, or make, Africans 
rural and tribal (Mamdani in Danby 2017: 87)
Deane was encircled by a young group of “British social anthropologists” 
in Northern Rhodesia whose “knowledge” was a prerequisite to “administer 
her surveys” (Danby 2017: 87). Her monograph in 1953 Colonial Social 
Accounting can be read as a description, a “record” (Danby 2017: 87) of 
the dialog between the economists and anthropologists. The elaborate and 
extensive “survey methodology” of rural Central Africa, exhibits Deane’s 
theoretical nightmare in the “estimate” process of agricultural output:
when the range of crops planted was large and harvests were continuous. 
She also acknowledged the difficulties of valuation, in cases in which 
there was only a very limited local market that could be consulted 
for the prices by which quantities of production could be turned into 
money-measured output. But she regarded these as data-gathering 
challenges rather than conceptual conundrums. Much more troubling 
to Deane were the problems of drawing the production boundary 
between economy and household and sorting out households from 
each other. Households were fluid: ‘the sleeping household, the eating 
household, the income household, the producing household, and 
the spending household all represented different combinations and 
permutations within one wide family group’. (Deane in Danby 2017: 
87, my emphasis)
My emphasis above aims to portray the ambiguous and undecided 
nature of the theoretical conundrum in Deane, the riddle can only be solved 
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theoretically by radicalizing the notion of the agent, it required reconstructing 
the then dominant vocabulary of economics.43
Danby’s notion of the agency clearly requires the modern “household/
family” and economy split reiterated in his narrative, which needs 
reconstruction. This move implies that “households” and thus the “agents” 
are the product of a more diverse set of social relations: relations and 
alliances within and between households44 and those who labor, and trade/
exchange under specific conditions: a heterogenous set of conditions of 
existence between and among heterogenous agents. In conceptual terms, we 
are dealing with a simultaneous double movement: agents have no complete 
or guaranteed closure of those contingent conditions that constitute them, 
which in turn are equally heterogenous and transient.
Theoretically, Deane had to consider that the agents in question, namely 
“families,” occupied the “social horizon,” by which one must understand an 
entity with a recognition mechanism and decision-making capacity. Although 
human individuals, they are organized through a specific mouthpiece, as 
“representatives” of an instituted “collective” decision, in which “kinship” 
relations, or “polygamous groups and young bachelors with ties to multiple 
households” (Danby 2017: 88), turn out to be the “real” agents.
Limited understanding on Deane’s part, as recorded by Danby is associated 
with the difficulty to incorporate the social tissue or social relations then 
dominant into some form of statistical order, it relates to the heterogeneity 
of the agents and their social relations to one another, a conceptual hurdle 
which can be overcome by displacing the economy/family split privileged 
by Danby’s argument as well as the notion of “opposed mentalities” (Danby 
2017: 88) (see further ahead).
The story insists on the inadequacy of Deane’s perspective to understand 
and “measure” output. Measuring the “national economy” encounters the 
“intimate” and the “commercial” (Danby 2017: 100) divide, unsettling the 
clear-cut household/commerce boundaries. But a “logical solution” (Danby 
2017: 88) seems in order, in which women’s participation is “integrally” 
included in output/income circle, independently of the “activities” traced 
(i.e. “prostitution”) as the source of the monetary income, or alternatively 
taking into account “villages” as “large households” (Danby 2017: 88). The 
exhibition of the unsolved and contradictory categories in the narrative 
in question examines the “non-marketed” familial or communal “output” 
bringing to light the curse and nightmare of Deane’s perspective. To cope 
“theoretically” with the distinction above, related to the approach to examine 
those heterogenous characteristics of the agents and their conditions of 
existence, Deane advanced the term “transitional” to explain the nature of 
43 See note 34 in Danby (2017: 102).
44 Hence recovering Danby’s own questioning of the notion of a “universal” notion of Kinship. 
(Danby 2007).
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the economies in question, presupposing a teleological process culminating 
in a fully-fledged market society, and hence, the importance, more than ever, 
of data recollection and policy construction.
Deane’s difficulties are the product of replicating Kuznets’s conceptual 
“boundaries”; “output,” “products retained by producers”:
The conceptual boundary she uses is essentially the same as that used 
by Kuznets (1941), who includes in his definition of output ‘products 
retained by producers for their own consumption (especially important 
farmers)’, while excluding domestic services (Kuznets 1941: 9.) (…) 
Another way to put it is that the ‘line of difference between economic 
and non-economic areas existing in real life’ (Kuznets 1933: 209) is no 
longer a parameter to be respected (‘shifting’) but something to be 
shifted via colonial modernization. (Danby 2017: 100)
Parallel to the theoretical enigma in process that Danby described, between 
those activities, which can be considered either economic or non-economic, 
or “non-marketed,” the narrative seemingly changes course, since Deane is 
also “deeply” (Danby 2017: 88) aware that the distinction above is linked to 
“what was in the mind of the person doing it” (Danby 2017: 88). Consequently, 
Deane’s theoretical demon reappeared within the “modernist ideology” version 
as a folk theory: the money/love split (economy/household). 
In other words, Danby perseveres with his standpoint to explain Deane’s 
theoretical nightmare: these are questions related to the form whereby family 
needs and “satisfactions” were resolved. These contravene a money-trade 
driven “motivation,” given the series of cultural hegemonic practices whose 
explanations by the locals (in return for “such-and-such a good or service”) 
implied several social obligations. 
Deane’s accounts, according to Danby apparently corroborate the 
“economy/family” split repudiated by those gazed upon (surveyed) in Africa. 
Therefore, the “economy/family” divide is transformed into an enigma of 
“imputing motivation” (Danby 2017: 89), inducing the next theoretical 
step by introducing the “modernist” narrative, the romantic presumptions. 
Nevertheless, we must not lose sight of the opportunity to build certain 
boundaries in the categories, with the aim to materialize certain productive 
or income “measurements,” in which the category of “motivation”45 might 
be theoretically superfluous. Danby’s account of Deane submits conceivable 
(logical) alternatives: what is integrally included or not within the house/
business divide may receive a wild free card by which to flee from the 
modernist (iron cage), but then the category of the agent and its conditions 
45 According to Deane, “we have still to establish firm conclusions of the mainsprings of econom-
ic behavior in African rural communities, on the motives for work or leisure” (Deane, emphases 
added in Danby 2017: 89) (…) [M]oney does not have the same power of inspiration in the 
semi-subsistence economy. Social and psychological considerations frequently outweigh the 
money factor as a determinant of activity … they often do not even try to make profits from either 
production or exchange (Deane, emphases added in Danby 2017: 89).
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of existence needs to be posed differently and in more general terms, the 
agents may be polymorphous: distinct forces and diverse objectives: not 
only does the notion of the “household” organization become problematic, 
whether “nuclear” or otherwise, but also the agents’ horizon’s configuration 
(productive/not marketed), can be described independently of their own 
“explanations.” Notwithstanding the Keynesian watershed distinction 
money/love, productive/non- productive and the exclusion of women as a 
non-paid activity, we can always “impute” a certain value to their activities.
Even if we concede Danby’s idea, which implies Deane as anticipating 
“the romantic view” that Herbert Frankel propounded,46 the “modernist” 
entrapment is not compulsory. Deane’s perspective (according to Danby) 
allows her to question the “motivations” assumed in developed economies 
which might not wholly differ in “degree” with some of the “ideological” 
choices perceived in “primitive cultures.” But Danby is not prepared to indict 
the theoretical wavering as “Eurocentric”, in the last instance:
she was not ready to simply align primitive and advanced communities, 
because she found Africans inscrutable: ‘the accounting problem is 
not simply that of the acute scarcity of quantitative data … It is also a 
qualitative problem that brings into question the fundamental validity 
for primitive communities of the social accounting concept itself 
(Deane 1953: 115). Without a thorough knowledge of the motives 
for economic behavior in the semi-subsistence economy and of the 
fundamental theories of value which colour the African outlook on 
economic matters it would not be profitable to do more than recognize 
the qualification and accept the limitation on the possible economic 
analysis. Certainly, our knowledge of the African economic outlook is 
not sufficient to permit a more precise analysis. (Deane in Danby 2017: 
89, my emphasis)
The “three-way conversation” (Danby 2017: 89) (Deane, anthropologists, 
and Africans) that Danby highlighted to depict Deane’s surveys and 
procedure, culminates with the “postcolonial point” (Danby 2017: 90), 
which “presume[s] [a] self-clarity of the European economy,” but which, in 
turn, is “itself a fabrication” (Danby 2017: 90). As Danby portrayed, Deane 
46 Frankel, reviewing Deane’s 1948 study, praised her scruple: ‘No author could be at greater 
pains to warn the reader of a tentative conclusion, or a suspected margin of error.’ But he 
wondered ‘why it should ever have been expected that a technique which suits a highly devel-
oped and large-scale national economy such as the United Kingdom should, even if it could, 
be applied to small so-called ‘national’ units which are only just entering the world economy 
through the development of one or two specialized products in them. The whole procedure 
looks like an experiment to discover whether the system of accounting applicable to General 
Motors can throw light on the operations of a whole petrol station run by a man whose main 
livelihood is obtained with the assistance of his wife and children from an agricultural allot-
ment … Are these aggregates a practical tool, or are they the symbols of fashionable concepts 
transferred from very highly developed economic regions to hide our ignorance of economi-
cally backward ones?’ (Frankel in Danby 2017: 100).
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appears as a “tormented bricoleur” rather than the “skilled bricoleur” (Danby 
2017: 90). However, her theoretical nightmare in Africa can, in hindsight, be 
pointed as leaving an indelible sign on her future work on economics and in 
the deceptive “universality” of the categories, which can be made to occupy 
theoretical positions, perhaps unwittingly, close to the Latin American 
Structuralism camp. 
Danby’s “logical solution” (Danby 2017: 90) could have solved the 
problematical nature of the rural communities, portrayed as undefined 
boundaries between households and businesses; this option meant treating 
these communities as “large households” (Danby 2017: 90) lacking “market” 
activities and hence “excluding rural villages entirely from the measured 
economy” (Danby 2017: 90), a posture that Deane rebuffed, as well as the 
alternative: businesses “with no household” (Danby 2017: 90).
On the other hand, Prest and Stewart tackled theoretically the 
polymorphous nature of kinships, the social relations, and the obligatory rules, 
by converting each “household” into an “individual”, positing every good 
and service, received by the individual, “no matter how close” (Danby 2017: 
90). Hence, Nigeria was all business, with the wife’s “bride-prices” setting 
the values as “services to husbands.” This posture received a “unanimous 
condemnation” (Danby 2017: 91): “farcical” in Frankel’s or Gilbert’s words, 
since it refuses to accept certain activities within the household as “economic 
activity” (Danby 2017: 91), but “far-fetched” (Danby 2017: 91) according 
to Peacokand Dossers, or “notorious” (Lury in Danby 2017: 91). But the 
critiques, especially those made by Gilbert and Deane, obey alternative 
theoretical logics. Again, the essence of the dispute seems to be mislaid, since 
the “problem” is related to the way we define the agent or units in question.
In what sense can we establish a monetary relation, or establish a 
“mercantile” or “commodity transaction,” between and within agents or 
“production units-activities?” We have already observed that certain unpaid 
activities “internal” to the household can be “measured” in monetary terms. 
The critique conveys certain reasons through which these activities were 
excluded,47 since, as Danby brilliantly illustrates, there are no univocal 
“technical” accountability obstacles for their exclusion.
Other evaluations assumed that “subsistence output” should be included 
in “total production” (Danby 2017: 91). “Activities” such as output and 
services can be valued: 
On Prest’s argument the reason why all intra-household activity 
(including services) should be treated as a part of the gross domestic 
product of countries like Nigeria is that the relationship between the 
47 In Deane’s words: “The strange reasoning whereby they embrace such activities as childrear-
ing, child minding, and the like in total production, and measure a year’s supply of non-agricul-
tural, non-trading activities of women in terms of the bride payments in a given year” (Deane 
in Danby 2017: 91).
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members of the family is closer to a commercial one in Nigeria than 
that to which we are accustomed in the West. This led him to the 
dubious but amusing exercise of estimating services by reference to 
the number of wives and the average bride price. It is doubtful whether 
this would have made sense to a Nigerian in 1950; it certainly does not 
make sense today. (Okigbo in Danby 2017: 91)
On the other hand, Eke wrote that Prest:
included the output of practically all agents or factors whose activities 
are remotely economic (…) illegal, imputed value to intra-household 
services, and placed monetary value on child bearing. This excursion 
by Prest could easily be dismissed as ludicrous, but (…) Prest seems to 
have gone into all this needless trouble not just because of his stated 
reason (the family life is more commercialized in Nigeria than in the 
West which of course is an illusion) but also because of his stated 
objective. He wanted to measure the level of economic welfare. He 
seemed to have failed to realize that no matter how widely he may 
define his output the omission of services and products which affect 
people’s welfare is unavoidable. (Eke in Danby 2017: 91-92)  
It is no wonder that Danby defines these episodes on “accounting” and 
economic categories in Africa as a “fascinating moment” (Danby 2017: 
92), an era inscribed in a procrustean bed of redefinitions, of theoretical 
transformations, mirrored in the respective will to power and war of 
interpretations between and within Center-Periphery development policies 
debates, during which pos-colonial economics emerged.
But articulated by the economy/family split modernist problematic and 
however eccentric, the vocabulary is “irreplaceable”:
There was nothing logically wrong with what Prest and Stewart did. 
Nor was their use of bride-prices to estimate wives’ services, however 
outlandish it can be made to appear, outside the practice of bricolage 
described (…) opportunistically using any available data to estimate 
different sectors of an economy. What made it ‘strange,’ ‘farcical,’ 
‘ludicrous,’ ‘dubious,’ and ‘notorious’ was its taboo-breaking challenge 
to the foundational assumptions about the economy as Marshall had 
framed it. Marshall’s argument, (…) was that a modern distinction 
between love and commerce allowed each to flourish in its own 
sphere. Thus, the modern society was superior in both respects to 
the traditional society in which these things were mingled. Okigbo’s 
and Eze’s rebukes to Prest and Stewart can be set alongside V.K. R. 
V. Rao’s defense of the separateness and non-economic nature of 
Indian households (…). All these authors recognized the implicit insult 
of regarding the domestic arrangements of their native countries as 
commercial and calculating, as falling short of fully self-sacrificing 
love. In the overarching modernist context, the only way to rescue love 
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was to adopt the same conventions British national income accounts 
followed. But what is interesting is not just that Rao, Okigbo, and Eke 
disputed the idea that their native countries were deficient in love, but 
that British and American economists led the charge. An economist 
like Milton Gilbert probably had little interest in Nigerian family 
life as such, but he had a large stake in the universal applicability of 
standardized national accounting. Okigbo and Eke spoke his language 
and supported his project; Prest and Stewart challenged it. (Danby 
2017: 92, last but one emphasis are mine)
Two aspects of the quotation are significant, especially if we are to 
recover Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge couple: “taboo-breaking” 
strategies imply a struggle, a search for an alternative strategic hegemonic 
move, in which Prest and Stewart’s demise was profound: they were 
“silenced.” But in contrast to Danby’s appreciation of the strategy, Gilbert 
was obliged to spearhead “the charge,” given what was at stake in the 
struggle, and “own up” the posture. The antagonistic “noises” of the war of 
interpretation in question are actually deafening: the hegemonic struggle 
implies precisely, simultaneously a “taboo-breaking” drive (victor or 
vanquished can only be “instituted” in hindsight) and a “charge,” and as 
the case above proves, and it was not just chance that those institutionally 
powerful swayed the day.
Equally displaced and silenced was Herbert Frankel’s critique and 
appreciation of the “data” collection-research and accounting vocabulary, 
but for alternative reasons, his liberalism and anti-government perspective 
placed his work, independently of the categories, outside of what was then 
becoming “development” mainstream discourse. To top it all, his opposition 
to Apartheid in South Africa made his academic and political life difficult, 
and in 1946 he left for Oxford: “He believed that Africans were fundamentally 
culturally different from Europeans, and on that basis, he became a leading 
critic of extension of national income accounting to Africa” (Danby 2017: 
92). His “cultural relativism” (Danby 2017: 102), hence his “praise” (Danby 
2017: 102) for Gaathon, the Palestine analysis, and for positive evaluations of 
so-called “economic dualism,” resembled the “welfare approach” to national 
income, which is reminiscent of Kuznets: 
National income accounting’s project should be to measure the 
sum of good things flowing to people (…) he had to address ethical 
questions of what counted as good (…) what Africans considered good 
was fundamentally different from what Europeans considered good. 
(Danby 2017: 93, my emphasis)
Danby discloses these debates in a consistent manner to incorporate them 
into an “underlying romanticism”:
Just as German or British romantics described the ideal village 
economy as a rich, society-making process whose purpose was as 
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much to maintain dense social interactions as to produce goods: they 
hunted not because they wanted meat but because they liked hunting; 
they made large work parties for farming not because it was efficient 
but because it was social. (Danby 2017: 93)
Simultaneously, Danby’s story aims to dissipate the idea that he is imposing 
on Frankel’s work a sort of “future anterior” (L. Althusser) effect: reading his 
earlier “romanticist” presumptions by way of later theoretical resonances, 
which is “difficult to demonstrate” but “an equally plausible source might 
simply be the common colonialist’s view that natives are incorrigibly native” 
(Danby 2017: 102). 
Frankel’s “disinterest” for the “Keynesian” and Deane’s “theoretical 
armature” (Danby 2017: 93), and/or “modernization” projects is not 
necessarily, as Danby contends, lack of “sympathy”, rather it is “liberalism” 
that underlines Frankel’s opposition to “development economics”:
in terms of the logical choices presented by the Marshallian definition, 
which are to regard African economies as falling entirely under the 
sphere of business, or somewhere in between, we could slot Frankel 
into the ‘all household’ camp, Prest and Stewart into the ‘all business’ 
camp, and Deane somewhere in between. This explains the difference 
between Frankel’s polite skepticism toward Deane and open hostility 
toward Prest and Stewart. Frankel also dissented from Deane’s view 
that non-marketed African activity was poised to enter the market 
and should. He was hostile to ‘development’ Economics as it gathered 
steam after WWII, assailing ‘dualist’ models like that of Arthur Lewis 
that foresaw the rapid modernization of the ‘traditional’ sector of a 
nation’s economy. (Danby 2017: 93)
Frankel’s works in 1952 and 1953 “eloquently” (Danby 2017: 101) 
developed this theme:
The activity and the income are inseparable and are both embedded 
together in the customs and ways of thought which mould the social 
life of the community as a whole. To endeavour to assess and compare 
‘welfare’ merely by comparing national income aggregates for societies 
with different laws, rules conventions, hopes, and ideal is as fallacious 
as to try to assess the pleasure which a pair of players derive from 
playing dominoes, and then compare it with that yielded to another 
pair engaged in playing chess, by comparing the points scored by the 
players in each game. (Frankel in Danby 2017: 93)
But Frankel’s arguments were seldom taken seriously, according to 
Danby. Subsequently, later, academia recovered these ideas in the “formalist-
substantivist” debates in the 1960s within the anthropologist camp. Dalton 
“approvingly quoted” both Deane’s “doubts about applying economic 
analysis to African settings” (Danby 2017: 94) and Frankel’s work:
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If the categories we use to describe output disposition are to 
be analytically revealing they must be derived from the special 
characteristics of indigenous African economies. We follow therefore 
the African emphasis on the social obligations to pay and to give, and 
the rights to receive goods and services, built into social situations. 
(Dalton in Danby 2017: 94) 
But Danby seems to be turning the table on Dalton, questioning his 
apparent premise in which “mainstream academic Economics” seemingly 
appears as the appropriate “self-understanding” (Danby 2017: 94) of the 
West and aberrantly out of line in Africa. The interpretation of Dalton’s 
appreciations, in Danby’s terms, follows the “romantic trope of the cultural 
unit,” which “must be understood on its own terms” and not through an “alien 
and universal logic” (Danby 2017: 94).48
My beef on this occasion refers to the suggestion that turns the “productive 
nature of the rationalist/romantic split” (Danby 2017: 94) as the necessary 
origin of the “substantive” categories developed in Dalton’s narrative: although 
“Western-centric” discourses are not the adequate substratum to explain the 
African plains (with which I coincide), Dalton’s argument should be analyzed 
and evaluated on its own terms, without conferring a “free pass to ignore 
culture” (Danby 2017: 94) when examining Dalton’s specific categories and 
arguments.49
According to Danby the theoretical conceptual problems above, seem 
to be the product of the potential “comparability” of distinct economic 
formations and the “data-gathering estimation apparatus,” that is, two 
distinct theoretical moments that must be separated. The former conundrum 
(“comparability”) and the latter (“categories for data gathering”) presuppose 
a conceptual bridge, which merge, however “real” or “unreal,” the process 
in question (love/money dichotomy, non-payment of activities) within the 
household. 
Indeed, however “eccentric” Frankel’s political and theoretical posture 
may be as a “liberal,” when push comes to shove, outright rejection of 
“Keynesianism” becomes the norm; “Romanticism” per se does not imply 
any unique necessary set of social relations, which in turn is open to an 
alternative analysis. The “Western-centric” vision, both explicit and implicit 
in Frankel’s discourse, only illuminates the theoretical limitations, and does 
not preclude an alternative theoretical strategy, but rather mandates an 
48 “The marginalization of Frankel and Seers suggest that one requirement for being a main-
stream economist in the postwar period was accepting comparability, which meant accepting 
the underlying theoretical armature” (Danby 2017: 102, note number 34)
49 Herskovits’s “cross-disciplinary attack on the problems of economic growth” (Danby 2017: 
94) and the differences between “academic disciplines” (Danby 2017: 94), as a way to delimit a 
“boundary” whereby a “free card” is donated to study Africans, need not, nor does not become 
an imperative, as Danby’s insistence implies, since anthropologists also take into consideration 
“whether” “social obligations to pay and to give,” or “total cultural context” matter in the “in-
dustrialized countries” themselves.
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ethical imperative to do so.50
For his part, Seers’s was everything that Frankel’s theoretical and ethical 
posture was not!! He consciously struggled against the specter of “the white 
man’s burden” curse that haunted him all his life, aware of the undecidable 
explicit and implicit ethical guidelines of most economic narratives, but 
especially in neoclassical thought. 
Seers’s “two significant” pieces about national income estimates, one of 
them about current Ghana and the other one dedicated to an “underdeveloped” 
area, underlined limitations, and “sketchiness” of national income in colonial 
Africa, which was countered by Seers by an alternative proposal, taking 
into consideration a heterogenous “national economy,” “distinct sectors,” 
unstably assembled. Seers’s main object examines an export sector of a 
primary product (cocoa), the domestic agricultural sector and diverse 
non-agricultural production. The problematic described is reminiscent of 
Ferguson’s critique of “Lesotho,” a dependent entity of South Africa: but in 
this case the dependent colonial economy in question managed somehow to 
steer clear of the consequences of the relatively asymmetric price movements 
with respect to their international realm, despite the unintegrated domestic 
nature of its “economy”: Lesotho was simply an appendix to the South 
African economy, a labor reserve area.
Hitherto data gathering in developing nations meant relying on gathering 
all sorts of alternative data, and hence was prone to large “errors” (Danby 
2017: 96), which made it difficult to compare among countries or “even for the 
same country in different years” (Danby 2017: 96). Hence Seers’s insistence 
on the foolishness of aiming to build a model as an internally “coherent” 
stable “creature” (Danby 2017: 96) analogous to a “mechanical clock” (Danby 
2017: 96), relying on how its parts can be assembled but contradicted by a 
“changing institutional structure” (Danby 2017: 96).
Seers’s argument points to the inadequacies of the terms used: 
The very words ‘mechanism’ or ‘model’ convey the mental picture of a 
great piece of machinery. It is not at all certain whether this is the most 
useful mental picture even for a developed economy, since it suggests a 
misleading stability of structure… Such ‘models’ are in any case hardly 
needed to explain economic developments. (Seers in Danby 2017: 96) 
Cycle studies or fluctuations displayed in the trading context of the 
primary product countries (Periphery) are more complex if examined 
from the peripheral economic formation’s perspective, in contrast to 
“world commodity prices, [which] are much simpler” (Danby 2017: 96) as 
customers in the Center portrayed them. Foreign trade statistics introduced 
50 Frankel’s theoretical admonition to keep away from “economists” (“warning to other an-
thropologists to steer clear of economists” (Danby 2017: 95), might actually weaken and sur-
render any mechanisms with which to undertake the struggle and thus hinder some form of 
participation in redirecting policies. 
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in the Periphery exhibit an instability which must be contrasted with the 
“national income estimates,” presumed stable and “coheren[t]” (Danby 2017: 
96). Equally important is the theoretical challenge of aspects that are not 
necessarily associated with the “estimates” themselves:
The approach implies that as a first priority, instead of trying to fill the 
gaps in the ‘national income,’ statistical resources should be devoted 
to strengthening and extending foreign trade statistics – particularly 
to improving valuation and classification. Since an underdeveloped 
country ipso facto relies on the proceeds of exports for much of its 
income, and on imports for most consumer goods (other than food) 
and for nearly all capital goods, the trade returns supply much of the 
information which must taken elsewhere from tax statistics (on sources 
of income), from censuses of production and distribution, or the 
statistics collected by trade associations and retailers (on supplies to 
the home market). (Seers in Danby 2017: 97)
According to Danby it is not univocally just a problem of national income 
data gathering. A more profound theoretical hurdle is present at the same 
time, namely, the notion of the totality in question:
Keynesian national income accounting starts by assuming a coherent 
and self-sufficient closed economy with a complete set of institutions, 
and then only grudgingly opens the borders to allow goods and finance 
to trickle across them – but without reimagining the institutions that 
structure the national economy. Seers is calling on us to start with 
the international linkages, and then build our picture of the ‘national 
economy’ out of those. (Danby 2017: 97, my emphasis)
The description of Prest’s critique of Seers’s reflection highlights this 
aspect:
Prest evaded Seers’s main arguments and focused on minor estimation 
points. Prest never questioned the existence, coherence, or stability of 
the thing he was measuring, and read Seers only as a series of quibbles 
over how that should be measured. These were the same tactics used 
against Frankel: to translate all fundamental critiques into technical 
quibbles, and then argue that the technical quibbles are resolvable with 
more technical work. (Danby 2017: 97)
Significant in Danby’s description of the “quibble” in question, it relates 
to the apparent source of the ambiguity as if it was a “technical” debate, 
independently of the theoretical aspects of the social relations of the object 
examined. On certain occasions, the story portrayed the similarity of 
“tactics” (Danby 2017: 97) used equally against Frankel and Seers despite 
their divergent theoretical differences depicted by the “social” in question 
as well as the historical specificities of the agents that they emphasized 
in those African societies: for Frankel, the markets at the time were 
undergoing a process of evolutionary emergence. That was the benchmark 
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to be observed as the necessary and appropriate mechanism to think 
production/distribution, but which Seers problematized.
It may well be claimed that they share the “modernist” split, but what seems 
theoretically and politically important is the presence of a counterposed 
strategy in the making, aiming to displace the Western “imagination.” 
However, in certain parts of Danby’s story, the “iron cage” of the modernist 
discourse seems devoid of alternatives, free from the contested and potential 
struggle. 
Mobile Army of Metaphors: Post-Keynesianism and Latin American 
Structuralism
Danby’s own description transfers this problematic into a “similar” 
“dialog” (Danby 2017: 97) in the “Latin American ‘structuralist-monetarist’ 
debate:”
in which Seers was also a participant. The structuralist side, which 
included even more radical figures, such as Celso Furtado and Juan 
Noyola, understood Latin American economies as theaters of political/
economic conflict between different groups, not all of which were 
national. Depending on the country in question, those groups might 
include agricultural exporters whose interests and economic lives 
were much more closely tied up to foreign markets and finance than 
domestic institutions. (…) A standardized Economics that understood 
national economies as bounded, uniform organisms had no place for 
these insights. (Danby 2017: 97)
Key theoretical aspects are associated to the notion of agents, and the 
economic formation or “totality” constructed. The technical aspects of 
measuring and the data gathering techniques may seem marginal, but Danby 
argues that these debates generated about “national economies” as entities in 
themselves with little overlapping “of foreign influences” (Danby 2017: 98), 
which were thought in the “Marshallian sense” (Danby 2017: 98), aimed at 
making a clear cut divide between household and business “sectors,” thus 
turning “problems of making the distinction” into a “merely technical” 
(Danby 2017: 98) issue.
Rather, a theoretical “disagreement” is required for turning those 
distinctions thinkable and, hence, for assuming the heterogenous nature of 
the agents (humans, sectors, households) in question. The fantastic Western-
centric “auto-imagination” considered by Seers’s critique on the importance 
of the “unintegrated” characteristics of the national unit and its external 
networks were simply unimportant.
On the one hand, we must merit Danby’s perseverant attitude to reject as 
plausible and sufficient the explanation, which assumes that the “ideological” 
dominion of romanticist modernism is simply an effect of the ethno-centric 
prejudices in question, but on the other, the theoretical mechanism whereby 
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he questions those sharing the predispositions are close to circular: to 
neutralize those explanations Danby argues that these stories proceed from 
the presumption of the existence of a “bounded” and “coherent” entity or 
totality (the “West”), which means that the enunciative modality or agency, 
and its statements, are assumed to be necessarily “consistent.” However, if 
agents or the enunciative modality are not necessarily fully in control of their 
conditions of existence (hence their “heterogenous” characteristics), the 
agency or the entity has no privileged and “plenitude” “self-understanding” 
or knowledge. Furthermore, the “Western-centric” indictment presupposes 
that those discourses are a coherent set of statements, but which only slip 
up when they leave the “space” to which those categories were supposedly 
constructed (the Center). 
Danby instantaneously denied both the agency’s unity of the West and 
the alleged implicit or explicit notion that Western-centric discourses are 
coherent in themselves. However, the latter’s repudiation is not grounded, 
in Danby’s narrative, on denying the theoretical consistency of the former:
I see no good reason to believe that any Economics, either orthodox or 
heterodox, deeply comprehended everyday material life in places like 
Western Europe or the United States of America. What is going on is 
not the exporting of an autochthonous ‘European’ perspective, but the 
construction of a European self-imagination. (Danby 2017: 98)
There could be no better unsullied manner to describe how “Western-
centric” discourse constructs its fantastic “self-imagination” (Danby 2017: 98) 
and yet Danby is well aware that the means of representation are not innocent 
verbal mechanisms exempted from the power asymmetries. Therefore, both 
the presumptions of a continental unity which seemingly generates these 
discourses and their (in)competence to describe appropriately its own form 
of “being,” have a role in the war of interpretations, but then indictments on 
the enunciative modality as “Western-centric” are not necessarily out of order 
and can certainly be posed as a first theoretical strategy to overpower (pun 
intended!) the hurdle in the theoretical reconstruction of those categories 
themselves.
In other words, what must be examined are those conditions of existence 
of the conceptual entities in question, which transcend the traditional 
knowledge/being relationship: both sides do not conform into a general form 
of representation, nor a unitary form of being. 
Discourses should be examined as forming part of the war of 
interpretations. Danby could counter by pointing to the “productive nature 
of the rationalist/romantic split” (Danby 2017: 94) as the creation of 
political economy, and modernist discourse, as a “combination of repulsion 
and attraction,” a “bad-tempered collaboration” (Danby 2017: 9) between 
romantics and rationalists.51 But then, the category of “ideological” has 
51 “All the characteristics of modernist political economy noted (…) are shared by two contend-
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no important role to explain the logic of the arguments or the source of 
substantive concepts.
Danby’s narrative implies a “thickly cultural understanding of economy” 
(Danby 2017: 119) but his theoretical aims to elucidate “uncritical descriptions 
of the economy,” compels him to define those categories. Notwithstanding 
the dazzling, profound and nuanced historical depiction of the evolution of 
political economy, in certain occasions the book tends to nullify questions 
related to taking on the “social” (Wade Hands 2005).
If “romanticism” is conceived as a well-organized discursive totality (an 
“iron cage”), it is practically and discursively hopeless to suggest or construct 
distinct and alternative discourses, which is what happens, unwittingly or 
not, according to Danby’s argument:
At the foundation of romantic social thought is the idea that society 
is built out of and depends on common understanding and shared 
meanings. Just as (sic) we expect coreligionists to share common 
understandings via texts, images, songs, and rituals, so a romantic 
social analyst looks for the shared core of ideas and understandings 
in society in general, and then asks how they are shared. This is why 
art is so vital to the romantics: it is how communities develop and 
share meanings. (…) Moreover, the romantic model of knowledge 
comes from the practice of art and the scholarship of art, which are 
bodies of common knowledge and tradition learned with difficulty 
and discipline. While romantics praise individual geniuses in the 
arts, they are always geniuses at accessing collective truth and 
communicating it back to the collective. (…) if human society rests 
on knowing, on interpretation, on shared meaning, and if every 
interaction affects those shared meanings, then we can ask about 
the social and moral implications of buying a sandwich. How odd, 
a romantic would say, to think that the paid work that shapes our 
lives (…) are nothing but technical solutions to technical problems. 
(Danby 2017: 121-122)52
Therefore, meanings and “economic transactions” (Danby 2017: 121) 
circulate simultaneously via a series of reiterations and habits (Hodgson 
2004, 2006, 2007), although the former are conceived as a more “existentially” 
loaded event, since it “knits” together social relations (society), aspects not 
related necessarily to whether the products are “expensive.”
ing moieties within modernist political economy, rationalists and romantics. I have sought to 
reframe the showy hostilities between them as a ritual combat atop a substantial, consequen-
tial, and troubling platform of agreement” (Danby 2017: 170)
52 “First, romantics are concerned with shared knowledge and understanding, not just feelings. 
(…) attentive to scarcities of time and attention (…) Bad art crowds out good art. (…) one char-
acteristic of bad art is irresponsible circulation of signs. (…) Romantic critique of fashionable 
clothing, popular novels, and money all sound alarm that signifiers have gotten loose and are 
reproducing irresponsibly.” (Danby 2017: 122)
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On the one hand, Danby’s critique seems to follow my own theoretical 
demons: “There are no [universal] historical actors. Neither gender, race, 
nor sexuality operates on large scales” (Danby 2017: 147), but then the 
encompassing modernist discursive formation cannot be presumed as a self-
enclosed cohesive unified “episteme,” but rather as a potentially antagonistic 
ensemble through which the theoretical transformations and distinct 
enunciative modalities are reconfigured. But on the other hand, the crucial 
concept of “scale,”, which Danby introduces into the soul of political economy, 
implies an alternative and more general and radicalized (antagonistic) 
concept of the agent (heterogenous) and its conditions of existence, which is 
implicitly a prerequisite to uphold a “multi-scalar” (Giampietro et. al. 2011) 
perspective of the “social” complex, or the Center-Periphery perspective for 
that matter. 
However, if the agent is not necessarily an individual human being 
(differing scales and entities), the story may displace the central role accorded 
to the examination of “motives in question” without much theoretical cost. 
More so significant is the examination of the power asymmetries, which 
constitute the agents and their conditions of existence: the possession 
in separation of certain of the prerequisites for their actual subsistence, 
whether organized/distributed traditionally or “culturally,” elements that 
Danby highlighted.
At the same time, he tackles the limitations of those romantic apocalyptic 
discursive modes,53 not only because they offer little substance or 
understanding regarding the financial ensembles and instruments discussed, 
but also because it leaves their “practitioners defenseless” to the IMF’s own 
contention on the inexistence of political and/or explicative alternatives to 
“global markets,” which allegedly is a product of a “single powerful force” 
(Danby 2017: 157).
The incorporation of people and capital movement across boundaries 
and their conditions of existence, absent in mainstream economics, makes 
theoretically prominent the notions of scales of the “national” or “global,” 
since these “spaces” are not “natural,” but rather “conjured into existence” 
(Danby 2017: 161). Whether one thinks of them as a product of the concept 
of the family/business split, vis-à-vis the economy, with opposed ethical 
features, love/money characteristics or the creativity which the forced 
migrations exhibit through a vast series of associations (Delgado and Marquez 
2006, Aragones 2015, Guha 1998), “scale making” requires conceptual 
justification. The “world scale” perspective implies an intercommunicating 
process between “families” and (national) economies (Center-Periphery), in 
53 According to Danby, “romantic anti-globalizers” find “finance opaque, malign, and violent; 
and we know about it not directly, via our senses and reason, but indirectly via our confusion, 
dread, and alarm. For all their rhetorical truculence, these anti-globalization theorists re-affirm 
the IMF’s view of the world. If we are to escape this trap we need to rethink the modernist 
priors that reproduce this agreement on the shape and nature of the world” (Danby 2017: 157)
224
which the concept of the mechanical financial “flows” of goods and finance is 
unsatisfactory in orthodox narratives.
The heterogeneity and power asymmetries’ characteristics of the “world,” 
“the modernist template” (Danby 2017: 162), defined as “untidy, loosely 
structured and cruelly unequal” (Danby 2017: 162), reveals Danby’s ambiguity 
with respect to certain potential political alternatives within the individual/
collective antagonistic divide: showing that the “modernist template” “limits 
our ability to understand the world” (Danby 2017: 161), it actually restricts 
the “political choices” (Danby 2017: 162). But the explanation whereby 
the “modernist” discourse “hides” the world tends to complicate and 
obscure his own posture on these crucial ethical-political decisions, since, 
notwithstanding the above declarations, he does display “alternatives” which 
he calls “Post-Keynesian Economics,” and/or the “heterodox” literature.
Ontologically speaking, despite the “material” and “cultural” coalescence 
of the world (“what it is”), it seems unequivocally no “better or nicer.” 
This singular and undecidable form of posing the examination of the social 
relations (individual/collective antagonistic divide) which are to be assessed 
is a tortuous episode which although hesitantly, is seemingly disavowed.
By means of the perspective mentioned, Danby proposed to understand 
“monetary and capitalist relations and multiple scales” (Danby 2017: 162), 
firstly criticizing the modernist narrative which “carves up” (Danby 2017: 
162) economic formations (Danby’s term is “society”), in “two opposed 
principles of loving households and competitive markets” (Danby 2017: 162) 
(“antagonistic markets,” my term). I believe the theoretical distinctions are 
important and they support his argument. 
The outcome of Danby’s examination of the modernist “ontological” 
discourse depiction of the “loving households versus competitive markets” 
culminates indicting as “poor” (Danby 2017: 162) ways to understand and 
divide the “complex social world” (Danby 2017: 161). On the one hand, 
even if the notion of “face to face” social relations are theoretically possible, 
the realm of “solidaristic” kinships is not inevitably required. On the other 
hand, the “impersonal” qualities of finance and business activities cannot be 
fully understood as unescapable offshoots of “competitive markets” (Danby 
2017: 162). Instead, for what follows, the latter expression can be replaced by 
“antagonistic markets” which follows Danby’s own theoretical leap. Before 
radicalizing these aspects, whose sources can equally be found in Latin 
American Structuralism, and common to Post-Keynesian political economy, 
let us examine Danby’s text:
In post-Keynesian theory, business and finance may be heterogenous 
in institutional terms. Some markets are competitive, some are 
oligopolistic, some are monopolistic, and some are regulated by the 
government. Large and small firms may be very different creatures. 
Firms are often linked in enduring ways. Key prices like interest rates, 
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exchange rates, and wages may be as much a product of political as 
market forces. This framework may incorporate productive activity 
that goes on under the name of household and kinship and may 
work out its complex interactions with activity under other names. 
By starting from concepts of time and fundamental uncertainty that 
stretch across institutionally heterogenous kinds of production, we 
can avoid presuming modernist ontology. Moreover, a theory of this 
kind is better able to understand patterns of dispossession, exclusion, 
and abjection that are ignored by a social ontology that boils down to 
loving families, plus impersonal markets on which anyone can buy and 
sell. (Danby 2017: 162)
First of all, the concept of “markets”: are they an ensemble of distinct 
geographical spaces in which we localize a series of goods that can be bought, 
or is the category the means by which we aim to theorize the “antagonistic” 
intensity of diverse and heterogenous agents,54 or alternatively, is it the locus of 
the power asymmetries in question?55 So-called “competitive,” “oligopolistic,” 
“monopolistic” characteristics on occasions, appear to refer to “markets” in 
the general sense presumed by the existence or otherwise, of a broader set 
of producers, but then those entities’ “markets” are not “agents,” since they 
don’t exhibit a mechanism through which a unitary calculus decision/choice 
is present. Agents’ internal/external antagonistic mechanism is specific: a 
principal source may be wage levels, vis-à-vis the procedural “price” calculus 
decision/choice moment of its administrative management (corporate or 
otherwise), which in turn is a construct, a practice, a habit institutionally 
established under certain antagonistic set of diverse-heterogenous conditions 
of existence. It is in this sense that agents are heterogenous, significantly so 
because they possess in separation only certain specific and distinct set of 
those conditions of their existence, which generates the “heterogeneity” in 
question, a product of the power asymmetries.56 Notice must be taken that the 
term “competition,” as contrary to “monopoly,” or degrees thereof, is plainly 
insufficient and theoretically impertinent, to think power asymmetries: 
the concept of “antagonism” has a “horizontal,” relational embeddedness 
characteristic among and between agents, which displaces the architectural 
base and superstructure analogies”: “downward or upward reconstitutive 
causation.” Therefore, both economic formations and agents present no 
necessary unified form of being and/or causality/determination. Markets, 
54 On heterogeneity, see further ahead.
55 Hence, M. Kalecki’s unhesitant definition of these power asymmetries (a relative notion) 
with the term “degree of monopoly power” (López and Assous 2010), which should not be 
confused with the notion of “monopoly.” 
56 Hence, “classes” can be specified according to those “entities” possessed in separation (tan-
gible or intangible; “things” or “permissions-property rights.” Obviously, a partial theoretical 
prelude to Latin American Structuralism was given by Marx, but superseded, in its Hegelian 
sense, by the former, and thus no concept of totality or necessary evolutionary process is re-
quired in a heterogenous, contingent set of social relations, see further ahead.
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as localities to buy “stuff,” a specific realm where goods are bought and sold 
as such are not “agents,” they lack a mechanism of recognition to undertake 
choice-decisions (unless distinct agents/traders coalesce into a unit-whole).57 
However, the presence of “markets” presupposes those “social relations” 
through which to think the articulation of a specific set of the conditions of 
existence of the agents in question, which are possessed in separation from 
each other. The agents’ choice-decision horizon is undertaken within specific 
power asymmetries, distinct price and interest rates, and differing time-scale 
ranges, hence “markets” can only be converted or gazed upon as agents, if 
they exhibit unity and a mechanism to “manage” choice-decisions. Therefore, 
within “markets,” localities, there might be several (heterogenous) agents, 
buyers, sellers, visitors, etc. Which does not exclude their association and 
construction of a sort of “monopoly.”
Therefore, agents are the product of transient, contingent institutionalization 
patterns, of certain social antagonistic practices, which generate rules and 
habits. Therefore, the notion of “systems” or totalities seems theoretically 
impertinent. Through the figure of the antagonism of agents, and between 
“economic formations” (not “societies”), both Center and Periphery, we can 
represent a privileged locus for the existence of agents, whether households, 
solidaristic or not, or “kinship” ensembles, which in turn have no pre-
established necessary unified form. The “household” may become the fountain 
head of antagonisms, exhibiting either real or imaginary power asymmetries, as 
the feminist movement has appropriately demonstrated.
The flow of goods and people, their associations, at local (which also 
comprises Center-Periphery antagonisms) and global “scale” (Center-
Periphery) is most effectively perceived in a “multi-scalar” complex: distinct 
angles of vision by agents, with respect to their own diverse set and plural 
heterogenous conditions of existence. In relative terms, these specific conditions 
of existence cannot be generalized. They are always transient, contingent, and 
culturally specific.58 The strategies and examination of those antagonisms, 
which we can call the individual-collective divide, is the object of the 
reform struggle: the plans for their reconfiguration (power asymmetries) 
are always constitutively undecidable, given their heterogenous situation: 
possession separately from a certain set of their conditions of existence must 
57 Units of productive (agents), whose conditions of existence are of their “own” so to speak, 
may coalesce into a larger entity, a classic in this sense is Marx’s sectoral description of the 
“concentration” under one roof (one agent), those tasks which were dispersed and undertaken 
by diverse and distinct agents/production units, distinguishing between formal and real sub-
sumption of capital. Significantly, today many “productive” tasks show an inverse “historical” 
process: the proliferation “home-office” type of jobs, or “outsourcing” reduces many respon-
sibilities and costs of the “larger” corporations or capital.
58 In fact, Danby has argued that “core institutions are not universal and that other constella-
tions of institutions may function to undergird forward transactions at the micro level, and 
stabilize price levels at the macro level (…) It is reasonable to expect money to mean different 
things and play different roles in differently structured economies” (Danby 2000: 419).
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be examined from a “multi-scalar” perspective. The notion of scales, as Danby 
perseveres, is important to examine and to pose the respective (contested) 
policies with which to transform those social relations. Hence, the notion 
of a “non-ergodic” uncertain and “multi-scalar” perspective presupposes 
the heterogenous and plural universe described above. By extension, the 
reform-revolution dichotomy must be substituted by “piecemeal” reforms 
or sectors, agents, since there are no general conditions of existence through 
which to construct a more equal world: the “socialization” of “possession” 
into some form of unity of those conditions by means of a “plan” could mean 
many things, but essentially, one is thinking of transforming possession in 
separation into a “non-separation” ensemble through the plan. But if this path 
can be potentially examined, the entities to be possessed “collectively” (not in 
separation) is the “plan” (not necessarily things), which again pertain to those 
conditions of existence which permit the instituting of a “plan,” implying the 
resurrection of the notion of “separateness” and, hence, examinations of 
institutions, practices, agents, and algorithms. 
Hence, the concept of “time,” as Danby underlined, is crucial. The emphasis 
on the notion of time disparity scales is crucial since these asynchronies form 
part of one of those power asymmetries previously highlighted. Agents have 
distinct temporal interludes, for example, in differing payment and cash 
flow dates, which explains Prebisch’s notion of “time disparities,” among 
and between agents, as well as Center-Periphery asynchrony, including 
those within the Peripheries and/or distinct economic formations: “Center-
Periphery” antagonisms.
The Center-Periphery perspective understanding of the productive and 
financial “cycles,” or circulating time periods, underlines the disparity, or 
“time” asynchrony under which diverse sectors and agents configure their 
calculations,59 which presupposes the heterogeneity in question: the inherent 
antagonism in the process through which prices are instituted, that is, the 
differing real or imaginary profit rates perceived and constructed, underlines 
much of Danby’s description of post-Keynesian theory as does the expression 
of “time gaps” used and Prebisch’s own notion of “time disparities.” These 
aspects reveal the problematic and uncertain consequences within contingent 
rules in process which agents must resolve, through a series of discursive and 
practical “conventional” habits (the “prices”) in question:
Some institution or institutions must handle this - I use ‘institution’ in 
a general sense of some regularized system of interaction with rules, 
whether it is embodied in an organization, enforced by contract law, 
despotically coerced, or supported by an informal social code. One of 
the more interesting questions (…) is how this coordination works [?] 
59 I presume that the notion of the “rational agent” or “representative agent” and “equilibrium” 




But Danby’s admirable theoretical transition exhibits certain ambivalences 
if looked at from Furtado’s or Prebisch’s posing of the problem. In some 
cases, mainstream and post-Keynesian economics share certain common 
specifications regarding “households” and “business.”61 We aim to show, 
through Danby’s own categories, the positive effect of their inclusion but 
within an alternative more encompassing concept of the “agent.” Although 
“households” “produce” a set of “services” (Danby 2017: 163) within the 
unit in question, these are equally “time-sensitive,” whether in money 
or institutionally arranged conventions. These activities-services and 
their “equivalences” and “exchanges,” between agents, “households” or 
“businesses” are not “pre-constituted,” and their conditions of existence are 
equally the product of antagonistic coordinating moments and decision-
choice making. In other words, neither “households” nor “businesses” are a 
“bed of roses.” Danby’s presentation of the problematic in question commits 
the narrative to exclude “households” as “having the purpose” (Danby 2017: 
163) of making money, but which his own examples in note number 3 (Danby 
2017: 163) tend to contradict. I insist on these aspects because, in many 
instances, “households” are also “businesses,” examples of which Danby’s 
own book exhibit.62 What tends to be confused in the literature is the existence 
of some “money” and “conventions” habits/exchanges, under a diverse set of 
historical conditions with an apparent hegemony of the commodified form a 
la Marx, hence Danby’s use of the term “formally” to think these interactions 
(time-money-conventions fix exchanges) when talking about “businesses.” 
Here the post-Keynesian “cash-flow” perspective seems, undoubtedly, a 
“time-dated” (Danby 2017: 163) obligation.
On the other hand, Danby’s account is fortunately relatively inconsistent, 
since he also underlines the heterogenous aspects of the agents and their 
conditions of existence, and the theoretical consequences that I am trying to 
emphasize:
Households, individuals, firms, and any other relevant units can 
therefore be characterized, at any moment in time, by (a) their 
commitments to do or provide things for others in the future, and (b) 
others’ commitments to do things for them or provide things to them. 
These commitments may be precise and precisely time-dated (e.g., bill 
60 As we will observe further ahead, what needs questioning is the theoretical role of the category 
“system,” otherwise the duplicitous characteristics of the notion of synchronicity/asynchrony 
cannot be questioned. Its corollary implies calling Saussure’s bluff on the presumed “systematic-
ity” and therefore the analogy of “language” regarding a monetary organization, and not least the 
presumed “systematic” nature of the organized chain of meanings (significant/signified), whose 
significations are defined negatively. Significations may well be the product of a negative process 
of meanings, but it does not follow that they are a well-organized “totality.”
61 Hicks (1946: 245), Klein (1946), Wade Hands (1991: 169).
62 Indeed, Danby declares that it does not matter if we consider activities by “household” as 
necessarily “loving,” or kinship as solidaristic.
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payments) or impressive and heavily contingent on circumstance (e.g., 
a parent’s open-ended obligations to a child). They may or may not 
be monetized, and they will reflect differing types of obligations and 
norms and power in terms of who meets obligations to whom and how. 
(Danby 2017: 164)
Emphasizing power asymmetries as contingent and antagonistic aspects 
of the complex in question, whether at the local “level,” within or between 
economic formations (Center-Periphery), as seen above, also implies 
emphasizing that agents are not necessarily “individual” human beings: 
whether “households” or “businesses.” The decision/choices may be 
invoked through an “individual,” having previously undergone a collective 
“conversation-discussion” on many counts; and on the other, the decisive 
dominion of certain “kinship’s ensembles” which realize simultaneously 
“love/and money” activities, can be observed as having de-Centered the 
agents “decision/choice” away from the “household” and establishing 
“equivalences” of exchanges within and without the latter entities not solely 
in “monetary” terms, in which certain obligatory, symbolical, traditional 
practices are taken into account. Danby’s own story can corroborate all that.
But I distrust the overriding pertinence that Danby gave to the notions of 
“introspection” and “subjectivity”:
Once we think of a person, household, or firm as enmeshed in future 
commitments, our attention is drawn to the large range of institutions 
that in various ways enable, condition, encourage, discourage, thwart, 
constrain, or enforce commitments, which may include government, 
law, community, family, friendship, and religious institutions. It 
(…) bears repeating that ‘ties’ and institutions can be systematically 
and cruelly oppressive, and that some institutions, like race or class 
differences, work in part by limiting the kinds of social ties people 
are able to draw on, make, and sustain. This is one obvious point at 
which culture enters. (…) it is not news that economy is cultural, always 
deeply culturally embedded. (Danby 2017: 164)63
My main “beef ” with Danby’s way of representing the antagonistic and 
heterogenous characteristics of the social ensemble is associated with the 
category of the “cultural.” The simple assumption of an entity, sharing or under 
the rule of a series of (antagonistic) meanings and symbols, gets theoretically 
troublesome when it involves converting individuals’ “time-map” within and 
between each other into a “totality”: an “ensemble of all of these maps, with 
all their interconnections” (Danby 2017: 164).
This gives us one possible vision of a larger ‘economy,’ and it will quickly 
be apparent that such an economy is global (such ties have never been 
63 In note number 4, Danby writes: “even institutions that present themselves as bureaucrati-
cally-formal and rule-bound are in practice often reliant on particularist social ties” (Danby 
2017: 168).
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stopped by national borders) and that it is not cleanly bounded off 
from other spheres of social existence. The resultant networks have 
properties of their own. (Danby 2017: 164) 
I am concerned here with the idea that we can envision “all” these maps 
into a “whole,” interconnected, which precisely displaces those theoretical 
conditions that are the aim to emphasize: those historical and contingent 
(“multi-scalar”) aspects of the agents and their ensemble. Questioning the 
existence of a “general” rationality, as Danby seems to be posing, notions of 
a “global economy” governed by a single motive force are a non-starter. But 
on certain occasions, Danby’s espousal of the “modernist ideology” and its 
critique undermines part of his argument.
The idea of “diachronic” and robust “financial institutions” mentioned by 
Danby’s “forward transaction” and “spot” transactions, implies paradoxically 
an uncertain future, since in Danby’s own words, there “are no bright lines 
between sound and worthy projects and crazy” (Danby 2017: 165) ones,64 
and collaterally it also holds for the process of “production” per se, since it 
requires a specific financial support.
Money as a financial asset and simultaneously a liability regarding other agents 
(it just depends at which end of the transaction you are upended), procreates a 
distinct monstrous “ontology” unimaginable to anti-globalizers discussed:
A Post-Keynesian social ontology starts in time, and thus always 
already in finance. Finance generates the conditions for making goods 
and services and generates money as part of a spectrum of financial 
assets. (Danby 2017: 164) 
However, according to Danby’s portrayal of the illusory “modernist” 
theory of production/finance, as an unruly contradiction, its theoretical 
64 Prebisch’s notions of time disparities (or time asymmetries) between and among agents 
when closing obligatory commitments, in Danby’s words as “time-dated,” or relatively con-
tingent under certain forms of obligations which might not be so precise, forms parts of the 
concept of “uncertainty.” These time “scales” of the agents, with certain high levels of lever-
age (those very credit worthy), may be able to adjust their “payroll dates,” interest or wages 
through new credit terms. Hence in a “forward-transacting” ensemble, the notion most under-
lined by Post-Keynesians, generally through Keynes’s own notion is the idea of “uncertainty,” 
and yet Prebisch wants to go one better, using instead the idea of “time disparities”: if  time 
had a known constant unit of sorts -within a commercial setting or future transacting complex 
-, the very idea of “uncertainty” would be redundant. Keynes’s critique has nothing to do with 
the existence or otherwise of certain probabilities to calculate the “uncertainty” in question, 
and which Danby highlights by the term as “ontological” condition is well taken, but then 
Prebisch’s own notion on time disparities has to be seen as a theoretical condition of existence 
of uncertainty itself. The ensemble’s existential conditions (time/uncertainty) explain “wave”, 
“undulatory,” movements of the economy: an asynchrony between space and time disparities 
of the circulatory and productive processes; between “capitals,” given the power asymmetries 
among them: “locally”, regionally and “worldwide”: “Center-Periphery” (Prebisch 1948d, 
1949a, 1949b); on endogenous money see Prebisch (1944a). Above I have suggested delink-
ing Prebisch from “Singer” and/or “Thirwall,” a fashion dominant in today’s Western-centric 
academy.
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transformation requires incorporating “history and large-scale power” and 
“subjectivity and knowledge” (Danby 2017: 166). I suggest that contrary to 
Danby’s proposal, not much is lost if we displace notions of “subjectivities” 
and “knowledge” of the “other”: Latin American Structuralism, as has already 
been highlighted, does not presume agents or “actors” (Danby 2017: 166), as 
generally human beings, and using Danby’s own words, because “institutions 
are contingent and reproduced through repeated performances” (Danby 2017: 
166). 65 Nonetheless, Danby’s story is notable since he considers that “history,” 
“law,” “government,” states, or institutions “can be changed” (Danby 2017: 
166). Pages under the heading of “Implications” (Danby 2017: 166) are some 
of the most advisable and brilliant to read, since the author finds himself under 
the unrenounceable ethical decision: “political history” (Danby 2017: 166) or 
more simply put: “power asymmetries.” The latter become the central object 
of “economics,” through an elegant prose which manages to verbalize these 
aspects as “institutional change” (Danby 2017: 166): “Celso Furtado, Michal 
Kalecki, Juan Noyola, and K. N. Raj” “this approach” (Danby 2017: 166) took 
“strong interest in sectoral conflicts within nations” (Danby 2017: 166). 
The emphasis in Furtado’s insistence to take account of the variety of 
agents’ struggles, under diverse historical circumstances, brings to light 
the reference to “distinct groups” as the entities that can be posed as the 
“economy.”66 Danby’s attractive prose conceals this perspective, sometimes 
unwittingly, since he takes back with one hand what he had offered with the 
other: “it does not reduce politics or history to economy, for that reason 
does not theorize power as necessarily emerging from economy” (Danby 
2017: 167), but on occasions Danby’s own narrative and Latin American 
structuralist stance run against these statements: power can only be posed 
as “necessarily emerg[ing] from [the] economy.” My interpretation of 
the ambivalent transition and theoretical difficulty is associated with the 
approach of Danby’s presentation of the question. By his own stipulations, 
the “Economy and material life matter,” is not a “free-standing realm, nor 
an adequate basis for explaining history” (Danby 2017: 167), opening the 
possibility of an alternative discourse.
And yet, how we can think of the social relations, which are presupposed 
by the term “economy,” its heterogenous conditions of existence, as the 
consequence of power asymmetries, represents those “objects” as the 
“matter” in the perspective in question. In other words, it does not negate 
the possibility of alternative narratives delving into “economics,” but Danby’s 
65 A tradition exemplified by Marshall, Kuznets, and Rao to whom the “Economy and family 
were opposed mentalities” (Danby 2017: 88, my emphasis) or “how to understand formal and 
informal employment, factories and backyard gardens, kinship obligations, Godparents, in-
heritance and marriage practices, trade unions, religious congregations, civic festivals, private 
charities? What are the motives for these people’s behavior?” (Danby 2017: 98).
66 “There is no ‘outside’ to politics or to economy. There are no neutral referees or apolitical 
technocrats” (Danby 2017: 166).
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lukewarm commitment seems ethically ambiguous,67 evading the “social” 
(Wade Hands 2005), or the politics and decisions democratically discussed 
with the aim to transform the individual/collective divide. In contrast to Latin 
American Structuralism, it begins and culminates with a narrative aiming to 
offer alternatives and policies related with “social justice,” notwithstanding 
Marxist scathing attacks during the 1970s and 1980s. Despite that, it must 
be said, Latin American Structuralism subsumed or using a Hegelian notion, 
“superseded,” major aspects of Marx’s hostility and critique of “capitalism,” 
but displaced notions on “being” and “knowledge” articulation and the 
presumed “economic totality.”
Clearly, Danby’s effort to salvage theoretically as worthwhile the 
advancement of a “post-Keynesian subjectivity” (Danby 2017: 167) is not 
necessarily at odds with Latin American Structuralism, although it generated 
certain ambiguities I wish to discuss. The “subjective/knowledge” couple 
narrative delves into the issue as to “how knowledge works” (Danby 2017: 
167) in “economics” and touches on the importance of “uncertainty” (post-
Keynesian) and on “information asymmetries” (Danby 2017: 167), and 
yet inadvertently culminates in a fundamental aspect in Latin American 
Structuralism: the heterogeneity of the agents (entrepreneur, banker, 
consumer), which are not necessarily human individuals and hence 
construct distinct optics for “solving” and calculating their respective aims 
and “paths.” Individuals may be the vehicle through which discussions are 
elaborated, in corporations or associations and unions, schools, and yet the 
entity which voices the choice-decisions has previously had to embark on a 
series of practices and dispositions governed by logics which cannot be made 
synonymous to “subjectivity”: in other words, not all agents are individual 
“human beings.”
Human individuals’ “experience” is materialized under specific and 
disparate discursive historical modes of existence, and unlike Thatcher’s 
dictum that only individuals exist, the source and presence of some rules and 
habits are not univocally the product of these agents, and whose mode of 
existence implies a whole set of heterogeneous agents: aims and mechanism 
of choice-decision are in turn, on occasions, the consequence of an 
administrative mechanism ensemble of a bureaucratic managerial hierarchical 
predisposition (corporate forms). Analogies between the “individuals” and 
“corporations” as under the category of “human subjectivity” with their 
respective modes of deliberations and mechanisms of recognition can only 
serve to discard those very set of conditions (power asymmetries), which are 
the basis to think those agents under their own historical conditions.
In some contexts, “human” individuals may be agents to reckon with, but 
they do not present a unified or pre-established constituted narrative and 
mechanism through which to solve the choice-decision. A “household,” is 
67 See Furtado’s reflection on the ethical consequences of thinking this problematic, above.
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itself a configuration of a variety set of agents-individuals, it also does not 
possess a univocally pre-established unity. Equally important differences 
and power asymmetries can be observed among and between a great variety 
of agents: “businesses,” individually or corporately “owned/managed,” 
and last but not least “workers” and their organizations present an equally 
diffuse range of narratives which explain their “recognition” and mechanism 
of decision-choice. Social justice in the context of the individual/collective 
antagonistic divide implies a struggle for a reconstruction of the boundary in 
question in a democratically contested complex.
One could argue that the notion of a “modernist” ontology does not 
exhibit the necessary qualities of a unified realm, which if unwrapped 
could set free diverse and contested plural theoretical alternatives. In this 
context, differing enunciative modalities are potentially power enabling 
for autonomous discourses. Therefore, questioning the pertinence of the 
substantive categories which give credence to modernism discourse is 
important, for example “individual psychologies” and “national units” and 
the ingrained teleological transition between tradition and modern. But the 
hegemonic discursive formation of “modernism”68 Centered around certain 
categories limits theorizing “kinship,” “community,” and other institutions 
and their diversity or heterogeneity, which Danby emphasizes. Otherwise, 
the “international” space (Center-Periphery)69 and its flows may be perceived 
as a set of uncontaminated social relations and/or antagonisms as expounded 
by mainstream economics.
Potential “political alternative[s]” (Danby 2017: 162) are deceptively 
unviable and yet it’s mandatory to flee from discussing “ontologies” as 
fully fledged totalities, as well as interrogating-rejecting those specific sets 
of notions presupposed by the agents (as necessarily human, psychologies, 
introspections). But more generally, what I am arguing has to do with 
discarding the idea of discourses as a guarded set of padlocked categories (an 
“iron cage”), and which on certain instances can be deduced form Danby’s 
narrative. Perhaps the reader may have perceived the irony of my critique, 
since if, as my contention presupposes, the absence of padlocked discourses 
is the norm, then “inconsistencies” are the rule (the norm)70. I see no problem 
68 According to Danby, both Marx and Keynes seemed wavering ambiguously in their standing 
as “romantics.”
69 A singular ruling of the totality in question is actually problematized: “My suggestion is that 
the world is not in fact very tightly organized, and that the financial markets are flighty and 
unreliable. Apologists and critics alike risk pareidolia, that is to say a tendency to read signals 
that are not there, and attribute more coherence than really exists. What is the warrant for 
assuming that international financial markets, or global capitalism or what have you, function 
according to any single inexorable logic, whether that is the logic of Moloch or Adam Smith? 
At the global level, we risk being frightened by a creature of our minds, an inflated image of 
international capitalism. At the level of the nation, the close alignment of society, population, 
and nation promoted by this kind of data has authorized the disciplining of households, and 
hindered migration and transnational kin and community ties” (Danby 2017: 170).
70 I am not going to bring K. Gödel into the picture, but his contemporary A. Lovejoy (The 
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in assuming the possibility of a non-closed discursive formation with their 
respective antagonistic enunciative modalities: it is the only option which 
can illuminate the presence of discourses not necessarily governed by the 
ideology of modernism or “Western-centrism,” and therefore discarding the 
idea that everything necessarily, under specific set of social relations “melts 
into air.” Classical “ontologies” can only maintain certain “consistency” 
under the cloak of a “being” whose conditions of existence is “general.” If 
alternative discourses are politically game changers, social relations may not 
unequivocally “melt into air.”
On the other hand, Danby’s second claim conveys “modernity” as coming 
fully into being after WWII, with the rise of a formal symbolic order of 
equality between nations and the end of “colonialism,” which explains the 
rise of discourses through which to diagnose and discipline governments. 
However, this description then would have little theoretical bearing if it were 
not for its aim to discontinue with traditional academia notions of “space,” as 
did Latin American Structuralism, bringing to the fore the Center-Periphery 
perspective. In fact, Danby recovers in this sense Tsing’s concept of “scale-
making projects” (Danby 2017: 170) whose vision: 
shows are not just that such scales as the national and global are made 
things, but that they are complex assemblages that do much work, 
incorporating not only the voices of governments and large businesses, 
but also simultaneously, rhetoric of suspicion and conspiracy. (…) 
Where Jameson and Graeber see conspiracy theories as demotic 
strivings to grasp the unknowable, Tsing shows that they are allied 
fictions, lurid retracings of the same notions of power and scale. 
(Danby 2017: 170) 
The definitions above related to the idea of “spaces” and their “logic” 
certainly sound more hesitant than modernity’s apparent ranting argument 
on the ineffable capitalism, tradition/modernity, or rationalist/romanticist 
designations.
Concluding Remarks
Therefore, to recapitulate, my critique of Danby’s book in fact reinforces 
my own ethical posture, which implies a decision to engage in a judicious 
democratic hegemonic struggle (political), involving a discussion of the 
role and extension of the individual/collective divide with respect to the 
regulations and institutions which should dominate social relations among 
agents. Therefore, the heterogenous characteristics emphasized by Latin 
American structuralist economics, although subversive of the Western-
centric “auto-imagination,” can also become a theoretical support to 
radicalize a “post-Keynesian” vision that Danby emphasized. The very 
possibility of organizing in disparate ways the process of production and 
Great Chain of Being), should be enough to quell the debate.
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circulation means that there is no overriding determination and teleological 
process to insist on the idea that “modernism” will “melt social relations into 
air.” Today’s so-called “left” or “right” divide cannot be the basis on which we 
can undertake the struggle to generate a more equal and better world, the 
reconstruction of the productive complex and its contingent social processes 
supposes examining the heterogenous and power asymmetric forces of the 
world we live in.
To sum up: first, we intended to describe Danby’s account of the rise of 
the rationalist-romanticist discourse within the framework of a discussion of 
modernism (the Western-centric “auto-imagination”) and the construction 
of the household/business, (love-money) distinction, as well as its role and 
consequences to economics with the emergence of the statistical revolution 
and the generation of mechanisms through which to survey and measure 
the existence of a world totality. Subsequently, I discussed under the banner 
of the rise of development economics the theoretical agents and “white 
man’s burden curse” in Africa, through a series of authors that unknowingly 
subsequently formed part of the worthiest theoretical moments in economics, 
offshoots of Western-centric discourse. Finally, I engaged with Danby’s 
“post-Keynesianism” with the intent to transform the vocabulary through 
Latin American Structuralism’s vision, which obliges us to rethink political 
alternatives to construct a better and more equal “society.” 
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